对湖北省十堰市农民贷款抵押品相关问题的调查

贷款抵押品问题直接关系到农民是否能够获得贷款。目前我国农村正处于发展的关键时期,农村城镇化建设急需大量的信贷支持。农民发展特色农业和专业合作社也急需大量的大额农贷。由于受许多因素的制约,农民贷款缺乏抵押品问题严重影响了其正常获得贷款。本文通过对目前农村贷款抵押品相关问题的调查,试图找出问题存在的原因和解决对策,以解决抵押品不足等问题,促进我国"三农"事业健康稳定发展。     

中央银行抵押品政策研究

2007年爆发的次贷危机,其负面冲击至今还严重影响着全球的实体经济。在这场危机中,各国中央银行都不遗余力地维持金融体系的稳定。多国中央银行作为整个金融体系的“最后贷款人”,采取了向商业银行发放再贷款,以维持其流动性的措施。然而,出于政策性目的的再贷款往往与中央银行资产收益性的要求发生冲突,存在债务人不能按时偿还再贷款本息的风险。部分国家的中央银行存在低息或无息再贷款,也蕴涵着相应的信用风险。另一方面,近年来随着我国商业银行的不良贷款率上升,流动性水平下降,资金风险敞口扩大,再贷款的违约风险也相应增加。因此,对贷款对象收取抵押品是防范中央银行风险的重要内容。本课题主要通过研究国外中央银行的抵押品政策,提出人民银行防范资产风险的可借鉴措施。     

央行合格抵押品制度的法律思考

2013年,人民银行在创设常备借贷便利等新型货币政策工具的同时,引入了合格抵押品制度。作为一项相对较新且具有广阔发展前景的货币政策调控工具,有必要在其发展初期对相关问题进行厘定。本文主要就合格抵押品制度的法律属性及其特点进行理论分析,并提出相关建议。     

中央银行抵押品政策的设计思路研究

国际经验表示,中央银行抵押品政策在保障中央银行资产安全,维护金融市场稳定方面有着显著效果。本文将研究中央银行抵押品政策,并着重分析金融危机期间中央银行抵押品政策设计思路的国际经验。     

中央银行抵押品制度框架相关问题研究

金融危机以来,发达经济体中央银行广泛使用抵押品政策以支持其非常规货币政策的实施,合格抵押品范围随之不断扩大.本文研究主要国家中央银行抵押品政策的主要内容及其最新变化,在分析抵押品政策内涵基础上,结合人民银行抵押品管理现状,对抵押品制度实施过程存在的问题进行剖析,从完善质押再贷款流程、健全内部评级体系等方面提出完善我国中央银行抵押品制度的措施建议.     

现代金融流动性创造中的抵押品渠道

阐述了抵押品创造金融流动性的过程,分析出源头抵押品规模的下降及扩展抵押次数的下降是雷曼破产后金融流动性大幅萎缩的原因,将抵押品市场与全球主要央行的非常规货币政策相联系,分析其利弊,最后提出相关政策建议。     

周锋荣：抵押品风险监控手段亟须提高

中国农业银行江西省余干县支行周锋荣2011年8月27日来稿指出,银行业应重视抵押品的风险管理,不断提高风险监控手段。一是正确确定抵押品。在办理抵押贷款时,银行必须对每一笔抵押贷款都认真细致地审查,确定抵押品,使之合规合法,更好地防范风险。要注重选择多品种的抵押品,除主要采取房地产抵押方式外,可考虑用企业的专利技术、有公开评估值的商标、机器设备、企业股权等来办理贷款抵押。二是合理估值抵押品。     

建议适当放宽中小金融机构合格抵押品范围

本文在我国以抵押方式进行货币政策操作种类和规模不断增加的新常态下,对我国央行现行再贷款抵押品范围和一家中小金融机构合格抵押品情况展开分析,从而提出适当放宽中小金融机构提供抵押品范围的建议。     

国外央行抵押品政策调整实践与借鉴意义

抵押品政策是央行货市政策操作的配套制度安排。从政策实践看,在国际金融危机影响沉重时期,欧美日等主要国家和地区央行对抵押品政策做出相应的调整,增强对市场流动性的支持。本文在梳理抵押品政策规则基础上,回顾国际上央行抵押品政策的变化特点,进而探讨这一发展趋势对于完善国内央行抵押品操作的借鉴意义。     

抵押风险分析和抵押贷款违约损失率研究

违约损失率是BaselⅡ规定的六大风险指标之一,而抵押是BaselⅡ标准法规定的信用风险缓释工具之一,两者在巴塞尔新资本协议中有着非常关键的地位和作用.本文总结了国内外违约损失率的研究概况,在利用历史数据对我国商业银行抵押贷款的违约损失率进行实证分析后发现：（1）回收率同融资金额成反比;（2）回收率同融资折率成反比;（3）回收率呈“U”型分布.本文的分析有助于进一步探究我国商业银行抵押贷款违约损失率的特征,是量化风险暴露和计算监管资本的基础,并为我们下一步的折率研究做好了铺垫.     

抵押风险分析和抵押贷款违约损失率研究

违约损失率是BaselⅡ规定的六大风险指标之一,而抵押是BaselⅡ标准法规定的信用风险缓释工具之一,两者在巴塞尔新资本协议中有着非常关键的地位和作用.本文总结了国内外违约损失率的研究概况,在利用历史数据对我国商业银行抵押贷款的违约损失率进行实证分析后发现:(1)回收率同融资金额成反比;(2)回收率同融资折率成反比;(3)回收率呈"U"型分布.本文的分析有助于进一步探究我国商业银行抵押贷款违约损失率的特征,是量化风险暴露和计算监管资本的基础,并为我们下一步的折率研究做好了铺垫.     

Loan Rates and Collateral

We investigate the relation between corporate loan spreads and collateralization. We use propensity scoring to create a matched sample of pairs of loan facilities from the Dealscan database. We find that noncollateralized loans are associated with lower spreads even after controlling for risk.     

股票抵押贷款预期回收率比较分析

股票抵押贷款是一种风险较大的产品.股票价值和收益的高波动性造成抵押品价值的回收率不稳定,进而影响贷款预期回收率,使得银行经营风险加大.为了有效估算股票抵押贷款回收率,本文运用预期回收率模型,借助中国色诺芬股票数据库和美国CRSP股票数据库信息,比较分析不同市场情况下预期回收率的区别.分析发现中国市场由于近几年股票波动率加强,整体预期回收率较低,而美国则相反;预期回收率与抵押率、违约概率都成负相关关系,而且预期回收率对于抵押率的变化非常敏感;60%贷款抵押率的设定在美国市场是可行的,而中国市场合理抵押率是54%左右.     

Money and Collateral

This paper presents a model in which collateralized monetary loans are essential as trading instruments. Money and private debt collateralized by real assets complement each other as allocative tools in an environment with informational and commitment limitations. Public debt may play a socially beneficial role when collateral is scarce.     

The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Abstract:  Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentive-compatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self-selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting-by-observed-risk or the sorting-by-private information paradigms on their own.     

Collateral in Monetary Policy Operations

We present a portfolio decision model for banks that permits us to estimate the costs associated with the need to collateralise loans from the central bank. This allows us to calibrate the difference between a restrictive collateral eligibility framework for open market operations, such as that applied by the FED, with a more flexible approach such as that of Eurosystem. We also document that there could potentially appear relevant cost differences between the various collateral mobilisation procedures (pooling and earmarking) that currently coexist in the eurozone.     

Are the Liquidity and Collateral Roles of Asset Bubbles Different?

Several papers explain why asset bubbles are observed when growth is large. These papers differ in the role of the bubble, used to provide liquidities or as collateral in a borrowing constraint. We compare the liquidity and collateral roles of bubbles in an overlapping generations model. When the bubble is deterministic, the equilibrium is identical under these two roles, implying that the same mechanism explains the crowding-in effect of the bubble on growth. With stochastic bubbles, growth is larger when bubbles play the liquidity role, because the burst of a bubble used for liquidity is less damaging to capital investors.     

The Role of Collateral in the Credit Acquisition Process: Evidence from SME Lending

This study tests the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private information on debt term contracts in a multi‐period setting, using a dataset of 12,666 credit approvals by one major Portuguese commercial bank during 2007–2010. The main results show that borrowers with good credit scores that know they have a high probability of success and are unlikely to default are more willing to pledge collateral in return for a lower interest rate premium (IRP). Furthermore, lenders tailor the specific terms of the contract, increasing both collateral requirements and the IRP from observed risk, for borrowers operating in riskier industries and with less credit availability. The results are robust to controls for joint debt terms negotiation and the degree of collateralization offered by the borrower.     

Collateral Framework: Liquidity Premia and Multiple Equilibria

Central banks normally accept debt of their own governments as collateral in liquidity operations without reservations. This gives rise to a valuable liquidity premium that reduces the cost of government finance. The ECB is an interesting exception in this respect. It relies on external assessments of the creditworthiness of its member states, such as credit ratings, to determine eligibility and the haircut it imposes on such debt. We show how such features in a central bank's collateral framework can give rise to cliff effects and multiple equilibria in bond yields and increase the vulnerability of governments to external shocks. This policy can potentially induce sovereign debt crises and defaults that would not otherwise occur. The success of the ECB's temporary suspension of these features of its collateral framework during the pandemic illustrates the practical relevance of this mechanism.