The evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and FDIC-insured bank utilization

The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was designed by the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to inject emergency short-term funds into banks, as a supplement to the lender of last resort discount window offerings. We describe how the Federal Reserve altered the design of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) over the course of the financial crisis and examine the utilization of this stand-alone facility. Most specifically we detail the impact of the greatly increased offering amounts in all auctions after October 2008, which resulted in the facility no longer auctioning scarcely available funds. We also document significantly different usage of the facility by FDIC-insured community and non-community banks, consistent with the notion of a two-tiered banking system in the U.S. Community banks were far less likely to use the facility than larger, non-community banks.     

Financial expert CEOs: CEO׳s work experience and firm׳s financial policies

We study CEOs with a career background in finance. Firms with financial expert CEOs hold less cash, more debt, and engage in more share repurchases. Financial expert CEOs are more financially sophisticated: they are less likely to use one companywide discount rate instead of a project-specific one, they manage financial policies more actively, and their firm investments are less sensitive to cash flows. Financial expert CEOs are able to raise external funds even when credit conditions are tight, and they were more responsive to the dividend and capital gains tax cuts in 2003. Analyzing CEO-firm matching based on financial experience, we find that financial expert CEOs tend to be hired by more mature firms. Our results are consistent with employment histories of CEOs being relevant for corporate policies. However, we cannot formally rule out that our findings are partly explained by endogenous CEO-firm matching.     

Credit constraints,firms׳ precautionary investment,and the business cycle

Credit constrained firms prefer types of capital that generate significant pledgeable output and are liquid, since they loosen current and future credit constraints. Because pledgeability and liquidity are low for long-term firm-specific capital, a negative temporary aggregate productivity shock that tightens credit constraints creates a bias towards liquid short-term investments. This dampens the short-run negative output reaction to the shock, at the expense of strong medium-run propagation effects. This mechanism can create a short-run expansion when a future tightening in credit conditions is anticipated.     

China׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform

The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China?s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.     

Dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the profitability of trading strategies around the preannouncement

Contrary to prior research, the preannouncement of earnings before taxes, either good or bad, partially reduces the forecast error in the French Stock Market. Moreover, this study shows that the abnormal return at the formal announcement is negatively related to the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts after the preannouncement. It is positively related to the actual earnings surprise, especially for bad news. After controlling for the precision of the preannouncement and the actual earnings surprise, investors should buy stocks with negative (positive) abnormal return at the preannouncement of bad (good) news.     

Market liquidity and institutional trading during the 2007–8 financial crisis

This paper shows that institutional sell-side herding increased bid–ask spreads and liquidity risk during the 2007–8 financial crisis. Such an impact on liquidity is most pronounced in firms with large numbers of institutions that sold the same stocks, that is, have correlated trades. For the same reason, we find institutional investors with a dedicated, buy-and-hold, investment style to be the least likely to herd; their trading activity did not affect stock market liquidity during the crisis. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, different test specifications and consistent with recent theories highlighting the negative impact of institutional trading activity on market liquidity during a crisis.     

Portfolio diversification: the influence of herding,status-quo bias,and the gambler’s fallacy

This experimental study examines the influence of herding [following the majority of fellow gamblers or the most successful gambler (guru)], status-quo bias, and the gambler’s fallacy on diversification behavior. We find that neither herding nor status-quo bias contributes significantly to non-optimal portfolio choices. The gambler’s fallacy, however, plays an important role in these decisions. Many subjects appear to find patterns in a history of random events and then use these “patterns” to infer the sequence of future events. The gambler’s fallacy is significantly responsible for the fact that the optimal structure of a portfolio is considered in only 37.7% of all choices made by an investor.     

Insider trading and share repurchases: Do insiders and firms trade in the same direction?

Signaling undervaluation is often considered a primary motive for repurchasing stock, but insider trading activity by repurchasing firms is not always consistent with undervaluation. Net insider buying and selling are both more frequent in quarters when firms are repurchasing non-trivial amounts of stock, with the odds of observing a repurchase the highest in quarters with net insider selling. In multinomial logit models, share repurchases associated with net insider selling are positively related to illiquidity, option exercises by insiders, and pre-repurchase returns and negatively correlated with industry-adjusted book to market ratios when compared to other repurchases. Hence, repurchases when insiders are selling stock are more likely done to support share prices or avoid dilution and are less likely undervaluation signals. We find that insider trades either validate or mitigate the undervaluation signal of the repurchase. Abnormal returns of repurchasing firms with net insider buying versus net insider selling in a given quarter are significantly higher for the quarter immediately after the repurchase and the three subsequent years. For repurchases accompanied by net insider selling, abnormal returns are negligible after only one year.     

Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Discussion of “CEO discretionary power,unconstrained stock ownership,and stock trading: Theory and evidence”

Hong (2023) provides both an analytical model and empirical archival evidence to explain why CEOs hold vested own-firm shares when doing so comes at the cost of reduced CEO portfolio wealth diversification. I discuss Hong (2023) in terms of the intuition provided by its analytical model and the inferences one can draw from its empirical results. Moreover, I briefly discuss (the lack of) multi-methods research in accounting and consider how accounting scholars can add insight to the cross-disciplinary literature on executive power and contracting.     

Price and trading volume reaction: the case of Hong Kong companies’ earnings announcements

In this paper, we investigate the price changes and trading volume reactions during the days surrounding the announcements of annual earnings based on a 31-day observation window for a sample of Hong Kong firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). The major findings of our study: (1) materially support the findings of Morse (1981), (2) demonstrate significant price and volume reactions over four days surrounding the annual earnings announcement over the years 1992 to 1995, (3) show similar market reaction for Blue Chip stocks compared to Non–Blue Chip stocks, and (4) indicate a larger overall price reaction for Non–Blue Chip stocks and mixed results regarding volume reaction when comparing the Blue Chip and Non–Blue Chip stocks. These results show that, although the Hong Kong results are largely in line with the U.S. and international evidence, the Blue Chip stocks are followed more and remain the mainstream stocks for Hong Kong investors.     

One size fits all? High frequency trading,tick size changes and the implications for exchanges: market quality and market structure considerations

This paper offers a systematic review of the empirical literature on the implications of tick size changes for exchanges. Our focus is twofold: first, we are concerned with the market quality implications of a change in the minimum tick size. Second, we are interested in the implications of changes in the minimum tick size on market structure. We show that there is a large body of empirical literature that documents a decrease in transaction costs following a decrease in the minimum tick size. However, even though market liquidity increases, the incentive to provide market making activities decreases. We document a strong link between the minimum tick size regulations and the recent increase in high frequency trading activity. A smaller tick enhances the price discovery process. However, the question of how multiple tick size regimes affect market liquidity in a fragmented market remains to be answered. Finally, we identify topics for future research; we discuss the empirical literature on the minimum trade unit and the recent calls for a minimum resting time for quotes.     

The effectiveness of the Fed’s quantitative easing policy: New evidence based on international interest rate differentials

This paper explores the effects of non-standard monetary policies on international yield relationships. We first document that long-term rates followed a common global downward trend that had already manifested itself prior to the financial crisis. The bond-buying operations (commonly dubbed Quantitative Easing (QE)) of the US Federal Reserve did not disturb this global co-movement – i.e. the global downward trend in interest rates. We model the relationship between USD and euro (riskless) long-term interest rates using a Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Model (CVAR) employing recursive estimation methods. We find no evidence that QE1 (or the QE episodes) destabilized the transatlantic interest-rate relationship, nor the relationship between interest rates and the US dollar exchange rate. A robustness test using a Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) with interest rates, inflation rates and output differentials for 11 countries (relative to US) yielded the same result. There is thus little evidence that central bank bond-buying in the US had an independent, distinct impact on US interest rates.     

Structural changes,bid–ask spread composition and tick size in inter-bank futures trading

This paper studies a period containing three major structural changes, which constitute a natural experiment in the NYSE.Euronext-LIFFE European short-term interest rate (STIR) futures market. These changes comprise (1) a 50% reduction in minimum tick size for the most heavily traded contract, (2) European Monetary Union and (3) the transition from open outcry to electronic trading. We analyse a number of microstructure features of the four largest European interest rate futures contracts throughout this period. In particular, we focus on bid–ask spread composition using a recent model which is appropriate for this market structure. Our analysis identifies the tick size as the largest bid–ask spread component in almost every instance, which suggests that participants in this STIR future market might benefit from a reduction in minimum tick sizes.     

Have capital market anomalies attenuated in the recent era of high liquidity and trading activity?

We examine whether the recent regime of increased liquidity and trading activity is associated with attenuation of prominent equity return anomalies due to increased arbitrage. We find that the majority of the anomalies have attenuated and the average returns from a portfolio strategy based on prominent anomalies have approximately halved after decimalization. We provide evidence that hedge fund assets under management, short interest and aggregate share turnover have led to the decline in anomaly-based trading strategy profits in recent years. Overall, our work indicates that policies to stimulate liquidity and ameliorate trading costs improve capital market efficiency.     

The Federal Reserve’s operating procedure,nonborrowed reserves,borrowed reserves and the liquidity effect

Recently, a number of researchers (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Christiano et al., 1996a,b, 1997; Evans and Marshall, 1998; Strongin, 1995; Pagan and Robertson, 1995; Brunner, 1994) claim to have found evidence of a statistically significant liquidity effect in a recursive structural VAR using nonborrowed reserves (NBR). It is claimed that innovations to NBR reflect the exogenous policy actions of the Fed. This paper argues that the opposite is true. Specifically, I show that the Fed has an incentive to offset bank-initiated discount window borrowing when it implements the Federal Open Market Committee’s policy directive, and that it has done so since the late 1950s. This practice has created a negative contemporaneous covariance between NBR and the funds rate that has been incorrectly attributed to the liquidity effect. By showing that these models capture the endogenous response of the Fed to bank borrowing on NBR, rather than the effect of exogenous policy actions on the funds rate, this paper also resolves the puzzle of the vanishing liquidity effect noted by Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Christiano (1995).     

Can quote competition reduce preferenced trading? A reexamination of the SEC’s 1997 order handling rules

In 1997, the SEC implemented the new order handling rules (OHRs) on the NASDAQ. We observe that some uncompetitive positions gained market share without improving quote competitiveness after the implementation of the OHRs. Also observed is a significant decline in the sensitivity of trading volume to quote competitiveness, indicating lower incentive for NASDAQ dealers to engage in quote competition in the post‐OHR regime. We find that positions that gained trading volume without improving quote competitiveness were less competitive and were more closely associated with stocks showing low information asymmetry, which suggests that preferenced trading might be responsible for the decline in the trading volume sensitivity. Examining entries and exits around the periods of adopting OHRs, we observe net entry of uncompetitive positions and net exit of competitive positions, which indicates that preferenced trading crowded out quote competition subsequent to the OHRs. Our findings suggest that forcing intense quote competition alone produced an unwanted effect that preferencing emerged as a more attractive alternative to quote competition.     

Wagner’s law,fiscal discipline,and intergovernmental transfer: empirical evidence at the US and German state levels

Does fiscal discipline restrain the government from increasing its budget size? To answer this question, this paper investigates whether Wagner’s law is satisfied for two types of states: US states, in which fiscal sovereignty is established, and German states, in which fiscal transfer dependence is high and budget constraints are softened. In US states, we demonstrate that Wagner’s law is validated, while some of the balanced budget requirements weaken the validity of the law. In German states, we find an “inverse” law, especially after the bailouts of Bremen and Saarland. The “inverse” law is a new channel of growth in government size and means that soft budget constraints cause significant negative correlation between government size and output. These results are robust regardless of whether intergovernmental fiscal transfers are taken into account, while they quantitatively change the validity of the law. Our findings imply that the characteristics of fiscal discipline are the prime determinants of the channel and degree of growth in government size.