信息披露质量与债务成本——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以深圳证券市场部分A股上市公司为样本,研究了我国上市公司信息披露质量与企业债务成本之同的关系.研究发现,样本公司的债务成本与信息披露质量之间存在显著的负相关关系,也即信息披露质量越高,债务成本越低,而且这一结果是稳健的.此外,企业的市场风险越大,信息披露质量对债务成本的影响程度就越大.     

企业债务融资结构与公司治理

企业债务是一种融资工具，而债务融资结构则对公司治理效应产生影响。本主要分析了企业债务期限结构、债务分布结构和债务优先结构，以及各种债务结构之间的协调配置对公司治理的影响。     

审计意见与债务期限约束——来自中国上市家族企业的经验证据

中国上市家族企业存在债务期限过短的融资约束问题。标准(无保留)审计意见是否对企业债务期限融资约束产生影响呢?以2003年—2008年的上市家族企业为样本,对此问题展开实证研究发现,较之于被出具非标准审计意见的公司,被出具标准审计意见的公司所获得的银行借款期限较长;大型会计师事务所出具的标准审计意见更能缓解家族企业债务期限的约束。研究结论证实了信号传递理论。     

CFO权力与企业债务违约

本文从组织权力、专家权力、声誉权力、所有权权力四方面构建CFO综合权力指数,基于2008~2017年沪深A股数据,分析了CFO权力对企业债务违约概率的影响及作用机制。研究结果显示,CFO权力越大,企业债务违约概率越低,在控制内生性影响后,该结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,具有较大权力的CFO通过降低业绩波动性和缓解融资约束来抑制企业发生债务违约。本文从CFO权力视角拓展了债务违约影响因素研究,对企业完善人力资源制度安排和降低债务违约风险具有一定的借鉴价值。     

终极产权与公司负债行为——来自民营上市公司面板数据的经验证据

本文利用我国股权分置改革导致股权结构变动的契机,对我国民营上市公司面板数据检验了公司所有权结构与负债行为之间的关系。结果表明,内部股权比例和公司负债水平正相关,忽略非观测效应的影响将导致错误的研究结论。我国特殊的制度环境导致公司具有股权融资偏好,配股和增发对利润的严格要求导致利润剧烈波动的公司只能利用债务融资,这造成了我国上市公司经营风险和负债水平正相关。     

Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt

This paper examines the impact on the cost of debt by ownership concentration and shareholder identity; that is, whether the shareholders are banks, non-financial firms, the state, institutional investors or the board of directors. Our analysis suggests that directors who own shares tend to be aligned with external shareholders, that firms with government ownership enjoy lower cost of debt and that banks effectively monitor management, so reducing the agency costs of debt.     

公司治理、持续经营审计意见与企业债务融资成本

本文选择沪深两市A股民营上市企业,时间范围为2011-2017年,对持续经营审计意见和公司治理对债务融资成本的影响与作用机理进行实证研究,并进一步分析了公司治理对持续经营审计意见与债务融资成本关系的调节效应。发现:持续经营审计意见与民营企业债务融资成本呈现出显著正相关;公司治理则与民营企业债务融资成本之间显著负相关,且显著削弱了持续经营审计意见对债务融资成本的负面影响。     

董事会非正式层级与企业债务融资

本文以2010～2019年沪深A股非金融业上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了董事会非正式层级对企业债务融资的影响。结果显示,董事会非正式层级清晰度越高,企业的债务期限结构越长,需要承担的债务融资成本越低;具体来说,董事会非正式层级会通过治理效应和资源效应这两个途径产生影响。进一步分析表明,董事会非正式层级对债务融资的影响在分析师跟踪较少、内部控制质量较低、环境不确定性较高以及非国有企业中更显著。本文的研究结论为企业缓解“融资难、融资贵”的问题提供了参考。     

The Effect of Family Ownership on Different Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Large US Firms

Previous research has shown that family firms differ from non‐family firms with regard to aggregate measures of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We argue that CSR is a multidimensional concept that comprises several aspects, which range from employee relations to ecological concerns and product issues. Based on an organizational and family identity perspective, we argue that the effect of family ownership can differ across various CSR dimensions. Family firms can be responsible and irresponsible regarding CSR at the same time. We use a dataset of large US firms to test our hypotheses. Our Bayesian regressions show that family ownership is negatively associated with community‐related CSR performance and positively associated with diversity‐, employee‐, environment‐ and product‐related aspects of CSR. The largest positive effect of family ownership on CSR performance exists with regard to product‐related aspects of CSR. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Profits and Corporate Philanthropy: An Economic Rationale for Dual Mission Firms

This paper provides an economic rationale for corporate social responsibility. We develop a model of a dual mission firm that produces both a private good and a philanthropic good. By incorporating economies of scope arising from shared inputs into our model, we demonstrate that corporate social responsibility and profit maximization can complement each other. Supporters of new legal corporate forms that facilitate the creation of dual mission businesses have persuasive new evidence in support of hybrid firms. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agents, Stakeholders and Corporate Governance in Russian Firms

This paper considers some developments within Russian privatized industrial firms 1992–94 through the lens of Stakeholder-Agency Theory (SAT). Although it has its own shortcomings and weaknesses, SAT, unlike the traditional financial version of Agency Theory, at least contemplates the possibility of a transitional period during which enterprise governance structures can evolve. It is by now widely recognised that in the middle of deep economic crisis, the Russian economy is too volatile for longitudinal studies of formally structured samples of firms over a period of time. In any case, SAT is at a stage of development that has not yet yielded detailed predictions for scientific testing. Yet surveys of recently privatized firms in Russia do provide empirical data away from the origins of SAT, and it is argued that this fresh data suggests new research propositions that can hopefully lead to more theoretical refinement and ultimately testing. At the very least, SAT can be used as a heuristic device, capable of providing a way of looking at complex Russian developments in a structured way. A process of Russian privatization through management–employee buy-outs involving giveaway distributions of shares has secured the compliance of the two main groups of enterprise stakeholders who could have prevented the withdrawal of the State from the governance of industrial enterprises, but has not yet produced a form of corporate governance structure that is likely to survive in the long term without State protection. In the longer term, international competitiveness can only be secured in Russia through investment in new products and processes, and the inadequacies of managers and other employees as sources of investable funds mean that incumbents must generate a more welcoming climate for outside investors. Even after such a short period since privatization and in the middle of a deep economic crisis, some enterprises are already favouring more efficient governance structures in a way consistent with SAT.     

Corporate Value, Managerial Stockholdings and Investments of Japanese Firms

We use a simultaneous equation model which treats firm value, investments and management ownership as endogenous to the firm. Our results show a feedback relation between corporate value and management ownership, i.e., corporate value is positively impacted by management ownership, which in turn is positively impacted by corporate value. Corporate value also affects investments made by the firm. We also find that the effect of the main bank on corporate value is positive but only up to a certain point; then, it turns negative. Supporting the argument that keiretsu firms have lower agency cost, we find that firms belonging to a keiretsu have higher valuations during the sample period. Finally, we find that management ownership increases as the ownership of the main bank, ownership of institutional holders and cross‐holdings decreases, suggesting a substitution effect among these monitoring forces. Our results indicate that ignoring the web of these relationships leads to incorrect inferences.     

审计监督、公司内部治理与债务融资能力

在当前市场经济环境下,企业之间的竞争愈发激烈,为激发企业管理层工作积极性,提升资金使用效率,保证自身长远发展,企业纷纷开展债务融资。但是受债务融资能力影响,部分企业未能获得充足的融资资金,对企业发展壮大造成了不利影响。本文通过借鉴国内外相关研究成果对我国A股上市企业进行实证研究,分析审计监督及公司内部治理对企业债务融资能力的影响。通过具体实证研究发现:公司内部治理与企业债务融资能力呈正相关关系;审计监督与企业债务融资能力呈正相关关系;审计监督能够增强公司内部治理与企业债务融资之间的相关性。     

债务资金个别资本成本率计算的讲解

个别资本成本率的计算是财务管理课程的重要内容之一。计算个别资本成本率的公式较多,学生掌握起来有一定难度,本文归纳出计算债务资金资本成本率的通用公式,以便学生更好掌握相关知识。     

公司声誉、财务信息与债务违约风险估计

假设公司资产信息是完全的,在财务信息完全和不完全两种情况下,本文把公司声誉水平作为一个影响因素,估计了公司债务违约概率,并着重分析了债务违约概率对声誉水平的敏感性。数值模拟分析的结论并不完全支持声誉水平与违约概率负相关、债务期限与违约概率正相关的常识。资产波动率、公司资产的瞬时漂移率分别与违约概率负相关、正相关。这些结论为把声誉纳入信用风险度量中提供了一个新的研究视角。     

公司治理与股权融资成本——单一与综合机制的治理效应研究

本文以我国深圳与上海证券市场连续四年具有配股资格的A股上市公司为对象,研究中国上市公司的治理机制是否会对其股权融资成本产生影响.研究发现,董事会治理机制确实能够降低股权融资成本,股权结构机制、管理层薪酬机制和企业控制权竞争机制对股权融资成本的影响不能确定,而中国特色的控股机制会提高股权融资成本.研究还发现尽管单一治理机制对股权融资成本的影响不太确定,但公司综合治理机制却能促进股权融资成本的降低,这说明公司治理诸机制之间的互补效应和替代效应,促进了公司整体治理效应的提高.     

上下游投资、下游研发的收益分配和成本分担的机制

本文针对企业上下游投资、下游研发的合作模式提出了一种收益分配机制和成本分担机制。得出研发合作后的产量、价格、收入均高于合作前等结论，并考虑了联盟规模和各因素的关系。在成本分担机制中研究了研发资金、联盟规模、成本分担系数等。     

客户集中度、技术创新投入与债务融资成本

客户集中度作为一项判断企业是否遵循风险分散原则的标准,近年来引起了众多学者的关注。以我国A股上市公司2012-2017年的数据为样本,理论分析并实证检验了客户集中度对企业债务融资成本的影响。研究结果表明,客户集中度与债务融资成本显著正相关,即客户集中度越高,企业的债务融资成本越高。进一步研究发现,企业的技术创新投入可以显著调节二者之间的关系,当企业的技术创新投入较高时,客户集中度对企业债务融资成本的影响会减弱。