Testing how information about cost-effectiveness,cause preferences,and geographic preferences interact to affect philanthropic giving

The broad instrumental philanthropy movement advocates for considerations of cost-effective impact in donation decisions. Within that broader movement, the effective altruism movement goes as far as to advocate for cause neutrality and geographic neutrality when prioritizing cost-effectiveness in charity. We present a survey experiment that examined how information about cost-effectiveness, cause area preferences, and geographic preferences interact to affect philanthropic giving. The experiment varied these three dimensions in a hypothetical giving situation and found that cost-effectiveness information had the strongest influence on hypothetical giving. Participants gave most when presented with charities that were shown to be highly cost-effective, local/domestic, and that matched their preferred cause area. Understanding how these three considerations interact to affect donors is important as donors continue to desire more information about the cost-effective impact of their donation.     

Characterizing lexicographic preferences

We characterize lexicographic preferences on product sets of finitely many coordinates. The main new axiom is a robustness property. It roughly requires this: Suppose $x$ is preferred to $y$; many of its coordinates indicate that the former is better and only a few indicate the opposite. Then the decision maker is allowed a change of mind turning one coordinate in favor of $x$ to an indifference: even if one less argument supports the preference, the fact that we started with many arguments in favor of $x$ suggests that such a small change is not enough to give rise to the opposite preference.     

Endowment-regarding preferences

We consider a general equilibrium model of pure exchange economies with endowment externalities. Consumers’ behaviors depend not only on their own consumption but also on the endowments of the other consumers. Applying the same method of analysis in Balasko (2015) about wealth concerns, we first show that almost all properties of equilibrium, including smooth equilibrium manifold and genericity of regular economies, can be directly extended to the economy where the demand function depends on the endowments of others and wealth of only one consumer. Next, we clarify the sufficient conditions under which those properties remain true in the economy with the most general form of endowment externalities. Finally, we generalize the above sufficient conditions to derive generic regularity results in the economy with both consumption and endowment externalities.     

Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies

Social security is commonly viewed as a commitment device for hyperbolic consumers. We argue that such common intuition is not consistent with formal economic theory. In a model where the government can choose either time-consistent or time-inconsistent policies to govern its social security arrangement and credit markets are complete, only a time-inconsistent policy achieves true commitment by hyperbolic consumers. This rules out a traditional social security program as a commitment device.     

Uncertain equilibria and incomplete preferences

This paper studies the tendency for incomplete preference structures to be associated with equilibrium price indeterminacies in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie state-contingent setting. It is shown that the presence of a sufficiently smooth stochastic production technology is inconsistent with equilibrium price indeterminacies even if all individuals have incomplete preference structures. A particularly convenient characterization of Paretian equilibria in the presence of incomplete preferences, which allows Paretian equilibrium to be characterized using simple principles of convex optimization and (sub)differential analysis, is also developed.     

Threshold preferences and the environment

In this article we study the implication of thresholds in preferences. To model this we extend the basic model of John and Pecchenino (1994) by allowing the current level of environmental quality to have a discrete impact on how an agent trades off future consumption and environmental quality. Thus, we endogenize the semi-elasticity of utility based on a step function. We find that for low (high) thresholds, environmental quality converges to a low (high) steady state. For intermediate levels it converges to a stable p-cycle, with environmental quality being asymptotically bounded below and above by the low and high steady state. As policy implications we study shifts in the threshold. Costless shifts of the threshold are always worthwhile. If it is costly to change the threshold, then it is worthwhile to change the threshold if the threshold originally was sufficiently low. Lump-sum taxes lead to a development trap and a proportional income tax should be preferred.     

Proper preferences and quasi-concave utility functions

It is shown that preferences which are continuous, convex and uniformly proper [Mas-Colell (1983)] on the positive cone of a Banach lattice can be represented by a quasi-concave utility function which is defined on a larger domain with non-empty interior. This utility function may be chosen to be either upper or lower semi-continuous on its domain, and continuous at each point of the positive cone. Conversely, any preference relation on the positive cone which is monotone and arises from such a utility function is shown to satisfy a condition which is slightly weaker than uniform properness but which (in the presence of appropriate compactness assumptions) is sufficient to establish the existence of quasi-equilibria. An example is presented to illuminate the role played by the uniformity requirement.     

Non-Archimedean preferences over countable lotteries

We prove a representation theorem for preference relations over countably infinite lotteries that satisfy a generalized form of the Independence axiom, without assuming Continuity. The representing space consists of lexicographically ordered transfinite sequences of bounded real numbers. This result is generalized to preference orders on abstract superconvex spaces.     

The relationship between attitudes toward diversity management in the Southwest USA and the GLOBE study cultural preferences

This study investigates the importance of diversity management as it relates to the GLOBE study cultural preferences. A survey of 225 students in undergraduate and graduate programs at a private Texas University concluded that collectivism was a strong predictor of how positively participants rated their organizations support for diversity, diversity recruitment efforts, diversity training for mentors, and employees with disabilities. The participants were nontraditional students who were also employed in a wide array of organizations. Collectivism and assertiveness were both strong predictors with regard to participant's ratings of chief executive officer (CEO) support of diversity and the organization's overall diversity training. With regard to leadership dimensions, humane-oriented leadership was a positive predictor of preference for a collective culture, which predicts diversity management ratings. Team-oriented leadership also predicted ratings of diversity management. The results of the study indicate that promoting a more collectivist rather than individualistic culture is associated with the increased rating of organizational diversity practices. Furthermore, it strengthens the argument that with the increase in globalization, organizations must be prepared to re-evaluate their policies and know when to adapt to changes in organizational culture.     

Job preferences as revealed by employee-initiated job changes

Many previous studies try to discover job preferences by directly asking individuals. Since it is not sure whether answers to these surveys are relevant for actual behaviour, this empirical examination offers a new approach based on representative German data. Employees who quit their job and find a new one compare the two jobs with respect to eight job characteristics: type of work, pay, chances of promotion, work load, commuting time, work hour regulations, fringe benefits and security against loss of job. It is argued that the observation of many improvements (and few declines) for a certain attribute indicates a particular relevance and high preference for this attribute. It turns out that pay and type of work are most important for employees in this sense. Differences across subgroups of employees with respect to individual characteristics, such as sex and age, are explored. Those between East and West Germany diminish over time.     

Potential games with incomplete preferences

This paper studies potential games allowing the possibility that players have incomplete preferences and empty best-response sets. We define four notions of potential games, ordinal, generalized ordinal, best-response, and generalized best-response potential games, and characterize them using cycle conditions. We study Nash equilibria of potential games and show that the set of Nash equilibria remains the same when every player’s preferences are replaced with the smallest generalized (best-response) potential relation or a completion of it. Similar results are established about strict Nash equilibria of ordinal and best-response potential games. Lastly, we examine the relations among the four notions of potential games as well as pseudo-potential games.     

Dynamic theory of preferences: Habit formation and taste for variety

We analyze individual preferences over infinite horizon consumption choices. Our axioms provide the foundation for a recursive representation of the utility function that contains as particular cases the classical Koopmans representation (Koopmans (1960)) as well as the habit formation specification.We examine some of the consequences of our axiomatization by considering a standard consumer choice problem, and show that typically in the space of concave utility functions satisfying our axioms the consumer displays a taste for variety. The latter means that such a consumer selects optimally time variant consumption programs for any given time invariant sequence of commodities’ relative prices and for all possible sequences of market discount factors. In contrast, if a concave utility function satisfies Koopmans’ axioms the consumer does not display a taste for variety.     

Equilibria in vector lattices without ordered preferences or uniform properness

This paper extends a result by Mas-Colell and Richard (Journal of Economic Theory, 1991, 53, 1–11) on the existence of an equilibrium for exchange economies over a vector lattice to cover non-ordered preferences. Moreover, it is shown that the uniformity requirement in the properness assumption made by these authors can be weakened. Furthermore, it is shown that, as a consequence of properness, an equilibrium allocation which is supported by a discontinuous prices can also be supported by continuous prices.     

Variable markups in the long-run: A generalization of preferences in growth models

This paper introduces variable markups in a horizontal-differentiation growth model by considering a larger class of preferences that nests the classic “CES” specification usually present in the workhorse love-for-variety models. Our first result is to obtain a generalized characterization of the Euler condition for this broader class of utility functions: in our model, the Euler rule features a supplementary term aiming at compensating the consumer for variations in the preference for variety along the consumption level. We are then also able to demonstrate that in our generalized framework, the economy’s balanced growth path displays both endogenous markups and a strictly positive growth rate of the number of available varieties (being the engine of growth). Finally, we show that under endogenous markups, the economy’s growth rate and firms’ market power can display a negative correlation, as opposed to the standard result obtained in the CES framework.     

Disentangling preferences and limited attention: Random-utility models with consideration sets

This paper presents a model of choice with limited attention. The decision-maker forms a consideration set, from which she chooses her most preferred alternative. Both preferences and consideration sets are stochastic. While we present axiomatisations for this model, our focus is on the following identification question: to what extent can an observer retrieve probabilities of preferences and consideration sets from observed choices? Our first conclusion is a negative one: if the observed data are choice probabilities, then probabilities of preferences and consideration sets cannot be retrieved from choice probabilities. We solve the identification problem by assuming that an “enriched” dataset is observed, which includes choice probabilities under two frames. Given this dataset, the model is “fully identified”, in the sense that we can recover from observed choices (i) the probabilities of preferences (to the same extent as in models with full attention) and (ii) the probabilities of consideration sets. While a number of recent papers have developed models of limited attention that are, in a similar sense, “fully identified”, they obtain this result not by using an enriched dataset but rather by making a restrictive assumption about the default option, which our paper avoids.     

Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences

This paper incorporates an agent’s time-inconsistent preferences into the Sannikov (2008) contract model to explore the effects of an agent’s preferences on his own behaviors: the incentive effort choice, the optimal retirement time and the consumption flow during his whole career life. We find the agent’s time inconsistency makes it difficult for him to be motivated and makes him need more compensation. An agent’s time-inconsistency erodes both the principal and his own income. The time-inconsistent agent will choose a lower incentive effort level, retire at an earlier time and have a lower consumption flow compared with his time-consistent peer. The time-inconsistent preference exactly influences the agents behavior and makes the agency problem more serious. Therefore, the firm has to cost more to stimulate such a time-inconsistent agent, which will damage the firms profits, as well as the efficiency.     

Equilibria in large economies with a separable Banach commodity space and non-ordered preferences

The purpose of this paper is to provide an existence result of equilibria for economies with a measure space of agents, a non-trivial production sector and an infinite dimensional commodity space. The commodity space is modeled by an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone has a non-empty interior. The discretization approach proposed in this paper, allows us to extend the existence results in Khan and Yannelis [Equilibrium in markets with a continuum of agents and commodities. In: Khan, M.A., Yannelis, N.C. (Eds.), Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. Springer, Berlin, 1991] and Podczeck [Economic Theory 9 (1997) 585] to economies with a non-trivial production sector and with possibly non-ordered but convex preferences as well as partially ordered (possibly incomplete) but non-convex preferences.     

The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences

We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicographically separable. We show that these social choice functions (which we call generalized random dictatorships) are induced by probability distributions on voter sequences of length equal to the number of components. They induce a fixed probability distribution on the product set of voter peaks. The marginal probability distribution over every component is a random dictatorship. Our results generalize the classic random dictatorship result in Gibbard (1977) and the decomposability results for strategy-proof deterministic social choice functions for multi-dimensional models with separable preferences obtained in LeBreton and Sen (1999).