规制、腐败与规制改革

文章对政府规制与腐败的因果关系进行了深入的分析,指出规制具有限制市场竞争的特点,而市场竞争被抑制的领域必然会产生经济租,经济租诱发寻租活动,对规制权力监管的缺陷导致腐败行为的发生。在此基础上,文章提出了有效减少腐败的规制改革方案。     

腐败与反腐败的理论逻辑

在经济飞速发展和改革逐步深入的今天,腐败问题已成为危害经济社会生活的毒瘤,而反腐败工作也日益提上了议事日程。本文描述了腐败对政治、经济与社会的危害,并在系统地分析了腐败成因的基础上,详细地论述了预防与治理并举的反腐败逻辑。     

Corruption and Age

In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption. The major aim in the paper is to investigate empirically the correlation between age and justifiability of corruption. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey that span the period from 1981 to 1999 to distinguish between an age effect (the changing attitudes of the same cohort over time) and a cohort effect (the differences in attitudes among similar age groups in different time periods). The results suggest that there is a strong age effect and no cohort effect.     

Corruption and privatization

This paper analyses the relation between corruption and privatization. In particular, we study how corruption affects the acquisition price and the post-privatization market structure. The model predicts that privatization in countries with highly corrupt government results in a higher degree of market concentration than in countries where governments are less corrupt. The acquisition price is also likely to be higher when a government is highly corrupt than when government officials are honest or moderately corrupt. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we demonstrate that a stronger propensity to embezzle state revenues may reduce government officials' benefits from corruption. The reason is that the more eager the government officials are to take bribes, the cheaper they are to buy.     

腐败问题研究

文章就腐败问题提出了两个论点。第一,政府机构和政治进程的结构是决定腐败程度的关键因素。软弱的政府因对其附属机构无法进行有效的控制从而导致了较高程度的腐败。第二,与税收相比,腐败的非法性和隐蔽性使其更容易受到扭曲,代价也更大。这些结论说明了为什么在一些欠发达国家,腐败程度如此之高,给发展带来的代价如此之大。     

中国转型期腐败和反腐败问题研究(下篇)

作者认为，经过艰苦探索，党和政府已经找到了在改革开放和建设社会主义现代化建设的新的历史条件下有效遇止腐败的新路，即依靠体制改革和制度创新从源头上预防和治理腐败并在这方面取得了可喜的成就。最后，笔者就中国下一步如何进行反腐败体制改革和制度创新，从治理和善治的角度提出了一整套政策性建议。     

Corruption,competition and democracy

This paper presents a model of the interaction between corrupt government officials and industrial firms to show that corruption is antithetical to competition. It is hypothesized that a government agent that controls access to a formal market has a self-interest in demanding a bribe payment that serves to limit the number of firms. This corrupt official will also be subject to a detection technology that is a function of the amount of the bribe payment and the number of firms that pay it. Under quite normal assumptions about the shape of the graph of the detection function, multiple equilibria can arise where one equilibrium is characterized by high corruption and low competition, and another is characterized by low corruption and high competition. Some suggestive empirical evidence is presented that supports the main hypothesis that competition and corruption are negatively related.     

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than that announced. We compute equilibrium corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: (i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, and (ii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence equilibrium corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.     

Corruption, inflation and growth

We present a model in which the embezzlement of tax revenues by public officials leads the government to rely more on seigniorage to finance its expenditures. This raises inflation which depresses investment and growth via a cash-in-advance constraint.     

不该污染的学术净土——学术腐败话题三人谈

中国的学术界在过去是处于长期封闭的,为什么打开之后会有这么多学术腐败的现象呢?这就说明整个一套体系不健全,刚开放的时候马上所有问题都暴露出来了。随着中国加入ＷＴＯ,必将开始出现以真本事来评判人的体制。用人机制要变,这就直接涉及到抵制学术腐败的问题。     

Corruption for sales

This paper investigates the impact of corruption on foreign affiliates’ sales of German multinationals that differ in their level of experience in the foreign market. We exploit the panel dimension of a detailed firm-level dataset to show that more experienced firms are less likely to suffer from the costs related to corruption. Controlling for persistent and unobserved factors at the country and firm levels, we show that corruption reduces unambiguously the sales of new entering firms, while having no impact on the sales of incumbents.     

Wages and Other Determinants of Corruption

Raising wages has commonly been viewed as an anticorruption policy by policymakers from both governments and multilateral development organizations. Conventional wisdom and recent theoretical work suggest that low wages encourage corruption. Nevertheless, the empirical studies done on the wage– corruption tradeoff are econometric estimates that find no conclusive support for the effectiveness of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure. The unique contributions of this paper are the application of an expected utility model to explain the emergence of corruption, and the use of comparative static results that are consistent with the empirical evidence and useful for the design of anticorruption policies. The most important result from the expected utility model is that anticorruption policies designed to increase the net income of potentially corrupt agents not only may be ineffective but may actually encourage corruption.     

政府审计监督与腐败治理

政府审计监督是腐败监督体系中的重要组成部分,主要通过对权力的制约和监督实现腐败治理.当前,改革、发展、法治、反腐是主题,政府审计如何在法治框架下实现腐败治理具有重要的现实意义.本文认为,基于政府审计与腐败之间的关系,政府审计应该从权力审计、审计信息共享机制、审计监督的协作机制、审计预警机制、国际借鉴等方面实现腐败治理.     

结构调整和体制改革:解决我国经济运行质量问题的战略性课题

在连续 4年积极的财政政策的作用下 ,我国经济仍然在低位徘徊 ,说明长期困扰我们的结构性、体制性等深层次问题仍然是制约我国经济发展的主要矛盾。结构调整要从三次产业构成入手 ,尽快提升第三产业 ;重视传统工业的技术改造和产品的更新换代 ;反省农村工作的指导思想 ,解决好农业富裕劳动力向第二、三产业转化和农村人口城市化、农业生产现代化工作。今后一个时期的经济体制改革的重点要放在营造发挥企业市场主体作用的微观方面 ,搞好国有企业改革、金融体制改革和社会保障制度改革。消除“准国民待遇”和“超国民待遇”问题。     

企业改革与企业家

本从国有企业的改革入手,较系统地探讨了企业改革与企业家的关系,指出了建立现代企业制度,进行制度创新的必要性。章还列出了企业家产生与成长的外部条件。     

关于腐败的八个问题

本文讨论了有关公共腐败的八个问题,即什么是腐败?哪些国家最腐败?严重腐败的国家有哪些共同特征?如何确定腐败的数量?官员们领取更高的工资能否减少腐败?竞争减少腐败吗?为何最近很少有成功抵制腐败的尝试?腐败影响增长吗?文章最后总结了腐败问题研究的新领域。     

关于腐败问题的经济学思考

本文从腐败产生的历史环境入手,通过对腐败行为、群众举报、司法工作的经济学分析,得出治理腐败经济学分析的几点启示。     

Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies

We re-examine alternative hierarchical designs for controlling corruption as studied by Bac (J. Comp. Econom.22,2:99–118), since his formulation of the principal's problem was incomplete. In a basic hierarchy, while collusion between a supervisor and his subordinate agent may prevent implementation of high corruption outcomes, the principal would be able to induce relatively low corruption outcomes. In a two-level decentralized supervision chain, internal collusion in the upper part always induces collusion at the bottom but not vice-versa. For nonincreasing returns-to-scale monitoring technologies, the principal prefers a decentralized hierarchy to a centralized hierarchy.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1997,25(3), pp. 322–344. Department of Economics and Accounting, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 3BX, United Kingdom.     

中国转型期腐败和反腐败问题研究(上篇)

本文分析了中国转型期腐败行为的类型，程度和发展演变趋势，并运用制度分析法剖析了诱发腐败的动机结构，机会结构和软约束机构，作者认为，经过艰苦探索，党和政府已经找到了在改革开放和建设社会主义现代化建设的新的历史条件下有效遏止腐败的新路，即依靠体制改革和制度创新从源头上预防和治理腐败并在这方面取得了可喜的成就，最后，笔者就中国下一步如何进行反腐败体制改革和制度创新，从治理和善治的角度提出了一整套政策性建议。