Should smart investors buy funds with high past returns?

We fully characterize the equilibria in a gme between a fundmanager of unknown ability who control the riskiness of hisportfolio and investors who only observe realized returns. Wederive two types of equilibria. The first one is such that (i)investors invest in the fund if the realized return falls withinsome interval, i.e., is neither too low nor too high, (ii) agood manager picks a portfolio of minimal riskiness and (iii)a bad manager picks a portfolio with higher risk, "gambling"on a lucky outcome. The second type of equilibrium is more traditional:(i) investors invest in the fund if the observed return is largerthan some threshold, and (ii) good and bad managers choose thesame risk level.     

Can hedge funds time market liquidity?

We explore a new dimension of fund managers' timing ability by examining whether they can time market liquidity through adjusting their portfolios' market exposure as aggregate liquidity conditions change. Using a large sample of hedge funds, we find strong evidence of liquidity timing. A bootstrap analysis suggests that top-ranked liquidity timers cannot be attributed to pure luck. In out-of-sample tests, top liquidity timers outperform bottom timers by 4.0–5.5% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. We also find that it is important to distinguish liquidity timing from liquidity reaction, which primarily relies on public information. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, hedge fund data biases, and the use of alternative timing models, risk factors, and liquidity measures. The findings highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating market liquidity conditions in investment decision making.     

Do hedge funds dynamically manage systematic risk?

Defining systematic risk management (SRM) skill as persistently low fund systematic risk, we find evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In weak market states, skilled managers focus on minimization of systematic risk via dynamic reallocations across asset classes at the cost of fund alpha and foregoing market timing opportunities. As markets strengthen, attention shifts to asset selection within consistent asset classes. The superior performance of low systematic risk funds previously documented arises due to the superior asset selection ability of managers in strong market states. Incremental allocations by investors arise due to this superior performance and not due to recognition of SRM skill.     

Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Do risk management practices work? Evidence from hedge funds

We examine hedge fund risk management practices and their association with left-tail risk during the 2008 financial crisis. Consistent with risk management practices reducing left-tail risk, funds in our sample that use formal risk models performed significantly better in the extreme down months of 2008. We find no evidence that having either position limits or a dedicated head of risk management is associated with reduced left-tail risk. Funds employing value at risk models had more accurate expectations of how they would perform in a short-term equity bear market.     

Can hedge funds time global equity markets? Evidence from emerging markets

This paper examines the ability of global hedge funds to time a particularly volatile asset class — emerging market equities. In particular, we study whether or not these funds can either time emerging markets as a whole, or time their exposures to different regions. Using both pooled and calendar-time approaches, we generally find no evidence of overall timing ability. However, we do find some evidence of period-specific timing ability during the financial crisis and subsequent recovery.     

Do hedge funds' exposures to risk factors predict their future returns?

This paper investigates hedge funds' exposures to various financial and macroeconomic risk factors through alternative measures of factor betas and examines their performance in predicting the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns. Both parametric and non-parametric tests indicate a significantly positive (negative) link between default premium beta (inflation beta) and future hedge fund returns. The results are robust across different subsample periods and states of the economy, and after controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors as well as the trend-following factors in stocks, short-term interest rates, currencies, bonds, and commodities. The paper also provides macro-level and micro-level explanations of our findings.     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.     

When do high stock returns trigger equity issues?

One of the most prominent stylized facts in corporate finance is that equity issues tend to follow periods of high stock returns. We document that firms exhibit such timing behavior only in response to high returns that coincide with strong institutional investor demand. When not accompanied by institutional purchases, stock price increases have little impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. The results highlight the importance of market reception for the timing of equity issues.     

Do hedge funds trade on private information? Evidence from syndicated lending and short-selling

This paper investigates an important contemporary issue relating to the involvement of hedge funds in the syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when hedge funds make syndicated loans and take short positions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence consistent with the short-selling of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to public announcements of both loan originations and loan amendments. We also find that hedge funds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, lower credit quality firms, where access to private information is potentially the most valuable and where trading on such information could lead to enhanced profits. Overall, our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulating the hedge fund industry.     

Should this team be saved?

As far as anyone could tell, Vigor Skin Care's star was rising, mostly on the strength of Ageless Vigor, its new line of enriched skin cleansers and cosmetics. In fact, this evening, the three employees responsible for developing the product line were slated to receive the parent company's highest award for performance. But CEO Peter Markles knew that despite the accolades, the business unit--and its "fearsome threesome"--had hit a rough patch in recent months. When Peter took the reins four years ago, Vigor Skin Care was the sleeping dog of the health-and-beauty industry; his challenge was to rejuvenate the maturing business. He knew a turnaround would require equal parts discipline, politics, and creativity--so he pulled together a team that could address those needs. Peter relied on Sandy Fryda, Vigor's longtime marketing director, to help him navigate the tricky political waters at headquarters. And he tapped 30-year-old Josh Bartola, a maverick contributor to Vigor Skin Care's research group, for his independent spirit and new product ideas. Their all-consuming, intensely collaborative efforts resulted in the successful Ageless Vigor line. Then reality set in. The team found the day-to-day operations of manufacturing Ageless Vigor, for all their necessity and urgency, a bit tedious. Peter felt relegated to troubleshooting distribution problems. Josh was having meetings with executives from another division who were actively recruiting the wunderkind. And Sandy was simply on the verge of burnout. Tonight, at the award ceremony, there would be speeches and applause and toasts. But tomorrow, Peter would have to face the question: Should he try to salvage the Ageless Vigor team? Four commentators offer their advice in this fictional case study.     

Should remittances be taxed or subsidized?

This paper analyzes the optimal nonlinear schedule of taxes and subsidies on remittances from emigrants. The analysis identifies conditions under which emigrants remitting small amounts of income face positive average and marginal subsidies on their remittances, whereas emigrants remitting relatively large amounts of income face positive marginal taxes. In this way, the tax system improves the distribution of income by indirectly taxing the “brain drain,” while simultaneously encouraging remittances that tend to go to low-income residents.     

Are there profit (returns) in Shariah-compliant exchange traded funds? The multiscale propensity

This paper is the first attempt to investigate the multiscale tendency of the co-movement and cross-correlation of nine Islamic Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) returns across the global developed and emerging markets using both wavelet coherence and wavelet MODWT methods. The wavelet coherence results tend to indicate consistent co-movement between most of the ETF returns especially in the long run. The study also uncovers evidence of wide variation of co-movement across the time-scales during the global financial crisis and the Euro debt crisis. Strong co-movement can be observed during the global financial crisis, both for the medium term investors and long term investors. The paper studies the relationship between different ETF returns using wavelet multi-resolution analysis. The cross-correlation analysis also shows certain significant and positive correlations between the ETF returns, especially during the period of global financial crisis. The findings from these two recent dynamic time-scale decomposition methodologies have important policy implications for both risk management and investors’ investment policy.     

Should the government be running job centres?

Most people find their jobs by means other than job centres. Since they are not a monopoly, what reason is there for government to run them? Can it even tell whether they are being run efficiently?     

Should the forensic accounting profession be regulated?

Adopting Huber’s (2012) argument that forensic accounting has become a profession, this paper examines whether the forensic accounting profession and the forensic accounting certification industry should be regulated. Several recent studies have uncovered significant problems within the forensic accounting profession and the forensic accounting certification industry. The failure of forensic accounting corporations to disclose either their legal status or the qualifications of their officers and directors, their failure to publish financial statements, and their failure to adopt or enforce a Code of Ethics or Standards of Practice, were among the most significant problems uncovered. The failures of the corporations were exacerbated by forensic accountants’ failure to investigate diligently the corporations that issued their certifications prior to obtaining their certifications. This resulted in a significant number of forensic accountants holding certifications from corporations that were inconsistent with their beliefs that a forensic accounting corporation should be not-for-profit, and their officers and directors should be qualified.Those studies suggested three alternatives for addressing the problems: voluntary action by the corporations, establishing an independent agency for accrediting the corporations and certifications, and regulatory intervention. However, the feasibility of the recommended alternatives was not sufficiently evaluated to be able to arrive at a conclusion for recommending which alternative should be implemented.This paper evaluates the feasibility of alternative solutions. It concludes that the most realistic alternative is for government regulation of forensic accounting in the form of legislation at the state level.     

Fund selection,style allocation,and active management abilities: Evidence from funds of hedge funds’ holdings

This study examines whether funds of hedge funds (FOHFs) provide superior before-fee performance through managers’ fund selection, style allocation, and active management abilities. Using reported holdings of Securities and Exchange Commission–registered FOHFs, we find that FOHF managers have fund selection abilities, as hedge funds held by FOHFs outperform their style indices and over half of the individual hedge funds in the Lipper Trading Advisor Selection System (TASS) database. We also find that FOHF managers add value through active management of FOHFs’ holdings, while evidence on their style allocation abilities is mixed. Our findings suggest that FOHFs generate superior before-fee performance and that FOHF managers’ skillset is broader than previously documented. Thus, our study helps explain why FOHFs continue to survive and suggests that FOHF fee structure reform merits consideration.     

Should short-term speculators be taxed,or subsidised?

Summary This paper explores the welfare implications of a securities transaction tax when long-term information contained in stock prices can improve resource allocation but speculators have short horizon objectives. Speculators can trade on information of differing time horizons and profit maximizing firms can use long-term information contained in stock prices to improve their investment decisions. The model takes full account of the effect of a tax on market liquidity and welfare for all market participants. Surprisingly, a subsidy on short-term speculation can increase the amount of equilibrium trade on long-horizon information. This is because short-term informed trade exerts a positive externality over long-term informed trade when speculators have a short planning horizon. The cost of paying the subsidy may be smaller than the gain in firm value, while no trader is made worse off.This paper is a revised version of chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation written at the European University Institute. I wish to thank Paolo Battigalli, James Dow, Thierry Foucault, Rainer Kiefer, Matt Spiegel, Erik Theissen, the co-editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. I would also like to thank audiences at the workshop of the ESSFM Gerzensee and EFA Annual Meetings 2000.     

Trapped in diversification – another look at the risk of fund of hedge funds

Recent literature implies that despite being more diversified, fund of hedge funds (FOFs) are exposed to tail risk. We propose an explanation for this phenomenon; tail risk is a systematic risk factor for hedge funds, which by construction, explains the higher portion of the returns in the diversified portfolios. Our study suggests that not only an additional tail risk factor improves the explanatory power of the factor model, the relative importance of tail risk factor increases with the number of underlying hedge funds in an FOF portfolio. Furthermore, we demonstrate that FOFs with a short history, higher management fees, leverage and requiring shorter lockup periods are more sensitive to tail risk.     

Can exchange traded funds be used to exploit industry and country momentum?

There is overwhelming empirical evidence on the existence of country and industry momentum effects. This line of research suggests that investors who buy country and industry portfolios with relatively high past returns and sell countries and industries with relatively low past returns will earn positive risk-adjusted returns. These studies focus on country and industry indexes that cannot be traded directly by investors. This raises the question of whether country and industry momentum effects really can be exploited by investors or whether they are illusionary in nature because they exist only on non-tradable assets. We analyze the profitability of country and industry momentum strategies using actual price data on exchange traded funds (ETFs). We find that over the sample periods during which these ETFs were traded, an investor would have been able to exploit country and industry momentum strategies with an excess return of about 5 % per annum. These returns cannot be explained by unconditional exposures to the Fama–French factors. The daily average bid-ask spreads on ETFs are substantially below the implied break-even transaction cost levels. Hence, we conclude that investors who are not willing or able to trade individual stocks may use ETFs to benefit from momentum effects in country and industry portfolios.