UK IPO underpricing and venture capitalists

We analyze the nature and causes of short-run underpricing for a unique sample of 591 Initial Public Offers (IPOs) issued on the London Stock Exchange for the period 1985–2003. We find significant differences between the 1998–2000 bubble years and the rest of the sample. Venture capitalists and reputable underwriters played a certification role in the latter period but not during the bubble years. These years featured significant increases in underpricing, money left on the table, and a decline in operating quality. The combination of venture capitalists and prestigious underwriters was increasingly associated with the highest underpricing witnessed during 1998–2000, which provides indirect support for the spinning hypothesis.     

Two‐Sided Matching: How Corporate Issuers and Their Underwriters Choose Each Other

In this article, the authors update and confirm the findings of a 2005 article that was the first to view corporate underwriter choices as the outcome of a two‐sided matching process in which issuers look to the abilities of the underwriters offering their services and underwriters focus on the quality of the issuers that wish to use their services. This view offers a contrast with both the conventional representation of issuer‐underwriter associations as one‐sided decisions (by either issuers or underwriters) and the classical economist's representation of a competitive market in which prices serve as the primary market‐clearing mechanism. In their examination of both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) during the period 1980–2010, the authors continue to find strong evidence that higher‐quality issuers associate with more reputable underwriters and lower‐quality issuers match with lower reputation underwriters. Moreover, when examining cases of underwriter switching between an IPO and SEOs by the same issuer, they find that cases involving the largest divergence in the relative rankings of issuer and underwriter were the most likely to produce a change of underwriter—and that issuers that experienced larger post‐ IPO increases in quality were more likely to find more reputable underwriters for their SEOs (than for their IPOs). The authors also find that the larger the number of offerings brought to market in a given year, the smaller the market share of the top‐tier underwriters, likely reflecting the willingness of the most reputable underwriters to turn down business to maintain quality and reputation. Finally, the most reputable underwriters appear to benefit from the fact that the issuers whose IPOs they underwrite end up raising larger amounts of capital, both at the time of the IPO and in the larger and more frequent seasoned offerings by such issuers that come after the IPO. This evidence in support of two‐sided matching suggests that, especially for high‐quality issuers, the reputation of the underwriters they contract with for security offerings is likely to be more important than the underwriting fees they incur. What's more, the authors' finding that the most reputable underwriters are less likely to lose high‐quality clients and have more stable market share—and that the higher‐quality issuers they attract end up raising larger amounts of capital over their lives as public companies—suggests that underwriters' investments in building and preserving their reputations have a large expected payoff.     

The Impact of the Corporate Control Market on IPO Decisions

Entrepreneurs who take their firm public during an active corporate control market face an increased risk of losing control through a takeover. I examine the extent to which the threat of takeover impacts IPO firms’ decisions and find that an active takeover market in an IPO firm's industry increases the probability that the firm incorporates in a state with state‐level antitakeover provisions. IPO firms backed by venture capital investors and reputable underwriters are less likely to incorporate in a state offering antitakeover provisions. A closer examination of equity carve‐outs suggests that control is not a first‐order consideration for some IPO firms.     

The reputation of underwriters: A test of the bonding hypothesis

In the spirit of the Bonding Hypothesis proposed by Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999, 2002), I find that foreign firms that cross-list in the U.S. and undertake IPOs are more likely to employ reputable underwriters if the firms come from countries with poor shareholder protection. The additional monitoring provided by reputable underwriters may help overcome the skepticism of U.S. investors, and partially explains the higher valuation these firms obtain after the offering. There is, however, a price to pay for this bonding benefit. I find that issuers from countries with weaker shareholder protection tend to be more underpriced if they are sponsored by prestigious underwriters.     

Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.     

Heterogeneous Beliefs,IPO Valuation,and the Economic Role of the Underwriter in IPOs

We empirically analyze the economic role of the underwriter in initial public offerings (IPOs), distinguishing between the “certification” and “market power” hypotheses. We find that equity in high‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs is priced higher and further away from intrinsic value than that in low‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs. Our results are robust to controlling for the endogenous selection of firms to take public by underwriters. Overall, our results support the market power hypothesis and reject the certification hypothesis, indicating that the role of underwriters is to obtain the highest possible valuation for the IPOs that they back rather than to price the equity close to intrinsic value.     

Stabilization and the aftermarket prices of initial public offerings

The paper examines the determinants of stabilization and its impact on the aftermarket prices. We use a unique dataset to relax several assumptions in the stabilization literature. We find that underwriters support IPO prices shortly after listing, particularly in cold markets and when demand is weak. We also show that stabilized IPOs are more common amongst reputable underwriters. This finding suggests that stabilization may be used as a mechanism to protect the underwriter’s reputation. It also implies that reputable underwriters may possess private information and price IPOs closer to their true values (i.e., higher than those indicated by the weak premarket demand). Consistent with the latter view, we show that stabilized IPOs are offered at higher prices and suffer less underpricing than those indicated by the premarket demand, firm characteristics and market-wide conditions. The post-IPO performance results indicate that stabilized IPOs are unlikely to be mispriced as their prices do not exhibit any significant reversal after the initial stabilization period. We conclude that stabilization may be superior to underpricing as it protects investors from purchasing overpriced IPOs, benefits issuers by reducing the total money “left on the table” and enhances the overall profitability of underwriters.     

Underwriter Reputation and Initial Public Offers: The Detrimental Effects of Flippers

In this research, we examine the relationship between the reputation of investment banks and the investor clientele to whom they market initial public offers. We hypothesize that the most reputable investment banks have considerable distribution power but confine initial public offer sales to investors with long-term horizons in an effort to maintain prestige. Using the level of relative after-market trading volume to proxy for investor type, we find that as underwriter reputation increases investors with short-term trading horizons (“flippers”) tend to dominate the offerings over the lower prestige levels. For underwriters in the upper reputation tier, however, this dominance begins to decline with increasing reputation. In addition, we find a negative relation between the after-market price performance of the initial public offer firm and the first week's trading volume. The results suggest that flippers can be detrimental to the performance of initial public offer firms. While distributing power may be essential for the maintenance of the reputation of investment banks, the type of investor clientele also appears to be of major importance.     

Liquidity and CDS premiums on European companies around the Subprime crisis

This paper sheds new light on the liquidity dynamics of the credit default swaps (CDS) market in Europe around the Subprime crisis. Based on an original dataset of 94 European companies from 2005 to 2009, we use a panel regression analysis to study the relationship between CDS premiums and liquidity. We measure the level of liquidity, look at liquidity risk, and study the liquidity spillovers from the bond and equity markets to the CDS market. We show that the effect of liquidity on CDS premiums is dominated by the influence of worsening credit conditions and deteriorating investors?? expectations about default risk. Controlling for credit risk, we also find that liquidity risk is priced in the European CDS market and that liquidity spillovers from the bond market matter in determining CDS premiums.     

What determines the issue price of lease asset-backed securities in China?

In this study, a unique data set is used to examine the pricing factors of lease asset-backed securities (ABS) in China's primary securitization market. In addition to conventional risk factors, such as credit enhancement, underlying asset characteristics, credit rating, and deal structure, we find that originators (i.e., leasing companies) play a critical role in determining the issuing price of lease ABS in China, as state-owned originators and high profitability lessors are more likely to receive a lower initial yield spread. We also find that non-state-owned guarantors, as a form of external credit enhancement for a tranche, can significantly broaden the issuance spread, which is opposite to the situation in mature securitization markets. In addition, lease ABS investors in China may underestimate the risks posed by the diversification level of the asset pool of lease ABS, and reputable underwriters can help the product earn a lower yield spread in the primary market. Our findings indicate some similarities between the pricing factors in China's lease ABS market and those in mature securitization markets, although they still have their own unique features.     

Evidence of Early-Mover Advantages in Underwriting Spreads

I use a sample of 2370 public security offerings, comprising 64 financial security innovations and 4 traditional securities, to examine how investment banks are compensated for bearing underwriting risks related to new product development. I find strong evidence that underwriting fees decline as the innovation is widely adopted and competition enters the market, suggesting that underwriters be compensated for the additional risk associated with innovative securities. The data also reveal that underwriters seek greater compensation for security features that increase price volatility, which is consistent with the notion that underwriters value their position as a put option on the security. Finally, the inverse relationship between underwriting spreads and underwriter prestige suggests that larger, more reputable underwriters experience economies of scale.     

信用债券市场流动性与投资者异质性研究

流动性是信用债券市场投资者和监管者高度关注的问题。从债权终止风险的视角出发,本文分析了投资者在投资期限习惯和信用品质偏好上的差异而产生的债券估值差异。可以发现,在配置型和交易型投资者并存的信用债券市场上,流动性水平与投资者异质性有关。提高配置型投资者比例、提高两类投资者间的异质性、降低同类投资者间的异质性能改善市场流动性。因此,培育合理的投资者结构对促进信用债券市场流动性建设具有重要意义。     

债券市场改革与投资者风险意识研究——来自公司债券发行定价的证据

2015年1月出台的《公司债券发行与交易管理办法》建立了公司债券市场发行“注册制”的雏形。本文研究发现,该办法出台后,投资者风险意识显著提升,风险识别能力显著增强。我国债券市场实施“注册制”后,对证券监管部门、市场投资者等参与主体的权责进行重新定义和划分,参与各方各尽其责,投资者的专业能力和风险意识显著提升,债券市场健康有序发展。在债券违约常态化趋势下,为保证债券市场健康有序发展,监管部门一方面要强化市场约束机制,更加注重投资者教育,打破投资者的刚兑信仰;另一方面要强化投资者保护,健全违约善后机制。     

A mean/variance approach to long-term fixed-income portfolio allocation

Abstract

Long-term investments in bonds offer known returns, but with risks corresponding to defaults of the underwriters. The excess return for a risky bond is measured by the spread between the expected yield and the risk-free rate. Similarly, the risk can be expressed in the form of a default spread, measuring the difference between the yield when no default occurs and the expected yield. For zero-coupon bonds and for actual market data, the default spread is proportional to the probability of default per year. The analysis of market data shows that the yield spread scales as the square root of the default spread. This relation expresses the risk premium over the risk-free rate that the bond market offers, similarly to the risk premium for equities. With these measures for risk and return, an optimal bond allocation scheme can be built following a mean/variance utility function. Straightforward computations allow us to obtain the optimal portfolio, depending on a pre-set risk-aversion level. As for equities, the optimal portfolio is a linear combination of one risk-free bond and a risky portfolio. Using the scaling law for the default spread allows us to obtain simple expressions for the value, yield and risk of the optimal portfolio.     

Will banning naked CDS impact bond prices?

We develop a tractable partial equilibrium model to analyze the impact on the bond market generated by a ban on naked credit default swaps (CDS). We demonstrate that such a ban will have a negligible impact on the borrowing costs if CDS speculators are risk averse and take positions which are small relatively to the amount of debt outstanding. We find that the ban only excludes from the market moderately pessimistic investors, and induces the most pessimistic to implement their strategy on the short side of the bond market. Despite the sovereign debtor benefits from the reduced yields on the issued bonds, he will suffer from a diminished borrowing capacity after the ban. Such findings suggest that regulators should consider other measures to reduce instability arising from excessive speculation in derivatives markets.     

Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting Services

The relation between investment bank reputation and the price and quality of bond underwriting services is studied here. After controlling for endogeneity in issuer–underwriter matching, I find that reputable banks obtain lower yields and charge higher fees, but issuers' net proceeds are higher. These relations are pronounced in the junk‐bond category, in which reputable banks' underwriting criteria are most stringent. These findings suggest that banks' underwriting decisions reflect reputation concerns, and are thus informative of issue quality. They also suggest that economic rents are earned on reputation, and thereby provide continued incentives for underwriters to maintain reputation.     

IPO Placement Risk and the Number of Co‐Managers

Previous studies show that co‐managers mainly affect initial public offering (IPO) aftermarket activities. We investigate the role of co‐managers in IPO pre‐market activities. We argue that co‐managers help reduce IPO placement risk and hypothesize that IPO issuers hire more co‐managers when placement risk is higher. We find the number of co‐managers is positively associated with three proxies for placement risk. IPOs with more price uncertainty and high‐tech IPOs hire more co‐managers, while IPOs in regulated industries hire fewer co‐managers. We also find larger IPOs, recent IPOs, and IPOs with more reputable lead underwriters hire more co‐managers.     

Breaking down the barriers: Competition,syndicate structure,and underwriting incentives

We argue that the entry of commercial banks into bond underwriting led to the evolution of co-led underwriting arrangements and lowered the screening incentives of underwriters. Lead underwriters in co-led syndicates faced weaker incentives to screen issuer quality. In boom markets, issues underwritten by co-led syndicates were more likely to be involved in financial misrepresentation events. Underwriter incentives in co-led syndicates were particularly weak in industries where commercial banks stole substantial market share. Similar patterns do not hold in bust markets where investors are likely to engage in their own information collection efforts. Our results suggest that competition may have an adverse effect on the incentives of financial intermediaries in market environments where their information production is more valuable to investors.     

中债估值识别了债券信用风险吗？——基于跳跃视角的实证分析

本文以2011—2018年中国A股上市公司发行的一般公司债为样本,探究了中债估值跳跃对债券信用利差的影响及作用机制,以此说明中债估值对债券信用风险的识别作用。研究发现:中债估值跳跃能够显著提高债券信用利差,其中,中债估值上跳降低了信用利差,下跳提高了信用利差,且相对于上跳,下跳对信用利差的作用更大。异质性分析发现:中债估值跳跃对信用利差的作用在机构投资者中较大,同时在信息不对称性较严重、流动性较差及违约风险较高的债券中也较大。进一步研究发现:中债估值跳跃不仅包含了公共信息,还含有私有信息,并能改善股票分析师预测表现。本研究说明中债估值能够识别债券信用风险,具有信息含量,对于债券市场信息环境建设和系统性金融风险防范具有重要意义。     

Cross‐sectional determinants of post‐IPO stock performance: evidence from China

This paper examines the cross‐sectional determinants of post‐IPO long‐term stock returns in China. We document that the aftermarket P/E ratio has the most robust negative association with post‐IPO stock returns. The negative relation indicates that the market corrects the aftermarket overvaluation of IPO firms in the long run. Underwriter reputation has a positive effect on post‐IPO stock returns, while board size has a negative impact, consistent with the views that reputable underwriters mitigate the information asymmetry in IPO pricing and over‐sized boards reduce the effectiveness of corporate governance. However, we find little evidence indicating that the equity ownership structure is significantly associated with post‐IPO stock returns.