Fixed versus variable rate loans under state-dependent preferences

This paper examines the optimal mix of fixed and variable rate loans of a competitive bank facing uncertain funding costs. The bank's preferences are state-dependent in that the utility function depends on a state variable. We show that the optimal amount of loans extended by the bank depends neither on the state-dependent preferences of the bank, nor on the joint distribution of the marginal cost of funds and the state variable. The bank, however, optimally lends less should it be forced to assume all interest rate risk by exclusively extending fixed rate loans. We show further that a non-positive spread between fixed and variable rate loans is no longer a necessary and sufficient condition for the bank to refrain from extending fixed rate loans should the marginal cost of funds be correlated with the state variable in the sense of expectation dependence. State-dependent preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the bank's optimal choice between fixed and variable rate loans.     

The Impact of Regret on Exports

We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.     

Risk and regret aversions on optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation

This paper examines the bank's optimal loan rate (and thus the bank's interest margin) under more stringent capital regulation when the bank is not only risk-averse but also regret-averse. Risk-averse preferences are characterized by an option-based utility function that includes disutility from the dislike of bank equity risk. Regret-averse preferences feature an option-based utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that an increase in bank capital requirement results in an increased margin under risk aversion dominating regret aversion, whereas it results in a reduced margin under regret aversion dominating risk aversion. The former holds when risk aversion domination stems from increasing risk-averse preference, but not from decreasing regret-averse preference, while the latter holds when regret aversion domination results from either decreasing risk-averse or increasing regret-averse preference. Risk aversion, as such, makes the bank more prudent and less prone to risk-taking, while regret aversion, as such, makes the bank less prudent and more prone to risk-taking.     

Regret theory and the competitive firm: A comment

In a recent paper, Wong [Wong, K. P. (2014), Regret theory and the competitive firm. Economic Modelling, 36, 172–175.] develops a model to examine the production behavior of a regret averse competitive firm. Wong discusses the sufficient condition to ensure the conventional result that the optimal output level under uncertainty is less than that under certainty hold. Our contributions in this note are two-fold. Firstly, we point out that Wong's condition in terms of the first order derivatives of the utility function and the regret function is actually not sufficient. Secondly and more importantly, we show that a sufficient condition should be in terms of the relatively increase rate of the first order derivatives of the two functions. That's, it's the ratio of the risk aversion and regret aversion degree that matters. Our proposed condition requests that the firm should be not too regret averse.     

Optimal sequential contract with a risk‐averse supplier

We study optimal contracts in environments where a risk‐averse supplier discovers cost information privately and gradually over time: the supplier is privately informed about its cost uncertainty at the time of contracting and discovers the realization of cost condition privately after contracting and before production. We show that both the buyer and the supplier prefer more cost uncertainty when the supplier is not very risk‐averse but less cost uncertainty when the supplier is sufficiently risk‐averse. However, the buyer always prefers to contract before the cost uncertainty resolves regardless of the supplier's degree of risk aversion. The nature of the optimal contract also depends on the supplier's risk preference. A separating contract is optimal when the supplier is not very risk‐averse; however, a pooling contract, which offers the same contract terms regardless of the cost uncertainty, can be optimal when the supplier becomes sufficiently risk‐averse. Moreover, the optimal production schedule is often characterized by “inflexible rules.”     

Regret theory and the competitive firm

This paper examines the production decision of the competitive firm under uncertainty when the firm is not only risk averse but also regret averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production decision had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price. If the firm is not too regret averse, we show that the conventional result that the optimal output level under uncertainty is less than that under certainty holds. Using a simple binary model wherein the random output price can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability, we show the possibility that the firm may optimally produce more, not less, under uncertainty than under certainty, particularly when the firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low output price is very likely to prevail.     

Regret theory and the banking firm: The optimal bank interest margin

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate of a bank, when the bank is not only risk-averse but also regret-averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the presence of regret aversion raises or lowers the optimal bank interest margin than the one chosen by the purely risk-averse bank, depending on whether the probability of default is below or above a threshold value, respectively. Regret aversion as such makes the bank less prudent and more prone to risk-taking when the probability of default is high, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.     

A SMOOTH AMBIGUITY MODEL OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM

This paper examines the optimal production decision of the competitive firm under price uncertainty when the firm's preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity is modeled by a second‐order probability distribution that captures the firm's uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the price risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second‐order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first‐order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the price risk. Within this framework, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the ambiguity‐averse firm optimally produces less in response either to the introduction of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails. In the case that the price risk is binary, we show that ambiguity and greater ambiguity aversion always adversely affect the firm's production decision.     

Production and insurance under regret aversion

This paper examines the behavior of a regret-averse producer facing revenue risk. To insure against the revenue risk, the producer can purchase a coinsurance contract with an endogenously chosen coinsurance rate. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the regret-averse producer never fully insures against the revenue risk even though the coinsurance contract is actuarially fair. When the producer is sufficiently regret averse and the loss probability is high, we further show that the regret-averse producer chooses not to purchase the actuarially fair coinsurance contract. Even when purchasing the actuarially fair coinsurance contract is optimal, we derive sufficient conditions under which the regret-averse producer reduces the optimal output level as compared to that without the coinsurance contract. These results are distinct from those under pure risk aversion, thereby making the consideration of regret aversion crucial.     

Two-part tariffs set by a risk-averse monopolist

This paper revisits the classical issues of two-part tariffs by considering risk aversion of a monopolistic seller. Under demand uncertainty, equilibrium unit price declines and approaches towards marginal cost as the seller becomes more risk averse. Marginal-cost pricing prevails, irrespective of the seller’s risk attitude, if clients are homogenous. Under cost uncertainty, unit price is higher than marginal cost and monotonically increases in risk aversion. The model is then extended to accommodate buyers’ risk aversion and it is found that demand uncertainty makes unit price decline in the seller’s risk aversion again but increase in buyers’ risk aversion.     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

Financial intermediation and endogenous risk in the banking sector

The paper revisits the impact of uncertainty on the decision problem of a bank. The bank extends risky loans to private investors and sells deposits to savers at fixed rates. The uncertainty under which deposit/loan-portfolios are chosen by banks is endogenized through an information system that conveys public signals about the return distribution of bank loans. Transparency in the banking sector is defined in terms of the reliability of these signals. We find that higher transparency always raises expected bank profits, but may lead to a higher or lower expected loan volume. Moreover, higher transparency may reduce economic welfare.     

Shocks to bank capital: evidence from UK banks at home and away

This article assesses how shocks to bank capital may influence a bank's portfolio behaviour using novel evidence from a UK bank panel data set from a period that predates the recent financial crisis. Focusing on the behaviour of bank loans, we extract the dynamic response of a bank to innovations in its capital and in its regulatory capital buffer. We find that innovations in a bank's capital in this (precrisis) sample period were coupled with a loan response that lasted up to 3 years. The international presence of UK banks allows us to identify a specific driver of capital shocks in our data, independent of bank lending to UK residents. Specifically, we use write-offs on loans to nonresidents to instrument bank capital's impact on UK resident lending. A fall in capital brought about a significant drop in lending in particular, to Private Nonfinancial Corporations (PNFC). In contrast, household lending increased when capital fell, which may indicate that, in this precrisis period, banks substituted into less risky assets when capital was short.     

On the theory of the competitive firm with a utility function defined on profits and regret

In this paper we analyze the optimal output determined by a competitive firm facing uncertain demand. We analyze the effect of introducing uncertainty and the effect of increasing uncertainty on the optimal output, under the assumption that the utility function of the firm depends both on profits and on regret. We show that if the firm is more risk averse to profits than to regret (in a sense described below), both effects tend to decrease the optimal output. Similar effects of introducing uncertainty and of increased uncertainty were previously shown by Sandmo (1971) to exist in the case where utility is defined on profits only. Thus, this paper provides conditions under which the above results hold true, even when utility is defined on regret and on profits.     

THE NEW THEORY OF COMMERCIAL BANKING AND BANK LENDING BEHAVIOR

This paper studies the bank's lending decision, based on three observed phenomena: banks earn substantial profits from off‐balance sheet activities and services, which they take into account in their lending decisions. Secondly, the critical point in the customer relation is the loan decision: the probability of the customer staying with the bank is a function of the loan extended each time one is applied for. Third, what is at stake in the loan decision is the expected value of the entire customer relation, which is the probability times the present value of expected future profits. The bank is a maximizer of this expected present value, while making decisions on individual loan applications. It is shown that the bank is in a corner solution with respect to its good customers, and other customers often have an incentive to get to a corner. Therefore, corner solutions may be the rule rather than the exception in the bank's customer relations, and there is no mechanism making the bank indifferent, at the margin, between lending to different customers. It can be optimal to extend loans to (present and expected future) good customers at an interest rate loss. A rationed customer with a concave enough probability function can receive a larger loan by asking for less. Loyalty increases the customer's value to the bank but improves its loan terms only if the customer makes it conditional on the loan extended.     

Rotating Savings and Credit Associations When Participants are Risk Averse*

We model rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) among risk‐averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks. A random Rosca is not advantageous, whereas a bidding Rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. The payoff scheme of a bidding Rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries. The risk‐sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding Roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk‐sharing contract, and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution.     

Optimal bank interest margins under capital regulation in a call-option utility framework

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation when the bank's preference admits an additive call-option representation including both the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. In the call-option utility maximization, an increase in the capital requirement results in an increased amount of loans held by a bank at a reduced margin when loan quality is in distress. We also show that the impact on the bank interest margin from an increase in the capital requirement which ignores the dislike, that we call such behavior call-option equity maximization, leads to significant underestimation. Our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of capital regulation to exert a risk-reducing and return-increasing effect on the bank in particular where loan quality becomes worse, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.     

Bank ownership type and temporal evolution of long‐term bank funding in the period 2005–2017

This study uses a large panel dataset of Western European banks to examine the determinants of bank funding stability. Banks are divided into three categories by bank ownership type; the ownership types in this study are commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. Three sources of stable bank funding are investigated: customer deposits, equity, and long‐term liabilities. Furthermore, the sum of these funding components is used as a proxy variable for a bank's total available stable funding (ASF). A special focus is on the temporal evolution of these funding types. The regression results show that commercial banks’ funding became much more stable in the period 2005–2017. However, that funding remains, on average, less stable than does cooperative and savings banks’ funding. In addition, funding stability has remained at the pre‐crisis level in cooperative and savings banks, despite a steep dip in cooperative banks’ ASF during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, banks substantially decreased financing from long‐term liabilities after the financial crisis, replacing it with customer deposits and equity.     

The changing nature of the real exchange rate: The role of central bank preferences

We investigate the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations. We do so, first, in the context of a DSGE model that explicitly considers the central bank's preferences. Then we estimate SVAR models, where shocks are identified by sign restrictions derived from the DSGE model. We perform this exercise for twelve countries, nine of which have adopted inflation targeting during the period analyzed. In sharp contrast to the previous evidence in the literature, we find that exchange rate (country risk premium) shocks have become the main drivers of real exchange rate dynamics, while real shocks play a less important role. Evidence from the DSGE model reveals that, as the central bank becomes more averse to inflation movements, and cares less about nominal exchange rate fluctuations, the impact of nominal shocks on the real exchange rate tends to increase, while the impact of real shocks decreases. Our results suggest that the adoption of inflation targeting, along with a floating exchange rate, contributes to a shift in the relative importance of demand and country risk premium shocks in determining the RER.     

Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion

The paper extends Diamond's (1984) analysis of financial intermediation to allow for risk aversion of the intermediary. As in the case of risk neutrality, the agency costs of external funds provided to an intermediary are relatively small if the intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with independent returns. Even though the intermediary is adding rather than subdividing risks, the underlying large-numbers argument is not invalidated by the presence of risk aversion.
With risk aversion of entrepreneurs as well as the intermediary, financial intermediation provides insurance as well as finance. In contrast to earlier results on optimal intermediation policies under risk neutrality, the paper shows that when an intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with independent returns, optimal intermediation policies must shift return risks away from risk averse entrepreneurs and impose them on the intermediary or on final investors.