On the strictly descending multi-unit auction

We analyze the bidding behavior in a strictly descending multi-unit auction where the price decreases continuously without going back to the initial start price once an object is sold. We prove that any equilibrium in the multi-unit descending auction is inefficient. We derive a symmetric equilibrium for general distribution functions as well as an arbitrary number of bidders and objects. Moreover, equilibrium bidding is characterized by a set of initial value problems. Our analysis thus generalizes previous results in the literature.     

Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions

This paper considers a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions of indivisible objects. The model allows for interdependent values, multidiminensional types and any attitude towards risk. Assuming only optimal behavior, we prove that each bid is chosen in order to equalize the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of bidding. This generalizes many existing results in the literature. We use this characterization to obtain sufficient conditions for truthful bidding, monotonic best reply strategies and identification results for multi-unit auctions.     

Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions

We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries lead to inefficient allocations, thereby creating a motive for resale after the auction is over. In our model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner of the auction makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. Our goal is to compare equilibria of the first-price auction without resale (FPA) with those of the first-price auction with resale (FPAR). For the three major families of distributions for which equilibria of the FPA are available in closed form, we show that resale possibilities increase the revenue of the original seller. We also show by example that, somewhat paradoxically, resale may actually decrease efficiency.     

Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions

A well-known myopic bidding strategy fails to support an equilibrium of simultaneous ascending proxy auctions for heterogeneous items when a hard-close rule is in place. This is because, in common with the single-auction case, last minute bidding (sniping) is a best response to naive behaviour. However, a modification to the myopic strategy in which all bidders submit an additional bid in the closing stages of the auction–a practice I call ‘defensive sniping’–is shown to yield an efficient, belief-free equilibrium of such environments. This equilibrium is essentially unique within the class of belief-free, efficient equilibria.     

Slack-adjusted efficiency measures and ranking of efficient units

In non-parametric methods many units are calculated as efficient. The article suggests a method for ranking efficient units, not by their efficiency, but by importance as benchmarks for the inefficient units, in contrast to earlier suggestions in the literature which rank units high if they are specialized. However, the total potentials for improvement frequently remain unrevealed by calculating radial efficiency measures of the Farrell type only. The article therefore first develops efficiency measures that explicitly extend the radial measures to include slacks. The new measures are applied to a typical multidimensional small-sample data set for Norwegian employment offices.     

Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions

Bidders’ values in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions are not necessarily point-identified under the assumptions of equilibrium bidding and independent private values, but meaningful policy analysis can proceed from bounds on bidder values. This paper provides upper and lower bounds on the set of values that can rationalize a given distribution of bids, under the additional (and standard) assumption of non-increasing marginal values. Novel testable implications of the best response hypothesis are also provided, again under the assumption of non-increasing marginal values.     

Capacity constraints and the winner's curse in multi-unit common value auctions

We explore the role of capacity constraints in establishing efficient pricing in multi-unit common value auctions in a setting relevant to auction-based equity IPOs. The method of inquiry is experimental economics. We find that sufficiently large capacity constraints mitigate the overbidding that plagues single-unit auctions and is one of the most robust laboratory findings. We also uncover a puzzling propensity for most bidders to place a portion of their bids at prices above their signals. This disequilibrium behavior persists with experience and in cases with substantial losses in previous auctions. Our results suggest caution is warranted in promoting auction based IPOs that allow unrestricted access by the non-professional investing public.     

The use of bundling in B2B online reverse auctions

In industrial purchasing a request for quotation (RFQ) can consist of a single item, but is most often composed of two or more products and/or services bundled together. While such bundles are used in offline purchase negotiations, their criticality is heightened in online auctions due to their usual short duration and constrained bidding environment. Despite this importance, little systematic discussion or evaluation has taken place concerning bundling practice, especially as it relates to the individual items included in the bundle, the overall bundle composition, and the resulting supply base and ultimate bundle performance. This study investigates these issues by developing a conceptual model and testing it with a large-scale survey completed by purchasing professionals practicing bundling in B2B online auctions. Results indicate that crafting a more homogeneous bundle is most important in achieving a successful outcome. Furthermore, more complex or difficult-to-specify items do not impact perceived bundle performance, but do influence the supply base that is willing and able to bid on the business.     

Efficiency vectors, efficiency and performance measures: new methods for ranking efficient organizational units

We present and discuss measures for analyzing productivity in deterministic frontier models. A new efficiency measure is introduced allowing for discrimination among efficient organizational units. In addition, a new performance measure for analyzing productivity of organizational units is presented. This measure fulfills various properties of efficiency measures but relaxes the indicator property. Both new approaches are based on the development of efficiency vectors which is a new vector measure for measuring efficiency. The vector components are efficiency measures related to subsets of a production possibility set. The new approaches are applied in the context of data envelopment analysis.

Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: Silence is not golden

I study the effect of cheap talk between bidders on the outcome of a first-price procurement auction in which participation is costly. Although no side payments or commitments are allowed, there exists a family of equilibria in which sellers use communication to collude on a subset of participants and/or reveal information about their cost. Cheap talk matters in the sense that it strictly enlarges the set of Nash equilibria (symmetric and asymmetric) and the set of public correlated equilibria of the game. I show that the buyer may benefit from cheap talk between sellers and that the surplus increases in the amount of information revealed in equilibrium under one fairly general condition. This is because when communication is cheap, sellers cannot directly collude on higher prices. Rather, communication leads to competition between fewer, but more aggressive bidders, which entails greater allocative efficiency and a decrease in the total wasteful entry cost.     

Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition

We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition setting. We determine the existence of equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss the potential shape of these strategies. Results for the war of attrition contrast with the characterization of the bidding equilibrium strategies in the first-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Furthermore we investigate the expected revenue comparisons among the war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions and discuss the linkage principle as well. Our findings are applicable to future works on contests and charity auctions.     

拆分招标的供应商数量研究

许多企业在采购时,常常将整笔业务拆分为两个合同:较大的第一合同和较小的第二合同,通过分批二级价格封闭式招标来选择不同的供应商供货。本文通过建立分批招标模型分析了供应商的投标策略和买方的采购策略,得出了当参加第一合同竞标的供应商数目和第二合同新引入的供应商数目满足一个不等式时,拆分招标的采购成本小于整体招标的采购成本,并且指出了拆分比例对拆分招标的采购成本的影响。     

An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of preemptive jump bidding in English auctions with a flexible reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the seller to adjust his decision to accept an offer based on the bidding history makes the existence of a signaling equilibrium questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump bidding behavior and the use and interpretation of opening bids as a signaling device.     

The geographical efficiency of education and research: The ranking of U.S. universities

This paper proposes to study the American efficiency of educational diffusion and research productivity following two distinctions: urban vs. rural areas and public vs. private universities. Following this geographical consideration, knowledge diffusion seems to be homogeneous over the American territory, whereas research productivity is more heterogeneous: American research efficiency decreased of 7% points, due to some rural university localizations. Universities in urban areas favor educational quality through high student selection criteria, contrary to those located in more rural areas. Third, public universities present higher educational efficiency, in favoring educational quality over research productivity: the lesser research efficiency of public institutions comes from difficulties in the management of several campuses, by comparison with the private institutions which are all single-campus.     

Information value and efficiency measurement for risk-averse firms

This paper has three goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production and duality analysis can be used to provide a comprehensive and general treatment of the value of information for a risk-averse firm with expected-utility (linear-in-probabilities) preferences and a general stochastic technology. Second, we place bounds on the value of information for a risk-averse firm and relate these bounds to characteristics of the technology and the producer’s preferences. The third and final goal is to derive the implications that information differences can have for measured efficiency differences and to relate the bounds on the value of information to those measured differences.      

Power and efficiency in production pillage games

A pillage game is a formal model of Hobbesian anarchy as a coalitional game. The technology of pillage is specified by a power function that determines the power of each coalition as a function of its members and their wealth. A coalition can despoil any other coalition less powerful than itself. The present paper studies the problem of achieving an efficient allocation of resources when the required reallocation changes the distribution of power. For example, land redistribution may increase total production, but may also deprive the original owners of the power they need to compel compensation. In this case the original owners would block the redistribution. Previous work on pillage games has focused on the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution) as a representation of a stable balance of power. However, the balance of power is typically too delicate to support all efficient allocations. The present paper shows that for a large class of power functions, a recently developed extension of the stable set, called the legitimate set, can be rich enough to support all efficient allocations.      

Measuring efficiency in Australian Schools: A preliminary analysis

In this paper, we apply a public sector Data Envelopment Analysis model to estimate the efficiency of Australian primary and secondary schools. Standard microeconomic production theory showing the transformation of inputs into outputs is extended to allow nondiscretionary environmental variables characteristic of educational production. Failure to properly control for the socioeconomic environment leads to inappropriate comparisons and biased efficiency estimates. We employ a conditional estimator that does not allow a school with a better environment to serve as a benchmark for a school with a worse environment. The results suggest that Australian schools are moderately inefficient and that efficiency increases for the quintile of schools with the most favorable environment. Further, efficiency gains are realized with increasing enrollment.     

Technical efficiency in farming: a meta-regression analysis

A meta-regression analysis including 167 farm level technical efficiency (TE) studies of developing and developed countries was undertaken. The econometric results suggest that stochastic frontier models generate lower mean TE (MTE) estimates than non-parametric deterministic models, while parametric deterministic frontier models yield lower estimates than the stochastic approach. The primal approach is the most common technological representation. In addition, frontier models based on cross-sectional data produce lower estimates than those based on panel data whereas the relationship between functional form and MTE is inconclusive. On average, studies for animal production show a higher MTE than crop farming. The results also suggest that the studies for countries in Western Europe and Oceania present, on average, the highest levels of MTE among all regions after accounting for various methodological features. In contrast, studies for Eastern European countries exhibit the lowest estimate followed by those from Asian, African, Latin American, and North American countries. Additional analysis reveals that MTEs are positively and significantly related to the average income of the countries in the data set but this pattern is broken by the upper middle income group which displays the lowest MTE.