On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person non-transferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.     

Delay,multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games

We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by the current state and the identity of the player who rejected the current proposal. This protocol encompasses a vast number of special cases studied in the literature. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. When such equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria as the players become infinitely patient need not be unique.     

Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset

We propose an equilibrium concept (the recursive Nash bargaining solution) that describes the outcome of repeated negotiations between two rational agents under the assumptions that the state of the economic system under consideration changes according to the actions of the players and that neither party can make binding commitments to future behavior. This equilibrium is dynamically consistent but typically not Pareto-efficient. As an application, we compute the recursive Nash bargaining solution in a model of two heterogeneous agents bargaining over the use of a productive asset with constant gross rate of return and study how the time-preference rates and the elasticities of substitution affect the solution.     

Bargaining over incentive contracts

The incentive contract theory assumes that the principal holds all of the bargaining power. By introducing alternating offers and strategic delay into the nonlinear pricing model, we relax this assumption and analyze an infinite-horizon contract bargaining game. We attain either the “sequential separating equilibrium” or the “simultaneous separating equilibrium”, depending on the parameter values. We prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium, and claim that multidimensionality and strategic delay can help resolve the multiple equilibria problem of bargaining theory. When the time between offers approaches zero, either quantity distortion or delay persists.     

Integration of collective bargaining and formal worker participation processes: Boon or barrier to worker rights?

Many employers are extending workplace rights by allowing for more employee voice in decision making. Numerous unionized organizations have established formal worker participation processes to help achieve this end and to improve organizational performance. Based largely on theory, such processes are normally designed to operate independently from the bargaining process. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between participation and bargaining processes, and the effect of this relationship on workplace satisfaction. A total of 712 Midwest union officials were surveyed, and the results indicate that the processes tend to become integrated in the workplace. Further, union officials' workplace satisfaction was greater where formal worker participation is institutionalized within the bargaining process.     

Coalition formation in general NTU games

A general nontransferable utility (NTU) game is interpreted as a collection of pure bargaining games that can be played by individual coalitions. The threatpoints or claims points respectively, in these pure bargaining games reflect the players' opportunities outside a given coalition. We develop a solution concept for general NTU games that is consistent in the sense that the players' outside opportunities are determined by the solution to a suitably defined reduced game. For any general NTU game the solution predicts which coalitions are formed and how the payoffs are distributed among the players.     

供应链中上下游企业间讨价还价的博弈分析

运用鲁宾斯坦的讨价还价模型的思想,构造了供应链上下游企业间不完全信息轮流出价的讨价还价模型,求解模型并对所得结果进行分析,得出双方达成协议主要取决于双方的“谈判成本”及其关于对方价格的预期。     

The determinants of pay settlements: the influence of the national context

This article studies the influence of national context and collective bargaining on the factors taken into account when adjusting wages. Using data from Spanish and British manufacturing establishments, we examine the relative importance of the cost of living, the ability to recruit or retain employees, the financial performance of the organisation and the industrial relations climate on wage adjustments of manual workers at the establishment level. Our findings show that there are significant differences on the importance given to these factors in both countries. In part, these are related to differences in the incidence of collective bargaining.     

The employer's perspective on collective bargaining centralization: an analytical framework

Despite the continuing debates about the performance implications of different degrees of collective bargaining centralization, our understanding of the determinants of bargaining structures is still limited. While recent research has largely focused on macro-level factors, the role of micro-level determinants has still not been systematically scrutinized. This article develops a multi-disciplinary framework for analysing the employer's perspective on collective bargaining centralization and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different forms and levels of collective bargaining from the perspective of management, the main focus being on the comparison between single-employer and multi-employer collective bargaining. This framework can be used for qualitative and quantitative empirical research as well as for discussions of the costs and benefits of different levels of collective bargaining.     

Faculty bargaining in private colleges and universities: Beyond Yeshiva

In 1980, the U.S. Supreme court inYeshiva University v. NLRB ruled that faculty members in some private colleges and universities are managerial employees, and, thus, are not entitled to the protection provided under federal labor law. Since then, the courts and the National Labor Relations Board have heard a number of cases arising out ofYeshiva. This article first reviews the status of managerial and professional employees under the NLRA, then examines how the law has been applied in the aftermath ofYeshiva. We conclude that while a few general principles have evolved, the courts have yet to establish clear criteria for defining “managerial” as applied to university faculty. We note that theYeshiva case has resulted in a substantive decline in collective bargaining among faculty in private sector higher educational institutions, and that the criteria arising out of the decision have the potential for restricting collective bargaining coverage outside academia.     

Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the termination of collective bargaining contracts

In 1984 the Supreme Court ruled that employers can unilaterally break an existing collective bargaining contract upon filing a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. This ruling changed both the contractual responsibilities of the employer to honor the collective bargaining agreement and the rights that workers have under the National Labor Relations Act. The purpose of this article is to show the conditions under which a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding will lead to the termination of a labor contract. Our results suggest that (a) legal rulings that reduce the costs of bankruptcy will increase the number of contractual dissolutions and (b) a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is more likely to occur when a firm operates in a climate of uncertain expectations.     

Small change,big impact? Organisational membership rules and the exit of employers' associations from multiemployer bargaining in Germany

German employers' associations first introduced a so‐called “bargaining‐free” membership (BFM) category in 1990, giving companies the option to join and access services while avoiding the obligations arising to regular members from industry‐level collective agreements with unions. To explain how this phenomenon contributes to change in the German political economy, we investigate why some associations offer their members BFM status whereas others have refused to introduce this option. Controlling for influences such as size and industry, our multivariate analysis of survey data shows that four sets of influences are positively associated with BFM: the role of courts' judicial decisions as “door openers,” structural characteristics of diverging business environments, the evaluation of multiemployer bargaining by the leadership of the association, and the strategic choices of associations.     

网络外部性、内生成本差异与企业定价策略

在产品成本内生条件下,通过建立扩展的Hotelling模型,分析网络外部性对企业定价策略的影响,结果显示:当网络外部性强度较低时,企业将选择歧视定价策略,当网络外部性强度较高时,企业将选择单一定价策略;在两种定价策略下,Nash谈判能力强的企业将获得更高的市场份额和利润;社会福利大小由网络外部性强度和企业Nash谈判能力共同决定,与产品定价策略无关,当网络外部性强度较高时,社会福利与企业间Nash谈判能力的差异正相关,反之则负相关。     

The collective bargaining of flexicurity: A case for sector‐level analysis? The Italian chemical and metalworking sectors compared

Although employment relations in Europe have long been seen as a factor of rigidity, limiting managerial discretion and adaptability, in the last 30 years, they have witnessed a trend towards decentralisation of collective bargaining and negotiations increasingly centred on flexibility–security trade‐offs between employers and employees. Research on the contribution of collective bargaining to the so‐called flexicurity has mostly focused on national‐level institutional arrangements. In this article, we contend that meso‐level differences need to feature more prominently in the debate. Our comparison of two sectors in the same country (chemicals and metalworking in Italy) shows that decentralisation has divergent effects on flexicurity issues depending in particular on differences in market structures and on depth of bargaining. The interplay between these two factors affects what we refer to as procedural security, which we view as important in ensuring sustainable trade‐offs between flexibility and security.     

中国房地产交易真的是卖方市场吗？——基于双边随机边界模型的实证研究

科学测算房地产交易市场买卖双方议价能力对市场价格形成的影响作用，是当前政府制定“因地施策”宏观调控机制的重要前提。采用双边随机边界模型，考察房地产交易环节中买卖双方议价能力的差异,结果表明：（1）买卖双方讨价还价因素对商品房销售价格的最终形成存在显著影响；（2）从全国平均水平看，对于整体市场以及住宅、写字楼和商铺等细分市场，卖房者议价能力在双方讨价还价过程中占主导地位，但买方议价能力的影响作用也不容忽视；（3）从一线、新一线、二线和三线城市角度看，除了一线城市商铺市场以及三线城市总体城市、住宅市场和写字楼市场外，其他均处于卖方市场阶段。     

New Technology in Unionized Firms: Advantages of Mandatory Bargaining

U.S. Labor Law currently allows employers whose work forces are unionized to introduce new technologies without bargaining over the decision to do so. This forces unions to adopt inefficient strategies when negotiating collective bargaining agreements in an effort to minimize the impact of technological change on their members. Allowing unions to bargain over the decision to introduce new technologies would obviate their having to resort to these inefficient strategies. In addition, it might increase the likelihood of employees suggesting alterations in production processes that would increase the rate of technological change. For these reasons, this article advocates amending U.S. labor law to require employers to bargain over the introduction of new technologies.     

Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example

We study a bargaining game between an individual and an ‘alliance’ in the sense of Manzini and Mariotti (J Econ Theory 121:128–41, 2005), in which the opponent of the alliance is incompletely informed about the relative strengths of its members. The best equilibrium outcome for the alliance under a unanimity rule is not attainable with a non-unanimity rule. However, unlike in the complete information model, less than optimal outcomes and delays may occur with positive probability even under unanimity, depending on the prior beliefs and the preferences of the agents. We are grateful to a careful referee for comments. We wish to thank Clara Ponsati for useful comments.     

中国A股上市公司股权分置改革前后盈余管理实证研究

本文以截至2005年底沪市和深市宣布进行股权分置改革的A股上市公司为样本,对股权分置改革过程中的盈余管理行为进行了研究。研究结果表明:股权分置改革方案出台的前一季度,股改公司的操控性应计利润显著为负;股改完成的后一季度,股改公司的操控性应计利润显著为正;股改后几批的公司比前几批的公司有更显著的操控性应计利润。进一步的研究表明,沪市的股改公司比深市的股改公司有更显著的操控性应计利润,低对价股改公司比高对价股改公司有更显著的操控性应计利润。     

Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game

We consider a two-player asymmetric differential game of pollution control. One player is non-vulnerable to pollution, or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non-cooperative game. We characterize the feedback-Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution. We establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non-vulnerable player to control her emissions. We further use the Nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time-consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff.     

A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule

In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. In this paper, a non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement.