Selection criteria and the award procedure in public procurement

This paper examines the admissibility of some selection criteria in the light of European public procurement law. It also points out the opportunity of using such criteria through an economic analysis. The main aspect to be dealt with is the numerical selection criteria, which may hinder firms not fulfilling them from participating in the award procedure. These criteria refer, according to the European Union directives on public procurement, to the economic, financial, and technical capacity of the candidate firms. In our analysis, the legal appreciation should be confronted with an economic analysis of the numerical selection criteria. This analysis is based on an arithmetic approach which focuses on relative rather than absolute values. Thus, through a series of performance indicators, an alternative approach to the above criteria is presented. This paper does not reflect the official position of the Commission of the EU.     

Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement

We consider the supplier’s strategic choice on delivery time in a public procurement setting as the result of the firm’s opportunistic behavior on the optimal investment timing when production costs are uncertain. We model the supplier’s trade-off between the option value to defer the contract execution and the penalty payment in the event of delays. We also take into account the issue of penalty enforcement, which in turn depends on both the discretion of the court of law in voiding contractual clauses and the “efficiency” of the judicial system (i.e. the average length of civil trials). We test our main results on Italian public procurement data showing that the supplier’s incentive to delay is greater the higher the volatility of production costs and the lower the “efficiency” of the judicial system. We then calibrate the model using parameters that mimic the Italian scenario on public works procurement and calculate the maximum amount that a supplier is “willing to pay” (per day) to postpone the delivery date and infringe the contract provisions. Our calibration results are consistent with the theoretical model’s predictions and the empirical findings.     

Effect of public procurement regulation on competition and cost-effectiveness

Journal of Regulatory Economics - This study empirically investigates the impact of public procurement regulation quality on the competition for tenders and the cost-effectiveness of awarded...     

The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.     

The law of small numbers: investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

A commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts. However, restricted auctions are frequently used among EU member states to procure small contracts. In this article, we investigate this paradox. Using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009, we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward, and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result. To our knowledge, this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts.     

On transformation of public sector research: A preliminary post-STBL assessment in Taiwan

The paper examines the impact of the Science and Technology Basic Law (STBL) enactment of 1999 on the transformation of public sector research (PSR) in Taiwan. The paper proposes a research framework to assess the changes on PSR mainly through four dimensions: (1) new infrastructure build-up, (2) industrial research links, (3) patenting and licensing, and (4) industrial education/training. Nine research hypotheses are developed. Based on the survey data of 107 PSR establishments, the paper reveals that Taiwan PSR has experienced a burgeoning infrastructure build-up and a more active partnership with industry in the post-STBL period. However, the paper argues that the scientific-economic transformation of PSR in Taiwan tends to develop better “industrial collaborative research and training capabilities” than “patenting and licensing capabilities” in the preliminary post-STBL period. The divergence on patenting, licensing and partnership capabilities still persists between experienced PSREs and non-experienced ones, suggesting a learning effect. These findings provide crucial policy implications to delineate appropriate roles of PSR in the new scientific-economic regime.     

The new stability and growth pact: A first assessment

The paper proposes a theoretical model of fiscal policy offering new insights on some of the key policy trade-offs involved in the recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. As suggested by the proponents of the reform, greater room for case-specific economic judgment in the implementation of the pact may improve welfare. In our model, these gains occur because the consolidation path implied by the implementation of the pact does not discourage high-quality measures. In practice, however, the difficulty to extract true policy intent from budget figures may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy. Hence, reforming a rules-based fiscal framework with a view to enhance its “economic rationale” would also require closer monitoring, a better grasp of the policies underlying the budget, and ultimately stricter enforcement. In that sense, recent reforms are at best unhelpful.     

The WTO dispute settlement system: a first assessment from an economic perspective

We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigationwithin the new WTO dispute settlement system. Our analysis yieldsa number of interesting predictions, First, because sanctionsare ruled out during the litigation process, the dispute settlementsystem does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However,the agenda-setting capacity of the complainant, including itsright to force a decision, make trade restrictions less attractivethan under the WTO's predecessor, GATT. Second, the system'sappellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentivesto delay negative findings, and both parties with a possibilityto signal their determinacy in fighting the case. Third, a relativelyweak implementation procedure potentially reinforces incentivesto violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements aremore likely at an early stage in the process and are biasedtoward the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlementprocedure. Empirical evidence based on a first dataset of casesat an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitativesupport for our claims.     

国际常用建设项目采购模式比较

国际项目采购模式现状1997年国际建造师协会(ICB)会议期间对建设项目采购模式(BuildingProcurementSystem)作了如下定义:“建设项目采购模式是一种战略,是在项目周期内的某个阶段,通过提供竣工的建筑产品来满足业主项目开发或运营要求的一种战略。”BPS中除了传统的采购模式外,     

Soviet agricultural procurement pricing: A study in perversity

The relationship between Soviet agricultural procurement prices and quantities is examined in the light of the existence of bonuses for above-trend sales (BATS) and zonal price differentiation (ZPD). That BATS leads to a positive relationship between prices and quantities as harvest conditions vary is shown to hold for the individual farm. Planners are apt, however, to be more concerned with the “average” price of a crop, which is closely related to the subsidy bill. This price is more likely to be “perverse” under ZPD than BATS, although neither guarantees perversity. Data suggest that such perversity is a common occurrence. J. Comp. Econ., March 1985, 9(1), pp. 24–45. Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois 61761.     

EPC总承包工程项目的争端与索赔

在国际工程承包中,合同是双方履约的惟一依据.然而,由于国际工程项目的特殊性与复杂性,合同的规定往往不够清楚、完整,从而导致承包商的索赔以及业主的反索赔(counter claim)甚至争端.恰当地处理工程索赔以及争端,是国际工程合同管理的一项重要内容,也是一项十分复杂和棘手的管理过程.笔者结合参加国际石油管道EPC项目的索赔体会,从EPC承包商角度,谈一谈处理国际工程合同的索赔和争端的经验与教训.     

A preliminary technology assessment of a standardized container recycling system

As America shifts to a metric system, an opportunity exists to develop a standardized container recycling system (SCR). Such a system would consist of a limited number of glass container sizes and shapes which could be recycled without the necessity to reform the container. A preliminary technology assessment has been conducted of the SCR system. The major advantages are energy savings and reductions in solved waste. Disadvantages include a displacement of labor and increased consumer inconvenience.     

中国行政体制下的公共财政绩效提升

新世纪以来,随着中国财政体制改革的深化,公共财政绩效提升变得越来越重要,通过分析公共财政的基本内容和提升公共财政绩效的意义,提出在市场经济体制下提升公共财政绩效的对策。     

不应把股份制等同于公有制--关于社会主义市场经济与股份制的研究之一

股份制本质上是生产社会化和市场经济发展的产物,它本身并不具有所有制属性,其核心问题是由“控股权”掌握在谁手里来决定企业法人产权的归属,因此股份制与公有制不是一回事。十五大报告关于股份制性质的论断是侧重于理论认识,十六届三中全会《决定》强调“使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式”,则侧重于改革实践。股份制是实现国有企业改革的最好途径。     

Competition in the economic crisis: Analysis of procurement auctions

We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms׳ bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders׳ construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 percentage points. We also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger. These two pieces of evidence point to pro-cyclical markups.     

关于国有企业物资采购招投标问题的研究

国有企业生产经营阶段,物资采购为其中的重要环节,直接关乎着企业的正常经验与发展。特别是就国有企业而言,由于自身生产规模较大,需要采购较多的物资量,强化物资采购管理十分有必要。现阶段的国有企业物资采购活动,招投标也是之中的重要组成部分,但就具体状况来看仍存有某些缺陷,要求相应工作者能意识到这一点,并积极的采取有效措施加以解决,从而推动企业的可持续发展。