Asset prices in an exchange economy when agents have heterogeneous homothetic recursive preferences and no risk free bond is available

We study a pure exchange economy under incomplete markets where households have heterogeneous homothetic recursive preferences and lending and borrowing are precluded. We fully characterize the properties of the efficient allocations and the equilibrium asset price. The ownership distribution dynamics reveal the emergence of a dominant agent, who after some finite time, remains the only investor that increases asset holdings until asymptotically owning the entire wealth. Investors can be ranked according to a unique parameter that aggregates agents’ preference characteristics and we show how time discount rate, attitude towards risk and intertemporal substitution contribute to capital accumulation.     

基于特征价格模型的住宅需求价格弹性分析——深圳住宅市场实证研究

基于特征价格模型(hedonic model)分析住宅价格包络函数曲线形态,边际价格增长速度随着特定特征值递增从呈现下降趋势转为呈上升趋势,即均衡价格曲线从凹向特征值轴转为凸向特征值轴.通过对深圳经济特区内外的两个住宅交易子样本进行hedonic分析,结果表明,均衡价格的增长速度随着特征变量面积的变化呈现由凹变凸的趋势...     

An equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time

We study a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time. The supply of the risky asset is assumed to be stochastic. This supply can be interpreted as noise from nonrational traders (noise traders). A rational informed investor (the insider) has private information on the growth rate of the dividend flow rewarded by the risky asset. She is risk averse and maximizes her inter-temporal utility rate over an infinite time-horizon. The market is cleared by a risk neutral market maker who sets the price of the risky asset competitively as the conditional present value of future dividends, given the information supplied by the dividend history and the cumulative order flow. Due to the presence of noise traders, the market demand does not fully reveal the insider’s private information, which slowly becomes incorporated in prices. An interesting result of the paper is that a nonstandard linear filtering procedure gives an a priori form for the equilibrium strategy to be postulated. We show the existence of a stationary linear equilibrium where the insider acts strategically by taking advantage of the camouflage provided by the noise which affects the market maker’s estimates on private information. In this equilibrium, we find that the insider’s returns on the stock are uncorrelated over long periods of time. Finally, we show that the instantaneous variance of the price under asymmetric information lies between the instantaneous variance of the price under complete and incomplete information. The converse inequalities hold true for the unconditional variance of the price.     

Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples

We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley–Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and non-transferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these properties define a maximal preference domain.     

Consumer surplus analysis under uncertainty: A general equilibrium perspective

This paper derives an exact form of partial equilibrium efficiency measure under uncertainty which is consistent with expected utility maximization in a general equilibrium situation with ex-post spot markets for many goods and asset markets which are in general incomplete.We consider that the good under consideration tends to be negligibly small compared to the entire set of commodity characteristics which is assumed to be a continuum, and look into the limit property of preferences over state-contingent consumption of the good and state-contingent income transfer associated to it. We show that the limit preference exhibits risk neutrality, not only that it exhibits no income effect, meaning that the two conditions are tied together. We also show that the marginal rate of substitution between extra income transfers at different states of the world converges to the ratio between the Lagrange multipliers associated to those states. When the asset markets are complete such ratios are equalized between consumers, but it is not the case in general when the asset markets are incomplete. This means that using the aggregate expected consumer surplus as the welfare measure will be in general inconsistent with individuals’ expected utility maximization in the general equilibrium environment or with ex-ante Pareto efficiency.     

On pricing and hedging options in regime-switching models with feedback effect

We study the pricing and hedging of European-style derivative securities in a Markov, regime-switching, model with a feedback effect depending on the economic condition. We adopt a pricing kernel which prices both financial and economic risks explicitly in a dynamically incomplete market and we provide an equilibrium analysis. A martingale representation for a European-style index option's price is established based on the price kernel. The martingale representation is then used to construct the local risk-minimizing strategy explicitly and to characterize the corresponding pricing measure.     

Urban housing with discrete structures

Competitive equilibrium in an urban housing model with structures that cannot be readily aggregated or subdivided is analyzed in this paper. The price and quantity of services forthcoming from each dwelling occupied by a household is determined by the equality of competitive supply and demand. A stack algorithm is then developed to ensure households are assigned to dwellings so that they would not prefer to live in any other dwelling with an equilibrium price less than the one they would pay if they lived there. Using the Urban Institute Housing Model as an example, the results of this algorithm are compared with those of the algorithm developed by de Leeuw and Struyk (D-S). The stack algorithm yields greater price discounting of existing dwellings below the price of a new dwelling than does the D-S algorithm and, thus, a greater potential for housing prices to be increased by a demand subsidy such as a housing allowance.     

Consumer Stockpiling and Price Competition in Differentiated Markets

In many storable-goods markets, firms are often aware that consumers may strategically adjust purchase timing in response to expected price dynamics. For example, in periods when prices are low, consumers stockpile for future consumption. This paper investigates the dynamic impact of consumer stockpiling on competing firms' strategic pricing decisions in differentiated markets. The necessity of equilibrium consumer storage for storable products is re-examined. It is shown that preference heterogeneity generates differential consumer stockpiling propensity, thereby intensifying future price competition. As a result, consumer storage may not necessarily arise as an equilibrium outcome. Economic forces are also investigated that may mitigate the competition-intensifying effect of consumer inventories and that, hence, may lead to equilibrium consumer storage.     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core

We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of expenditure-minimizing Walrasian allocations. Because of the indivisibility, the preference maximization does not imply the expenditure minimization. An expenditure-minimizing Walrasian equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all agents satisfy both the preference maximization and the expenditure minimization.     

Coherent Dempster–Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals

This paper reappraises the Dempster–Shafer equilibrium, a novel solution concept for signaling games introduced by Eichberger and Kelsey (2004), and suggests a new refinement approach. It is demonstrated that if the types of the Sender–but not messages–are assumed to be ex-ante unambiguous, then the Receiver’s conditional Choquet preference derived by the Dempster–Shafer updating rule coincides with subjective expected utility. This property of the pessimistic updating rule narrows the pooling, but not separating, Dempster–Shafer equilibrium to be behaviorally equivalent to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, if one refines the separating Dempster–Shafer equilibrium à la Ryan (2002a) by imposing the belief persistence axiom, then no deviations from the perfect Bayesian equilibrium are feasible. To eliminate Ryan’s type of behavior, a less stringent refinement based on the notion of coherent beliefs is elaborated.     

Real indeterminacy of equilibria and manipulability

In this paper, we analyze the indeterminacy of equilibria in financial markets and propose a selection mechanism. We suggest that there is one equilibrium that prevails over the others, as a result of the market power of the agents that some states of nature become monopolists of certain commodities. Given a financial assets model, we define a price game and show the existence of mixed strategies equilibria. Then we purify these equilibria by considering a price game with incomplete information.     

Spatial competition under uniform delivered pricing

A Hotelling-type model of spatial competition is considered, in which two firms compete in uniform delivered prices. First, it is shown that there exists no uniform delivered price–location equilibrium when the product sold by the firms is perfectly homogeneous andwhen consumers buy from the firm quoting the lower delivered price. Second, when the product is heterogeneous and when preferences are identically, independently Weibull-distributed with standard deviation μ, we prove that there exists a single uniform delivered price–location equilibrium iff μ≧1/8 times the transportation rate times the size of the market. In equilibrium, firms are located at the center of the market and charge the same uniform delivered price, which equals their average transportation cost, plus a mark-up of 2μ. Finally, we discuss how our result extends to the case of n firms and proceed to a comparison of equilibria under uniform mill and delivered pricing.     

Market competition and pricing strategies in retail supply chains

This study provides a better explanation for the continued prevalence of high–low (Hi–Lo) pricing strategy. We investigate the impact of market competition on adopting two different pricing strategies in the retail industry: everyday low price (EDLP) strategy and Hi–Lo strategy. We developed two analytic models using a game-theoretic modeling approach: the profit maximization model and the sales revenue maximization model. We then conducted an econometric analysis based on retail store-level dataset. The result shows that an EDLP player's equilibrium price depends highly on the cost level rather than competitor's price whereas the Hi–Lo player's equilibrium price depends mainly on the range of promotional basket as well as the cost level.     

Diversity Analysis of Structural Change Based on the Canadian Input–Output Tables

This article presents some of the results of a study conducted at Statistics Canada that involved the analysis of the variability through time of input–output structures. All structures have been analyzed in current and constant prices over the period 1961–84, but only the results about the industries' input structures in current prices are reported in this article. Structural changes are assessed over time horizons of 1, 2 and 5 years, using the Kullback, cross-entropy index formula. Structural changes in the current prices input structure are decomposed into a price and a quantity component, following a new decomposition of the entropy formula. It is shown from that decomposition that the traditional analysis of the variability of constant prices input–output structures may be quite misleading. The authors have found that structural changes generally follow a smooth path through time and tend to be cumulative in the long run, with some cyclical fluctuations in the short term. Some of the structural changes appear to be due to statistical events (establishment moves across industries, changes in methodologies, etc.) rather than reflecting real phenomena. The quantity component of structural change appears to be more important than the price component in almost all time periods and time spans, except when the Canadian economy was subjected to important price shocks during the 1970s.     

Shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales in the valuation of the firm and its assets

This paper presents a simple framework for the valuation of compound options within shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales. The shadow cost includes two components. The first component is the product of pure information cost due to imperfect knowledge and heterogeneous expectations. The second component represents the additional cost caused by the short-selling constraint. Information costs are linked to Merton's (1987. Journal of Finance 42, 510) model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information, CAPMI. This model is extended by Wu et al. (1996. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 7, 136) who propose an incomplete-information capital market equilibrium with heterogeneous expectations and short sale restrictions, GCAPM. This model is used in our paper to provide for the first time in the literature analytic solutions for derivatives in the presence of both shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales.When deriving the compound call option formula, we consider a call option on a stock, which is itself an option on the assets of the firm. Our methodology incorporates shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales on the firm's assets as well as the effects of leverage in the capital structure. The formula can be useful in the valuation of several corporate liabilities in the presence of information uncertainty and short sales constraints about the firm and its cash flows. Our analysis can be used for the valuation of several real options.     

The formulation of a linear economic plan for implementation by an optimal combination of command and financial stimulus

Conclusions Command and market activities may be viewed as having different coefficients and different mechanisms of implementation. The command activities are implemented by direct order, the market activities by the producers or consumers optimizing their individual preference functions without regard to state preferences, except as so far these are directly affecting their budgets, via i) direct taxes or subsidies upon their activities, ii) the price system, and iii) lump taxes (subsidies).An optimal combination of command and market activities may be obtained by describing the social system as a linear programme with some constraints and variables based upon the producers and consumers preference functions, and finding its optimal primal and dual solutions. These solutions may be used for directing the command activities, for constructing the tax-subsidy system and for information about equilibrium prices and activity levels.     

Full or partial market coverage? A note on spatial competition with elastic demand

In this paper, a spatial model is used to endogenously determine product locations and prices when consumers have an elastic demand with a finite reservation price. I show under which condition a two‐stage Bertrand–Nash equilibrium yields maximal product differentiation with full market covering. Additionally, this paper highlights the effects of a change in the reservation price and in the utility loss rate on the equilibrium values of the model. The ambiguous effect of a change in the utility loss rate on prices constitutes a rather puzzling result. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE TRANSPORT SECTOR AND REGIONAL PRICE DIFFERENTIALS: A SPATIAL CGE MODEL FOR CHINESE PROVINCES

With regression formulas replaced by equilibrium conditions, a spatial CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model can substantially reduce data requirements. Detailed regional analyses are thus possible in countries where only limited regional statistics are available. Alhough regional price differentials play important roles in multiregional settings, transport does not receive much attention in existing models. This paper formulates a spatial CGE model that explicitly considers the transport sector and FOB/CIF prices. After describing the model, the performance of our model is evaluated by comparing the benchmark equilibrium for China with a survey-based interregional I-O table for 1987. The structure of Chinese economies is summarized using information obtained from the benchmark equilibrium computation. This includes regional and sectoral production distributions and price differentials. The equilibrium for 1997 facilitates discussion of changes in regional economic structures that China has experienced in the decade.     

Slack in incomplete markets with nominal assets: A symmetric proof

In this paper, we provide an equilibrium analysis in the framework of incomplete markets where some agents’ preferences are possibly satiated at some state of the nature. We will consider nominal assets with exogenously fixed asset prices. We extend the notion of equilibrium with slack – introduced by Drèze and Müller [Drèze, J., Müller, H., 1980. Optimality properties of rationing schemes. Journal of Economic Theory 23, 150–159] in a fixed price setting – to the GEI framework.