商业银行组织结构变革中的经营管理机制创新

不同的银行组织结构各不相同,组织结构的设置体现着自己的经营方针和原则.由于历史的、经济制度方面的原因,我国商业银行特别是国有商业银行的组织结构带有明显的行政色彩,缺乏有效的自我发展与自我约束机制,风险意识淡薄,经营管理粗放.这种组织管理体制和运行机制阻碍了我国商业银行的发展.本文通过对西方商业银行组织结构和经营管理机制特征的阐述,分析了我国商业银行的差距与不足,指出了我国商业银行经营管理机制的创新方向,包括完善组织架构,优化管理层次,推行扁平化管理;构建科学的组织管理体制;建立现代商业银行的资源配置机制及先进的人力资源管理机制.     

Genetic testing: affected parties and decision making

The network of issues around information obtained from genetic testing is wide and complex. While risk assessment, awareness and discussion are often public driven, and in many instances, including that of nuclear power, are allied with democratic principles, the case of gene technology and genetic testing appears to be different. The opportunity for risk assessment by gene testing is rejected by many, and this rejection is supported by the claim of the right not to know. This article discusses the background to this development, and argues that decisions that consider issues related to genetic testing should be taken with the participation of affected parties.     

Are required SEC proxy disclosures about the board’s role in risk oversight substantive?

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires companies it regulates to include disclosures about the board’s role in risk oversight in the annual proxy statement to shareholders. The SEC does not mandate specific content or actions that boards should perform as part of their risk oversight responsibilities, leaving the nature of activities and extent of those disclosures to the discretion of the reporting entity. This study examines whether these disclosures contain substantive information reflective of the effectiveness of the organization’s risk oversight. We find that organizations disclosing more specific information (but not simply more information) about board risk oversight practices are associated with firms independently assessed as having the strongest management and governance processes. These findings suggest that these firms use the discretion provided by the SEC’s disclosure rule to provide substantive and potentially value-relevant information for stakeholders about the entity’s risk management processes and board risk oversight activities.     

Bank holding company performance,risk, and “busy” board of directors

We examine the association between “busyness” of the board of directors (serving on multiple boards) and bank holding company (BHC) performance and risk. We estimate several simultaneous-equations models employing the 3SLS technique and instrumental variables to account for endogeneity. We obtain four main results. First, BHC performance measures (return on equity, Tobin’s Q and EBIT over total assets) are positively associated with busyness of directors. Second, BHC risk measures (total, market, idiosyncratic, credit and default risks) are inversely related to busyness of directors. Third, performance (risk) benefits of having busy directors strengthened (weakened) during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Fourth, busy directors are not more likely to become problem directors (fail the 75% attendance standard), and if sitting on boards of both BHC and non-financial firms, they attend more of the BHC board meetings, than those of the non-financials. Our findings partially alleviate concerns that over-boarded directors shirk their responsibilities.     

基于AHP方法的科技保险实施效果实证研究

基于公共治理理论,构建包括科技企业、保险公司、政府部门和第三方机构在内的科技保险公共治理框架,设计科技保险实施效果综合评价指标体系。运用层次分析法考量北京、上海、天津、重庆四个直辖市科技保险实施效果,结果表明,四直辖市在科技保险保障范围和保障深度方面存在显著差异。     

An examination of contextual factors and individual characteristics affecting technology implementation decisions in auditing

While computer-assisted audit techniques (CAATs) have the potential to increase efficiency and effectiveness of audit engagements, research in this area suggests that such techniques are under-utilized in public accounting. We propose that this condition is due to performance evaluation pressure and the use of budgets for multiple purposes, which result in the misalignment of firm and individual employee goals. We apply technology acceptance and budgeting theories to test this contention as well as potential organizational strategies for reducing the impediments to technology acceptance in the audit profession.Results from an experiment with experienced auditors suggest that firms have the ability to influence the implementation of new technology by using longer-term budget and evaluation periods and by communicating the approval of remote superiors regarding the software. In the absence of such firm interventions, the individual characteristics of the auditor (risk-aversion and perceptions of budgetary pressure) determine implementation decisions. Specifically, risk-seeking individuals are more likely to implement technology regardless of budget pressure perception, but for risk-averse individuals the decision to implement is positively related to perceived budget pressure.     

Board risk committees: Insurer financial strength ratings and performance

We hypothesize and find that the existence of a board risk committee is positively related to A.M. Best’s Financial Strength Ratings, a measure widely used in the insurance industry to assess financial health. Using a sample of insurance firms from 2007 to 2013, we measure the impact of board risk committees on financial strength ratings and performance after controlling for various factors such as corporate governance characteristics. We find that firms with board risk committees report higher financial strength ratings, but only in the post-financial crisis period. Also, the formation of a board risk committee is positively associated with an increase in financial strength ratings from the year prior to committee formation to the year after committee formation. Further, we find that the presence of a board risk committee is not related to short-run firm performance benefits and that it takes five years for the presence of a board risk committee to be associated with future performance. Overall, our results provide evidence suggesting board risk committees are effective and beneficial from the standpoint of rating agencies and long-term financial performance.     

How can we explain internal auditing? The inadequacy of agency theory and a labor process alternative

This paper draws on labor process theory (LPT) to explain how capitalism creates conditions that give rise to a demand for internal auditing. Internal auditing developed from the metamorphosis of capitalism during the twentieth century, when capital gradually succeeded in institutionalizing structural control of labor processes to address the problem of control in inherently antagonistic capital-labor relationships. In this control context employees, management, and the board of directors are responsible for achieving the required rate of return on capital. With the premise that the literature has not adequately theorized the role of internal auditing in this context, this paper proposes an initial theorization of the role of internal auditing as a mechanism employed by management and the board of directors to control the labor process in the generation and realization of surplus value. Internal audit's assurance services to execute business activities according to management's conceptions, and its advisory services to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, are interpreted within the firm's overarching goal of maximizing the rate of return on capital employed. Future research agenda and methodological considerations are discussed.     

数字技术创新对企业违约风险的影响研究

基于2009—2022年中国沪深A股上市公司数据,采用面板固定效应模型,考量数字技术创新对企业违约风险的影响。结果显示,数字技术创新主要通过治理效应和信息效应显著降低企业违约风险,且在非高科技行业以及处于成长期和成熟期的企业中更为明显。鉴于此,建议加大对企业数字技术创新的支持力度,有效降低企业违约风险,增强金融经济体系韧性,推动经济平稳健康发展。     

我国证券公司治理绩效的因子分析

证券公司是资本市场最重要的行为主体之一,我国证券公司虽已建立了董事会、监事会、独立董事等现代公司治理框架,但在实际运作中其职能行使上存在许多不规范的地方。2008年金融危机告诫我们,不仅需要提高证券公司的风险防范机制,更需要建立完善的公司治理结构,促使证券公司风险防范机制作用顺利发挥。通过因子分析法将证券公司内部治理变量综合成为四个因子,即规模激励因子、结构因子、监管因子和独立性因子,进而分析内部治理因子对证券公司经营绩效的影响。     

理念与规则:关于依法治税的深层分析

随着经济体制环境的变化 ,税收理念及其运行规则应当也必须做相应修正。市场经济条件下的政府收支活动 ,实质上是“取众人之财 ,办众人之事”。在市场经济体制的环境中 ,围绕税收而形成的各有关行为主体之间的关系 ,均表现为权力与义务的对称。要按照“权力与义务相对称”的税收理念 ,规范各有关行为主体之间的关系。并以此为线索 ,分解作为一个整体的政府部门和专司征税之职的税务部门的涉税行为并分别冠之于“用税人”、“征税人” ,进而同“纳税人”并列 ,按照“三位一体”的税收关系分别确立其相应的税收理念和行为规范。