Safe asset shortages and asset price bubbles

We build a model economy in which a shortage of safe assets can create conditions for intrinsically useless ‘safe’ bubble assets to circulate at a positive price. Our environment features infinitely lived individuals who are not subject to credit constraints but who face uninsurable idiosyncratic production risk. Bubbly equilibria exist when safe assets offer real returns below the growth rate of the economy. Bubble assets circulate at a positive price only if they offer returns which are safe relative to production returns. These ‘safe’ bubbles reduce consumption volatility but exert a contractionary effect on the economy.     

Sectoral bubbles,misallocation, and endogenous growth

Stock price bubbles are often on productive assets and occur in a sector of the economy. In addition, their occurrence is often accompanied by credit booms. Incorporating these features, we provide a two-sector endogenous growth model with credit-driven stock price bubbles. Bubbles have a credit easing effect in that they relax collateral constraints and improve investment efficiency. Sectoral bubbles also have a capital reallocation effect in the sense that bubbles in a sector attract more capital to be reallocated to that sector. Their impact on economic growth depends on the interplay between these two effects. Bubbles may misallocate resources across sectors and reduce welfare.     

A remark on the fiscal theory of price determination

The fiscal theory of price determination asserts that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal public debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. To show its fragility, we describe a simple monetary economy with an infinitely lived real productive asset. Under the hypotheses of the fiscal theory, speculative bubbles occur at equilibrium, thus leading to an indeterminate price level.     

A remark on the fiscal theory of price determination

The fiscal theory of price determination asserts that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal public debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. To show its fragility, we describe a simple monetary economy with an infinitely lived real productive asset. Under the hypotheses of the fiscal theory, speculative bubbles occur at equilibrium, thus leading to an indeterminate price level.     

Equilibrium and arbitrage in incomplete asset markets with fixed prices

At arbitrary prices of commodities and assets, fix-price equilibria exist under weak assumptions: endowments need not satisfy an interiority condition, utility functions need only satisfy a very weak monotonicity requirement, and the asset return matrix allows for redundant assets. Prices of assets may permit arbitrage. At equilibrium, though restricted through endogenously determined trading constraints, arbitrage possibilities may persist; in an example, an individual holds an arbitrage portfolio.     

Leverage and the price volatility of equity shares in equilibrium

The traditional valuation formulas for corporate debt, which are derived in a complete market setting and are based on the no-arbitrage principle, imply that equity prices become more volatile as leverage increases. If the asset structure is incomplete, the presence of corporate debt affects the linear subspace spanned by the payoffs of the existing assets, and the pricing of corporate debt and shares of levered firms becomes a simultaneous valuation problem. This paper characterizes the relationship between the price of corporate debt and the share price of a levered firm in an equilibrium framework where corporate debt is a non-redundant asset. While, in the absence of bankruptcy, higher leverage always implies riskier equity, it does not necessarily mean more volatile equity prices. In fact, the link between leverage and equity price volatility depends in a particular way on investors’ preferences towards risk.     

Portfolio constraints,differences in beliefs and bubbles

I propose an arbitrage-based theory of bubbles in economies with general portfolio constraints and differences in beliefs. I find that, in general, bubbles cannot exist unless the constraints restrict the demand for credit sufficiently to induce low interest rates. Speculation due to heterogeneous beliefs does not cause bubbles. Ruling out bubbles under asymmetric information requires stronger assumptions: the presence of some uninformed agents and mild portfolio restrictions (debt or borrowing constraints), or alternatively, the existence of some impatient and fully informed agents.     

Margin trade,short sales and financial stability

We model how leveraged trading activities constrained by dynamic funding availability affect financial stability. In the market, customers trade based on the fundamental value of the risky asset and make full payment for their transactions, while speculators take trading position based on margin, which is constantly adjusted by the financier, the fund provider, according to the price volatility. As a result of equilibrium price discontinuity triggered by dynamic margin requirements, trivial shocks to external supply, wealth or fundamental value can be transmitted into asset price crashes or jumps. We find that tightening margin requirements improves (mitigates) the market liquidity in the bull (bear) market, and that imposing short sale constraints helps prevent the price from falling further when the asset is sufficiently under-priced and accelerate price collapse when the asset is over-priced.

     

基于公允价值的政府资产与负债计价研究

本文介绍了我国政府会计中资产与负债的范畴及政府资产、负债计价的必要性,对现有政府资产与负债计价存在的局限性进行了探讨,指出在政府资产与负债计价中引入公允价值将成为未来发展趋势。     

ECONOMETRIC TESTS OF ASSET PRICE BUBBLES: TAKING STOCK*

Abstract Can asset price bubbles be detected? This survey of econometric tests of asset price bubbles shows that, despite recent advances, econometric detection of asset price bubbles cannot be achieved with a satisfactory degree of certainty. For each paper that finds evidence of bubbles, there is another one that fits the data equally well without allowing for a bubble. We are still unable to distinguish bubbles from time‐varying or regime‐switching fundamentals, while many small sample econometrics problems of bubble tests remain unresolved.     

Adverse effects of leverage and short-selling constraints in a financial market model with heterogeneous agents

This paper investigates the impact of leverage and short-selling constraints on financial market stability. Investors׳ demand is modelled in a well-known asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs. In particular, I generalise the heterogeneous agents model of Brock and Hommes (1998) and Anufriev and Tuinstra (2013) to allow for leverage constraints as well as a short-selling tax. I consider two examples of adaptive belief systems describing the coevolution of prices and investors׳ beliefs. First, if the market is inhabited by fundamentalist and chartist traders, demand constraints have potential adverse effects and may restrict the stabilising fundamentalist strategy such that mispricing and price volatility increase. Second, if the market is inhabited by fundamentalists, optimists and pessimists with fixed beliefs, demand constraints drive down price volatility, but mispricing remains. The results suggest the stabilising effects of demand constraints in financial markets are limited. Only if asset prices are too high compared to fundamentals, policy makers should consider constraining leverage ratios in order to deflate financial bubbles.     

上市公司资产评估与交易定价关系研究——基于2010年上市公司数据分析

本文以2010年沪深两市上市公司资产评估与交易定价为研究对象,对沪深两市整体资产评估与交易定价情况进行描述性统计,并结合行业、交易类型、板块等因素分析评估价值和交易价格之间的关系,研究表明,上市公司资产评估价值已经成为交易定价的重要参考依据,行业、交易类型、板块因素对评估价值和交易价格之间的关系存在一定影响。     

Equilibria with coordination failures

This paper extends the literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbitrary convex sets of admissible prices. This makes it possible to address coordination failures for cases with price indexation or more general price linkages between commodities. We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a unified treatment to all cases considered in the literature so far. At a QCE the expected trade opportunities on supply and demand are completely determined by a rationing vector satisfying that the prevailing price system maximizes the value of the rationing vector within the set of admissible prices. When the set of admissible prices is compact, we show the existence of a connected set of QCEs. This set connects two trivial no-trade equilibria, one with completely pessimistic expectations concerning supply opportunities and one with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities. Moreover, the set contains for every commodity a generalized Drèze equilibrium, being a QCE at which for that commodity no binding trade opportunities on both supply and demand are expected, and also a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium at which no binding constraints on demand opportunities are expected and for at least one commodity also not on supply. We apply this main result to several special cases, and also discuss the case of an unbounded set of admissible prices.     

Asset specificity,capital intensity and capital structure: An empirical test

Capital investment and capital financing decisions interact. To resolve current controversies in investment-leverage-growth relationships requires an integrated industrial organization/financial economics empirical model of profit margins, capital investment intensity, leverage and risk. Using cumulative future losses in discontinued operations to measure the asset specificity of the firm's investments, empiricai results support a complementary (positive) relationship between debt and investment, the debt financing of verifiable contemporaneous growth, equity financing of future growth and the debt financing of specific assets. This evidence rejects the transactions cost theory of capital structure in Fortune 500 firms.     

Prices,debt and market structure in an agent-based model of the financial market

We develop an agent-based model in which heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents interact by trading a risky asset at an endogenously set price. Agents are endowed with balance sheets comprising the risky asset as well as cash on the asset side and equity capital as well as debt on the liabilities side. A number of findings emerge when simulating the model: we find that the empirically observable log-normal distribution of bank balance sheet size naturally emerges and that higher levels of leverage lead to a greater inequality among agents. Furthermore, greater leverage increases the frequency of bankruptcies and systemic events. Credit frictions, which we define as the stickiness of debt adjustments, are able to explain a key difference in the relation between leverage and assets observed for different bank types. Lowering credit frictions leads to an increasingly procyclical behavior of leverage, which is typical for investment banks. Nevertheless, the impact of credit frictions on the fragility of the model financial system is complex. Lower frictions do increase the stability of the system most of the time, while systemic events become more probable. In particular, we observe an increasing frequency of severe liquidity crises that can lead to the collapse of the entire model financial system.     

An equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time

We study a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time. The supply of the risky asset is assumed to be stochastic. This supply can be interpreted as noise from nonrational traders (noise traders). A rational informed investor (the insider) has private information on the growth rate of the dividend flow rewarded by the risky asset. She is risk averse and maximizes her inter-temporal utility rate over an infinite time-horizon. The market is cleared by a risk neutral market maker who sets the price of the risky asset competitively as the conditional present value of future dividends, given the information supplied by the dividend history and the cumulative order flow. Due to the presence of noise traders, the market demand does not fully reveal the insider’s private information, which slowly becomes incorporated in prices. An interesting result of the paper is that a nonstandard linear filtering procedure gives an a priori form for the equilibrium strategy to be postulated. We show the existence of a stationary linear equilibrium where the insider acts strategically by taking advantage of the camouflage provided by the noise which affects the market maker’s estimates on private information. In this equilibrium, we find that the insider’s returns on the stock are uncorrelated over long periods of time. Finally, we show that the instantaneous variance of the price under asymmetric information lies between the instantaneous variance of the price under complete and incomplete information. The converse inequalities hold true for the unconditional variance of the price.     

Wilhelm Röpke and Richard C. Koo On Secondary Deflations and Balance Sheet Recessions

The concept of a ‘secondary deflation’ was developed in the 1930s by the German economist Wilhelm Röpke, who saw it as something different from a normal depression. While a primary deflation is a necessary reaction to the inflation from a boom period, a secondary deflation is independent and economically purposeless. Röpke argued that secondary depressions occurred in the US, Germany, France and Switzerland during the 1930s, but was vague on what made them follow primary depressions. Recently, the Taiwanese–American economist Richard C. Koo has claimed to have discovered the ‘Holy Grail of macroeconomics’, that is, what made the Great Depression so deep and long. During the Great Depression, the bursting of the asset price bubble resulted in private sectors having more debt than assets; as they shifted from maximising profits to minimising debt, the consequent debt deflation shrank the economy. According to Koo, Western economies today are suffering from a similar ‘balance sheet recession’. Strengthened by the notion of a balance sheet recession, Röpke's long‐lost insights might advance our understanding of the business cycle in general and the present crisis in the US and the Eurozone in particular.     

Robust bubbles with mild penalties for default

Limited enforcement of debt contracts and mild penalties for default can lead to low equilibrium interest rates, to ensure debt repayment. Low interest rates, in turn, create conditions for bubbles. I show that bubbles in unsecured private debt exist when the punishment for default is a permanent or a temporary interdiction to trade. Bubbles are an inefficient source of liquidity, as they lower interest rates and reduce welfare by discouraging saving.     

An empirical investigation of the cross sectional determinants of lease use

This paper examines the determinants of cross-sectional variation in lease ratios. Results indicate that leases substitute for debt and that relative lease use is negatively related to the size of the lessee. Leased assets, as a fraction of total assets, are negatively related to the financial strength of the lessee. Relative lease use is positively related to the lessee's level of non-debt tax shields, and some support is found for a negative relationship between leasing and the tax rate. Additionally, asset factors, as proxied by industry, provide most of the explanatory power of the model.     

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

The objective of the paper is to propose endogenous debt constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo et al. (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independent of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model.