Measuring the gains from trade under monopolistic competition

Abstract .  Three sources of gains from trade under monopolistic competition are (i) new import varieties available to consumers; (ii) enhanced efficiency as more productive firms begin exporting and less productive firms exit; (iii) reduced markups charged by firms due to import competition. The first source of gains can be measured as new goods in a CES utility function for consumers. We argue that the second source is formally analogous to the producer gain from new goods, with a constant-elasticity transformation curve for the economy. We suggest that the third source of gain can be measured using a translog expenditure function for consumers, which, in contrast to the CES case, allows for finite reservation prices for new goods and endogenous markups.     

GDP steady-state multipliers under monopolistic competition revisited

New Keynesian general-equilibrium static models showed the fiscal multiplier is an increasing function of the degree of monopoly. Here, I develop a simple intertemporal model allowing us to study the steady-state role of optimal capital stock (and depreciation) in the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. The GDP multiplier may be locally decreasing in the degree of monopoly when the number of firms is fixed, but results depend strongly on the set of parameter values chosen. Using a net-output definition or allowing for free entry leads to unambiguous dominance of the long-run monopolistic multiplier over the Walrasian one.

Intergenerational welfare effects of a tariff under monopolistic competition

A dynamic overlapping-generations model of a semi-small open economy with monopolistic competition in the goods market is constructed. A tariff increase reduces real output and employment and improves the terms of trade, both in the impact period and in the new steady state. The tariff shock has significant intergenerational distribution effects which are different for creditor and debtor nations. Bond policy neutralizes the intergenerational inequities and allows the computation of first-best and second-best optimal tariff rates. The first-best tariff exploits national market power, but the second-best tariff contains a correction to account for the existence of a potentially suboptimal product subsidy.     

Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES

We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.     

On the theory of east-west trade under uncertainty

Taking the final stage of the existing socialist economy as the labormanaged economy, this paper establishes a model of East-West trade between a capitalist economy and a labor-managed economy, both of which face asymmetric technological uncertainty. The model reflects the facts that the securities markets for firms' ownership shares exist only in the capitalist economy and that the firm's objective function in the capitalist economy is different from that in the labor-managed economy. It also considers the existence of international forward markets for commodities as international risk-sharing arrangements. Thus, the paper shows that all the basic theorems in traditional trade theory (Factor Price Equalization, Heckscher-Ohlin, Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski) carry over to the uncertain environments characterized by different types of economies.This is the final version of the paper, the first draft of which was presented at the 1987 annual meeting of the Japanese Association of International Economics. An earlier version has recently appeared in my book,Competition, Monopoly and International Trade Under Uncertainty (written in Japanese, Tokyo: Asian Economic New Press 1989). I wish to thank professors H. E. Leland, S. Fujino, H. Eguchi, M. Ohyama, K. Otaka, M. Ogawa, T. Ohsawa, K. Fukao, M. Nishijima and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors, however, are my responsibility.     

Optimal fiscal policy under monopolistic competition with firm heterogeneity

Government spending is a policy instrument used to sustain economic development and improve social welfare. Empirical observations, however, reveal a significant decrease in the government spending to GDP ratio for the United States. In addition, the United States has been observed to exhibit a rise in firm heterogeneity in productivity in recent decades. This paper shows that the optimal size of government expenditure will decrease as firm heterogeneity increases. We thus indicate that the rise in firm heterogeneity in productivity may serve as a plausible vehicle to explain the decline in the share of government spending in GDP for the United States.     

A simple model of foreign brand penetration under monopolistic competition

The main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple monopolistic competition trade model, how trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade costs) can affect domestic entrepreneurs’ decision between providing domestic or foreign brands, and thus the degree of foreign brand penetration. It is shown that, as trade costs decrease, more entrepreneurs choose to provide foreign brands. Furthermore, the shift to foreign brands is shown to magnify the negative impact of trade liberalization on the profits of firms selling domestic brands.     

Unemployment and welfare consequences of international outsourcing under monopolistic competition

This paper challenges the conventional academic view that international outsourcing is just another form of gainful trade. Contrary to that view, we show that labour‐service outsourcing can reduce the high‐wage country's welfare even when product‐market trade is beneficial, within a model that combines involuntary unemployment and monopolistic competition. Outsourcing's impact on welfare is worsened by a definite loss of jobs and a possible contraction in the range of varieties produced worldwide. While owners of capital benefit from outsourcing under certain conditions, labour's welfare always falls.     

On the theory of effective demand under stochastic rationing

The concept of effective demand under stochastic manipulable quantity rationing is shown to be compatible with the existence of nontrivial equilibrium. It is argued that stochastic rationing is unavoidable for any satisfactory definition of effective demand. Moreover, manipulability of the rationing mechanism is necessary for reasons of logical consistency, at least if the distribution over realisations for each agent depends on his own action and on the aggregate values of demand and supply only. In that case, anonymous stochastic rationing schemes reduce to those random functions, the mean value function of which is the uniform proportional rationing mechanism.     

On the relations between demand creation and growth in a monopolistic firm

This paper deals with the allocation of resources over time by a monopolistic firm between growth of the productive capacity and growth of the market-demand capacity. As the demand-creation relations follow an S-shaped curve, different phases in the behavior of the growing firm are conceived in which investment cycles occur both in productive and demand-creation activities.The paper analyzes the case of homogeneous resources as well as nonhomogeneous resources. It is shown that in general the phases in the behavior of the growing firm are preserved in both cases. In the homogeneous case, when there are investment activities in both types of capital, it is shown that the firm will allocate its resources between the two activities in such a way that the ratio of the rate of growth of demand price (with respect to demand-creation capital) and the rate of growth of output (with respect to productive capital) will be equal to one plus the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand and will, therefore, be bounded between zero and one.     

The indeterminacy of equilibrium city formation under monopolistic competition and increasing returns

We study the indeterminacy of equilibrium in the Fujita–Krugman [When is the economy monocentric?: von Thünen and Chamberlin unified, Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 25 (1995) 505–528] model of city formation under monopolistic competition and increasing returns. Both the number and the locations of cities are endogenously determined. Assuming smooth transportation costs, we examine equilibria in city-economies where a finite number of cities form endogenously. For any positive integer K, the set of equilibria with K distinct cities has a smooth manifold of dimension K-1 as its interior for almost all parameter values in a regular parameterization. The disjoint union of these sets over all positive integers K constitutes the entire equilibrium set.     

On the theory of the competitive labor-managed firm under price uncertainty

The short-run behavior of a labor-managed firm under competitive assumptions and price uncertainty is analyzed assuming risk aversion. It is compared with its behavior under certainty and the behavior of a capitalist-managed firm under price uncertainty. It is shown that a risk-averse labor-managed firm employs more labor than a risk-neutral labor-managed firm. Generally, uncertainty is seen to have greater impact on the behavior of a labor-managed firm than on the behavior of a capitalist-managed firm. Except under constant risk aversion, the behavior of a labor-managed firm under price uncertainty is less predictable than that of a capitalist-managed firm.     

Spatial monopolistic competition versus spatial monopoly

This paper compares the equilibrium firm output, market area, price of services, and level of net benefits in monopolistically competitive spatial equilibrium versus the multiplant monopolists spatial equilibrium. Through a computer simulation, it is found that the welfare comparisons depend on population density—the monopolists equilibrium is superior to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium in high density areas and vice versa, contrary to traditional economic theory in which distance is assumed costless.     

Sequential location under one-sided demand uncertainty

In entering a new market, firms face demand uncertainty. We depart from the usual Hotelling duopoly model with sequential entry. We allow firms to locate outside of the city and assume that market conditions are common knowledge. We then introduce one-sided demand uncertainty. We find that demand uncertainty can be seen as a differentiation force when faced by the first entrant and as an agglomeration force when faced by the second entrant. Finally, the second firm’s imperfect information implies higher welfare losses.