The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the Evidence

Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets.     

Corporate taxes,capital structure,and valuation: Combining Modigliani/Miller and Miles/Ezzell

The valuation of a firm with discounted cash flow (DCF) approaches requires assumptions about the firm’s financing strategy. The approaches of Modigliani and Miller and Miles and Ezzell assume that either a passive debt management with predetermined debt levels or active debt management with capital structure targets is applied. Over the last decades, various extensions of these approaches have been developed to allow for a more realistic depiction of financial decision making. However, recent empirical analyses indicate that current theories still have limited power to explain large variances in capital structure across time. We provide an alternative explanation for the empirical observation by assuming that firms combine both capital structure targets and predetermined debt within future periods, and we show how to value a firm given such a partially active debt management. The approaches of Modigliani and Miller and Miles and Ezzell are embedded into a common valuation framework, with the familiar valuation formulas shown as special cases. In a simulation analysis, we illustrate that the textbook valuation formulas may produce considerable valuation errors if a firm applies a partially active debt management.     

On the Relevance of Debt Maturity Structure

In this paper, we present a tax-induced framework to analyze debt maturity problems. We show that under some modifications of the existing U.S. tax code, debt maturity is irrelevant even in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs that yield an optimal capital structure. If this restrictive structure is relaxed, and assuming the Miller [15] equilibrium does not prevail, tax reasons would usually imply the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure. If there exists a gain from leverage, then an increasing term structure of interest rates, adjusted for default risk, results in long-term debt being optimal. A decreasing term structure, under similar circumstances, renders short-term debt optimal. In the absence of agency costs, a Miller [15]-type result emerges at equilibrium and irrelevance prevails. We also argue that agency costs could again reverse the irrelevance and imply a firm-specific optimal debt maturity structure.     

TEXTBOOK INCONSISTENCIES IN GRAPHING VALUATION EQUATIONS: A FURTHER NOTE

In this note, the authors demonstrate that if a firm's leverage ratio is measured by debt-to-total value (debt-to-equity) in the pure capital structure rearrangement framework implicit in research reported by Modigliani and Miller (e.g., debt-to-equity exchanges), the market value of levered equity will be a concave (convex) function, and the market value of debt will be a convex (concave) function. These nonlinearities exist even without bankruptcy costs.     

Cash-flow shortage as an endogenous bankruptcy reason

This paper develops a simple model for a leveraged firm and endogenizes the firm’s bankruptcy point by assuming that equity issuance is costly. Equity-issuance costs reflect the difficulties in issuing new equity for firms that are close to financial distress. The resulting model captures cash-flow shortage as a reason to go bankrupt, though the equity value is positive. I analyze the optimal bankruptcy point as well as corporate bond prices and yield spreads for various levels of equity-issuance costs in order to study the impact of different liquidity constraints. Finally, I discuss the consequences on optimal capital structure.     

Corporate Debt Value,Bond Covenants,and Optimal Capital Structure

This article examines corporate debt values and capital structure in a unified analytical framework. It derives closed-form results for the value of long-term risky debt and yield spreads, and for optimal capital structure, when firm asset value follows a diffusion process with constant volatility. Debt values and optimal leverage are explicitly linked to firm risk, taxes, bankruptcy costs, risk-free interest rates, payout rates, and bond covenants. The results elucidate the different behavior of junk bonds versus investment-grade bonds, and aspects of asset substitution, debt repurchase, and debt renegotiation.     

Do Personal Taxes Destroy Tax Shields? A Critique to Miller’s (1977) Proposal

We discuss the relevance of personal taxes on tax shields. Interest and taxes are the basis for defining an optimal capital structure. When personal taxes are greater than or equal to TS, an optimal capital structure does not exist.

We suggest that the approach proposed by Miller (1977) might understate the effect of personal taxes in the net TS and/or its associated net value. We consider the irrelevance of personal taxes on interest received by debtholders on the value of TS earned by the firm on interest paid. We conclude that Miller’s approach might be wrong and has some inconsistencies.     

Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure

The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is examined. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads, but their importance is small for the range of environments considered. Risk management is also examined. Hedging permits greater leverage. Even when a firm cannot precommit to hedging, it will still do so. Surprisingly, hedging benefits often are greater when agency costs are low.     

Dynamic capital structure with callable debt and debt renegotiations

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm's capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders' own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders' bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.     

Investor heterogeneity,market segmentation,leverage and the equity premium puzzle

Financial economists for the past two decades have attempted to explain why the equity premium is so high, now known as the equity premium puzzle (EPP). We model investor heterogeneity, market segmentation and optimal leverage, using the time separable standard power utility, market completeness and ignoring transaction costs to explain the EPP. We explain both the EPP and the related risk-free rate puzzle without resorting to preference modification. Furthermore, we show a unique interior equilibrium for the debt ratio, contrary to the work by F. Modigliani, M.H. Miller (The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48 (1958) 261–297; Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital, American Economic Review 53 (1963), 433–443) and S.C. Myers (Presidential address: The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance 39 (1984), 575–592). Our simulations show the relevance of our models.     

Debt Tax Shields Around the OECD World

Taxes affect a company’s optimal capital structure, value, and cost of capital, but their impact depends on the tax regime of the country where the company operates. The OECD classifies the tax regimes of its member countries in seven groups. In this paper we offer a general model that encompasses those seven groups. We show that tax benefits of debt vary significantly across tax systems, and that using either Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) or Miller’s (1977) formulas in other tax regimes can lead to quantitatively important mistakes. We also find a significantly positive relationship between average leverage in OECD countries and our indicator of tax shields.     

THE FAMA‐FRENCH MODEL,LEVERAGE, AND THE MODIGLIANI‐MILLER PROPOSITIONS

For a cost‐of‐equity model to conform to the Modigliani‐Miller cost‐of‐capital propositions, any sensitivity coefficients in the model must be related to the firm's leverage. In this paper I apply these principles to the Fama‐French model for the cost of equity and develop the relation between its sensitivity coefficients and firm leverage. I then examine an empirical process developed by Fama and French (1997) to model the evolution through time of their sensitivity coefficients and show that this empirical process is inconsistent with the Modigliani‐Miller propositions. Separable functions are proposed for these sensitivity coefficients that are consistent with the Modigliani‐Miller propositions.     

Capital Structure Theory and the Fisher Effect

This paper incorporates capital structure theory to model the response of nominal interest rates to expected inflation in a world with taxes. Within an otherwise common framework, the model includes Modigliani-Miller (MM) and Miller capital structure theory, as well as a variation of the Miller model with bankruptcy costs, developed by DeAngelo and Masulis. Within this framework, we derive an equation to predict the response of nominal interest rates under each capital structure hypothesis. With MM theory, our model predicts di_D/d_π value consistent with empirically observed ranges. With Miller theory, the predictions are inaccurate. With DeAngelo-Masulis, the predictions vary widely; the midpoint of the predicted range is less accurate than with Miller theory.     

现代资本结构理论

自Modigliani和Miller提出MM理论以来,资本结构问题一直是理论界和实务界关注的焦点.本文从MM理论及其修正--基于税差的分析、基于权衡理论的资本结构理论、信息不对称条件下的资本结构理论、资本结构的实证研究四个方面阐述了自20世纪50年代以来资本结构理论的发展和研究成果,试图为我国学者开展资本结构研究提供借鉴.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

Personal bankruptcy costs: Their relevance and some estimates

The paper argues that there is a need for the formal treatment of personal bankruptcy costs in the finance literature. The need arises out of the relevance of such costs to both corporate and personal financing decisions. We show that (a) personal bankruptcy costs (like personal taxes) are relevant to the corporate capital structure problem and that (b) differential bankruptcy costs across corporations and individuals can result in a clientele model of individual investment-borrowing decision which could lead to institutional arrangements designed to minimize combined bankruptcy costs. Further, we develop a theory of personal bankruptcy and a set of testable hypothesis with regard to their costs. Some preliminary estimates of personal bankruptcy costs are reported which suggest that they are higher than corporate bankruptcy costs. There is also some evidence of economics of scale in personal bankruptcy costs.     

Presidential Address: Collateral and Commitment

Optimal dynamic capital structure choice is fundamentally a problem of commitment. In a standard trade‐off setting with shareholder‐debtholder agency conflicts, full commitment counterfactually predicts the firm would rely almost exclusively on debt financing. Conversely, absent commitment a Modigliani‐Miller‐like value irrelevance and policy indeterminacy result holds. Thus, the content of dynamic trade‐off theory must depend on the commitment technology. In this context, collateral is valuable as a low‐cost commitment device. Because ex ante optimal commitments are likely to be suboptimal ex post, observed capital structure dynamics will exhibit hysteresis and depart significantly from standard predictions.     

An empirical re-examination of the dividend–investment relation

Modigliani and Miller show that, in perfect capital markets, the optimal investment decisions of a firm are not affected by how these investments are financed. Miller and Modigliani further imply that, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, a firm's investment decisions are not affected by its dividend decisions, although dividend decisions may or may not be influenced by investment decisions. Fama and Miller label this result the separation principle. Most recent studies of the separation principle that take into account the existence of market imperfections report sharply contradictory results. This paper tests for linear and nonlinear causality between dividends and investments using both firm-specific and aggregate data for a sample of 417 firms over the 1962 to 2004 period. In general, linear causality tests support the separation principle, whereas nonlinear causality test results contradict the separation principle by revealing strong bi-directional linkages between dividends and investments.     

Optimal capital structure: A multi-period programming model for use in financial planning

This paper describes a multi-period, chance constrained mathematical programming model to compute for each period, the firm's optimal debt to equity ratio and the optimal maturity distribution of its debt. The model assumes that the firm's objective is to maximize total value of the firm, and that the firm operates in a world of uncertainty, with corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs. Finally, the actual coupon rate paid by the firm which is commensurate to the risk of default is endogenously determined by the model.     

Human Capital,Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure

We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.