BRETTON WOODS, THROUGH THE LENS OF STATE-OF-THE-ART MACROTHEORY AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM

‘Le moyen d'avoir raison dans l'avenir est, á certainesheures, de savoir se résigner a etre démodé’(E. Renan. 1882, p. 56).     

BRETTON WOODS - ORIGINAL INTENTIONS AND CURRENT PROBLEMS

The Bretton Woods institutions have been subjected to a variety of criticisms in recent years and have been faced with severe problems in carrying out their objectives. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have not performed in accordance with the original intentions of their founders. As shown in this article, this is in large measure because the world economic environment has been quite different from that envisaged by the participants in the Bretton Woods conference. Many of the original intended functions for these institutions are no longer relevant. This article examines the current problems facing the IMF and World Bank, with special attention to how they are related to the original intentions. For example, in recent years, a major problem has been the financial crises of member countries that have liberalized their economies in line with trends toward globalization. These crises have resulted in demands on the IMF and World Bank for financial assistance for purposes other than those for which their assistance was originally designed. Other problems of the two institutions include providing assistance to the world's poorest countries that have made virtually no development progress in recent years, and assisting the former communist countries in transition to market economies. The author gives his personal views on how these and other problems of the IMF and World Bank should be dealt with.     

PROSPECTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM CONSTITUTION

Cost-benefit reasons account for the adoption of the pre-World War I gold standard and the Bretton Woods system–the closest approximations to a constitution for the international monetary system that the world has experienced. Past rule-based international monetary proposals that were rejected were judged not to serve national interests. Current proposals do not deal with policymakers' and governments' self-interest in preserving their existing power to choose domestic objectives and to adopt policies to achieve those objectives.     

LDC DEBT: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

For a combination of reasons that differ among countries, many developing countries' foreign debt service obligations have become difficult to meet. The size of the problem in 1982 raised concern over the stability of the banking system. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided the forum through which the international community's strategy for meeting this concern has evolved. The IMF also played, and continues to play, an active role in helping to finance the structural and balance-of-payments adjustments needed in countries with debt service problems. The IMF's involvement is an integral part of the broader strategy, which builds on the cooperation of debtors and creditors, on a case-by-case basis. The objective is to share the burden in a balanced way. Obtaining adequate adjustment in deficit countries is central to the strategy, but the Baker Plan increased the emphasis on restoring longer-term growth through more far-reaching structural adjustments supported by longer-term financing. The IMF has modified and enhanced some of its lending facilities in light of this emphasis. However, though the short-term nature of its lending was critical in averting a possible banking crisis during 1982 and 1983, it diminishes somewhat the IMF's role in financing the more protracted adjustments now required.     

REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM BASED ON SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA

In the midst of the current global economic crisis, China's central bank governor came out with a proposal to reform the international monetary system based on special drawing rights, contrary to the general expectation of the international community. Although many believe the announcement was politically motivated to address the dollar problem, the reform idea may have important bearings upon the future evolution of the economic integration of Asia. This paper reviews the implications of the reform proposal for the Asian region.     

人民币国际化与国际货币体系改革

从美国债务上限调整的议案及美国信贷主权评级的下调,可见现行由美元和欧元所组成的二元国际货币体系并不稳定。为测度出人民币的引入能否增加国际货币体系的稳定性,本文先建立面板回归模型分析影响一国货币国际化的基础条件因素,并在模型的基础上,测度出人民币在可自由兑换后将成为一个能与欧元相互抗衡的国际货币。通过方差比较,本文论证了由美元、欧元和人民币三种货币所组成的外汇储备组合较二元体系下的稳定,说明人民币国际化有助于改革现行的二元体系,使国际货币体系发展成为更稳定的三元体系,从而促进全球经济的健康发展。     

NON-SEPARABLE CONSUMPTION-LABOR CHOICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS: A NOTE

This paper derives in the model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) a steady state that is stationary in the presence of monetary policy shocks. To this end, the impact of monetary policy shocks on the current account is shut off by assuming that the preferences of households exhibit a particular non-separability between consumption and labor supply. [F31, F41]     

THE TRANSITION TO EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE

The European Monetary Institute (EMI) will prepare a framework for European Monetary Union (EMU) monetary policy during the transition to the EMU. This involves a trade-off between deepening financial market integration and harmonizing central bank instruments, a choice between centralized and decentralized monetary strategies with significant welfare implications, and a trade-off between expected welfare and certainty of policy outcomes. As a result of being dominated by national central bankers and of the conflict between the core and the periphery of the European Community (EC), the EMI is biased toward an inefficient solution. Enlargement of the EC by the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) group would raise the probability of a more efficient, two-track EMU, which initially would involve only the core group.     

INTERNATIONAL CREDIT CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY: AN EMPIRICAL NOTE

A longstanding macroeconomic issue is how monetary policy affects the real economy. There are economists placing an emphasis on the role of bank lending in monetary transmission. Their view, called the credit view, is that a monetary tightening shifts the supply schedule of bank loans left, thereby forcing bank‐dependent borrowers to cut back on expenditures. In the literature, the credit view is typically studied in a closed‐economy context. In reality, however, banks make international loans through their overseas branches and subsidiaries. This suggests that the credit view should be studied in an open‐economy context. This paper proposes the international credit view: a monetary‐policy shock originated in one country propagates to another through banks’ reallocation of funds between the two countries. For testing the hypothesis, Australia and New Zealand provide an excellent case to study. This is because Australian‐owned banks dominate the banking market in New Zealand. This paper aims to test the international credit view within a framework of vector auto‐regression models. A significant and robust finding is that the supply schedule of loans shifts left in New Zealand after a monetary tightening in Australia.     

THE INSTABILITY IN THE MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTION AND THE ESTIMATION OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS

We extend Romer and Romer's (2004) analysis of the estimation and the effects of monetary policy shocks by controlling for (1) changes in the monetary policy reaction function and (2) changes in the response of output and prices over time with an extended data set. The results suggest that the post 1979 responses of output and prices to a monetary policy shock are significantly different from what has been reported for the whole sample: While output and prices respond significantly and negatively if their response is estimated for the whole sample period (1969–2005), the response of output is insignificant for the period of 1979–2005, and the response of prices is much weaker. The analysis of the changes in the monetary policy conducted over time allows us to partly attribute the diminished price and output responses to a successful monetary policy which led to a less volatile economy during the great moderation. (JEL E52, E32, C50)