碳交易下供应链横向减排研发策略效果分析

本文针对碳交易机制下供应链企业横向减排研发策略选择所面临的复杂问题,考虑两个减排研发效率不同的制造商构成的供应链,构建碳交易机制下政府和制造商决策的三阶段博弈模型,研究了制造商选择减排研发竞争和研发合作的效果。结果表明:与研发竞争相比,制造商选择研发合作必定会降低研发效率较高企业的净碳排放量、利润以及整个国家碳排放总量,研发溢出率较高时会降低研发效率较低企业的净碳排放量和利润,研发溢出率较低时会增加研发效率较低企业的净碳排放量和利润。因此,提出适当鼓励减排研发成果在制造商之间溢出、补贴参与减排研发合作的制造商、鼓励制造商之间建立合理的利益共享契约,促使制造商选择减排研发合作策略。     

政府碳减排政策方式选择的博弈研究

本文根据碳税和碳排放交易的政策属性,构建了在单一碳交易、单一碳税以及碳交易与碳税相结合的复合政策下政府与企业之间的三阶段博弈模型,并通过逆向求解,对这三种减排政策进行了比较分析。研究发现:政府制定的碳交易价格相对于碳税税率较高时,应选择实施碳交易减排机制;政府制定的碳税税率相对于碳交易价格较高时,应选择实施碳税减排政策,在这两种情况下社会福利水平较高,低碳商品的价格较高,市场份额较大,生产低碳商品制造商获得的利润较大,有助于低碳产品占领市场,从而减少碳排放,促进国家低碳经济的发展。     

基于DSGE模型的我国三类碳减排政策效果分析

本文利用动态随机一般均衡模型(DSGE),分析单一碳税、碳排放权交易机制和复合政策(碳税+碳排放权交易制度)等三类碳减排政策对碳减排率和总产出影响,发现碳税对碳减排和环境质量改善有中长期效应;碳排放权交易机制影响在短期内波动性较强;复合制度影响介于二者之间。在不同减排目标下,单一碳税制更适合持久性碳减排,而单一碳排放权交易机制则适合局部和快速化目标实现。因此,提出如下政策建议:在高碳排放生产行业应推行单一碳税政策;通过采取碳排放权交易制度促进企业发展模式转变;整体上,政府应积极推进实施复合制度,确保减排的政策效果和经济的正常运行。     

基于2030年碳达峰目标的中国省域碳配额分配研究

研究目标:基于2030年碳达峰目标,将公平、效率、责任、发展等多项原则纳入区域间碳排放权分配方案中。研究方法:综合运用空间联立模型、零和博弈SBM模型、熵权法等构造不同原则下的碳配额分配方案。研究发现:兼顾公平与效率原则的综合性碳配额分配方案因地区间减排成本差异小而容易被更多主体所接受,最适合中国当前情况。研究创新:设计的碳配额分配方案在公平性原则的基础上融入可持续发展原则,在效率性原则的基础上融入零和博弈的思想,兼具公平性、效率性、可持续性和可操作性。研究价值:制定区域间初始碳配额的合理分配方案,对于推进省际协同减排战略、建立和完善全国统一碳交易市场、实现2030年碳达峰目标具有重要的借鉴意义。     

基于博弈论的物流业节能减排政策执行分析

通过构建上级政府与下级政府、地方政府和物流企业以及物流企业与物流企业之间的博弈模型,讨论各个参与者之间的博弈关系,探索参与各方在进行节能减排行动时的内在关系,总结促进物流业节能减排工作多样化的政策手段。     

基于博弈论的物流业节能减排政策执行分析

通过构建上级政府与下级政府、地方政府和物流企业以及物流企业与物流企业之间的博弈模型,讨论各个参与者之间的博弈关系,探索参与各方在进行节能减排行动时的内在关系,总结促进物流业节能减排工作多样化的政策手段。     

考虑企业社会责任的工业园区废弃物定价策略

考虑制造商承担企业社会责任,构建了工业园区内两个制造商和政府之间的三阶段博弈模型,研究了工业园区废弃物的均衡定价决策。通过模型仿真分析了企业社会责任水平和共生系数对制造商定价、利润和社会福利的影响,并比较了不同废弃物处理情形下制造商的利润。     

碳排放权会计处理研究

近年来,随着全球经济的迅速发展,环境污染,特别是气候污染问题严重影响了国民的生活质量和身心健康.为了实现经济和环境的可持续发展,我国政府把节能减排作为当前的一项重点工作,采取了诸多政策措施来实现减排目标.截止目前,全国已有7家碳排放权交易所成立并开展相关业务,碳排放权已作为一种可交易的生态商品出现.伴随着碳排放权交易行为的出现,相关企业必然需要对碳排放权交易进行会计核算,而学术界尚未对碳排放权的会计处理达成共识,本文试图在现有研究的基础上对碳排放权的会计核算问题进行探讨分析.     

考虑碳排放差异的闭环供应链补贴机制研究

考虑到再制造碳排放差异闭环供应链的决策与补贴问题,运用stackbelberg博弈理论,研究了补贴机制对闭环供应链均衡价格与节点企业利润的影响,探讨了政府补贴力度、碳排放差异与制造过程总碳排放量之间的关系。研究表明:补贴机制能有效提升回收率与节点企业利润,降低节点企业决策价格与单位产品平均碳排放量,并能根据补贴力度、碳排放差异与碳排放总量之间的关系,制定合适的补贴制度,在提高再制造水平的同时控制总碳排放量。最后通过数值算例验证了上述结论。     

碳排放权交易确认——基于深圳碳排放权交易的会计处理探讨

正碳排放权交易是指通过设计碳排放总量,明确参与企业、行业范围,对碳排放权指标进行"配额"分配的交易方式,从而达到节能减排、控制温室气体的目标。2013年6月18日,深圳在全国率先启动碳排放权交易市场,完成了我国首单配额交易。会计作为一项管理工具,需要对碳排放权交易的经济后果进行确认、计量和报告,但是现阶段我国政府层面还没有制定相应的政策法规。笔者拟在总结深圳企业碳排放权交易的会计处理实践和借鉴国际相关排放权交易会计准则规定的基础上,提出自己的看法,以期为我国制定相关会计法规提供参考。一、基于碳排放权交易的主要会计问题及深圳企业的处理在总量控制交易机制下,碳排放权交易涉及的会计问题主要是会计确认和计量方面,主要包括:一是企业从政府无偿取     

Abatement R&D,market imperfections,and environmental policy in an endogenous growth model

We develop an endogenous growth model featuring environmental externalities, abatement R&D, and market imperfections. We compare the economic performances under three distinct regimes that encompass public abatement, private abatement without tax recycling, and private abatement with tax recycling. It is found that the benefit arising from private abatement will be larger if the degree of the firms’ monopoly power is greater. With a reasonably high degree of monopoly power, a mixed abatement policy by which the government recycles environmental tax revenues to subsidize the private abatement R&D is a plausible way of reaching the highest growth rate and welfare.     

A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game

We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the firms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the firms have heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with different reservation wages and that a worker's productivity is independent of his type. We show that equilibrium unemployment arises in the wage-setting game under certain conditions, although the efficient allocation of workers would result in full employment.     

从“零和”至“正和”——博弈视角下城市公共空间合作开发要件研究

近年来,我国城市公共空间作为城市中的公益用地突破了由政府部门统一提供的定势,出现了私人资本参与城市公共空间建设的案例。这样的模式是否只是城市中的偶发现象还是会对公共空间的开发起到划时代的意义?本文借由博弈视角的理性模型,对城市公共空间合作开发的案例及合作双方的博弈关系进行分析,总结出其合作开发的要件,期颐将城市公共空间的正外部效应合理分配,实现从"零和"至"正和"的跨越。     

DOES IT PAY TO BE GREEN? AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMISSION REDUCTION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

Evidence can be marshalled to support either the view that pollution abatement is a cost burden on firms and is detrimental to competitiveness, or that reducing emissions increases efficiency and saves money, giving firms a cost advantage. In an effort to resolve this seeming paradox, the relationship between emissions reduction and firm performance is examined empirically for a sample of S&P 500 firms using data drawn from the Investor Responsibility Research Center's Corporate Environmental Profile and Compustat. The results indicate that efforts to prevent pollution and reduce emissions drop to the ‘bottom line’ within one to two years of initiation and that those firms with the highest emission levels stand the most to gain.     

Supporting capacity sharing in the cloud manufacturing environment based on game theory and fuzzy logic

This paper proposes a Framework for Capacity Sharing in Cloud Manufacturing (FCSCM) able to support the capacity sharing issue among independent firms. The success of geographical distributed plants depends strongly on the use of opportune tools to integrate their resources and demand forecast in order to gather a specific production objective. The framework proposed is based on two different tools: a cooperative game algorithm, based on the Gale–Shapley model, and a fuzzy engine. The capacity allocation policy takes into account the utility functions of the involved firms. It is shown how the capacity allocation policy proposed induces all firms to report truthfully their information about their requirements. A discrete event simulation environment has been developed to test the proposed FCSCM. The numerical results show the drastic reduction of unsatisfied capacity obtained by the model of cooperation implemented in this work.     

公共餐厨废弃物资源化的实现有赖于政府监管与激励机制的建立＊--公共餐厨废弃物回收企业与政府间的博弈分析

餐厨废弃物以及餐厨废弃物的不合理处理已经给人们的日常生活带来不利影响,加上回收企业的利己性行为和选择,都使得餐厨废弃物的回收和资源化处理成为了一个重要课题。文中认为在回收企业与企业之间和企业与政府之间都存在着博弈,并对其进行了博弈分析。企业与企业之间的博弈分析的结论表明政府对餐厨废弃物资源化的干预是必要的,因为企业只会做出利己选择;政府作为参与一方,与企业之间也形成了博弈关系,其博弈结果显示,政府提高监管力度、惩罚力度、补贴额度和降低资源化处理成本,都有利于刺激企业提高资源化处理的积极性和主动性。     

The investment decision of a Multinational Firm under uncertain quantity restrictions

In this paper we analyze the allocative investment decisions of a Multinational Firm (MNF) when it faces uncertain quantity restrictions such as a voluntary export restraint or a quota imposed by the host government. The model with uncertain quantity restrictions is analyzed further by introducing additional uncertainties such as a foreign tax rate, transfer prices, foreign exchange rates and foreign demand. The MNF invests more in the host country due to uncertain quantity restrictions. The risk averse MNF invests more in the host country despite its uncertain tax rate if the transfer price is less than the expected marginal revenue loss due to the uncertain quantity restriction. The uncertain transfer price leads the MNF to invest more in the foreign country if the tax rates are dissimilar between the two countries. Foreign demand uncertainty and foreign exchange rates uncertainty have the same effects on capital allocation between the host country and home country. In particular, we derive the condition under which the direction of investment is unambiguous.     

The environmental and macroeconomic effects of socially responsible investment

We analyze the effects of socially responsible investment and public abatement on environmental quality and the economy in a continuous-time dynamic growth model featuring optimizing households and firms. Environmental quality is modeled as a renewable resource. Consumers can invest in government bonds or firm equity. Since investors feel partly responsible for environmental pollution when holding firm equity, they require a premium on the return to equity. We show that socially responsible investment behavior by households partially offsets the positive effects on environmental quality of public abatement policies.     

政府与失地农民之间的利益博弈分析

在我国城市化过程中,地方政府征用了农民大量的土地,由于政府在征地过程中的强势地位,使其在征地过程中与农民进行博弈时,对农民的合法权益造成了极大侵害。分析政府与失地农民在征地时的利益博弈过程,将为我们促进农民合法权益的维护提供借鉴。     

Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries

We analyse taxation of capital in a two-country model, where one country is unitary while the other one is federal, consisting of two identical regions. Both national and regional governments levy a tax on capital. The countries play a noncooperative game between them, with the government of the federal country acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its regional governments. We show under what circumstances, at equilibrium, the federal country sets its tax rate inefficiently low, while the unitary country sets it inefficiently high.We are deeply grateful to three anonymous referees for their comments, and especially to one of them for extremely helpful suggestions. We also wish to thank participants at ESEM 2004 for fruitful discussions