The decision to seek advice in the self-directed retirement fund industry

This article examines the influence of investor knowledge and the cognitive bias that arises from overconfidence on the advice-seeking behaviour of investors managing their own retirement funds. Specifically, we trace whether overestimating one’s own technical and financial abilities can hinder the willingness to seek advice, particularly when it would be in the investors’ best interest to do so. We identify a subset of investors who are not knowledgeable and yet do not seek advice. These investors exhibit overconfidence in their ability to manage a fund, despite holding under-diversified and less sophisticated portfolios relative to their peers. Given the global rise in investors choosing to manage their own retirement funds and the importance of seeking advice in this context, there are direct policy implications from these results. They suggest a need to identify and target investors who display overconfidence since they are most likely to be managing underperforming retirement investments in the longer term.     

Investor Overconfidence in Experimental Asset Markets across Market States

Abstract

This study explores how individual overconfidence adjusts after receiving extreme feedback that either supports or contradicts previous decision-making when buying or selling stocks. We find that highly contradicting feedback causes overconfidence to vanish as confidence declines sharply while supportive signals cause overconfidence to increase. Further evidence suggests that strong feedback impulses are associated with higher investor disagreement, supporting prior hypotheses that investors interpret such impulses differently. We also find that methodologies that measure overconfidence in prediction tasks systematically overstate confidence scores as respondents tend to fail to internalize stated confidence intervals appropriately.     

The psychology of sunk cost: A classroom experiment

Abstract

Economics and business students are taught that sunk costs are irrelevant to their decisions. Yet, there is ample evidence that managers fail to integrate this simple rule and fall prey to what is known as the sunk-costs bias. To mitigate cognitive biases, such as the sunk-cost bias, educators must raise students’ awareness of these common judgment errors. In this article, the author proposes a classroom activity that actively engages students and allows them to identify this bias in their own judgments. The activity builds on a series of experiments from the psychology literature. The author discusses how these experiments have been adapted for classroom use and presents evidence suggesting that the activity increased students’ awareness of the sunk-cost bias and improved their decision-making skills.     

Underperformance of Actively Managed Portfolios: Some Behavioral Insights

Abstract

Two glaring anomalies in investment management are apparent: (1) after fees, active portfolio managers do worse than market indices, and (2) clients continue to pay for services they don’t receive. The purpose of this paper is to offer explanations of these anomalies from a behavioral perspective. We explore some of the cognitive biases that perpetuate active management and subsequent underperformance, including herding, disposition, and endowment effects, as well as conservatism and status quo biases, overconfidence, and agency problems. Investors’ continued use of active managers despite persistent disappointing returns is attributed to being victims of framing effect, hot-hand fallacy, lack of knowledge as well as intimidation or insecurity, and status quo bias. We propose some ways that portfolio managers and investors could improve their decision making.     

Corporate social irresponsibility,CEO overconfidence,and stock price crash risk

This study examines whether and how corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) influences stock price crash risk for firms with overconfident CEOs. We find that the positive association between CEO overconfidence and stock price crash risk as shown in prior studies is significantly weakened when firms have higher CSI concerns. As a result, our intriguing findings demonstrate that investors are less surprised at the negative news hoarded by overconfident CEOs of CSI firms, possibly because they are already aware of and have previously reacted to the socially irresponsible behavior in their daily operations.     

The effects of optimism bias in teams

This article imports a behavioural perspective into a team context to study the effort-coordination problem among agents. Specifically, we investigate how the presence of optimism bias impacts the severity of the free-rider problem, the organizational structure of the team and the compensation contracts offered to agents in equilibrium. The results indicate that all agents become more reluctant to exert effort and the team welfare decreases when some of its agents are optimistic, suggesting that optimism aggravates the free-rider problem in teams. Appointing a team leader makes all agents work harder, and the team benefits more by having the optimistic agent as its leader. These findings are in sharp contrast to the effects of overconfidence as identified in the literature. It is advisable to pay the optimistic agents less than the rational agents. Encouragingly, optimistic agents can learn about their own bias in the long run, leaving their team without too much detriment of optimism.     

Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners

We report the results of experiments conducted over the internet between two different laboratories. Each subject at one site is matched with a subject at another site in a trust game experiment. We investigate whether subjects believe they are really matched with another person, and suggest a methodology for ensuring that subjects’ beliefs are accurate. Results show that skepticism can lead to misleading results. If subjects do not believe they are matched with a real person, they trust too much: i.e., they trust the experimenter rather than their partner. JEL Classification C9     

The impact of cross-border acquisitions on target banks’ performance in an institutionally poor environment: Ukraine’s takeover wave

We investigate the impact of the 2005–2007 cross-border bank takeovers in Ukraine – a country with poor institutional quality – on the performance of the target banks. Because acquirers targeted mainly larger, less-capitalised banks, we control for selection bias by combining propensity score matching and a difference-in-difference methodology. We find that the cost efficiency of the acquired banks improved after takeover (because of a decreased reliance on deposits), but that neither their profitability nor their loan market shares increased. Overall, our findings tally only piecemeal with the existing multi-country studies for transition economies. This argues in favour of additional single-country research.     

Overconfidence as a social bias: Experimental evidence

The overconfidence bias is discussed extensively in economic studies, yet fails to hold experimentally once monetary incentives and feedback are implemented. We consider overconfidence as a social bias. For a simple real effort task, we show that, individually, economic conditions effectively prevent overconfidence. By contrast, the introduction of a very basic, purely observational social setting fosters overconfident self-assessments. Additionally, observing others’ actions effectively eliminates underconfidence compared to the individual setting.     

The impact of expenditure rules on budgetary discipline over the cycle

We study the impact of expenditure rules on the propensity for governments to deviate from their expenditure plans in response to surprising cyclical developments. Theoretical considerations suggest that due to political fragmentation in the budgetary process expenditure policy might be prone to a procyclical bias. However, this tendency may be mitigated by strictly enforced expenditure rules. These hypotheses are tested against data from a panel of EU Member States. Our key findings are that (1) deviations between actual and planned government expenditure tend to be positively related to output gap surprises, and (2) expenditure rules reduce this procyclical bias. These results are particularly pronounced when the analysis is confined to spending items with a high degree of budgetary flexibility.     

TACKLING THE ENDOGENEITY OF FERTILITY IN THE STUDY OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION STRATEGIES USING DATA FROM URBAN BRAZIL

Abstract

Opinions differ about whether family structure, especially fertility, should be considered endogenous in models of behavior in developing countries. Faced with a dearth of good instruments, mainstream researchers often urge working in reduced form and, therefore, losing variables of policy interest or limiting the type of questions they ask to those where good instruments are available. Rather than treating endogeneity as a yes or no characteristic, we suggest instead that researchers consider the likely magnitude of endogeneity bias before moving to reduced form. Facing a situation where endogeneity bias is often presented as a concern but where we expect little endogeneity bias, we tackle endogeneity using multiple econometric techniques not available to the average researcher. We find support for our hypothesis that little bias arises due to the assumption of exogeneity of recent fertility in a model of women's employment.     

Search within or beyond the industrial cluster? The effect of perceived competition and knowledge base tacitness on strategic location choices of external knowledge search

ABSTRACT

From a knowledge-based perspective, this paper highlights the need for a framework linking perceived competition of the industry and firms’ strategic location choices of external knowledge search and examines whether the perceived competition increases the propensity of cluster firms to search more widely from extra-cluster knowledge sources than intra-cluster knowledge sources. Furthermore, we emphasise that cluster firms with varying degrees of tacitness in their knowledge base might respond to such competition differently when conducting external knowledge search activities. Using a sample of 310 cluster firms in the Zhejiang Province of China, we find that the cluster firm would increase the propensity for more geographic boundary-spanning search relative to local search while under the pressure of competition. Moreover, the positive relationship between perceived competition and the propensity towards geographic knowledge search is weaker when the tacitness of the cluster firm’s knowledge base is higher. The findings contribute to the understanding of the relationship between competition and the choice of location strategies in external knowledge search.     

Overconfidence and Market Efficiency with Heterogeneous Agents

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogenously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not affect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders’ expected profits or their welfare. Intuitively, as overconfidence goes up, so does price informativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition activities, effectively undoing the standard effect of more aggressive trading by the overconfident. The main intuition of the paper, if not the irrelevance result, is shown to be robust to different model specifications.We would like to thank Alberto Bisin, Xavier Freixas, Ken French, Moshe Kim, Jose Marín, and Terrance Odean for comments on an early draft, as well as an anonymous referee and seminar participants at HEC Geneva, the 2004 EFA meetings, the 2004 European Econometric Society meetings and the 2005 SAET conference. Diego García and Branko Urošević gratefully acknowledge financial support by SECCF (Belgrade).     

Identity,homophily and in-group bias

Many instances of social interaction display either or both of the following well-documented phenomena. People tend to interact with similar others (homophily). They also tend to treat others of shared social identity more favorably (in-group bias). While both phenomena involve some degree of discrimination towards others, a systematic study of their relations and interplay is yet missing. In this paper we report the findings of an experiment designed to address this issue. Participants are exogenously and randomly assigned to one of two groups. Subsequently they play a sequence of eight games with either an in-group or an out-group member. In treatment EXO in- and out-group matches are formed exogenously, while in ENDO participants can choose between in- and out-group matches. We find strong evidence of in-group bias in EXO, and strong evidence of homophily in ENDO. In-group biases, however, either decrease or disappear altogether under endogenous matching. We show that self-selection of homophilous agents into in-group matches cannot explain this fact. We also find that homophily is strongly correlated with risk aversion, and we build on this evidence to derive a rationale for both the existence of homophily and the disappearance of in-group biases under endogenous matching.     

Adoption and use of technology with low litigation risk – the case of financial reporting on Twitter by ASX companies

ABSTRACT

Corporate adoption of technology faces challenges such as resource constraints and litigation risk. To investigate if low litigation risk encourages technology adoption and its use, this paper investigates corporate financial reporting on Twitter, a voluntary corporate disclosure practice without obvious litigation risk in Australia. This study reviews 4,540 financial reporting related tweets from 222 ASX listed companies’ Twitter accounts. An examination of tweet sentiment reveals a positive reporting bias, as listed companies are more willing to disclose positive financial reporting information on Twitter. A comparison of corporate financial reporting tweets prior to and after 2013 reveals that use of Twitter for opportunistic voluntary disclosure is gaining popularity, a trend that warrants close attention by regulators in order to protect investors from selective disclosure with reporting bias.     

Exploring Ambiguity and Familiarity Effects in The “Earnings Game” Between Managers and Investors

Prior evidence suggests that managers and investors play an earnings game in which managers bias their earnings forecasts downward as the earnings announcement date approaches. Knowing managers’ incentives to provide biased guidance, investors still revise their expectations downward helping to create “positive earnings surprises.” Using a 2 (ambiguity) × 2 (familiarity) between subject randomized experimental design where MBA students playing the roles of manager and investor answer a series of questions related to earnings guidance, we investigate whether earnings environment ambiguity and manager-investor familiarity influence behavior during the “earnings game.” In general, results from this study suggest that ambiguity contributes to managers’ propensity to mislead and investors’ propensity to follow, and a false sense of familiarity may amplify investors’ reliance on managers’ guidance.     

The impact of production offshoring on the skill composition of manufacturing firms: evidence from Italy

In this work we explore how the international outsourcing of production impacts the skill composition of employment within Italian manufacturing firms. In particular, our aim is to assess whether the choice to offshore production activities to cheap‐labour countries implies a bias in the employment of skilled workers relative to unskilled ones.

Using a balanced panel of firms covering the period 1995–2003, we set up a counterfactual analysis in which, by using a difference‐in‐differences propensity score matching estimator, we compare the dynamics of skill demand for treated and control firms while addressing the possible problem of selection bias.

Our results identify a ‘potential’ skill bias effect of production offshoring. In particular, we find that treated firms tend to show an upward shift in the skill ratio with respect to the counterfactual sample, but coefficients are not significantly different from zero. When we look at the elements of the skill ratio separately, we find that the skill bias is driven by a fall in the employment of production workers (blue collars), rather than by the increase in the employment of non‐production workers (white collars), thus providing further evidence on the unskilled labour‐saving nature of international outsourcing.     

World Bank Trade Adjustment Loans and Export Policy Distortions

Abstract

This work investigates whether World Bank loans fostering trade liberalization are associated with less distorted export policies, by employing some gravity model‐based measures of anti‐export bias, and a Herfindhal index of export revenues concentration. When accounting for non‐random selection in a sample of 88 developing countries over the period 1980‐2000, the receipt of trade adjustment loans seems to have reduced the policy distortion under scrutiny. Such a beneficial influence, however, vanishes when a longer time horizon is considered, casting doubts on the country ownership of waves of liberalizations supported by the Bank.     

Can an overconfident insider coexist with a representativeness heuristic insider?

This paper develops an insider trading model that incorporates the presence of rational, overconfident, and representativeness heuristic insiders. We find that the heuristic insider and overconfident insider trade more aggressively on their information than the rational insider, and that therefore, a higher probability exists for them to earn more profits. Furthermore, both higher heuristic bias of the heuristic insider and greater overconfidence of the overconfident insider lead to less expected profit for the rational insider and less expected loss for the noise trader. Moreover, in an equilibrium, both higher heuristic bias and greater overconfidence of an insider lead to a more efficient and stable market.     

Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias

We study the behavior of experimental subjects who have to make a sequence of risky investment decisions in the presence of network externalities. Subjects follow a simple heuristic—investing after positive experiences and reducing their propensity to invest after a failure. This result contrasts with the theoretical findings of Jeitschko and Taylor [Jeitschko, T.D., Taylor, C., 2001. Local discouragement and global collapse: A theory of coordination avalanches. Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (1), 208–224] in which even agents who have only good experiences eventually stop investing because they account for the fact that others with worse experiences will quit. This can trigger sudden economic collapse—a coordination avalanche—even in the most efficient Bayesian equilibrium. In the experiment, subjects follow their own experiences and disregard the possible bad experiences of others—thus exhibiting behavior that we term “solipsism bias.” Solipsism results in sustained investment activity and thus averts complete collapse.