Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach

In most experimental studies of tax evasion, participants are instructed that they may report any amount of income from zero up to the amount they actually earned or received. This amounts to an invitation to gamble. In contrast, real-world tax authorities unambiguously demand compliance. We develop two new settings for conducting tax experiments. Both involve an explicit demand for compliance. Thus, we can determine whether knowing that the experimental authority would regard evasion as wrongful disobedience will influence compliance decisions. We demonstrate that simply telling people that they are required to pay a “participation fee” analogous to a tax produces remarkably high compliance rates and less sensitivity to changes in economic variables than in the earlier experimental literature using invitation-to-gamble language. This suggests that many people pay taxes despite the financial attraction of non-compliance because they are strongly inclined towards obeying authority. Furthermore, we show that giving participants a week to make their reporting decisions at home without an authority figure physically present overcomes the inclination to obey for some people, significantly lowering compliance rates. However, the majority still complies, even after the audit rate falls from 25% to 1%, which would make non-compliance extremely attractive if it were viewed only as a simple matter of risk and expected return. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, H26     

Global capital markets,direct taxation and the redistribution of income

Standard fiscal theory suggests that taxation should be heaviest on the least mobile factors of production – for both efficiency and revenue reasons. A shift in tax burdens from capital to labour as economies become globally integrated is thus justified. This theoretical tradition (founded by Ramsay and continued by Mirrlees and Lucas) assumes by construction that profit taxes reduce investment and growth; and while sensitive to inter-generational equity, sidesteps the issue of income distribution within generations. In contrast, starting from Keynes’ critique of these assumptions and building on modern endogenous growth models, it can be shown that profit taxation is not necessarily injurious to productive investment. In practice, moreover, the effect of globalisation has not been to reduce tax rates on capital, but rather to erode the tax base itself (i.e. ‘tax evasion’). Improved information exchange between tax authorities, which is now being driven by fiscal insolvency in developed countries, would allow tax incidence to be shifted so as to improve income distribution within OECD countries. Such cooperation could also permit the replacement of the current discretionary system of fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries (‘development aid’) by equitable sharing of global capital tax revenue.     

The Strategic and Effective Dimensions of the Border Tax Adjustment

Between 2001 and 2011, the Kyoto Protocol has experienced defections of two countries that took part in its negotiation and accounted for around 44% of all parties' emissions. The border tax adjustment, a tax levied on imports to reproduce domestic taxation on similar goods, is advocated to prevent such compliance failures as well as to support unilateral pollution regulations by mitigating firms' competitiveness losses and carbon leakages. The paper investigates whether this trade instrument can constitute a decentralized solution to achieve the first‐best in a noncooperative framework. It develops a two‐country two‐firm reciprocal‐market model of trade with global pollution and country heterogeneity. Countries' interactions are studied following a noncooperative game theory approach, for two scenarios defined by the possibility to implement a border tax adjustment to sanction unilateral deviation from the cooperative situation. The paper predicts first that this opportunity modifies the countries' choices of strategies toward more compliance; second that among the strategic and effective dimensions of the border tax adjustment, only the former allows to achieve the first‐best; finally that the border tax adjustment fosters countries' participation in the cooperative international environmental agreement.     

The impact of public R&D expenditure on business R&D*

This paper attempts to quantify the aggregate net effect of government funding on business R&D in 17 OECD Member countries over the past two decades. Grants, procurement, tax incentives and direct performance of research (in public laboratories or universities) are the major policy tools in the field. The major results of the study are the following: Direct government funding of R&D performed by firms has a positive effect on business financed R&D (except if the funding is targeted towards defence activities). Tax incentives have an immediate and positive effect on business-financed R&D; Direct funding as well as tax incentives are more effective when they are stable over time: firms do not invest in additional R&D if they are uncertain of the durability of the government support; Direct government funding and R&D tax incentives are substitutes: increased intensity of one reduces the effect of the other on business R&D; The stimulating effect of government funding varies with respect to its generosity: it increases up to a certain threshold (about 10% of business R&D) and then decreases beyond; Defence research performed in public laboratories and universities crowds out private R&D; Civilian public research is neutral for business R&D. * We thank the participants to various seminars, including the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technology Policy and the NBER 2000 Summer Institute on Productivity for helpful comments and suggestions. All opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect necessarily the views of the OECD or Université Libre de Bruxelles.     

Tax evasion and tax morale: A social network analysis

We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion when individuals interact in a network. We present a model that incorporates incentives for tax compliance in the form of punishment and fines, tax morale, and reputation for social behaviour. We assume that individuals adjust their tax morale by observing the neighbours' tax morale. We simulate the model for different values of the parameters and show that the steady-state share of taxpayers as opposed to tax-evaders is affected by the probability of finding like-minded peers in the reference group (network integration), the weight that individuals attribute to reputation, and the share of individuals who update their tax morale. Last, we consider the possibility of a fiscal authority using the knowledge of the network structure and targeting ‘central’ individuals. We show that by positively affecting the tax morale of individuals whose influence within the network is high, a fiscal authority can increase tax compliance.     

Equilibrium conditions in corporate tax competition and Foreign Direct Investment flows

We consider a collection of countries which attempt to maximize their corporate tax revenue, the latter being viewed as a function of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow and the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) which each country sets for itself. Under a model that assumes a direct influence of tax differentials on the flow of FDI, each country's decisions are naturally ‘coupled’ to those of others, leading to a non-cooperative game in which countries–players compete for FDI inflows by sequentially altering their tax rates. Their decisions are made via a differential equation-based model used to predict the effect of tax rate changes on a player's share of FDI inflows. Our model, calibrated using empirical data from 12 OECD countries for the period 1982–2005, combines FDI inflow and tax-rate differentials to arrive at a “steady-state” FDI inflow share for each player, given its competitors' corporate tax rates. We explore the game's equilibrium, including the question of whether equilibrium necessarily implies a ‘race to bottom’, with low corporate tax rates for all players.     

The influence of user-supplier relationship on innovation dynamics of Oil & Gas industry

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the role of user-supplier relationships in the innovation dynamics of the Oil and Gas (O&G) industry, from an analysis supported by R&D and patent application data. This paper points to some recent interesting phenomena in the O&G sector, such as: (i) the remarkable advancement of two Chinese oil companies; (ii) the significant growth in O&G companies’ technological engagement in exploration and production (E&P) from the 2000s; (iii) the non-negligible increase in the application of O&G companies’ patents for renewable energy. Moreover, by working with the oil and gas chain complete, we show that the performance of the companies oil and gas equipment and services industry (O&GES) is restricted to the upstream activities. Finally, we bring up some arguments that have as objective relativise the typology of R&D intensity adopted by OECD.     

How elastic are national corporate income tax bases in OECD countries? The role of domestic and foreign tax rates

Abstract To what extent do reductions in corporate income tax (CIT) rates attract foreign tax bases? What are the revenue implications of a unilateral tax reduction when tax bases are internationally mobile? These questions are explored using annual data from 17 OECD countries spanning the period 1982 to 2005. Controlling for fixed country effects, year effects, and country time trends, and subjecting our results to an extensive robustness analysis, we find (i) a country’s aggregate reported corporate profits are negatively and significantly affected by CIT rate reductions in neighbouring countries; (ii) a unilateral reduction in the domestic CIT rate results in lower domestic CIT revenues.     

The Golden Age of Tax Expenditures: Fiscal Welfare and Inequality in Portugal (1989–2011)

ABSTRACT

This paper studies social tax expenditures as an instrument of social policy, considering its broader social and political ramifications, particularly regressive distributive impacts, the targeting of social protection and making markets for non-state providers. Using OECD data and government budgets, we look at ‘tax breaks for social purposes’ in Portugal since the 1980s, with a focus on healthcare, educational and mortgage loan expenses. Portugal presents a comparatively high level of TBSP before the Great Recession. Why? Using Portugal as a theory-developing case, the paper argues that in the critical juncture following the late, double transition to democracy and structural economic reform, tax and welfare state developments combined to create social tax expenditures as a modality of targeted social expenditure favouring middle and higher strata. Once in place, a combination of powerful vested interests, obscure policy-making, regressive income distribution and high take-up rate across taxpaying groups obtained a path-dependent outcome, keeping inegalitarian and costly fiscal welfare growing during adverse fiscal conditions. Such a resilient outcome was curbed only in 2011 by the harsh conditionality of the economic and financial adjustment programme of the Portuguese bailout, an instance of how deep crises provide opportunities for path-shifting reconfigurations of social policy.     

Kleptocracy and tax evasion under resource abundance

Evidence has shown that petroleum wealth is associated with less transparency and at the same time less tax collection. In this paper, we find that the two issues are linked through the citizens’ tax evasion behavior. We develop a model to explain this link and conduct extensive empirical tests of its validity. The explanation is that officials tradeoff greater transparency to improve tax compliance against less transparency to increase gains from corruption. Oil windfalls diminish tax revenue needs, causing officials to optimize on less transparency. Seeing this, citizens optimize on a lower level of tax compliance. At equilibrium, both decline with a positive oil shock. We also study the alternative channel in which tax compliance responds to enforcement. Transparency is found to be the more robust channel. Ignoring citizens’ strategic behavior would lead to predicting suboptimal investment in state capacity for tax enforcement. Using giant oil discoveries data combined with oil price data, we develop a dynamic composite instrument and estimate the model with a dynamic panel system generalized method of moments. We find robust support for our explanation and the model's deep structure for 130+ countries and the 1980–2010 period.     

Tax buoyancy in OECD countries: New empirical evidence

A renewed interest in the link between business cycle and tax revenues has recently emerged, especially during economic crises. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis on 35 OECD countries over the period 1995–2016 to estimate both short-run and long-run tax buoyancies, taking into account the macroeconomic framework, changes in governments’ tax policies, budgetary and political variables possibly affecting how taxes react to GDP fluctuations. By adopting the dynamic common correlated effects estimator, we find that both short- and long-run tax responses are lower than those reported in previous cross-country studies. We suggest that this slightly lower than expected reaction of tax revenue can be interpreted as a reduced power of both automatic stabilization in the short-run and fiscal sustainability in the long-run. Results are robust to possible endogeneity issues between tax revenues and business cycles.     

The effects of economic freedom,regulatory quality and taxation on the level of per capita real income: a preliminary analysis for OECD nations and non-G8 OECD nations

This study of the impact of economic freedom, regulatory quality and the relative burden of taxation on the level of per capita real income/GDP among OECD nations over the period 2003 to 2007 adopts a modified version of the overall economic freedom index computed by the Heritage Foundation (2013), one with the fiscal freedom and business freedom indices removed. This study then provides panel least squares fixed-effects estimates for five linear specifications/models. Each nation during this time frame can be regarded either as a nation per se or as a de facto ‘economic region’ within the OECD. The analysis first focuses upon all of the OECD nations and then, as a robustness test, subsequently focuses only on non-G8 OECD member nations. The estimations in this study all provide strong empirical support for the three central hypotheses proffered here, namely: (1) the higher the overall degree of economic freedom, the higher the per capita real income (GDP) level; (2) the higher the level of regulatory quality, the higher the level of per capita real income (GDP) and (3) the higher the overall tax burden, expressed as a per cent of GDP, the lower is the level of per capita real income (GDP).     

论OECD国家税收改革成效及其政策有效性

作为世界上最发达国家代表的OECD组织,其税收政策在过去的三十年中经历了一系列的改革。从税收政策有效性的角度看,这些改革的效果究竟怎样?本文以此为基本思路,首先从制度经济学的角度对税收政策及其有效性进行新的诠释;其次从改革实践和改革成效两个方面分析OECD国家的税收改革;再次对OECD国家税收改革的有效性进行了评价,最后得出一些启示。     

Tax Morale in Transition Countries

This article tries to reduce the lack of tax compliance research analysing tax morale in transition countries. The empirical analysis using tax morale as a dependent variable working with World Values Survey data indicates that there is a significantly higher tax morale in Central and Eastern European than in former Soviet Union countries. This difference has increased during the transition process. Furthermore, the article shows that factors such as trust in the legal system and the government have a significant positive effect on tax morale in transition economies.     

Tax morale,fiscal capacity,and war

This paper studies the effects of mobilization for war on the development of fiscal capacity and the values of tax compliance (tax morale). We propose a dynamic setting where governments may invest resources to improve the efficiency of the fiscal apparatus and the citizens' tax morality in order to raise the necessary revenues for the defense against a threat (external or internal), and parents optimally choose to transmit their preferences of tax compliance to children. Despite fiscal capacity and tax morale are initially substitutes, we show how a dynamic complementarity may arise in equilibrium from a more efficient transmission of the values of tax compliance in countries with high fiscal capacity, and this may explain why they tend to move together over time. Under reasonable conditions, we obtain that the effect of a higher threat of war on the steady-state level of the culture of tax compliance is negative when fiscal capacity is relatively low, and positive when the latter is large. We show cross-country evidence based on war frequency, fiscal capacity, and tax morale that is consistent with the results of our theory.     

Tax enforcement,tax compliance and tax morale in transition economies: A theoretical model

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between tax enforcement, tax compliance and tax morale within countries characterised by rapid introduction of market institutions and slow evolution of political regimes, such as transition economies. The paper investigates a coordination game in which the government is ex-ante committed to tax enforcement and can observe the proportion of tax-compliant agents in the economy. In turn, two groups of agents (third-party reporting and self-reported income) are keen to evade taxes unlawfully but have limited information on how many others evade taxes; their tax morale is therefore an endogenous function of agents' perception on tax compliance. The model predicts that the lower the quality of political institutions and the weaker tax morale, the less tax compliance can be achieved. The third-party reporting group will also be bearing higher tax burden than the self-reported income group. The model entails that having political institutions of good quality is not a sufficient condition to conduce to tax enforcement or tax compliance. Due to the endogenous role of tax morale, the government could be pushed ex-post towards poor or no tax enforcement. If good political institutions are not accompanied by good information about the enforcement of tax collection, there is scope for co-existence of poor tax enforcement, low tax compliance and weak tax morale. As such, this model well describes the tax evasion behaviour observed since the outset of transition from planned to market economy.     

Measuring ‘indirect’ investments in ICT in OECD countries

ABSTRACT

ICT components, such as microprocessors, may be embodied in other capital goods not recorded as ICT in National Accounts. We name ‘indirect ICT investment’ the value of embodied ICT components in non-ICT investment. The paper provides estimates of ‘indirect ICT investment’ based on detailed and unpublished Supply-Use tables (SUT) in 12 OECD countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Our main finding is that ICT investment appears significantly higher when considering its indirect component, the average increase being about 35%. The inclusion of indirect ICT investment, excluding software (for which firms’ expenditures are difficult to measure), changes significantly the relative position of countries with respect to the ICT intensity of their investments. The inclusion of software further increases indirect ICT investment but the increase is smaller (in percentage) than without this inclusion. A final result, but concerning only three countries, it that the diagnosis of a stabilisation, or even a decrease, of ICT investment in percentage of GDP or of total investment, observed from the beginning of the century, is not modified if we take into account the indirect ICT investment.     

The Cosine-Shaped Pattern of Innovations and Technological Advantages： Theory and Evidence

Using data from 24 OECD countries, we find that the relationship between a country＇s R＆D investment and technological advantage in a sector （measured by the country＇s labor productivity of the sector relative to the rest of the world） is non-monotonic. In particular, for countries whose technology levels are much lower or higher than the rest of the world in a sector, their sectoral R＆D investment declines as their advantages in the sector improve; for counties with middle technology levels, the opposite is true. Extending the Eaton and Kortum framework, we develop a static model to theoretically analyze the relationship between R＆D investment and technological advantages. We show that when the research efficiency in a sector is sufficiently elastic with respect to the sectoral technological advantage, a country＇s R＆D investment increases with its technological advantage, and vice versa.     

The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale

In this paper we argue that tax enforcement is an additional contextual factor affecting tax morale, one of the most important determinants of tax compliance. By using a unique dataset that merges a representative sample of Italian households with administrative data on tax enforcement, we first find that tax morale is positively correlated with tax enforcement. Second, to deal with possible endogeneity of tax enforcement, we show that results are confirmed in an IV specification using the change in the tax gap at the provincial level as an instrument for tax enforcement. Finally, we provide evidence that the impact of tax enforcement and social environment is stronger at low quantiles of tax morale. Our results show that besides that of lowering the expected value of tax evasion, tax enforcement has an additional and indirect effect on tax compliance through its effect on tax morale.     

Harmonization of carbon taxes in international climate agreements

The use of some kind of carbon tax is often proposed as part of an international climate policy. One possibility could be an international climate agreement requiring a harmonization of domestic carbon taxes. It is shown that there are several practical difficulties with such an agreement, and that it therefore is unlikely that CO₂ emissions will be allocated efficiently between countries with this type of agreement. Alternative types of agreements include an international carbon tax, in which the governments of the participating countries pay a tax, in proportion to their CO₂ emissions, to an international agency. A very similar arrangement would be to introduce a system of emission permits which are internationally tradeable between governments. Under quite general conditions, agreements of these two types can be designed so that they are both efficient and satisfy whatever distributional objectives one might have. Under both of these systems, the choice of domestic policies could be left to the individual countries. A domestic carbon tax is an obvious policy response from a country participating in an agreement of this type.Significant parts of the paper are based on research at CICERO (Center for International Climate and Energy Research, Oslo) and the Centre for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Oslo. The paper draws heavily on a related paper (Hoel, 1992a) which was prepared for Workshop on Fee and Charge Systems for Reducing Greenhouse Gases, OECD, Paris, November 5–6, 1991. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper.