Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences

The paper investigates the structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with unrestricted domain under the assumption that individual weak preference relations are reflexive, connected, and quasi-transitive. Among other results, neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules on this domain are characterized for alternative social rationality assumptions.     

Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems. Each such game is determined by the set of (anonymous) minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems, and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. In the (3,2) case, the approach yields a version of May's Theorem, classifying all possible anonymous voting rules with abstention in terms of quota functions. In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry.     

On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice

This paper attemts to make precise the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice. It is shown that some criterion of rejection of some alternative is the critical factor. In the absence of such a condition, it is possible to construct a fairly wide class of “democratic” decision rules which satisfies a class of consistency conditions. Any one of these, together with the criterion of rejection, generates a power structure similar to the ones discovered by Arrow, Gibbard, and others when the decision rule is required to satisfy the weak Pareto principle and the independence condition.     

Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems. Each such game is determined by the set of (anonymous) minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems, and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. In the (3,2) case, the approach yields a version of May's Theorem, classifying all possible anonymous voting rules with abstention in terms of quota functions. In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry.     

收入差距、位置消费与社会稳定

适度、合理的收入差距,不仅是激励人们竞争,促进发展的重要务件,也是位置消费产生的基本条件;但过分悬殊的收入差距则不仅会影响人们的社会心理,不利于提高有效消费,而且可能产生畸形的位置消费行为,甚至会因此影响社会的稳定.在分析和研究目前收入分配问题时,应当从位置消费的新视角研究它们对社会稳定的影响.研究位置消费有利于我们从人们相互比较的满意度中观察改革的效果,权衡各项利弊得失,并及时地采取微调措施,尽可能地减少改革的摩擦和阻力.     

长沙市民文化旅游决策规则分析

随着文化旅游愈益重要,人们的文化旅游决策的影响因素是一个值得特别重视的问题。通过对长沙市居民进行问卷调查,获得1068份有效问卷,形成数据库,采用决策树技术分析,发现文化旅游者具有三级决策规则,分别对应＂文化底蕴＂、＂地方风俗＂和＂月收入＂。使用决策树建立决策规则模型,从年龄和职业角度对三级规则的人口构成进行了分析。     

社会资本规制与产权安排的替代效用和替代规则

按照科斯定理的逻辑,可以证明社会资本规制与产权安排具有相互替代的效用;而两者之间的替代规则,可以在交易成本理论的平台上,从交易的频率、专用性、异质性三个维度进行刻画;对于现实中的社会资本规制和产权安排的互补现象,也可以通过交易成本递增和外部性分析,在满足两者效用替代的基础上得到解释。     

Impossibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels: The "Extended Sympathy Approach" Reconsidered

We re-examine a type of interpersonal welfare comparison, called the "extended sympathy" approach, which Arrow (1977), Hammond (1976) and Roberts (1980a) introduced in order to escape from Arrovian impossibility theorems. In particular, we extend the positional dictatorship theorem due to Roberts to the case where the domain of social choice rules satisfies the axiom of identity. We show that there is a positional dictator if the rule with the domain satisfies independence, Suppes unanimity and monotonicity
JEL Classification Numbers: 022, 025, 026     

Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium with or without short sales

Summary A condition oflimited arbitrage is defined on the endowments and the preferences of the traders in an Arrow-Debreu economy. Theorem 1 establishes thatlimited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in markets with or without short sales. Limited arbitrage bounds utility arbitrages, the diversity of the traders in the economy, and the gains from trade which they can afford from initial endowments (Proposition 2); it is related to but nonetheless different from the no-arbitrage condition used in finance. Theorem 2 establishes that an Arrow — Debreu economy has a competitive equilibrium if and only if every one of its subeconomies withN + 1 traders does, whereN is the number of commodities. Limited arbitrage has been shown elsewhere to be equivalent to the existence of the core [16], to the contractibility of spaces of preferences and to the existence of continuous anonymous social choice rules which respect unanimity [10], [14], [15], [16].This paper was circulated in December 1991 as a Working Paper of the Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, and presented at seminars at Mathematics, Economics, and Operations Research Departments at Columbia, Harvard, Stanford University of California at Berkeley, University of Bonn and the University of Siena, at an invited presentation at the European Congress of Mathematicians, July 1992, and the Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society in Boston, January 1994. Valuable comments and suggestions from Roko Aliprantis, Masahiko Aoki, Kenneth Arrow, Duncan Foley, Geoffrey Heal, Lionel McKenzie, Paul Milgrom and two anonymous referees, and research support from NSF Grant No. 92-16028 and the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics are gratefully acknowledged.     

基于可持续发展的区域矿产资源配置问题研究

本文基于矿产资源的有限性和不可再生性,确立了资源优化配置的多目标准则;在全面分析影响区域矿产资源优化配置的社会经济发展需求因素,区域资源基础及潜力因素,资源开发利用的能力和水平因素,区域生态环境承载力因素,资源安全储备因素,区域外资源可供性因素,配套资源及基础设施支持因素的基础上,建立了区域矿产资源合理开发规模和速度的评价指标体系和分析计算模型;就河北省矿产资源的合理开发问题进行了具体的实证分析,研究了多目标准则下区域矿产资源开发和利用在时间维度上的优化配置问题,为合理规划和调整区域矿产资源开发利用战略提供了有益参考。     

The Possibility of Issue-Specific Decisions on Multiple Social Choice Issues

This paper considers an aggregation rule when each alternative consists of elements of multiple issues. I assume that each issue-specific aggregation rule can be applied to each issue and explore whether various different issue-specific aggregation rules are compatible. When the set of alternatives has some structure (which we call a set connected by loops), there exists a powerful individual whose preference always coincides with the social ordering in every issue. As a corollary, Arrow's General Possibility Theorem is obtained.     

The rules of abstraction

Friedrich Hayek’s work on spontaneous order suggests that the emergence of a spontaneous order requires the existence of abstract rules of conduct. But how much abstraction is required? Abstraction exists on a gradient, from the highest specificity (pertaining to particular persons and narrowly defined circumstances) to the highest generality (pertaining to all persons in all circumstances). If rules create order by coordinating expectations, either end of the spectrum is undesirable; the most specific and the most abstract rules fail to provide decision makers with useful guidance. This article argues that rules that foster coordination must be characterized by an intermediate degree of abstraction. This conclusion will be explained and applied to law, language, and etiquette in order to draw out the similar character of rules across various contexts. The article concludes by discussing four properties that rules of intermediate abstraction must also possess to foster spontaneous order.     

Multiple Criteria Decision Making: A Case Study of the Columbia River Salmon Recovery Plan

A common problem faced by decision makers is choosing the best alternative from among many. Traditionally, such decisions in the public arena were made using benefit-cost analysis, which involves the conversion of all costs and benefits associated with a project into monetary terms. But public projects often have a variety of economic, ecological, social and political objectives, many of which cannot or perhaps should not be converted to monetary terms. In such projects decisions must be made based on multiple, even conflicting objectives. Multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) methods are widely used for such decisions. However, a common disadvantage among many such methods available in the literature is that they require input from a real decision maker. This paper presents the development and application of an expert system based on fuzzy set theory and IF-THEN rules. The system mimics a real decision maker. Along with two conventional MCDM methods the developed expert system was applied on a data set from the Columbia River Basin salmon recovery plan to assess its potential usefulness as a decision-making tool for natural resource projects. The results suggest that the fuzzy expert system is easy to develop and makes better decisions than the other two conventional MCDM methods used.     

Gaus,Hayek, and the place of civil religion in a free society

In The Order of Public Reason, Gerald Gaus uses Hayekian insights to give a contractarian justification for the specific social rules the rules that comprise the social order of a free people. But in doing so, Gaus inadvertently endorses a kind of skepticism about our ability to justify the institutions that comprise our social order as a whole. The disadvantage of a political theory so pervasively skeptical is that, while contractors can arrive at a series of specific solutions to their social problems, they have no way to assure themselves that their moral nature and their moral practices as a whole are sufficiently sound that the rules they endorse are genuinely morally binding. I argue that this problem can be solved in political practice through the adoption of a civil religion. Civil religions provide narratives and social practices that assure members of free orders that their regimes are good or justified on the whole. In this way, we can introduce the idea of civil religion into contractarian political theory as a social technology for sustaining a free social order.     

Simple and inertial behavior: an optimizing decision model with imprecise perceptions

Summary Simplicity and inertial (or status-quo) bias are common features of actual decision rules used by real-life agents. In this paper, we provide one possible rationale for these features in terms of a model in which the decision maker is subject to imprecise perceptions about the consequences of actions that differ from (an already experienced) status quo.I am grateful to participants in seminars at Harvard University, University of Virginia, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona for helpful comments. Finantial support by the CICYT, project no. PB86-0613, and the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in gratefully acknowledged.     

An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules

Buchanan and Tullok (The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962) argued that the optimal k-majority rule should minimize the sum of external costs and decision costs. Dougherty et al. (Public Choice, 163(1–2):31–52, 2015) formalized their approach using various groups of voters. In this study, we analyze the optimal k-majority rule in terms of expected utility and compare our results to Dougherty et al. (2015), which focuses on costs alone. Specifically, we replace Buchanan and Tullock’s external cost function with an external utility function that accounts for both the benefits and costs of enacting proposals. We find that analyzing k-majority rules in terms of utility, rather than costs, affects the optima. Furthermore, in terms of utility, the optimal k-majority rule can vary depending on the group one expects to be in during a vote. With some interesting exceptions, individuals from groups that favor the proposal often find small k-majority rules optimal. Individuals from groups that oppose the proposal often find large k-majority rules optimal.     

The Role of Environmental Management in Consumers Preferences for Corporate Social Responsibility

Consumers in modern societies are increasingly sensitive to environmental performance by large and small corporations, making it a crucial issue in the overall policy of corporate social responsibility. The objective of this paper is to study the role of environmental performance in the profile of corporate social responsibility as perceived by consumers. We utilize a stated preference approach to the study of consumer’s preferences. This approach allows for the evaluation in monetary terms of the trade-offs that individuals can make between various aspects of corporate policy decisions, including the extent of environmental performance. The data is modelled by means of a mixture heuristics approach that allows us to study the utilization of various decision rules in the choice of products with various degrees of environmental performance. The results show that the linear compensatory heuristic is the most extended across individuals and these subjects value most the policies concerned with environmental management. Those subjects opting for the non-compensatory decision rule tend to focus on the attribute of good labour relations as the most salient factor defining corporate social responsibility. In addition, policy measures are relatively more valued for some products rather than for others, suggesting that consumers discriminate between products when valuing companies’ environmental profiles.     

生态文明建设视角下国家可持续发展实验区资源配置评价

建设国家可持续发展实验区是实施可持续发展和生态文明建设的重要战略,对实验区资源配置效率进行科学评价可以为其提供重要决策依据。以生态文明建设为主线,兼顾社会经济发展目标,从优化国土空间格局、自然生态环保、资源节约提升及生态文明制度建设4个方面,统筹建立国家可持续发展实验区资源配置效率评价指标体系,运用数据包络分析方法构建国家可持续发展实验区资源配置效率评价模型,对实验区资源配置效率进行纵向和横向两个维度的评价。以湖北省国家可持续发展实验区资源配置为例进行实证分析,验证了模型有效性,可为衡量和提升国家可持续发展实验区建设水平提供决策参考。     

Surrender Value of Capital Assets: The Economics of Strategic Virginity Loss

This paper provides the first econometric analysis of rationalizations of virginity loss in terms of love. Data from the UK National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles are used to estimate logit equations to predict the claim that virginity loss was occasioned by being in love. The sample consists of 2,269 males and 1,476 females between the ages of 16 and 59. In economic terms, a dichotomy is found in terms of male and female virginity loss, such that to a degree it is possible to infer that sex is for males more of a consumption good, whilst for females it is more of a capital good. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

On equilibrium existence in payoff secure games

We propose a single framework for studying the existence of approximate and exact pure strategy equilibria in payoff secure games. Central to the framework is the notion of a multivalued mapping with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective fixed point theorem, we first show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem that covers a number of known games. Then a short proof of Reny’s (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) equilibrium existence theorem is provided for payoff secure games with metrizable strategy spaces. We also give a simple proof of Reny’s theorem in its general form for metric games in an appendix for the sake of completeness.