Angels and non-angels: Are there differences?

The market for informal venture capital is an elusive and nearly invisible source of financing for entrepreneurial ventures. This market consists of a diverse set of high net worth individuals (business angels) who invest a portion of their assets in high-risk, high-return entrepreneurial ventures. The emerging consensus of the characteristics of the individual investor is that of a well-educated,middle-aged individual with considerable business experience and a substantial net worth. These informal investors appear to prefer investing in the early start-up stage of the venture and, if given a choice, prefer that their investments be located close to home. One consequence of this consensus is the tendency to assume that the traits of these business angels are as tightly clustered around the norm as are the traits of venture capital funds. They are not. In terms of their competence in the many areas of venture investing, these Individual investors range from the successful, cashed-out entrepreneur on the one hand to individuals with little or no experience with venture investing on the other. At the same time, little is known about the characteristics of high net worth individuals who never ventured where angels dare to tread, or about these non-angels' propensity to join the fold. Thus, this study seeks to fill the void by examining the characteristics of high net worth individuals regardless of their investment history or their interest in venture investing.An analysis of the data reveals three groups of high net worth Individuals: business angels with experience investing in entrepreneurial ventures, interested potential investors with no venture investment history but who express a desire to enter the venture investment market, and uninterested potential investors who under no circumstances would consider investing in entrepreneurial ventures as part of their investment strategy. Business angels and potential investors (both the interested and non-interested segment) share similar views about the economic significance of the entrepreneur and the difficulty in securing the equity capital for development of the venture. As the issues move from the general to the specific, divergence in investment attitudes takes place among the two groups, but this divergence is in terms of magnitude or intensity, rather than in contrasting or opposing views of the process. The potential investor tends to view investing in entrepreneurial ventures on a smaller scale than the active investor, especially in terms of the dollar amount committed to any one investment. While the business angel is more interested than the potential investor across all stages of financing, the interest for both groups increases as the type of financing progresses from the seed stage to expansion financing. In contrast, the potential investor is more likely to seek diversification as a motivation for venture investing than their angel counterparts.The potential investor pool is segmented into those potential investors who appear willing to take on the role of business angels and those individuals who have no desire to participate in the venture market. For the interested group to increase their interest in providing venture capital, these potential investors want assistance in monitoring the performance of the venture investment, followed by assistance in pricing and structuring. Both of these resources relate more to the technical aspects of venture investing and Indicate that these are the areas where the potential investor is least likely to have expertise. Other resources, such as finding and evaluating the investment opportunity, appear to represent less of a stimulus for the potential investor. In many respects, interested potential investors act like business angels across several dimensions. Both consider the later stages of the development of the venture as the preferred stage to invest. The business angel and interested potential investor prefer investments to be located relatively close to their primary residence and share similar views on the amount of the investment portfolio to allocate to venture investing. Where the interested potential investor and business angel clearly differ is on the scale of the commitment and the motivation for investing. The potential investor will commit a smaller dollar amount to any one venture, is more inclined to participate with other investors, and is more apt to see venture investing as a diversification strategy than is the seasoned business angel.     

Passion for entrepreneurship or passion for the product? A conjoint analysis of angel and VC decision-making

Passion is important to venture investors, but what specifically do they want entrepreneurs to be passionate about? This study theorizes that angel investors and venture capitalists consider both entrepreneurs' passion for activities related to the product or service the venture provides (i.e., product passion) and passion for founding and developing new ventures (i.e., entrepreneurial passion). We demonstrate that both types of passion become more appealing when the investor perceives that the entrepreneur is highly open and receptive to feedback, suggesting that openness to feedback mitigates potential concerns associated with passion in its extremes. We further find that venture investors differ in their consideration of passion; angel investors and venture capitalists with more investing experience place greater emphasis on the combination of product passion and openness to feedback, whereas those with more entrepreneurial experience emphasize the combination of entrepreneurial passion and openness to feedback.     

The role of domestic and cross-border venture capital investors in the growth of portfolio companies

This paper studies how the presence of cross-border as opposed to domestic venture capital investors is associated with the growth of portfolio companies. For this purpose, we use a longitudinal research design and track sales, total assets and payroll expenses in 761 European technology companies from the year of initial venture capital investment up to seven years thereafter. Findings demonstrate how companies initially backed by domestic venture capital investors exhibit higher growth in the short term compared to companies backed by cross-border investors. In the medium term, companies initially backed by cross-border venture capital investors exhibit higher growth compared to companies backed by domestic investors. Finally, companies that are initially funded by a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border venture capital investors exhibit the highest growth. Overall, this study provides a more fine-grained understanding of the role that domestic and cross-border venture capital investors can play as their portfolio companies grow and thereby require different resources or capabilities over time.     

A theoretical analysis of optimal financing strategies for different types of capital-constrained entrepreneurs

In this paper, we compare two alternative financing strategies that capital-constrained entrepreneurs can adopt: they can either wait until they raised enough money to complete their project (the more conservative strategy) or use limited resources to achieve some intermediate milestone before contacting large outside investors such as venture capitalists (the more adventurous strategy). We examine how the choice of financing strategy is affected by entrepreneurial types (life-style, serial and pure profit-maximizing entrepreneur). We show that specific entrepreneurial characteristics may ultimately affect the shape of firms as they may pursue different strategies to achieve similar goals. The paper generates a number of empirical predictions on security design, the interplay between angel and venture capital finance, and the professionalization of the venture capital market.     

风险资本退出时机和退出方式的确定原理

风险企业或者其部分股份能否高价出售 ,让风险资本带着丰厚的利润退出是风险投资的关键。风险资本退出的两个基本问题是何时退出和怎样退出 ,即退出时机和退出方式问题。理论上 ,风险投资周期由项目边际增加值和项目边际成本共同确定。实际上 ,风险资本退出时机和退出方式还受到风险企业其他投资者、交易双方信息不对称、风险资本家的管理能力、预先签定的投资协议和市场形势影响。     

Angels or Sharks? The Role of Personal Characteristics in Angel Investment Decisions

We use actual negotiations between angel investors and entrepreneurs to study the impact of personal characteristics on investment outcomes. We construct a unique data set with 707 investment requests led by 1,089 entrepreneurs and find that the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur, including gender, race, and age, are correlated with requested valuations, the likelihood that an offer is received, and the implied valuation when an angel investor extends an offer. Shared personal characteristics between entrepreneurs and investors also affect the likelihood that an investor makes an offer, the entrepreneur accepts an offer, and the implied valuation when an offer is extended.     

Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries

The rapid internationalization of markets for venture capital is expanding the funding alternatives available to entrepreneurs. For venture capital firms, this trend spells intensified competition in markets already at or past saturation. At issue for both entrepreneurs and venture capital firms is how and when venture capitalists (VCs) can provide meaningful oversight and add value to their portfolio companies beyond the provision of capital. An important way VCs add value beyond the money they provide is through their close relationships with the managers of their portfolio companies. Whereas some VCs take a very hands-off approach to oversight, others become deeply involved in the development of their portfolio companies.Utilizing surveys of VCs in the United States and the three largest markets in Europe (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France), we examined the determinants of interaction between VCs and CEOs, the roles VCs assume, and VCs' perceptions of how much value they add through these roles. We examined the strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles through which VCs are involved in their portfolio companies, and we analyzed how successful such efforts were. By so doing we were able to shed light on how and when VCs in four major markets expend their greatest effort to provide oversight and value-added assistance to their investment companies.Consistent with prior empirical work, we found that VCs saw strategic involvement as their most important role, i.e., providing financial and business advice and functioning as a sounding board. They rated their interpersonal roles (as mentor and confidant to CEOs) as next in value.Finally, they rated their networking roles (i.e., as contacts to other firms and professionals) as third most important. These ratings were consistent across all four markets. VCs in the United States and the United Kingdom were the most involved in their ventures, and they added the most value. VCs in France were the least involved and added the least value; VCs in France appeared to be least like others in terms of what factors drove their efforts. Our theoretical models explained a greater proportion of variance in governance and value added in the United States than elsewhere. Clear patterns of behavior emerged that reflect the manner in which different markets operate. Among the European markets, practices in the United Kingdom appear to be most like that in the United States.Determinants of Governance (Face-to-Face Interaction)We operationalized VC governance or monitoring of ventures as the amount of face-to-face interaction VCs had with venture CEOs. We found some evidence that VCs increase monitoring in response to agency risks, but the results were mixed. Lack of experience on the part of CEOs did not prompt significant additional monitoring as had been predicted. A more potent determinant was how long the VC-CEO pairs worked together; longer relationships mitigated agency concerns and reduced monitoring. Contrary to expectations, perceived business risk in the form of VCs' satisfaction with recent venture performance had little impact on face-to-face interaction. Monitoring was greatest in early stage ventures, indicating that VCs respond to high uncertainty by increased information exchange with CEOs. We measured two types of VC experience and found different patterns for the two. Generally speaking, VCs with greater experience in the venture capital industry required less interaction with CEOs, whereas VCs with greater experience in the portfolio company's industry interacted more frequently with CEOs than did VCs without such experience.Determinants of Value AddedWe argued that VCs would most add value to ventures when the venture lacked resources or faced perceived business risks, when the task environment was highly uncertain, and when VCs had great investing and operating experience. Contrary to expectations, VCs added most value to those ventures already performing well. As we had predicted, VCs did add relatively more value when uncertainty was high: e.g., for ventures in the earliest stages and for ventures pursuing innovation strategies. Finally, we found that VCs with operating experience in the venture's focal industry added significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs have a strong preference for VCs with similar backgrounds as their own. We found no evidence that experience in the venture capital industry contributed significantly to value added. Together, these results suggest that investigations of the social as well as economic dimensions of venture building may prove a fruitful avenue for future study. Overall, the results showed that value-added is strongly related to the amount of face-to-face interaction between VC-CEO pairs and to the number of hours VCs put in on each individual venture.Implications for Venture CapitalistsThe competition for attractive investments is heating up as economies become more globalized. Thus, the pressure on venture capital firms to operate both efficiently and effectively is also likely to build. It is as yet unclear whether the recent trend toward later stage, safer investments will continue, and how those venture capital firms following this path can differentiate themselves from other sources of capital. Venture capital firms that are able to choose the appropriate bases for determining governance effort and the appropriate roles for delivering added value to their portfolio companies will be those most likely to survive.In the largest, most robust markets (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom), more effort is expended by venture capitalists to deliver something of value beyond the money. This suggests that the tradeoff preferred by those succeeding is to be more rather than less involved in their investments. Our results indicate that VCs clearly economize on the time they devote to involvement in their portfolio companies. However, our results also indicate that they do this at the great peril of producing value insufficient to justify the cost of their product.Implications for EntrepreneursOur findings provide two important insights for entrepreneurs. First, they show that where and when they obtain venture capital is likely to have an impact on the extent and nature of effort delivered by their venture capital investors. It appears that on average entrepreneurs receiving venture capital in the United States and the United Kingdom will be more closely monitored and will receive more value-adding effort from their VCs than will those in France or the Netherlands. Needless to say, entrepreneurs should consider their preferences for level and type of involvement from their investors as they consider their choice of partners. In France, for example, VCs put great emphasis on their financial role in comparison with other roles, but they contribute much less than VCs elswhere via other strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles.The second key implication of our findings is that entrepreneurs may be able to gauge what roles VCs will see as most important, when VCs are more or less apt to become involved in their companies, and when they believe they can most add value. Such knowledge may help CEOs anticipate VC activity, be aware of the parameters of VCs' preferences, communicate their own preferences, and negotiate the timing and extent of interaction. For example, although our results indicate that geographic distance significantly limits face-to-face interaction, it appears to have less impact on the amount of value added.Implications for ResearchersMuch more can be learned about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of alternative governance arrangements. Little is known about how formal structures such as contract covenants and board control work in conjunction with informal oversight and interaction. Even less is known about how value is added and how it is best measured. Although this study took a step toward developing a model of the circumstances under which value is added, the theory and its operationalization await further development.     

International perspectives on the supply of informal venture capital

Despite major changes in the number and range of sources of finance for new and small ventures in the United Kingdom in recent years, there continues to be a shortage of risk capital for ventures actively seeking external equity finance. In the United States the informal venture capital market plays a major role in filling this equity gap, particularly in the early stages of venture development.However, there is little comparable information on the size of the informal venture capital pool in the United Kingdom or other European economies, despite recent recognition that the apparent underdevelopment of this market in the U.K. represents a major barrier to the development and growth of new ventures. This paper, therefore, presents the first analysis of the informal venture capital market in the U.K. and compares the characteristics and attitudes of U.K. informal investors with those in the U.S.The data reported in this paper have been obtained from a combination of postal survey and snowball sample techniques that generated useable information from 86 informal investors. Informal investors are playing an important role in venture financing in the U.K. in three ways: they make small scale investments in new and early stage ventures, where the equity gap is most significant; they are more permissive in their financing decisions than the formal venture capital industry in terms of having lower rejection rates, longer exit horizons, and lower target rates of return; and they invest locally and can thereby close the regional equity gap arising from the overconcentration of venture capital investment in the core South-East region in the U.K.In terms of demographics, U.K. informal investors share many of the characteristics of North American informal investors: they are predominantly male, with an entrepreneurial background, financially well-off without being super-rich, and identify investment opportunities from friends and business associates. There are a number of key differences, that may be attributable to differences in contextual factors such as personal tax regimes, regulatory environments, wealth distribution, and the structure of the formal venture capital and IPO markets. For example, U.K. informal investors are significantly older than those in the U.S. reflecting the influence of higher U.K. tax rates on the rate of capital and wealth accumulation.More generally, in comparison to U.S. investors, U.K. informal investors: have more investment opportunities brought to their attention; seriously consider more proposals but invest in no more opportunities; operate independently with syndication and joint investment relatively uncommon, reducing the average total investment per financing round available to ventures; fail to identify entrepreneurs themselves as a primary source of information on investment opportunities; have higher rate of return and capital gains expectations; are slightly less patient investors; and are rather less satisfied with the overall performance of their informal investment portfolios, reflecting intercountry and intertemporal variations in investment climate and conditions. It appears, therefore, that the general inefficiency of the informal capital market identified by Wetzel (1987) (which reflects the invisibility of informal investors, the fragmented nature of the market, and the imperfect channels of communication between investor and entrepreneur) is compounded in the U.K. case. The extent to which this reflects contextual differences on the one hand or simply a slower developmental process in the U.K. will only be common methodological basis. Based on the evidence presented in this paper, however, a key conclusion is that the information networks available to U.K. informal investors are less effective than those in North America, and in particular appear to contain lower quality information and a higher degree of redundant information. Specific forms of intervention in the market by, for example, stimulating the flow of information through the promotion of informal investment networking and brokerage services along the lines of U.S. and Canadian examples such as VCN and COIN therefore appear defensible.     

When does corporate venture capital investment create firm value?

Over the past decade, billions of dollars have been invested by established companies in entrepreneurial ventures—what is often referred to as corporate venture capital. Yet, there is little systematic evidence that corporate venture capital investment creates value to investing firms. Scholars have suggested that established firms face underlying challenges when investing corporate venture capital. Namely, structural deficiencies inherent in corporate venture capital may inhibit financial gains. However, firm value may still be created as a result of other benefits from investing—primarily providing a window onto novel technology. In this paper, we propose that corporate venture capital investment will create greater firm value when firms explicitly pursue corporate venture capital to harness novel technology. Using a panel of CVC investments, we present evidence consistent with our proposition. The findings are robust to various specifications and remain unchanged even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in investing firms. Our results have important implications for corporate venture capital in particular, and technology strategy in general.     

Do women-owned businesses have equal access to angel capital?

Women-owned businesses are the fastest growing sector of new venture ownership in the United States. Although women's access to, and use of, debt and venture capital financing have been explored, comparatively little is known about women's access to capital from private equity investors. In this paper, we examine the equality of women's access to angel capital. The research suggests that women seek angel financing at rates substantially lower than that of men, but have an equal probability of receiving investment. We also document that women are more likely to seek, and to a lesser extent receive, financing from women angels.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

Publicly traded venture capital funds: implications for institutional “fund of funds” investors

Institutional investors supply the bulk of the funds which are used by venture capital investment firms in financing emerging growth companies. These investors typically place their funds in a number of venture capital firms, thus achieving diversification across a range of investment philosophy, geography, management, industry, investment life cycle stage and type of security. Essentially, each institutional investor manages a “fund of funds,” attempting through the principles of portfolio theory to reduce the risk of participating in the venture capital business while retaining the up-side potential which was the original source of attraction to the business. Because most venture capital investment firms are privately held limited partnerships, it is very difficult to measure risk adjusted rates of return on these funds on a continuous basis.In this paper, we use the set of twelve publicly traded venture capital firms as a proxy to develop insight regarding the risk reduction effect of investment in a portfolio of venture capital funds, i.e., a fund of funds. Measurements of weekly total returns for the shares of these funds are compared with similar returns on a set of comparably sized “maximum capital gain” mutual funds and the daily return of the S&P 500 Index. A comparison of returns on an individual fund basis, as well as a correlation of daily returns of these individual funds, were made. In order to adjust for any systematic bias resulting from the “thin market” characteristic of the securities of the firms being observed, the Scholes-Williams beta estimation technique was used to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading.The results indicate that superior returns are realized on such portfolios when compared with portfolios of growth-oriented mutual funds and with the S&P 500 Index. This is the case whether the portfolios are equally weighted (i.e., “naive”) or constructed to be mean-variant efficient, ex ante, according to the capital asset pricing model. When compared individually, more of the venture funds dominated the S&P Market Index than did the mutual funds and by much larger margins. When combined in portfolios, the venture capital funds demonstrated very low beta coefficients and very low covariance of returns among portfolio components when compared with portfolios of mutual funds. To aid in interpreting these results, we analyzed the discounts and premia from net asset value on the funds involved and compared them to Thompson's findings regarding the contribution of such differences to abnormal returns. We found that observed excess returns greatly exceed the level which would be explained by these differences.The implications of these results for the practitioner are significant. They essentially tell us that, while investment in individual venture capital deals is considered to have high risk relative to potential return, combinations of deals (i.e., venture capital portfolios) were shown to produce superior risk adjusted returns in the market place. Further, these results show that further combining these portfolios into larger portfolios (i.e., “funds of funds”) provides even greater excess returns over the market index, thus plausibly explaining the “fund of funds” approach to venture capital investment taken by many institutional investors.While the funds studied are relatively small and are either small business investment companies or business development companies, they serve as a useful proxy for the organized venture capital industry, despite the fact that the bulk of the funds in the industry are institutionally funded, private, closely held limited partnerships which do not trade continuously in an open market. These results demonstrate to investors the magnitude of the differences in risk adjusted total return between publicly traded venture capital funds and growth oriented mutual funds on an individual fund basis. They also demonstrate to investors the power of the “fund of funds” approach to institutional involvement in the venture capital business. Because such an approach produces better risk adjusted investment results for the institutional investor, it seems to justify a greater flow of capital into the business from more risk averse institutional investment sources. This may mean greater access to institutional funds for those seeking to form new venture capital funds. For entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funds for their young companies, it may also mean a lower potential cost of capital for the financing of business venturing. From the viewpoint of public policy makers interested in facilitating the funding of business venturing, it may provide insight regarding regulatory issues surrounding taxation and the barriers and incentives which affect venture capital investment.     

Investment Patterns of Informal Investors in the Alberta Private Equity Market*

This study identifies three main types of informal investors in private equity markets: relationship investors, opportunity‐based investors, and angel investors. We find evidence that the first two investor types are a major total source of capital and they prefer to invest smaller amounts close to home and in the context of existing relationships. With respect to angel investors, we find evidence of stratification in their desired investment amount which is consistent with a model where their investments evolve though a life cycle of investing. We also find evidence that changes to capital market regulations that allow for lower investment amounts by this type of investor increase the amount of capital available for early‐stage firms.     

Distributing Start‐Up Equity: A Theoretical Foundation for an Emerging Practice

We use agency theory to model equity division in venture capital financing with three complementary value‐creation factors—the entrepreneur's effort, the venture capitalist's advising/monitoring service, and the investment amount. While considering that investors often base their funding decisions on gut feeling, even as they employ rational decision‐making processes, we derive closed‐form expressions for optimal ownership sharing. Our findings provide theoretical explanation to support the recent call for practitioners to allocate ownership equity based on the relative potential contributions of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist to generate value for the new investment prospect.     

Venture capital secondary funds—the third exit option

This article highlights some of the challenges associated with investing in private equity and, specifically, venture capital, as well as the opportunities presented by the availability of secondary market solutions. Today, the secondary market allows venture capital investors to align liquidity solutions with investment objectives similar to those used in other established markets like real estate and lending. Over the last ten years, it has become clear that exit opportunities for venture‐backed portfolio companies correlate strongly with the state of the economy and its ability to support merger‐and‐acquisition (M&A) and initial public offering (IPO) market activity. Due to their experience and specialization, secondary funds know how to assess quickly potential investments and offer tailored investment solutions. Moreover, these funds offer an attractive exit option that is compelling not only in down economic cycles but also during periods of economic expansion. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

陈凛 不仅仅是陈逸飞的儿子

<正>不同于常见的天使投资,陈凛专选那种发展到一定规模但VC还没介入的企业,而且投资额度达几百万美元,也要比一般的天使投资大。2012年初,陈凛成了联创策源的投资合伙人。在这之前,陈凛,这位著名艺术家陈逸飞的儿子,一直作为天使投资人在上海单打独斗。不同于常见的天使投资,陈凛专选那种发展到一定规模但VC还没介入的企业,而且投资额度达几百万美元,也要比一般的天使投资大。"很多上海的公司是这么想的,与其早期融资让VC拿走很多股份,还不如找     

Prediction and control under uncertainty: Outcomes in angel investing

Venture investing plays an important role in entrepreneurship not only because financial resources are important to new ventures, but also because early investors help shape the ventures' managerial and strategic destiny. In this study of 121 angel investors who had made 1038 new venture investments, we empirically investigate angel investors' differential use of predictive versus non-predictive control strategies. We show how the use of these strategies affects the outcomes of angel investors. Results show that angels who emphasize prediction make significantly larger venture investments, while those who emphasize non-predictive control experience a reduction in investment failures without a reduction in their number of successes.     

Concentrating Too Hard? Foreign and Corporate Venture Capital Involvement in Syndicates

We investigate the relationship between investment of corporate venture capital (CVC) and foreign venture capital (FVC), and the concentration of investors involved in a financing round. As forms of venture capital distinct from independent venture capital, CVC and FVC can offer different value to new ventures. However, having FVC or CVC investors in the syndicate can also pose additional risks to other investors. We find that a corporate venture capital or a foreign venture capital affiliation is related to lower concentration of investors. Our results suggest that the investors evaluate not only the venture but also their syndicate partners in determining their relative share of round investment.     

Informal risk capital investors: Investment patterns on the East Coast of the U.S.A.

In this study we profile a group of informal investors, their investment criteria and the nature of their referral network. The study supports the findings of several earlier studies. It indicates the existence of an extensive informal investment community on the East Coast of the U.S.A., which can provide substantial financial resources to startup and young firms. A full 58% of the sample investments were in startups; a huge proportion compared with formal venture capital sources. The study further supports earlier findings that this group is difficult to locate, for entrepreneurs and researchers alike. This opaque market consists primarily of friends and business colleagues who individually provide modest sums of money ($20,000–$50,000), but are often able to use their network to assemble a group of investors who will sponsor the entire funding requirement. 130 informal investors report that in three years they and their networks raised 38 million dollars to support 286 new venture proposals.There are also encouraging indications that these angels are both enthusiastic and persistent. Many of them claim that they have achieved higher returns via angel activity than any other investment options that they have tried. Of the angels who did better with alternative investment options, more than 80% are still prepared to make further investments. Even those who reported failed investments in the informal risk capital market remain supportive: over 65% indicate a willingness to invest again.The criteria by which the angels screen the proposals differ markedly from those of the venture capital community. In particular, the angels do not appear to be interested in a thorough business plan, a sine qua non for venture capitalists. Unlike the capital firms, angels are not interested in competitive insulation. They do not limit their investments to industries that are appealing, or with which they are familiar, nor do they care very much about the degree to which the entrepreneur has identified competition. However, they are in close agreement with the venture capital community in their concern with the management ability of the venture team and a requirement that there be a clear, demonstrated need for the product or service, preferably in a market with large potential.The study has shed some light on the structure of the referral networks of angels. Though we do not know from this study how the respondents themselves first heard of the ventures that were described in this survey, we do know that their referral network is composed primarily of friends and business colleagues; to whom they refer as much as 60% of the proposals that they receive and in which they themselves eventually invest. Thus they pass on serious opportunities to their network. Their referees are inclined to be very supportive; in our sample almost 75% of them also invested in the venture. The current strategy for informal investors is to approach mainly close contacts. These are inclined to be supportive (85% also invested in the venture) and to follow a trusting investment behavior pattern, relying mainly on the recommendation of the angel. This strategem ensures that the total capital requirements are met via the network. However, given the results of this study; the angels might be well-advised not to stop here, they might also approach at least one professional. Only a small proportion of professionals were approached by our sample of angels (less than 30%). As the study shows, professionals are more effective at selecting successful ventures. Thus a mixed strategy may be called for; use mainly trusting referees to ensure full capitalization and a limited number of professional referees to screen the proposals. This will help ensure that those proposals that do get supported by the more trusting members of the network have been competently screened, thus increasing to the probability of venture success.A discriminant analysis revealed some useful pointers in helping the informal investor select successful ventures. First it is critical to select only ventures in which the entrepeneur can be relied on to evaluate the risks of the ventures and manage these risks well; Angels do not need entrepreneurs that will gamble with their money. Equally important is to avoid placing too much credence on highly articulate sales pitches by the venture team, or too much reliance on ventures in which the main emphasis is on product and proprietary protection. Rather insist on being shown clear evidence that the product or service has channel and/or market acceptance. It is also important for Angels to stick to investments where they know the industry well, and to back venture teams with a solid reputation and a propensity to get involved in the details rather than gloss them over. As in the case of studies of venture capital investments, competitive insulation in the early stages of the venture is also important.