Non-manipulability in Walrasian cost games

JEL classification: D41, D51 Received: 24 December 1999 / Accepted: 18 October 2001     

军队物资供应商逆向选择行为研究

列举了信息不对称引致的供应商逆向选择行为的表现，通过构建信号传递模型来说明治理这种行为的有效方法，并提出了治理供应商逆向选择行为的对策。     

信息不对称理论下中小企业信用担保风险分析

信用担保是国际公认的高风险行业,信用担保市场上的信息不对称是信用担保风险客观存在且居高不下的主要原因。本文从信息不对称理论的视角,分析了中小企业信用担保风险的表现形式,并提出了解决信用担保过程中信息不对称问题的对策。     

Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling

Hurwicz (1979) and Otani and Sicilian (1982, 1990) characterized the Nash equilibrium allocations of the Walrasian demand manipulation game in successively more general exchange environments. In this paper, I extend the analysis to production economies with short-selling. First, I generalize Hurwicz’s and Otani and Sicilian’s theorem that any allocation at which each agent’s consumption bundle lies above her true offer curve can be supported in Nash equilibrium. I then show that for finite economies of any size the set of such allocations is often topologically large.Received: 17 January 2003, Accepted: 4 April 2005, JEL Classification: D51, D82For comments on this and earlier versions of the paper, I wish to thank Rick Bond, Bhaskar Chakravorti, Tom Gresik, Costas Syropoulos and William Thomson. I would especially like to thank Mike Jerison for helping to overcome a difficulty with a previous version. Also, the comments of the anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.     

信息不对称与中小企业融资困难分析

中小企业在我国经济建设中发挥着重要的作用,但由于中小企业与银行之间存在信息不对称而引发的逆向选择和道德风险,从而导致了其融资困难。本文认为,作为资金需求方的中小企业,应提高其融资管理水平,降低“道德风险”所产生的融资成本。而作为资金供给方的政府和金融机构,应研究制定中小企业融资制度,降低融资市场的“逆向选择”。     

公司发行可转换债券融资的动机分析

公司使用可转换债券筹集外部资金既是作为普通债券的替代,增加转换特性来降低利息率从而保持现金流量,也是转换条款建立“延迟股权”,通过转换,以高于现行股票的价格出售。本文研究发现,公司发行可转换债券是为了减少由于股东和管理者以及股东和债权人之间冲突所引起的代理成本;为了降低由发行普通债券带来的高额预期财务危机成本和普通股发行中经常出现的严重负面公告效应;以及在投资者和管理者对公司面临的风险认识不同时,使其价值不易受公司风险变化的影响。     

Monopoly regulation without the Spence–Mirrlees assumption

The paper extends the Baron and Myerson [Baron, D., Myerson, R.B., 1982. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica 50, 911–930] model of monopoly regulation to bidimensional adverse selection: both the marginal cost and the fixed cost of the monopoly are unknown to the regulator. Like in Araujo and Moreira [Araujo, A., Moreira, H., 2000. Adverse section problems without the Spence–Mirrlees condition. Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Ensaios Economicos 389], the paper provides an explicit solution of a screening model without the Spence–Mirrlees assumption.     

基于产品生命周期的顾客忠诚意图动态演化模型研究

本文将委托-代理理论和关系营销理论相结合发展了一个顾客-品牌关系形成过程的概念化模型以探讨品牌忠诚的生成机理。根据逆向选择和道德风险的委托代理问题,品牌信号和品牌溢价可以作为解决上述问题的策略。然而,上述策略本身并没有减轻消费者对品牌所提供利益的不确定性和对企业采取机会主义的担心。因此,文章认为顾客对品牌的信任机制才是减少不确定性和机会主义的核心构件。     

Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies

We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.     

On blocking coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal–Schmeidler–Vind

In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Warlasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers α$\alpha$ and β$\beta$ between 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between α$\alpha$ and β$\beta$, is arbitrarily close to 1/2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large.     

Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower–lender relationship

This paper presents a stylized model of a borrower–lender relationship where funds are gradually invested in a project with uncertain return. We show that an exclusive financing relationship arises endogenously in equilibrium due to initial lender’s superior information on the project’s progress. The analysis also identifies a novel distortionary effect of exclusivity and the consequent loss of future rents on the ex-ante choices of the borrower. When she chooses the amount of funds to be initially invested in the project, the borrower chooses to overinvest making the future rent extraction by the initial lender as costly as possible. We would like to thank Alberto Bisin, Andrew Chen, Boyan Jovanovic, Hideo Konishi, David Mauer, Efe Ok, Mike Riordan, Charles A. Wilson, and seminar participants at Society of Economic Design 2002 meetings in New York and Southern Methodist University for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

信息不对称与中小企业融资问题

中小企业在我国已成为国民经济的重要组成部分。但是,随着商业银行加强对贷款风险的控制,普遍实行担保和抵押制,中小企业融资难问题日益突出。造成这一矛盾的根本原因在于中小企业与金融机构之间严重的信息不对称,中小企业由于自身信誉差、信息内部化,银行不能准确判断筹资者真实情况而惜贷。解决的根本途径在于全社会健全信用系统,促使中小企业树立诚信观念,提高资金使用效益,还贷守信。同时,还需要政府、金融机构共同努力协作,成立中小企业管理机构,建立中小企业发展基金,完善专门的贷款担保机构,有效解决信息不对称问题,改善中小企业融资环境。