Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia

In a centralized federation, in which tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities. In this article, we test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia's regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspected of tax auditing manipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s, increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federal centre. Our findings confirm the existence of strategic tax collection for the Yeltsin period; the results for the Putin period are however ambiguous.     

Fiscal Equalization and Tax Enforcement

In many countries organized as federations, fiscal equalization schemes have been implemented to mitigate vertical or horizontal imbalances. Such schemes usually imply that the member states of the federation can only partly internalize (marginal) tax revenue before redistribution. Aside from the internalized marginal revenue, referred to as the marginal tax‐back rate, the remainder is redistributed. We investigate the extent to which state‐level authorities in such federation under‐exploit their tax bases. By means of a stylized model, we show that the member states have an incentive to align the effective tax rates on their residents with the level of the marginal tax‐back rate. We empirically test the model using state‐level and micro‐level taxpayer data, OLS regressions and natural experiments. Our empirical findings support the results from our theoretical model. Particularly, we find that states with a higher marginal tax‐back rate exploit the tax base to a higher extent.     

Fiscal policies, environmental pollution and economic growth

This paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure and environmental pollution; and analyses the properties of optimal fiscal policy in the steady state growth equilibrium. We consider the level of consumption as the source of pollution. Government allocates its tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. Optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is equal to the competitive output share of the public input, when productive public expenditure is depicted as tax revenue minus abatement expenditure. However, the proportional income tax rate exceeds the competitive output share of the public input. There is no conflict between the social welfare maximizing solution and the growth rate maximizing solution in the steady state growth equilibrium. The unique steady state growth equilibrium appears to be a saddle-point when the growth rate is above a critical level and the steady state equilibrium growth rate in the market economy is not necessarily lower than the socially efficient growth rate.     

我国省际间财政差异趋势与影响因素的实证研究

本文通过1980-2005年间的样本数据,揭示1980年以来我国省际间财政差异的变化趋势,以及这种变化趋势的影响因素.我们的研究表明,在财政收入方面,受地区经济差异加大的影响,1994年以后财政收入差异有扩大态势,而分税制改革有助于缩小省际间财政收入差异.在财政支出方面,1995年以后财政支出差异呈上升趋势,这是地区间经济发展水平差异与分税制共同作用的结果,但是前者的作用远远大于后者.因此,缩小省际间财政差异的途径除转移支付外,还应当主要致力于缩小省际间经济发展水平差异.     

Fiscal federalism in monetary unions: hypothetical fiscal transfers within the Euro-zone

Net fiscal transfers are commonly seen as a possible means to ensure the well-functioning of a currency area. We show that US net fiscal transfers, measured as the difference between gross federal revenues and federal expenditures per state, are enormous. Moreover, we run panel regressions that suggest their dependence on relative GDP and relative GDP growth during crisis periods, evidence of net fiscal transfers from relatively rich to relatively poor states (redistributive effect) and to states with an underperforming economic development (stabilization effect). The Euro-zone (EZ) lacks a system of fiscal federalism, which raises the question of whether it should be established in the medium- and long-run. If so, which should be the magnitude of net fiscal transfers? We calculate these transfers hypothetically for 1999–2010, using a relative volume comparable to the one in the USA.     

美国与法国财政联邦主义比较

财政联邦主义是处理中央与地方政府之间财政关系的一种制度设计。美国和法国分别是典型的联邦制国家和单一制国家,其政府间的职权、支出责任、税收与税权的划分以及转移支付关系等,均表现出极强的财政联邦主义特征,通过比较,既可以为财政联邦主义理论提供实证,也能够为我国分税制财政体制的完善提供可资借鉴的内容。     

A New Perspective for Fiscal Federalism: The NK Model

Economic models of fiscal federalism, according to different settings, are generally linear and static, offering unique and deterministic solutions starting with simplifying assumptions. This article stems from the idea of investigating how decision-makers, abandoning their traditional economic models and focusing on innovative components of evolutionary economics instead, can achieve better performance results in organizing and optimizing an economic system based on fiscal federalism. For this purpose, fiscal federalism must be understood as a dense network of economic relationships between different complex adaptive and co-evolving systems, the jurisdictions, linked by strong interdependencies. A better understanding of the links between interdependence will be provided by Stuart Kauffman’s NK model. The relevance of the NK model in the study of economic organizations has been noted in the relevant literature. This literature, however, neglects the problem of co-evolution, which underpins our article.     

A Cournot Mechanism for Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information

The contribution of this paper is to show that a simple nonlinear tax can achieve a long-run socially optimal level of pollution without the regulator knowing marginal abatement costs. Firms are charged their differential contribution to total damages, evaluated at the upper margin of current emissions. This induces a Cournot game in pollution levels. We show that the Nash equilibrium exists, corresponds to the socially optimal long-run output and emission levels and number of firms, is stable, and can be reached by iterative computations where conjectures are formed using a linear estimator based on past emission levels.     

Environmental capital flight and pollution tax

This paper analyzes the impacts of a production pollution tax on environmental capital flight and national product in a two-country static general equilibrium model with two-way foreign investment. It is assumed that the capital input in both countries is a composite good of domestic and imported capital. And pollution is assumed to originate in the production process. The productivity of capital in each country is negatively (or positively) related to the worldwide aggregate emissions.The analysis shows that when a domestic pollution tax is levied, domestic capital outflows increase and foreign capital inflows decrease for sufficiently high elasticities of substitution between labor (immobile input) and capital (mobile input) in both countries. Moreover, with negative transnational externalities, increases of a domestic pollution tax reduce domestic production and increase foreign production. The difficulty of substitution between immobile and mobile inputs hinders the optimal allocation of worldwide capital and national product. In this paper, the optimal pollution tax is based on global welfare maximization, not on global income maximization, taking into consideration the impact of income change on individual welfare. Therefore, an optimal pollution tax in the developing country should be lower for a given rate of pollution.     

Hybrid Carbon Incentive Mechanisms and Political Acceptability

This paper analyses how hybrid systems of carbon taxes and tradeable permits optimize some conflicting dimensions of political acceptability related to the design of these instruments. Pure systems like taxes without exemptions or auctioned tradeable permits cause problems for political acceptability in open economies due to high overall costs (abatement cost plus payments on the tax or auctions) for current polluters. Unfortunately, pure systems based on grandfathering of emission rights across the board do not provide a feasible alternative because of monitoring and enforcement problems. In contrast, consciously designed hybrid systems employ grandfathering of emission rights together with either carbon taxes or auctioned carbon permits in order to overcome acceptability problems of pure systems, while leaving incentives to reduce emissions at the margin untouched. Moreover, monitoring and enforcement costs of the hybrid systems are less due to the lower number of participating agents compared with the pure systems, while opportunities for cost- or burden-sharing exist as well.     

Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of India

This paper studies mechanisms to compensate local government for the public provision of environmental services using the theory of optimal fiscal transfers in India. Especially, we analyzed the role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving the environmental goal. Simply assigning the functions at appropriate levels does not ensure optimal provision of environmental services. Optimality in resource allocation could be achieved by combining the assignment system with an appropriate compensation mechanism. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers would be a suitable mechanism for compensating the local governments and help in internalizing the spillover effects of providing environmental public goods. Illustrations are also provided for India.     

Policy Framework for Transition to a Low-Carbon World Economy

Climate change mitigation policy is the most difficult to come before our polity in living memory. There can be no solution without international agreement involving all substantial economies, and yet each country has an incentive to free ride on others. The international agreement must have five parts: agreement on the objective in terms of concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, agreement on allocation of an emissions entitlements budget among countries, agreement on rules for international trade in entitlements, agreement on developed countries taking the lead on development of low-emissions technologies, and agreement on assistance from developed countries for climate change mitigation in developing countries. Two sources of market failure must be corrected to achieve emissions reduction targets efficiently: the external costs of emitting greenhouse gases and the external benefits of private investment in innovation in relation to low-emissions technologies.     

State enforcement of federal standards: Implications for interstate pollution

This paper explores the relationship between interstate air pollution and the division of power between federal and state agencies in setting and enforcing standards. In the context of the US Clean Air Act we argue that the EPA is able to monitor the adoption of technology-based standards more closely than it can monitor state-level enforcement, and that this causes an effective division of control between federal and state agencies. Our analysis offers three main insights into the interstate pollution problem in this setting. First, states have an incentive to enforce standards less stringently on firms located close to downwind borders, and this leads to excessive interstate pollution in equilibrium. Second, there can arise an inherent substitutability in the regulatory problem between strict standards and compliance effort, and this creates a strategic linkage between the federal policy on standards and state policies on enforcement. In particular, a tighter federal standard can induce less selective enforcement but can also lead to less enforcement overall. Third, states will attempt to neutralize the impact of location-based federal standards (that specifically target interstate pollution) in a way that actually exacerbates the underlying enforcement problem.     

Co-ordinated environmental regulation: controlling non-point nitrate pollution while maintaining river flows

Environmental policy often addresses multiple targets, yet much economic analysis of pollution control is based on a single-target objective. In this paper, we present an analysis of policies to control non-point source nitrate pollution in the presence of minimum river flow restrictions. A non-linear bio-physical economic optimisation model of an intensively cultivated Scottish agricultural catchment was constructed. The presence of minimum river flow controls in the catchment was found to reduce nitrogen pollution. However, by themselves, river flow controls were found not to be a cost effective means to reduce non-point pollution. We quantify the improved social welfare from coordinating the environmental regulation of river flows and pollution, and determine the conditions under which such coordination is beneficial. The paper also investigates whether the benefits of such coordination can be sustained under wetter (winter) weather conditions implied by current climate change predictions.     

Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control

The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International WorkshopEconomic Aspects of International Water Resources Utilization in the Mediterranean Basin, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan, October 1993, and the Fifth Annual Conference of EAERE, Dublin, June 1994. I would like to thank Peter Berck, Charles Kolstad, Mordechai Schechter, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

The importance of product positioning and global branding for sustaining competitive advantage within the companies＇ global marketing strategy

In today＇s globally competitive world, because of the globalization, new business patterns and the changing nature of consumers, the companies feel the necessity to act strategic in the market and to reach up the target markets and sustain maximum customer satisfaction in order to compete and survive. In this context, within the study it is tried to define product positioning in international markets and global branding strategies conceptually and to focus on their contributions to the overall competitive advantage of the company. Initially, the study tries to present the association between product positioning and global branding approaches of the companies and sustaining competitive advantage. Justifications for the examination of the importance of companies＇ international product positioning and global branding orientations as a basis of creating competitive advantage were derived from the literature. It is suggested that the companies＇ product positioning and global branding orientations and sustaining competitive advantage are the important aspects in multinational management and international business areas. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of product positioning and global branding strategies of the companies with special references to various industries and global brands.