Does auditor ratification matter to bondholders? Evidence from new bond issues

We investigate the relation between shareholder votes on auditor ratification and the client’s credit risk, using both parametric and nonparametric regression techniques. Using data from 2006 to 2016, we show that the proportion of shareholder disapproval for auditors heterogeneously impacts credit risk, as shown by bond spread and bond rating. The results suggest that higher shareholder disapproval of the auditor has an adverse effect on yield spread and bond ratings after controlling for firm characteristics associated with audit quality, such as auditor size and tenure.     

Why are some mutual funds closed to new investors?

Fund families typically claim that closing a fund protects the fund's superior performance by preventing it from growing too large to be managed efficiently. Even though funds with better performance and larger size are more likely to be closed, there is no evidence that closing a fund can indeed protect its performance. Instead, fund closing decisions are more likely to be motivated by spillover effects – by closing a star fund, the fund family signals its superior performance and also brings investors' attention and investments to other funds in the family. Some evidence exists to suggest that the closing strategy is effective in generating higher inflows into the rest of the family, at least in the short run.     

Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Are IPO investors rational? Evidence from closed-end funds

Why buy a closed-end fund at IPO, when it is likely to trade at a discount in a few months’ time? One theory suggests that buying a new fund is justified by an initial period of investment outperformance. A second theory is that new funds are launched to provide access to assets that are temporarily illiquid and to exploit the subsequent liquidity gain while a third theory asserts that buyers of new issues are not fully rational but are influenced by time-varying sentiment. This paper tests the three theories using data from UK-traded closed-end equity-fund IPOs over 1984–2006. The empirical results provide strong support for the influence of sentiment but provide little or no support for the two other theories.     

The performance of precious-metal mutual funds: Does uncertainty matter?

We studied the relative risk-adjusted returns and downside risk performance of precious-metal mutual funds (PMFs) in different uncertainty periods (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis) using propensity score matching techniques and difference-in-differences matching regression. For a sample of PMFs and global corporate funds quoted in USD over the period January 2005 to June 2015, we found that the relative performance of PMFs differed across uncertainty periods. Thus, they performed similarly to corporate funds in the pre-crisis period, they outperformed corporate funds regarding risk-adjusted returns but underperformed in terms of downside risk in the crisis period and they displayed a similar risk-return performance to corporate funds in the post-crisis period. Difference-in-difference estimates indicate that a shift from low to high uncertainty had a positive impact on risk-adjusted returns for PMFs, whereas this advantage dissipated when uncertainty was reduced. However, fluctuations in uncertainty had mixed effects on the relative downside risk associated with PMFs. This evidence has implications for investors who seek to gain exposure to precious metals using PMFs.     

Does mutual fund ownership reduce stock price clustering? Evidence from active and index funds

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - The literature is rich with examples of price clustering in financial markets. This study focuses on the relation between mutual fund ownership (both...     

Is conservative reporting attractive to foreign institutional investors? Evidence from an emerging market

This study investigates the relation between conservative reporting and foreign institutional ownership using a unique dataset of firms in Turkey. In doing so, we distinguish between foreign funds and corporations. Contrary to prior findings, our analysis shows that conservative reporting is not necessarily a desirable accounting feature for foreign institutional investors. We also find that the interplay between conservative reporting and ownership is significantly different between foreign funds and corporations. The estimated negative relation holds only for foreign funds. Further analysis reveals that foreign funds do not find conservative reporting desirable in low-asymmetric information firms and reduce ownership with greater accounting conservatism in such firms. The analysis sheds significant lights on the relevance of conservative reporting in alleviating the negative consequences of asymmetric information.     

Does firm visibility matter to debtholders? Evidence from credit ratings

This paper investigates the role of a firm's information visibility in the assessment of its default risk. We use press coverage to proxy for firm visibility and find that highly visible firms generally have better credit ratings. The positive association between firm visibility and credit ratings arises because (1) press coverage facilitates the generation and dissemination of firm-specific information to market participants and (2) it disciplines the activities of managers and large shareholders. This positive association becomes stronger for firms with more severe information asymmetry or weaker alternative monitoring systems. Our findings contribute to the accounting literature by providing new evidence on the influence of firm visibility in the debt market.     

Does government report readability matter? Evidence from market reactions to AAERs

We investigate whether market reactions to Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) vary with different levels of readability in the AAERs. After controlling for the complexity of an AAER report and the severity of the enforcement case, we find that when the AAER is more difficult to read, with readability measured based on the directives of the Plain Writing Act of 2010, markets react more negatively to the AAER announcement. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the effect of AAER readability is attenuated by investor sophistication and firm visibility, whereas the effect is more pronounced when AAER firms are exposed to greater uncertainty. Contrary to conventional wisdom that linguistically complex disclosures receive reduced market reactions, our results suggest that complex AAER announcements could trigger more negative stock price reactions, since investors under uncertainty and ambiguity tend to assume the worst and bid down the market value of AAER firms. Our study offers meaningful implications for regulators concerned with writing clarity in government documents.     

Do mutual funds have information advantage? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings in China

By integrating the literature on institutional investors with that on seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this paper investigates the role played by mutual funds around SEO announcements in China. To the extent that shareholdings already held by mutual funds in a firm prior to the firm's SEO issuance represent funds' information advantage, our first finding suggests a positive association between such information advantage and funds' decision to participate in certain SEOs. Second, we find that certain SEO firms that have attracted fund participation at issuance outperform peer firms without fund involvement when performance is proxied for by accounting-based measures. Collectively, our findings are consistent with the notion that mutual funds have an information advantage over other types of investors, and such an advantage would allow them to be able to invest in the “right” SEOs.     

Does shareholder coordination matter? Evidence from private placements

We propose a new role for private investments in public equity (PIPEs) as a mechanism to reduce coordination frictions among existing equity holders. We establish a causal link between the coordination ability of incumbent shareholders and PIPE issuance. This result obtains even after controlling for alternative explanations such as information asymmetry and access to public markets. Improved equity coordination following a private placement leads to favorable debt renegotiations within one year of issuance. Mitigating coordination frictions among shareholders ultimately decreases the odds of firm default in half.     

When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.     

Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.     

Do foreign investors insulate firms from local shocks? Evidence from the response of investable firms to monetary policy

Extant research shows that stock returns of investable firms are highly sensitive to foreign market and global information shocks, suggesting that having foreign investors might insulate investable firms from shocks to local fundamentals. Examining 24 emerging markets, we find that both investable and non-investable firms are sensitive to local monetary policy shocks. This allays the concern that emerging-market opening reduces the efficacy of local monetary policy. We also find that in 11 countries (46% of our country-sample), investable firms are more sensitive to local shocks than non-investable firms. Differences in leverage, stock liquidity, size, domestic product-market exposure, or industry cyclicality do not drive this finding.     

How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records

The rise of passive institutional investors in the U.S. stock market raises questions about the governance implications to their portfolio firms. While the existing literature documents positive governance changes when passive institutional ownership displaces retail ownership, it remains unclear how passive institutional ownership approaches corporate governance differently than their active peers. This paper compares the proxy voting behaviors between same-family passive and active mutual funds with identical investment styles. We find that passive funds are not more likely to vote in favor of governance reforms than active funds. We also provide suggestive evidence that besides voting, the influence of passive funds on corporate governance also operates through a “behind the scenes” channel.     

Does foreign institutional ownership increase return volatility? Evidence from China

This paper investigates the impact of foreign institutional ownership on firm-level stock return volatility in China, based on our study of a sample of 1458 firms between 1998 and 2008. The empirical results show that share ownership by foreign institutions (both financial and non-financial) increases firm-level stock return volatility, even after controlling for a complete ownership structure, firm size, turnover, and leverage, and correcting for potential endogeneity problems. However, the results also show that foreign individual shareholdings reduce volatility. Furthermore, we document a positive relationship between domestic shareholdings (individual, institutional, and governmental) and firm-level stock return volatility. Empirical results with interaction terms show that foreign institutional ownership increases firm-level return volatility by strengthening the positive impact of liquidity on volatility. The volatility reduction effect of foreign individual ownership is attenuated by government ownership suggests a poor governance environment as a result of the involvement of the Chinese government.     

Does prestigious board membership matter? Evidence from New Zealand

This study investigates whether ‘prestigious’ multiple board membership is positively associated with firm performance. We employ Resource Dependency theory to explain why performance outcomes may be improved by the presence of ‘prestigious’ multiple directorships. Our analysis relies on extensive hand‐collected data on New Zealand company directorships. The results support the contention that ‘prestigious’ multiple directorships are related to better accounting and market performance. Conclusions reflect upon how Resource Dependency theory informs this phenomenon and how ‘prestigious’ board members may be a valuable resource for firms. We also reveal how these findings expose a new avenue for board governance research.     

Does location matter for disclosure? Evidence from geographic segments

The segment disclosures of multinational companies provide strategic information. We use the location characteristics of geographic segments to identify the reasons for withholding or disclosing segments. We examine segment data from around the adoption of IFRS 8, a reporting standard that requires firms to reveal more disaggregated information. Consistent with a proprietary cost motive for nondisclosure, we find that segments in regions that are deemed better for business tend to be hidden, while higher entry barriers for a segment are positively related to disclosure. These effects appear to be stronger for firms for which proprietary cost motives are more important. Among the previously unrevealed segments, proprietary costs explain the nondisclosure of segment earnings and other relevant financial information for investors.