Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria

In a standard model of oligopoly with differentiated products, the existence of an equilibrium at which the first-order conditions for profit maximisation are simultaneously satisfied for all firms is proved and this is done without imposing any restrictions on the demand functions. This is an equilibrium in the following sense: although some firms may not necessarily be maximising their profits, nevertheless if each firm's knowledge of demand is limited to the linear approximation of its own demand curve, then it will believe that it is indeed maximising its profits.     

Determinants of capacity utilization by firms in less developed countries

The factors which influenced the capacity utilization decision of two hundred firms in the light manufacturing sector in Thailand during the period 1962–1974 were analyzed. The profit-maximizing capacity utilization rate for each firm was calculated using the projected balance sheets and income statements the firms prepared at the time of their initial investment. This ‘optimal’ rate was roughly twice the rates chosen by the firms. The extent of nonoptimal capacity underutilization of a firm was a function of the nationality of the firm's owner, entry date, number of firms in the industry, projected profits, and the manager's perceived risk of multishift operations.     

Size structure,stability and performance of the largest British and EEC firms

This paper indicates that industrial as wel' as aggregate concentration of the largest European firms is increasing. Inside the group itself, the British firms show a marked decline of their size superiority over the EEC firms and a lower survival rate. At performance level, the actual increase in economic concentration does bring inferior results in terms of profit and growth rates along with it. The main consequence of a larger size is to reduce the firm's exposure to risk as expressed by the coefficient of profit variation. Comparing the two groups, the effect of a lower British survival rate is strengthened by the fact that the surviving British firms grow systematically more slowly than the continental firms. On the other hand, the British firms have a higher rate of profit and a lower coefficient of profit variation.     

Identification of technological threats and opportunities by firms

A number of models and approaches are being developed in attempts to anticipate the nature and direction of technological change and its impact on the firm. Under what conditions might we expect firms to use one or more of these models in an organized way and under what conditions might we expect the resulting information to be used in the firm's planning process? The basic hypothesis of this paper is that effective use by firms of models for anticipating technological change can be explained based upon: the nature and extent of uncertainty in the firm's environment,the firm's strategy for growth, and the degree of definition of communication networks (both formal and informal) within the firm and between the firm and its environment. Technology planners and managers of 29 firms in a variety of industries have been interviewed concerning the ways in which technological threats and opportunities are identified and analyzed and the ways in which this information is integrated into the firm's normal planning cycle. A follow-up questionnaire is being designed to be sent to a larger number of respondents.     

The effects of one-way compatibility on technology adoption in systems markets

This paper analyzes the effects of one-way compatibility on technology adoption in a market that is characterized by a free-entry condition on the software side. We show that hardware-backward compatibility increases a new-generation hardware firm’s profit; the effects of software-backward compatibility on the hardware firm’s profits depend on the distribution of consumer types.     

The ex-post behavior of firms offering optimal employment contracts

The influential papers of Azariadas (1975) and Baily (1974) have clearly demonstrated that with imperfect labor mobility expected profit maximizing firms will offer employment contracts that will not result in profit maximizing behavior once the ‘state of nature’ is disclosed. This Letter shows that such firms will behave as if their objective were to maximize the expected utility of each individual worker subject to a profit target. The rule that emerges when there is unemployment will be shown to be formally equivalent to Meade's Rule for optimal population [Meade (1955, ch. 6)].     

Why are firms sometimes unwilling to reduce costs?

This paper identifies the environments in which it does not pay for a multiproduct firm to engage in small cost reductions. Specifically, it shows that a multiproduct Bertrand firm’s profits will decrease in response to a small reduction in one product’s marginal cost if and only if the output share of the cost-reducing unit is below a threshold. Because cost reductions by a single-product firm or by a multiproduct Cournot firm always increase the firm’s profits, this result is unique to multiproduct Bertrand firms.     

Incentive effects of benevolent intervention: The case of government loan guarantees

There has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the United States. This paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice. Using the simplest available two-period model, it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming, they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage. These perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan-guarantees-related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected. Our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm's assets and its leverage.     

STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS*

A firm which lobbies government for a change in policy, say an import tariff, can increase its profits in two ways. First, the policy can increase the profits of all firms in the industry. This effect therefore involves a free-rider problem. Second, a firm's lobbying expenditures may signal other firms about its costs and interests. For example, a firm with low marginal costs may profit much from an import ban. Other firms which see that this firm expects to profit much from the ban may decide not to enter the industry. This may further increase the low-cost firm's profits.     

Bargaining costs and regulation induced cost distortions

The regulated rate of return of most public utilities exceeds the cost of capital. Also, the regulated utility and its customers present evidence in rate hearings to influence the commission's decision. The negotiation and lobbying activity in turn affects the firm's choice of factors. As the price of additional negotiation rises, the firm is less willing to continue these discussions and instead will rely on other, non-negotiated profit sources such as traditional Averch-Johnson overcapitalization. This hypothesis is empirically supported by a 1970 cross section of 168 steam electric plants.     

The welfare effects of FDI: A quantitative analysis

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can increase productivity and wages. However, it is also often accompanied by primary income deficits as foreign-owned firms repatriate their profits. The welfare effects of FDI are thus ambiguous. A particularly illustrative example of this phenomenon are the Visegrád 4 (V4) countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). This paper investigates whether FDI can be beneficial in the presence of profit repatriation using a general equilibrium model calibrated to the V4 economies. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the benefits of FDI outweigh the costs for these countries. On average, a 1% increase in the share of foreign firms is associated with a 0.17% increase in welfare. However, incentivising foreign firms to reinvest more of their profits domestically is, ceteris paribus, welfare-improving. A 10-percentage-point increase in the profit repatriation rate is associated with a 1.06% welfare gain on average.     

Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?

In this paper, we demonstrate that in contrast to the case with exogenous number of foreign private firms, partial privatization is always the best policy for the public firm in long-run equilibrium, which casts doubt on the robust result in Matsumura and Kanda (J Econ 84(1):27–48, 2005) who argued that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Critical cost gap determines that long-run degree of privatization is larger than the short-run one. In particular, regarding the scenario wherein one public firm competes with domestic private firms and foreign private firms, equilibrium price is lower than marginal cost of public firm instead of being equivalent to marginal cost of the public firm, and that public firm’s outputs, profit, and social welfare is the smallest in the concerned mixed oligopoly models.     

Appropriability rules,capital maintenance,and the efficiency of cooperative investment

It is generally accepted that investment in cooperative firms is discouraged by limitations on individual appropriability of the capital and its returns, and by obligations to maintain the firm's capital. Both disincentives, operating most acutely in Yugoslavia, result in suboptimal investment behavior. This paper argues, however, that most of the disincentive is due to the capital maintenance obligation rather than to limited appropriability. In the absence of the former and as long as workers' time horizon is not inordinately short, disincentives may not significantly interfere with efficient selection of certain types of investment.     

A dynamic profit function with adjustment costs for outputs

It is well known that there are adjustment costs associated with many input factors, which delays firms response to changes in relative prices. Although adjustment costs are implicitly acknowledged when a cost rather than profit function is used, little attention has been given to adjustment costs for outputs. However, in many cases there will also be adjustment costs associated with changes in the product mix for multioutput firms. In this paper we formulate a firm’s optimization problem in a profit maximizing set up that allows adjustment costs for all netputs from which it follows that adjustment cost for some factors affect the adjustment of both inputs and outputs. We also show that one can test whether a factor is quasi-fixed or fully fixed.      

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.     

A model of incentive regulation

A method of incentive regulation is presented. The regulatory agency sets a‘fair rate of return’ which is used to determine a ‘target’ profit for the regulated firm. If the firm's actual profit differs from the target profit, it retains a fraction of the excess (or absorbs a fraction of the deficit). This feature of the system provides a strong incentive for efficient operation. Properties of the incentive system are explored and problems of implementation are briefly examined.     

THE POTENTIAL FOR SHORT‐RUN SHIFTING OF A CORPORATE PROFITS TAX

Can the owners of a firm shift a corporate profits tax to consumers? Not in the short run if the tax is stated as a proportion of profits and the firm is a profit maximizer. But what if the firm wishes to pursue a strategy other than profit maximization, say revenue maximization subject to a profit constraint? Under such a condition the firm's reaction to a tax or tax increase might be a price rise that captures part of the foregone profits. We show that firms which operate at a point on their demand curve that differs from profit maximization have an incentive to raise price in response to the tax – and that high cost firms have a greater incentive to raise price than do low cost firms. Our empirical analysis of the US beer industry confirms this finding, and sheds light on the Krzyzaniak–Musgrave analysis of the 1960s which suggested that the corporation income tax produced significant short‐run shifting.     

Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives

In a game of a finite number of repetitions of a Cournot-type model of an industry, if firms are satisfied to get close to (but not necessarily achieve) their optimal responses to other firms' sequential strategies, then in the resulting noncooperative “equilibria” of the sequential market game, (1) if the lifetime of the industry is large compared to the number of firms, there are equilibria corresponding to any given duration of the cartel, whereas (2) if the number of firms is large compared to the industry's lifetime, all equilibria will be close (in some sense) to the competitive equilibrium.     

Forward markets and the multiproduct,multifactor firm under price uncertainty

In this paper a competitive firm producing multiple outputs with multiple inputs is examined. All input and output prices are uncertain, and forward markets exist for all prices. The firm's optimal production and forward market strategies are analyzed.     

Sustainable positive profit multiple-price strategies in contestable markets

One of the most important features of contestable market is the incumbent's inability to react to entry. While in the traditional literature, this prevents the incumbent from earning positive profits, in multiple price setting it allows him to make a binding commitment to maintain his strategy even if entry occurs. It is shown that as a result of this pre-commitment, any natural monopolist can find a multiple price strategy that yields positive profit, and prevents entry.