Bundling and the Reduction of the Winner's Curse

The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in an independent-private-values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small.     

Identification and estimation in sequential,asymmetric, English auctions

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit, sequential, asymmetric, English auctions. When the identity of the winner and the number of units won by each bidder in previous stages of the auction are observed, we demonstrate nonparametric identification and propose a semi-nonparametric estimation strategy based on orthogonal polynomials. We apply our estimator to daily data from fish auctions in Denmark. For single-unit supply, we use our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction employed instead.     

The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions

We determine the conditions under which the seller in a first-price sealed-bid auction has an incentive to reveal his private information about the mean of bidders’ valuations in order to increase his expected revenue. With risk-neutral bidders, we show that the seller’s expected revenue is higher when information is revealed. However, when bidders are risk-averse, this result does not necessarily hold; it depends on the bidders’ risk-aversion level and on the number of bidders.     

Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities

This paper examines whether the seller of an object should reveal the identities of the participating bidders before bids become due. It is shown that when bidders experience identity dependent externalities and auction participation is exogenous, then for a large class of standard auction mechanisms, a policy of revelation serves to realize a higher surplus because it improves the accuracy of each bidder's estimate of her ex-post willingness-to-pay, and therefore changes the auction allocation in a more ex-post efficient manner. Furthermore, it is shown that the policy of revelation increases both the expected seller revenues as well as ex-ante expected bidder payoffs. Received: 4 February 2000 / Accepted: 15 November 2000 An earlier version of this paper had the title 'Disclosure of Bidder Identities'. I thank an anonymous referee and an Associate Editor for suggestions that improved the paper. I also acknowledge comments made by participants of the Auctions session during the North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society 2001 held in New Orleans. I remain solely responsible for any errors.     

Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

Consider a seller and a buyer who write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet, it may be impossible to achieve the first best, even though the risk-neutral parties are symmetrically informed at the contracting stage and complete contracts can be written. The second best is characterized by distortions that are reminiscent of adverse selection models (i.e., models with precontractual private information but without hidden actions).     

Common-value auction versus posted-price selling: an agent-based model approach

Previous theoretical work has compared a private-value auction and posted-price market, and an affiliated-value auction and a posted-price market to determine the selling method preferred by sellers. Much less, however, is known about the seller’s preferred selling method when the buyers have a common value of the item. Our objective is to determine if a first-price auction or a posted-price market provides a seller with the larger expected revenue when buyers have a common value of the item being sold. An agent-based posted-price market and an agent-based first-price common-value auction with a reserve price are developed to compare these selling methods. Holding the buyers’ uncertainty about the value of the item constant, the seller prefers the posted-price market when the seller has no uncertainty about the item’s value. When the seller has an equal level of uncertainty as the buyers, the seller’s expected revenue for each market is similar. As the seller’s uncertainty increases beyond the level of the buyers’ uncertainty, the auction with a reserve price eventually becomes the preferred choice.     

Pricing used books on Amazon.com: a spatial approach to price dispersion

This paper estimates a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model of price dispersion using publicly available internet bookselling data. It uses a semiparametric adaptive estimator that does not require the usual Gaussian assumption of maximum likelihood (ML) estimators. The results suggest that both price competition and seller heterogeneity are key drivers of the observed price dispersion. The paper finds that sellers with large sales volume, newly established sellers and US mainland states-based sellers tend to price lower. The identified significant spatial interaction is evidence of spatial price competition. Controlling for everything else, a seller asks a lower price when large sellers charge relatively high prices, which is also evidence of price-based selling and undercutting.     

Optimal auctions under collusion of buyers with discrete valuations

The potential seller of an indivisible good faces two potential buyers whose valuations for the good are private information. We derive the optimal selling mechanism under the assumption that the buyers collude both when the valuations are independently distributed and when they are correlated. We find that when the valuations are independent the seller can obtain the same expected revenue as if the buyers behaved noncooperatively; if instend the valuations are correlated then collusion harms the seller. In this latter case, moreover, each buyer’s information at the collusion stage about the other buyer’s valuation turns out to be very relevant for the effectiveness of collusion.     

Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation

We present a model in which buyers and sellers use links to trade with each other. Each seller produces a good which can be one of two types. Buyers are ex ante identical but receive specification or valuation shocks after the links are formed. We show that efficient networks are stable and that severing a link in an efficient network results in a higher price for the buyer but a lower price for the seller. We also examine network intermediation when sellers (buyers) form links sequentially. When sellers form links sequentially, the first seller becomes an intermediary and shares links with other sellers; this makes all sellers better off. However, when buyers form links sequentially, buyers may or may not share links. If links are shared multiple intermediaries result.     

ML– and semiparametric estimation in logistic models with incomplete covariate data

ML–estimation of regression parameters with incomplete covariate information usually requires a distributional assumption regarding the concerned covariates that implies a source of misspecification. Semiparametric procedures avoid such assumptions at the expense of efficiency. In this paper a simulation study with small sample size is carried out to get an idea of the performance of the ML–estimator under misspecification and to compare it with the semiparametric procedures when the former is based on a correct assumption. The results show that there is only a little gain by correct parametric assumptions, which does not justify the possibly large bias when the assumptions are not met. Additionally, a simple modification of the complete case estimator appears to be nearly semiparametric efficient.     

逆向物流中基于均匀分布的库存控制策略研究

库存管理是逆向物流的重要研究内容。假定销售商允许顾客退货,退回物品可如新以原价卖出,且顾客的需求与退货均服从独立的均匀分布;在此条件下,提出了一个最优订货模型,并进行了求解分析。研究结果表明,退货率对销售商的订货数量和期望收益都有影响,销售商应采取有效的措施尽量降低退货率。     

基于拍卖的垄断型产品供应链的博弈分析

论文研究了基于拍卖交易的垄断型产品供应链中卖方和买方的博弈问题,成交价格同时取决于卖方向拍卖市场的供货数量和买方向拍卖市场的竞拍数量。博弈结果显示,在垄断供应的情况下,博弈的纳什均衡将会是买卖双方都不通过拍卖渠道来进行交易,只有在非常极端的条件下可以达成供货和竞拍等量的均衡。最后,论文引入一个新卖方作为买方参与拍卖后的补货来源,得到的新均衡解能使原买卖双方的收益提高,从而说明单纯的拍卖并不总是最好的交易方式,多渠道的销售方式有时更能保障买卖双方的利益。     

Possibly-Final Offers

A price-setting seller faces a buyer with unknown reservation value. We show that if the buyer is sufficiently risk averse, the seller can benefit from employing a Possibly-Final Offer (PFO) strategy. In a PFO, if the buyer rejects the seller's initial offer the seller sometimes terminates the interaction. If the seller does not terminate, he follows up with a subsequent, more attractive offer. As the buyer's risk aversion increases, the seller's expected profit under the optimal PFO approaches the full-information profit. These results extend to contexts with endogenous commitment, multiple types of buyers, multidimensional objects, and nonseparable utility functions.     

基于Floyd算法的供应链网络路径研究

21世纪的竞争不是企业与企业之间的竞争，而是供应链之间的竞争。运输系统是供应链中一个重要的子系统，运输路径的选择是否合理直接影响供应链的运作成本、速度和效益。文中考虑在拉动式生产的背景下，当销售商提出需求订单的时候，最快的选择相应的制造商和配送中心，使得供应链的总运输成本最小化的问题，利用floyd算法研究三级供应链的运作模式，理论证明其可行性，并通过算例分析验证了此优化算法使得供应链运输成本最小化。     

多单位网上拍卖中的托投标分析

在独立私有价值的多单位网上英式拍卖中，诚实的竞标者能够采用对抗性的竞标策略来降低卖者参与托投标的激励，然而即使考虑了诚实竞标者对于托投标的策略性响应，托投标对于卖者而言依然是有利可图的。更为有效地阻止托投标的措施可能包括吸引更多的潜在竞标者，并限制在单次拍卖中销售的物品数量。同时考虑了卖者对于这种对抗性竞标策略的策略响应，求解了卖者的最优托投标，结论表明无论最优的托投标是唯一的还是多重的，卖者的最优策略是在开始使用低的托投标，在观察到之前的竞标信息之后通过动态调整将托投标设定到最优水平。     

On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers

Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) show that this is not the case when there are at least two buyers. In the latter context, if the highest possible seller's valuation is not too large, we provide an ex post efficient mechanism in which the mechanism designer and the agents are not required to know the probability distribution for the seller's valuation. Received: February 18, 1998 / Accepted: September 10, 1999     

供应链数量折扣契约与退货契约研究评述

供应链契约是目前供应链管理研究的前沿问题之一,主要目标是解决如何协调供应链中各方的决策和利润分配,其中数量折扣契约和退货契约是目前研究较多、应用较广泛的契约形式.本文综述了数量折扣契约和退货契约的研究现状,指出以下问题是未来重要的研究方向:(1)不确定需求下的数量折扣契约;(2)数量折扣与退货的组合契约;(3)跨国供应链数量折扣契约、退货契约;(4)多级供应链的数量折扣契约、退货契约.     

On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell her object(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyers’ valuations. Each buyer knows only the signal that the seller observes about him, but not the signals she observes about other buyers. The seller first chooses how to disclose her information and then chooses a revenue-maximizing mechanism. We allow for very general disclosure policies, that can be random, public, private, or any mixture of these possibilities. Through the disclosure of information privately, the seller can create correlation in buyers’ private information, which then consist of valuations plus beliefs. For the standard independent private values model, we show that information revelation is irrelevant: irrespective of the disclosure policy an optimal mechanism for this informed seller generates expected revenue that is equal to her maximal revenue under full information disclosure. For more general allocation environments that allow also for interdependent, for common values, and for multiple items, disclosure policies may matter, and the best the seller can do is to disclose no information at all.     

On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions

Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-price auctions assume that the price is given by the highest losing bid. In practice, however, the price is usually given by the lowest winning bid. We derive the equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction when there are k objects for sale and n bidders with unit demand, and prove that it converges to the bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction if and only if the number of losers n−k gets large. When the number of losers grows large, the bidding functions converge at a linear rate and the prices in the two auctions converge in probability to the expected value of an object to the marginal winner.