Four essays on economic evolution: an introduction

This essay is in two parts. The first considers the evolution of evolutionary economics from 1982 to 2012. While enormous advances are acknowledged, it is argued that the field is in danger of fragmentation and that there has been relatively little development in its over-arching theoretical framework since Nelson and Winter (1982). This sets the scene for a 2011 workshop and four of the papers presented at the event. In the second part, each paper is outlined in turn, both in terms of its specific contribution and any light it may shine on the problems raised in the first part.     

Scientific misconduct and research ethics in economics: an introduction

Abstract

Since the screening of Inside Job in movie theatres around the world in 2010, research integrity in economics has been questioned by scholars and public intellectuals. Prestigious economists and policy makers are accused of conflicts of interest while prominent economists are charged with plagiarism and self-plagiarism. Some of these economists replied to accusations about themselves while many others have preferred not to respond at all. These days, economists hear the following question more often than before: “what is wrong with economics?”     

Cost competition: new evidence on an old issue

The relation between cost changes and market share changes is examined for five size ranked cohorts of firms in US manufacturing industries. Cost reductions are expected to yield market share increases via associated price reductions. It was found that this is indeed the case, although the realation is not strong. A 10% cost reduction produces roughly a 2% market share increase, an estimated which for various reason is most likely a lower bound. Cost reductions are also associated with both price reductions and price-cost margin increases.     

Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective

We construct a model in which an investment opportunity arisesfor a first mover before it knows the identity of a second moverand in which joint location results in a negative externality.Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover cannotbargain over its ex ante investment decision with the anonymoussecond mover. Given this departure from the setting of the Coasetheorem, the allocation of property rights over the externalityhas real effects on social welfare. We investigate the relativeefficiency of property rights regimes used in practice: injunctions,damages, the ruling in the Spur Industries case, etc. The firstbest can be obtained by allocating property rights (in particularthe right to sue for damages) to the second mover. Allocatingproperty rights to the first mover, as a "coming to the nuisance"rule entails, leads to overinvestment. In contrast to conventionalwisdom, this inefficiency persists even if a monopoly landownercontrols all the land on which the parties may locate.     

Immigration and domestic wage: an empirical study on competition among immigrants

While studies on the wage effects of immigration focus on native workers, there is significantly less information on the wage effects of immigration on domestic foreign-born workers. In addition to analysing the impact of immigration on wages of native workers, in this article, we estimate the internal competition among foreign-born workers in the United States. Firstly, using data from the Current Population Survey, we find no empirical evidence supporting the substitutability of native workers for immigrants. Secondly, there is no statistical difference between skilled and unskilled immigrants on the influence of the domestic labour market outcomes. Finally, there is no internal competition among immigrants. The income of non-citizen workers mainly depends on state and national levels of economic situations, not the number of non-citizen workers available in the labour market.     

Checks and balances outside the government: an introduction to the symposium

The symposium brings together case studies that are all about reasonably successful experiments in institution building and policy making by interactions between public and private spheres. The cases deal with the provision of information enabling market to perform, law making, and the control of political discretion and public bureaus. Each in its own way, they show how agents have room for some reasoned choice, although eventually this room for choice is narrowed by the emergence of stabilized institutions that come to shape in a rather permanent way the environment within which they later operate. The common characteristic across these case studies is the non-Parliamentarian process through which process of experimentation, rationalization and institutionalization takes place.