Credit default swaps and the market for sovereign debt

In this paper, we analyze the determinants and effects of credit default swap (CDS) trading initiation in the sovereign bond market. CDS trading initiation is associated with a 30–150 basis point reduction in sovereign bond yields, with greater yield reductions accruing to higher default risk economies. For countries with high default risk, rated B or lower by Standard and Poor’s, CDS initiation is also associated with significant price efficiency benefits in the underlying market. CDS trading initiation is more likely following increases in local equity index volatility, index spreads for regional and global CDS markets, or depreciation of the local currency relative to the US dollar, and decreases in a country’s ability to service foreign debt. Our results are robust to selection bias controls based on these factors.     

Systemic risk in the European sovereign and banking system

We investigate the systemic risk of the European sovereign and banking system during 2008–2013. We utilize a conditional measure of systemic risk that reflects market perceptions and can be intuitively interpreted as an entity’s conditional joint probability of default, given the hypothetical default of other entities. The measure of systemic risk is applicable to high dimensions and not only incorporates individual default risk characteristics but also captures the underlying interdependent relations between sovereigns and banks in a multivariate setting. In empirical applications, our results reveal significant time variation in systemic risk spillover effects for the sovereign and banking system. We find that systemic risk is mainly driven by risk premiums coupled with a steady increase in physical default risk.     

上市公司违约风险、盈余质量与银行信用借款——基于沪深A股市场的经验研究

本文从静态和动态两个层面研究了会计信息的银行债务契约有用性。实证研究发现,上市公司基于会计信息的违约风险越大,银行信用借款比例越低;盈余质量越差则会显著降低违约风险与信用借款之间的关系;而在区分了长短期信用借款后,上述关系仅存在于短期信用借款之中。进一步研究发现,银企关系的好坏会显著影响长期信用借款的比例。这表明会计信息能降低银行债务契约决策中的信息不对称,但其有用性却受到盈余质量和债务期限的影响。     

A comprehensive approach to measuring the relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.     

Sovereign risk and the bank lending channel in Europe

The main purpose of this article is to analyze how sovereign risk influences the loan supply reaction of banks to monetary policy through the bank lending channel. Additionally, we aim to test whether this reaction differs in easy and tight monetary regimes. Using a sample of 3125 banks from the euro zone between 1999 and 2012, we find that sovereign risk plays an important role in determining loan supply from banks during tight monetary regimes. Banks in higher sovereign risk countries reduce lending more during tight regimes. However, we find little evidence to support any relationship between sovereign risk and loan supply reaction to monetary policy expansions. These results are very interesting for the way monetary policy is conducted in Europe. Banking union, banking system strength, and the budget control of governments would be necessary measures to reduce the heterogeneous transmission of the monetary policy in the euro zone.     

Implied liquidity risk premium in the term structure of sovereign credit default swap and bond spreads

In this study, we focus on the dynamic properties of the risk-neutral liquidity risk premium specific to the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) and bond markets. We show that liquidity risk has a non-trivial role and participates directly to the variation over time of the term structure of sovereign CDS and bond spreads for both the pre- and crisis periods. Secondly, our results indicate that the time-varying bond and CDS liquidity risk premium move in opposite directions which imply that when bond liquidity risk is high, CDS liquidity risk is low (and vice versa), which may in turn be consistent with the substitution effect between CDS and bond markets. Finally, our Granger causality analysis reveals that, although the magnitude of bond and CDS liquidity risk is substantially different, there is a strong liquidity flow between the CDS and the bond markets, however, no market seems to consistently lead the other.     

Bond finance,bank credit,and aggregate fluctuations in an open economy

Corporate sectors in emerging markets have noticeably increased their reliance on foreign financing, presumably reflecting low global interest rates. The evidence also shows a rebalancing from bank loans towards bonds. To study these developments, we develop a dynamic open economy model where these modes of finance are determined endogenously. The model replicates the stylized facts following a drop in world interest rates; in particular, rebalancing towards bonds occurs because bank credit becomes relatively more expensive, reflecting the scarcity of bank equity. More generally, the model is suitable for studying interactions between modes of finance and the macroeconomy.     

Distance to default,subordinated debt,and distress indicators in the banking industry*

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the inadequacy of present supervisory arrangements to identify reliable ex‐ante indicators of banking distress. For a sample of US bank holding companies, we analyse the extent to which distance to default based on market data can be explained using accounting‐based indicators of risk. We show that a larger number of bank fundamentals help predict default for institutions that issue subordinated debt. For banks that issue sub‐debt, we find that higher charter values and low bank capitalizations further increase the power of bank fundamentals to predict default risk.     

Bank pay caps,bank risk,and macroprudential regulation

This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks’ risk and raise banks’ values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1 increase. The cap encourages diversification and reduces the need a bank has to focus on a limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulation to encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail banking sector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remuneration would have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra Tier 1 for UBS, for example.     

Incomplete contracts,renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and public debt issues

In a two-period model where an investment project is funded with standard debt, the probability distribution of final cash flow is determined, at the interim date, by an unverifiable state of nature together with a choice by the controlling party (entrepreneur or creditor). With a control allocation contingent on a noisy default signal, renegotiation may improve efficiency in two ways: (i) reduce excessive risk-taking – due to the entrepreneur's moral hazard – through debt forgiveness; (ii) avoid the costs of financial distress associated with excessive liquidation or underinvestment by debt-holders, by letting them receive an equity stake in the firm. Such efficiency gain is an advantage of bank loans over publicly traded debt, given that the former are more easily renegotiated than the latter. The difference between the two types of debt is increasing in the degree of contractual incompleteness (noise present in the default signal) and in the portion of project value accounted for by future discretionary investment options.     

Deposit interest rates, asset risk and bank failure in Croatia

Financial deregulation, while beneficial in the long-term, seems to be linked to instability. Intense competition for deposits appears to be an ingredient in instability. We examine the aftermath of deregulation in Croatia, which included rapid growth of both deposits and deposit interest rates, followed by numerous bank failures.

Using panel regression techniques, we find evidence of “market-stealing” via high deposit interest rates. We connect high deposit interest rates to bank failure using logit models. High deposit interest rates were a reliable signal of risk-taking. When supervisory capabilities and powers are weak, deposit interest rate regulation may be worth considering.     

Yield spreads,agency costs and the corporate bond call feature

This paper theoretically compares yields and optimal default policies for callable and non-callable corporate debt. It shows that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is possible for the yield spread (callable minus non-callable) to be negative. It also identifies the key determinants of the yield spread. Next, it shows that the optimal default trigger for non-callable debt is higher than the trigger for callable debt, resulting in additional default-related costs. Thus, the use of non-callable debt gives rise to an indirect agency cost of early default, which is the difference in total firm value with callable and non-callable debt. This agency cost provides a rationale for the existence of callable debt. By examining the determinants of the magnitude of this agency cost, the conditions that make callable debt more attractive (to the issuing firm) relative to non-callable debt are identified. This allows certain predictions to be made regarding the likelihood of a call feature in a corporate bond. The model's implications are supported by existing empirical studies.     

The politics of transnational accountability policies and the (re)construction of corruption: The case of Tunisia,Transparency International and the World Bank

This study explores the intersection between accountability policies and anti-corruption measures. Transnational actors define acceptable governance and implement accountability policies on the assumption that corruption is a problem endemic to developing countries. Such accountability policies influence and help constitute transnational geographic and social spaces. However, the impacts of such assumptions and the resultant policies on developing countries and their citizens have not been widely investigated. This study uses a critical discourse analysis of the case of Tunisia before and after its 2011 revolution, to explore the politics and vested interests specific to anti-corruption policies promoted by transnational actors. The study’s contribution is twofold: Firstly, we identify the highly fungible character of the emanant cycles of Western-driven corruption discourses, and indicate their consequences in Tunisia. Secondly, we propose a future research agenda towards non-exploitative anti-corruption and accountability policies.     

The influence of accounting enforcement on earnings quality of banks: Implications of bank regulation and the global financial crisis

We study the effects of country-level accounting enforcement on earnings quality of banks and whether bank regulation substitutes or complements the effect of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality. We also examine whether the influence of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality changed after the global financial crisis. Using a sample of listed banks from 40 countries between 2001 and 2014, and abnormal loan loss provisions (ALLP) as our main proxy for earnings quality, we document a consistent and strong association between accounting enforcement and bank earnings quality. More specifically, an increase in accounting enforcement decreases the level of ALLP and decreases the propensity to manage earnings to avoid losses. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence that bank regulation complements the effect of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality. Finally, unlike in the pre-crisis period, we find a positive association between accounting enforcement and income-decreasing ALLP in the post-crisis period, which indicates that stronger accounting enforcement is associated with more conservative earnings and higher loan loss reserves. Overall, our results indicate that accounting enforcement reduces opportunistic earnings management.     

Bank Panics,Government Guarantees,and the Long‐Run Size of the Financial Sector: Evidence from Free‐Banking America

Governments attempt to increase the confidence of financial market participants by making implicit or explicit guarantees of uncertain credibility. Confidence in these guarantees presumably alters the size of the financial sector, but observing the long‐run consequences of failed guarantees is difficult. We look to America's free‐banking era and compare the consequences of a broken guarantee during the Indiana‐centered Panic of 1854 to the Panic of 1857 in which guarantees were honored. Our estimates of a model of endogenous market structure indicate substantial negative long‐run consequences to financial depth when panics cast doubt upon a government's ability to honor its guarantees.       

Sovereign Defaults,Credit to the Private Sector,and Domestic Credit Market Institutions

Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in foreign and domestic credit to the domestic private sector. This paper analyzes theoretically whether sovereign defaults can lead to this decline, even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt. It also studies whether the quality of domestic financial institutions affect the magnitude of this effect. In order to address these issues, the paper embeds the traditional sovereign borrower/foreign creditors relationship of the sovereign debt literature in a macromodel where widespread individual financial constraints limit a country's ability to reallocate resources. The paper finds that sovereign defaults can indeed generate a decline in foreign and domestic credit even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt, and that stronger domestic financial institutions can amplify this effect. These findings constitute a new step toward understanding the costs of sovereign defaults.     

关系融资、银行信贷与新创企业绩效的关系研究

日益活跃的创业活动已经成为推动我国经济发展的重要的内生力量,然而新创企业面对以银行信贷为主体的正式融资具有一定的新创弱性。这时,关系网络对它们来说就是一种重要的选择。基于社会关系网络理论和资源观,结合中国文化和管理的情景,本文试图提出一个关系特征、银行信贷与民营企业绩效的理论模型,通过实证分析,探讨市场型关系和非市场型关系对银行信贷特性的影响,并阐述其对民营企业绩效的作用。     

基层商业银行合规风险管理现状、问题及改进对策

本文阐述了我国基层商业银行合规风险管理现状,分析了基层银行合规风险管理建设中存在的问题,结合银行合规风险管理的目标,提出了进一步加强商业银行合规风险管理的若干建议。     

The impact of central clearing on counterparty risk,liquidity, and trading: Evidence from the credit default swap market

This paper examines the impact of central clearing on the credit default swap (CDS) market using a sample of voluntarily cleared single-name contracts. Consistent with central clearing reducing counterparty risk, CDS spreads increase around the commencement of central clearing and are lower than settlement spreads published by the central clearinghouse. Furthermore, the relation between CDS spreads and dealer credit risk weakens after central clearing begins, suggesting a lowering of systemic risk. These findings are robust to controls for frictions in both CDS and bond markets. Finally, matched sample analysis reveals that the increased post-trade transparency following central clearing is associated with an improvement in liquidity and trading activity.     

The cross-sectional relation between conditional heteroskedasticity,the implied volatility smile,and the variance risk premium

This paper estimates how the shape of the implied volatility smile and the size of the variance risk premium relate to parameters of GARCH-type time-series models measuring how conditional volatility responds to return shocks. Markets in which return shocks lead to large increases in conditional volatility tend to have larger variance risk premia than markets in which the impact on conditional volatility is slight. Markets in which negative (positive) return shocks lead to larger increases in future volatility than positive (negative) return shocks tend to have downward (upward) sloping implied volatility smiles. Also, differences in how volatility responds to return shocks as measured by GARCH-type models explain much, but not all, of the variations in excess kurtosis and multi-period skewness across different markets.