Competition,regulation and bribery

Bribery of government officials is commonly used to obtain contracts in many foreign countries. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) made it illegal for US firms to pay bribes, even in the absence of regulation on the bribe-taking side of the transaction. Opponents of the law claimed it would put US firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign suppliers who were not subject to the same regulation. This paper models the effects of two types of anti-bribery regulation. In general, regulation of bribe takers reduces the disciplinary effect of competition and is ineffective in deterring bribery unless the penalties exceed the gains. The impact of regulation of bribe payers (i.e. suppliers) depends on whether the law is applicable to all bribe payers, firms' costs and the existence of contract price constraints on the purchasing side of the transaction. The results lead to empirically testable hypotheses about US exports to bribery-prone countries.     

The impact of the foreign corrupt practices act on us exports

In 1977 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted to penalize US firms and their employees for paying bribes to foreign government officials. If bribe payments influence the awarding of contracts and the FCPA regulation differentially affects US exporters compared to foreign competitors, then US exporters' bribe-paying ability and market share would be expected to decline. This study provides empirical evidence that the FCPA had a negative effect on US exports to non-Latin American countries but not to bribery prone ones in Latin America.     

Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery

This paper studies the effects of asymmetric punishment of bribery on both bribery and compliance with regulations. The bribe amount is decided via Nash bargaining and regulatory compliance and whistle-blowing are strategic decisions. Moreover, investigations of bribery and noncompliance occur in a manner that may be interdependent. We show that, under symmetric punishment, inducing whistle-blowing has no effect on the frequency of bribery. When the bribery and noncompliance investigations are independent, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either makes no difference or induces more nonharassment bribery. Only when bribery detection increases the chance of noncompliance detection and asymmetric punishment leads to whistle-blowing for both types of entrepreneurs, can the shift succeed in reducing noncompliance. The result is robust to the case where legalization of bribe-giving is not feasible for nonharassment bribes.     

The macroeconomic implications of corruption in the choice to educate

Educational corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, yet its macroeconomic implications are largely unknown. We formulate a fixed-price bribe model to explore the impact educational corruption may have on growth, income inequality and other factors. When using aggregate ability as our measure of growth, our model produces a v-shaped relationship between growth and corruption, suggesting that corruption is detrimental to growth at lower levels of bribery, but growth enhancing at greater levels. A cross-section of countries is used to empirically test our model and provides qualitative support for our modeling structure. Distributional analysis reveals that an increased prevalence of corruption leads to greater income inequality and reduces the ability of education to signal quality.     

International Financial Reporting Standards and Private Firms’ Access to Bank Loans

Prior research has focused on publicly listed firms when examining the economic consequences of adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This study extends the literature by examining the ability of private firms to attract bank loans through the use of IFRS. Based on firm-level data from 25 countries, we show that private firms that voluntarily use IFRS are associated with a higher propensity to attract debt from foreign banks. We find no such association when examining their relationships with domestic banks. Supplementary analyses show that the results are mainly driven by private firms operating in countries with strong regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that, conditional on adequate enforcement, the use of IFRS provides useful information for foreign non-relationship banks.     

Does going abroad lead to going green? Firm outward foreign direct investment and domestic environmental performance

This study examines whether and how outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) affects firms' domestic environmental performance. We use both the reverse knowledge transfer and resource crowding perspectives to predict the association. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we find that firms' environmental performance improves after the initiation of OFDI, which is consistent with the reverse knowledge transfer perspective. Furthermore, we find that when the host countries of OFDI are developed countries, have stricter environmental regulations, and are characterized by higher values for the long-term orientation and masculinity dimensions of national culture, firms enjoy a further improvement in environmental performance. Our channel tests show that firms' domestic green patent applications and their investment in research and development increase after the initiation of OFDI.     

Press freedom and corruption in business-state interactions

We show that press freedom has a role in constraining business corruption. Using firm-level data, we find that countries with greater press freedom have significantly fewer incidences of bribery involving public officials. In particular, we find that a free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that report corruption during interactions with tax officials and when obtaining construction permits. Furthermore, we find that fewer businesses in these countries report that corruption is the biggest problem that they face. These findings highlight the role of an independent media in combating corruption.     

Firm financing and growth in the Arab region

This paper documents how firms in Arab countries use equity, corporate bond and syndicated loan markets to obtain financing and grow. Working with a new dataset on issuance activity in domestic and international markets and firm performance, the paper finds that capital raising through these markets has grown rapidly since the early 1990s and involved an increasing number of firms. Whereas the amounts raised in equity and loan markets (relative to gross domestic product) stand well relative to international standards, bond issuance activity lags behind. However, bond financing has gained importance over time. Equity issuances take place primarily in domestic markets, whereas bonds and loans are mostly issued internationally, display long maturities and entail low levels of credit risk. Issuing firms from the Arab region are very large compared to international standards. They also tend to be larger, faster growing and more leveraged than non-issuing firms in Arab countries.     

Financial liberalization and firms’ capital structure adjustments evidence from Southeast Asia and South America

This paper investigates the impact of financial liberalization on the adjustment of debt ratios in 12 emerging markets using firm-level data from 1991 to 2004. The results support the central hypothesis of this paper that adjustment costs are important in explaining firms’ adjustment toward their debt ratio targets. Our results show that deviations from targets are halved within 1.09 years in South America and 1.19 years in Southeast Asia, suggesting speed of adjustment is relatively faster in South American countries than Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, our results show that after full liberalization those countries where rule of law and creditors rights were properly enforced, firms had higher adjustment speed compared to those countries where such enforcement was not present.The estimated adjustment coefficients imply that on average firms’ adjustment speeds have increased in all South American countries over the period of financial liberalization. On the contrary, firms’ adjustment speeds did not increase in Southeast Asian countries, reflecting the uneven effect of liberalization on the firms’ financing behaviour in Asian countries. There was a significant reduction in time (in years) taken to half the gap between actual debt ratios and targets only in Pakistan and South Korea. This finding supports the idea of uncertain impact of financial liberalization programs on the domestic financial markets in those emerging markets which started opening up their market and integrating with the rest of the world latter than others. These findings have significant implications for the sequence of banking sector liberalization in the emerging markets.     

基于法律视角的商业贿赂问题研究:美国经验及启示

目前我国从严整治商业贿赂问题迫在眉睫。严格明确的立法和执法是打击商业贿赂最重要的手段,美国根据实际情况,通过不断制定和修订相关法律,为本国预防和打击商业贿赂提供了良好的法律环境保证,在很多方面值得我们借鉴。目前,我国治理商业贿赂问题的法律环境不断改善,但还存在立法不明确,监管分散等等问题。完善立法,依法治理商业贿赂,既是完善社会主义市场经济体制、维护市场经济秩序必然要求,也是预防与惩治腐败的重要内容。     

Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption

We construct a dynamic model of corruption in organizations where officials privately know their propensity for corruption and clients optimally choose the bribe offered. We show that there is a continuum set of stationary bribe equilibria due exclusively to the dynamic nature of the model and the endogenous determination of bribes. This can explain why similar countries have stable but different "implicit prices" for the same illegal services. We also show that, by not considering the reaction of clients, traditional analysis have systematically overestimated the beneficial effect of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure.     

Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption

We construct a dynamic model of corruption in organizations where officials privately know their propensity for corruption and clients optimally choose the bribe offered. We show that there is a continuum set of stationary bribe equilibria due exclusively to the dynamic nature of the model and the endogenous determination of bribes. This can explain why similar countries have stable but different "implicit prices" for the same illegal services. We also show that, by not considering the reaction of clients, traditional analysis have systematically overestimated the beneficial effect of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure.     

A Comparison of Reporting Lags of Multinational and Domestic Firms

This study examines whether multinational firms report earnings sooner than domestic firms. When compared with domestic firms, the reporting environment and business operations of multinational firms are significantly more complex. There is a greater amount of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders of multinational firms. Therefore, multinational firms potentially face higher monitoring and external financing costs. To reduce these costs, we conjecture that managers of multinational firms take steps to reduce the information asymmetry between shareholders and management by increasing the timeliness (a proxy for relevance) of their earnings reports. Specifically, we expect multinational firms to announce earnings earlier than domestic firms. We separate earnings reporting delay into auditor‐related delay and management's discretionary delay. While test results weakly support the hypothesis that auditors take longer to audit multinational firms, there is strong evidence that managers of multinational firms release their earnings reports sooner than domestic firms.     

The Effect of Import Competition on Firm Productivity and Innovation: Does the Distance to Technology Frontier Matter?

How does foreign competition affect growth and innovation in China? Using our unique measures of proximity of Chinese firms and industries to the world technology frontier, we find that despite vast sectoral heterogeneity, Chinese manufacturing industries have undergone rapid technological upgrading over the period of 2000–06. The distance to the world production frontier of firms and industries plays an important role in shaping the nexus between the competition pressure from foreign imports and domestic firms' growth and innovation behaviour. Our results support the theoretical predictions of Aghion et al. (2005, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 701–728) that import competition stimulates the domestic firms' productivity growth and R&D expenditure if firms and their industries are close to the world frontier, but discourages such incentives for laggard firms and industries. The two forces highlighted by the model operate for imports under the ordinary‐trade regime, for collective and private firms, and for imports originated from high‐income countries. Our findings are robust after controlling the influence of foreign investment, the reverse causality of regressors and the short‐term business cycle fluctuations.     

Emissions permit allocation and strategic firm behavior: Evidence from the oil sector in the European Union emissions trading scheme

With the growing urgency of climate change, governments around the world are increasingly implementing new regulations for greenhouse gases. This trend elevates the importance of examining how firms engage in strategic efforts to influence regulations before they are in place and how they respond once they are in effect (i.e., their ex‐ante and ex‐post strategic behavior). This paper examines the outcomes of such strategic efforts by multinational and domestic oil companies within the European Union emissions trading scheme. An analysis of a panel dataset of oil firms (2008–2012) shows that on average the outcome of ex‐ante strategies did not differ significantly between multinational companies (MNCs) and domestic firms. However, the findings indicate that among those firms that received positive net benefits from the new climate policy, domestic firms were able to maximize these benefits better than MNCs through their ex‐post strategies. In contrast, among the firms that faced net costs due to the policy, MNCs were able to minimize these costs better than domestic firms, ex‐post. This paper advances our understanding of whether and to what extent MNCs differ from domestic firms in their economic outcomes stemming from strategic behavior related to emissions trading. This question is especially pertinent for regulations related to climate change, which is one of humanity's grand challenges and has important consequences for our economic, social, and political systems.     

International Franchising Practices in Mexico: Do Franchisors Customize Their Contracts?

The contracting practices of franchisors outside their domestic market have received little attention in the empirical literature on franchising to date, largely because of lack of data. We exploit a novel data set that allows us to describe the contracts offered by a number of US and Canadian franchisors operating in Mexico and also compare them to contracts employed at home. Our analyses reveal a series of stylized facts that we hope will prove useful in guiding future empirical and theoretical research on contracting and especially on cross-border contracting practices. These are as follows: (1) The overwhelming majority of franchisors seeking franchisees in Mexico offer exactly the same contract to potential Mexican franchisees as that employed in the home market; (2) Among those franchisors that already have established outlets in Mexico, nearly half use the exact same fees in Mexico and at home; (3) The majority of those franchisors that make changes only alter the fixed fee component of the contract; (4) There is no evidence that franchisors use franchising more or less in Mexico compared to home as an alternative to royalty rate customization—in fact, the extent of franchising (versus company-owned units) of these firms in Mexico is not different systematically from that observed in their domestic market or worldwide; and (5) There is no evidence of increased customization over time—if anything, the evidence suggests increased similarities in contracting practices over time.     

The Value Relevance of Foreign Income: an Australian, Canadian, and British Comparison

In this paper we examine the value relevance of geographical earnings disclosures for firms listed and domiciled in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. We find that foreign earnings in all three countries are valued differently than domestic earnings. The estimate of the association coefficient for foreign earnings changes with returns is positive in all three countries and statistically larger than the association coefficient for domestic earnings changes in Canada and the United Kingdom. Further tests show that this difference is related to relative growth opportunities of overseas operations to domestic operations. These findings are similar to results for foreign earnings association coefficients for American‐based multinationals found in Bodnar and Weintrop (1997). These results indicate that across countries the market perceives the results of foreign operations as value relevant and suggests that greater emphasis should be placed on the required disclosure of segmental data rather than on the concern that all countries prepare the segmental information using a common GAAP.     

Does going public in the U.S. facilitate corporate innovation of foreign firms?

We examine how going public in the U.S. IPO market influences corporate innovation. Using 185 foreign and 2948 U.S. domestic firms going public in the U.S. over the 1980–2006 period, we find that while exhibiting similar innovativeness in the pre-IPO period, non-U.S. firms tend to generate more innovation than U.S. domestic firms after going public. The findings are robust to adopting subsample tests, various measures of changes in innovation around the year of the IPO, and accounting for truncation problems and potential endogeneity concerns. Further tests show that changes in innovation around the year of the IPO tend to be less prominent for non-U.S. firms that domiciled in countries with more developed equity market and higher level of economic freedom. Our study provides insights into the real effect of going public in the U.S. IPO market on innovative activities.     

Psychological contract violations during corporate restructuring

The authors examine the nature, extent, and consequences of psychological contract violations which occur in restructuring firms. Managers in restructuring firms were significantly more likely to perceive psychological contract violations in the areas of job security, input into decision making, opportunities for advancement, and amount of responsibility. Managers in restructuring firms were also significantly more likely to be looking for new jobs and were significantly less likely to be loyal to their employers. Several situational factors mitigated against managersß strong negative reactions to psychological contract violations: procedural justice in how layoffs are handled, low likelihood of future violations, and positive working relationships with colleagues. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.