银行贷款担保的若干思考

在我国,银行借贷活动的担保方式主要有抵押、质押和保证。抵押和质押属于物的担保,保证属于人的担保。抵押和质押都受《中华人民共和国物权法》的约束,而在涉及保证时,主要依据《担保法》。贷款担保为银行提供了额外保障,这是贷款担保最主要的作用,可以在一定程度上减少资本金要求。贷款担保的局限性主要体现在贷款担保不会改变借款人的经营和财务状况,担保财产具有价值风险和变现风险,担保权的实现依赖于法律体系的完整,担保权的实现要付出较高的成本等方面。     

抵押担保、置信威胁与融资选择

我国由于法律环境不完善、信用情况较差等原因形成了大量的银行不良资产.为降低不良资产比率,目前抵押担保在我国商业银行贷款中被普遍地使用.本文构建了拥有不同抵押担保品和自有资本的微观融资主体的借贷模型,通过分析借款者和贷款者的最优选择,推导得出了不同类型企业的最优融资模式,并指出银行为了切实降低不良贷款比率,不能只把抵押担保作为一种贷款前的风险甄别机制,作为借款人违约后弥补贷款损失的补救手段,更重要的是要在监管过程中利用抵押担保对借款人实行置信的威胁,以迫使其努力经营,从而实现有效的监管.文章最后结合模型对我国融资现状作了一些分析并相应提出了几点政策建议.     

谈融资担保人考核的关键要素

社会主义市场正处于一个极不稳定的状态,各种外在风险往往给企业造成严重的经济损失。为了巩固企业在市场上的经营地位,经营者常常采取扩大规模的方式,以综合增强抵制市场风险的能力。通过担保方式筹集资金是比较常见的,银行等金融机构在发放款项时应注重担保对象的考核。本文分析了融资担保模式中,担保人考核过程需要重视的几个要素,降低贷款企业及担保人承受的风险损失。     

考虑中小企业收益的存货质押融资风险控制北大核心CSSCI

存货质押融资是指融资企业(借款企业)将其所拥有的存货交给银行(贷款企业)指定的物流企业(第三方)保管,然后向银行申请贷款,获得融资的一种新型商业模式。由于信息不对称,中小企业的借款违约风险和道德风险客观存在,银行、物流企业、中小企业之间的决策行为存在着多方博弈。在贷款利率市场化条件下,综合考虑中小企业的投资收益率和项目成功率、银行的贷款利率和质押率,以及声誉价值等因素,针对中小企业的借款违约风险和道德风险,分别建立银行与中小企业的不完全信息静态博弈和有限理性下的演化博弈模型并求解,结果表明:银行通过设置适当的贷款利率和质押率,可以有效控制中小借款企业的融资风险,促使其投资风险更小和收益更合理的项目,以实现满意的借款履约率;而减少核查成本、加大违约处罚,并且采取声誉价值与诚实奖励相结合的双重激励机制,可以有效防范中小企业道德风险,促使其采取诚实经营策略。     

当前银行贷款担保中的法律问题浅析

为了规范担保行为，我国于１９９５年开始实施《担保法》，它在一定程度上促进了债务人诚信履约，挽救了债权损失，降低了资金流转风险，在保护银行资金的安全和实现其债权方面发挥了积极的作用。 一、担保在银行贷款运用中的不足 《担保法》实施以来，在担保的实际运用中仍存在许多不足之处，其具体表现在： ｌ、担保无效。（ｌ）担保人主体不合格。担保贷款是由政府机构或不具备担保人资格的单位出具的担保，这些单位没有担保的实力，使担保流于形式，没有起到担保或代偿的作用。法律明确规定了担保人必须是具有民事权利能力和民事行为能…     

进出口银行——出口卖方信贷

船舶出口申请条件1.借款人经营管理、财务和资信状况良好,具备偿还贷款本息能力;2.提供中国进出口银行认可的还款担保(如涉及);3.中国进出口银行认为必要的其他条件。申请材料1.借款申请书;2.借款人及担保人的基本情况、经年检的营业执照副本、近3年(成立不足3年的,成立以来)经审计的财务报告及本年近期财务报表及附注,其他表明借款人及担保人资信和经营状况的资料;3.还款担保意向书(如涉及);4.采取抵(质)押担保方式的,须提供有效的抵押物、质物权属证明,由中国进出口银行委托外部机构评估抵押物、质物价值的,还须提供价值评估报告;5中国进出口银行认为必要的其他资料。     

简析我国上市公司对外担保问题

正确运用担保这种经济行为,可以减少公司运营风险,使债权人、债务人和第三方担保人同时实现多赢。与一般保证人提供的担保相比,由上市公司提供的担保,因担保人具有雄厚经济实力、良好发展前景和安全稳定的特质而易为银行等债权人所接受。因而我国上市公司对外担保频繁。然而,从我国上市公司对外提供担保的实践活动来看,种种不规范的担保行为反而加大了整个市场的风险。一、现行会计准则有关担保事项存在缺陷从会计实务发展的趋势来看,我国会计准则有些规定存在着一定的问题:对于未来可能形成的损失即或有损失应根据其发生可能性的大小采取确…     

浅析银行贷款担保过程中所涉保险问题

正担保是保障债权实现、救济债权损失的法律手段,是重要的民事法律制度,我国《担保法》设定的担保方式有"保证、抵押、质押、留置、定金"等五种。银行在发放贷款时,通常采用抵押、质押或保证的方式要求借款人提供担保,以保障贷款债权的实现。笔者近期参加了国家发展改革委和我省组织的商业银行收费检查,通过近半年时间的检查,发现有些商业银行在发放抵押贷款的同时,将"抵押手续持续合法有效,抵押物办理保险并制定我行为第一受益人。"作为放款的必要前提条件,强制借款人为抵押物办理足额的财产保险;还有些商业银行在发放保证贷款的担保合同中,以格式条款的形式要求在保证人是非自然人的情况下,借款人应为保证     

信用担保合约的定价

随着信用担保行业的不断发展,作为高风险行业,对其担保合约的科学定价以覆盖其担保失败的损失,显得极为重要。利用信用担保合约与信用违约互换的支付函数的同构性,构建适当的信用违约互换合约及模拟信用担保公司的信用担保合约,以信用违约互换的定价方式为信用担保公司的信用担保合同进行定价,更能体现出定价模型对担保合约定价的客观性、科学性和准确性。     

融资性担保机构担保风险分析

在回顾相关担保理论的基础上,本文以融资担保机构的直接利益相关者(银行和中小企业)为研究视角,通过建模分析了融资担保机构与银行之间的比例担保,中小企业提供的反担保,以及融资担保机构对中小企业调查监控力度的强弱对其担保风险的影响。研究结果表明:当中小企业提供足够的反担保品并且该反担保品价值大于担保责任余额时,加大对企业的调查力度以及增加担保机构的承保比例,有助于缓解信息不对称带来的逆向选择和道德风险问题;当中小企业提供的反担保品价值不足以抵偿贷款金额本息和时,加大对受保企业的调查力度以及提高承保比例只会加剧企业的逆向选择和道德风险。     

Loan guarantees: Costs of default and benefits to small firms

Governments of most countries seek to encourage Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (SME) growth and the job creation that many believe is fostered by such growth. Substantive growth usually requires expansion capital. It is often perceived that compared with larger firms, SMEs face disproportionately less access to the debt capital they need for start-up, growth, and survival. Consequently, governments and trade associations have often intervened in credit markets by taking on the role of guarantor of loans that financial institutions advance to SMEs. For example, the Small Business Administration in the United States provides guarantees of loans made by banks to qualifying small firms. Similar schemes are in effect in, among other countries, Canada, Japan, the U.K., Korea, and Germany. Trade associations take on such roles in France, Spain, and other nations.Loans that support the expansion of small enterprises may convey significant benefits to the borrowing firms and, through job creation and retention, to the rest of society. However, to the extent that some borrowers are unable to meet the repayment obligations of their debt, guarantors also face material real costs of honoring their guarantee to the lenders. Loan guarantee programs are designed in a variety of ways. Often these programs do not appear to reflect guidance from economic theory or experience. This paper draws on empirical evidence to compare costs with benefits. In addition, it uses the results and economic theory to provide some guidance for the design of loan guarantee programs. Finally, the study shows that loan guarantee programs can be an effective means of supporting start-up, growth, and survival of new and risky enterprises. The work finds that substantial total and incremental job creation may be attributed to the Canadian loan guarantee program.The paper reviews previous attempts to conduct cost-benefit analyses of loan guarantee programs. It finds wide variation, internationally, in default rates. Published data suggests default rates vary from less than 5% (Germany) to more than 40% (U.K.). The empirical analysis reported here focuses on the Canadian implementation of loan guarantees, the Small Business Loans Act (SBLA). Findings include (1) loan guarantees granted under the terms of the SBLA provide an extremely efficient means of job creation, with very low estimated costs per job; (2) default rates are higher for newer firms, increase with the amount of funds borrowed, and vary widely by sector (borrowers in the retail and accommodation, and food and beverage sectors were significantly more likely to default than borrowers in other sectors); and (3) the widening eligibility to larger firms and to larger loans may not be well advised and is inconsistent with the goals of the program. Moreover, reducing the loan ceiling would arguably discourage fraudulent applications while servicing those SMEs most in need of early-stage capital.In addition, analysis of the lenders' motives suggests that default rates on the portfolio of guaranteed loans and, therefore, the costs of honoring guarantees, are particularly sensitive to the level of the guarantee. Small reductions in the level of the guarantee (for example, guaranteeing 80% of principal and accrued interest instead of 85%) could lead to substantial reductions in default rates.Debate persists in economic theory about whether or not government intervention in the credit market is warranted, in spite of the findings that loan guarantees seem to make positive contributions. Further analysis of these issues is advised.     

中小企业融资中的自有资金信贷机制

银行贷款收益取决于贷款利率和贷款风险两个因素。在贷款利率受到管制时,理性的银行为了实现期望利润最大化,要求企业提供足够抵押来规避贷款风险。我国中小企业由于自身特征及所处信贷环境的原因,银行向其贷款风险大,且得不到足够抵押品,也没有第三方提供担保,这就导致中小企业贷款难现象。因此,我国商业银行应该灵活运用抵押、担保、关系贷款和自有资金多种手段,积极构建中小企业的多层次信贷机制体系。     

Effect of climate-related risk on the costs of bank loans: Evidence from syndicated loan markets in emerging economies

Based on a novel dataset that combined syndicated loans originated in the emerging market economies with greenhouse gas emission intensity data of borrowers, this study examines whether and to what extent banks in these emerging markets have factored in climate transition risk in their lending decisions. On loan pricing, our results suggest that banks in these emerging markets have started to price-in climate transition risk for loans to emissions-intensive sector since the Paris Agreement. This could reflect their increased awareness of a climate-transition risk towards such firms. The extent of the transition risk premium is also found to be dependent on the environmental attitude of banks. Specifically, green banks are found to charge a higher loan spread than other banks, when lending to the same brown firm after the Paris Agreement. Apart from pricing a transition risk premium in the loan spread, we find evidence that banks may also consider imposing more stringent non-pricing contractual terms, such as shortening loan tenor and imposing collateral requirement, on brown firms especially when the associated credit risk impacts on these firms are more uncertain.     

信用风险缓释工具对商业银行贷款定价之影响

本文基于我国上市公司的银行贷款数据,就信用风险缓释工具对商业银行贷款定价的影响进行了多视角的研究,发现只有抵押贷款和非抵押贷款的风险溢价间存在显著差异,且信用贷款和保证贷款的风险溢价显著小于抵押贷款。我国商业银行似乎对更高质量的风险缓释工具执行了较高的贷款利率,表明信用风险缓释工具在其贷款风险定价中未能得到应有的体现与反映。我国商业银行对抵押等工具的风险缓释作用的漠视,是与其特定的风险定价与激励机制有关;同时,基于供应链小企业融资中的过程控制等结构化设计等,讨论了如何降低抵押贷款风险溢价的方式和方法。     

Japan's Lost Decade and its Financial System

After briefly explaining the causes of the Japanese asset‐price bubble in the 1980s, this paper analyses why the bursting of the bubble developed into a full‐fledged financial crisis in the late 1990s. In order to cope with this crisis, the Government has injected capital directly into the banking sector and banks have written off enormous amounts of bad loans. However, the Japanese financial sector remains very weak and Japan still faces a number of problems in its financial system. Firstly, the profit margin of banks is too small to cover the increased default risk following the bursting of the bubble, and there are market distortions created by the government‐backed financial institutions and the requirements on new lending to small and medium sized companies. Secondly, banks still have excessive stock investment and crossholding of shares between banks and other companies has weakened the market discipline on entrenched management. Thirdly, the government guarantee of all banking‐sector liabilities should be removed. Once the financial system is stabilised, a risk‐adjusted deposit insurance premium should be introduced so as to strengthen market discipline on banks, and the huge postal saving system should be privatised to create a level‐playing field among deposit taking financial institutions. Besides the foregoing, the weak corporate governance structure of Japanese financial institutions has to be remodelled. The management of banks has shielded themselves by extensive cross‐shareholdings, especially with life insurance companies. There has been extensive mutual provision of capital, most large life insurance companies have weak corporate governance, and many of the large shareholders of banks are life insurance companies. This double gearing between banks and life insurance companies has therefore weakened the market control of Japanese financial institutions.     

Impacts of the borrower's attributes,loan contract contents,and collateral characteristics on mortgage loan default

This paper explores the factors influencing mortgage loan default and default probability by using the data from the mortgage loans of a case financial institution. The results indicate that the borrower's gender, the borrower's job position, whether the regional codes of the borrower's present residence and registered permanent residence are the same, the degree of relationship between the borrower and the guarantor, the loan-to-value ratio, the use status of collateral, and the located region of collateral are significantly positively correlated with the default probability. However, the education degree and the loan amount are significantly negatively correlated with the default probability.     

Corporate environmental responsibility and bank loans

Drawing on both qualitative analyses of banks' sustainability reports and quantitative analyses of 11,538 bank loans from 1993 to 2018, we explore interactions between corporate environmental responsibility (CER) and bank loan contracting. We find CER dominates how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects bank loans. We propose a two-way relationship between CER and bank loans. Firms with strong CER performance receive cheaper bank loans due to banks' environmental risk management efforts. These banks provide services to corporate borrowers that have a positive influence on borrowers' ongoing environmental performance.     

Banking Reforms for the 21st Century: A Perfectly Stable Banking System Based on Financial Innovations*

Although bank loans themselves are somewhat illiquid because of private information, most of their cashflows are not. Recent financial innovations allow commercial loans to be liquefied via credit derivatives and actual and synthetic securitizations. The loan originating bank holds the remaining illiquid equity tranche containing the concentrated credit risk, private information rent and the ‘excess spread’ that incentivize the bank to continue to monitor and service the loans. Empirically, we find that the average size of the equity tranche is about 3% for the representative commercial loan portfolios in our sample. The liquefaction of bank loans makes possible a banking system that restricts the guaranteed accounts to be backed by 100% reserves and the non‐guaranteed deposits to be backed by liquid securitized loan tranches, while retaining the deposit‐lending synergy. Such a system is perfectly safe without deposit insurance and it renders banks bankruptcy‐remote without sacrificing a bank's traditional role as a financial intermediary.     

Official bailouts,moral hazard and the ‘speciality’ of the international interbank market

We analyse the evolution of emerging market loan spreads at a more disaggregated level than other studies on the subject, providing statistical support to the assumption of the ‘speciality’ of the international interbank market, to the extent that the pricing of interbank credit is insensitive to the nature (public or private) of the borrower. In sharp contrast, the public or private nature of other borrowers, such as corporates or financial firms, causes significant differences in spreads. These results could be interpreted as evidence of the possible role played by implicit government guarantees in the international interbank market, which lower the incentives for participants to monitor counterpart risk very closely. Furthermore, the specificity of banks is witnessed by the fact that only spreads on loans to emerging market banks have clearly declined following the 1995 Mexican bailout, whereas evidence on the pricing of lending to corporates and financial firms is more ambiguous. Although, on the one hand, this might support the view that financial assistance from the IMF gives rise to moral hazard, on the other hand, contrary to expectations, spreads on loans to Asian banks, among the major candidates in the current policy debate on moral hazard, have been unaffected by the IMF's response to Mexico's crisis.     

商业银行与小额贷款公司合作模式探索

小额贷款公司相对商业银行而言,资金来源渠道较窄。而商业银行相对小额贷款公司而言,贷款条件较苛刻,独立经营小额贷款成本较高。商业银行和小额贷款公司可以在相互竞争的环境下更好地合作发展小额贷款业务,建立小额贷款批发机制,创新以外包零售业务方式、以资源共享为主和以技术输出为主的双赢的合作模式,为中小企业和"三农"提供更多贷款。