Lowering the Marginal Corporate Tax Rate: Why the Debate?

In an effort to attract new investors and retain existing producers, governments use corporate tax rates as a policy tool for industrial recruitment, resulting in inter‐state tax competition. Foreign direct investment (FDI) growth and GDP growth are the two policy outcomes gauged in inter‐state tax competition. The assumption is that lower corporate taxes lead to increases in FDI, which results in capital formation that generates GDP growth. This 60‐nation panel study tests that assumption through examining economic indicators contingent on taxation, such as FDI and mergers and acquisitions among multinational corporations between 1999 and 2009. The results suggest that reduced corporate tax rates can increase FDI but decrease annual GDP growth. The main policy implication is that tax competition may attract investment, but may not promote overall economic growth, offering support for value‐extraction theories.     

Do Corporate Tax Concessions Really Matter for the Success of Free Economic Zones?

Not only a large number of developing countries but also transition economies have established free economic zones (FEZs) with the aim of attracting foreign capital by providing tax incentives, creating employment opportunities, and promoting exports and regional development. Tax investment promotion schemes include profit tax exemption, free or accelerated depreciation, investment tax allowance, subsidy for investment costs, etc., the effects of which on firms investment decisions can be compared based on the net present value model. This study suggests that even a low corporate tax rate combined with generous depreciation rules does not provide incentives for investors when the inflation rate is high. A case study on Najin–Sonbong FEZ in North Korea delivers a wide range of more crucial economic and political reasons why such a development project can fail, although tax concessions offered there are more favourable than those in China and other Asian nations.     

Are There Tax Arbitrage Opportunities in Private Rental Housing Markets?

Tax arbitrage opportunities in rental housing markets arise when high bracket taxpayers exploit the tax shelter and conversion features of the tax treatment of rental housing and as a consequence offer low bracket taxpayers rental housing at a cost lower than if they purchased the same quantity of housing for owner occupation. A microdata set has been employed to estimate the size of these tax arbitrage opportunities with respect to 1907 properties owned by Australian landlords. The measure of tax arbitrage opportunities is the breakeven tax rate at which the maximum rental rate a potential occupant is prepared to pay before turning to purchased housing is equal to the landlord's reservation rental rate. Potential occupants with marginal tax rates below the breakeven tax rate find that renting has a relative cost advantage over home purchase. When agency costs (the costs incurred in managing landlord-tenant relationships) are included in the tax arbitrage model, our estimates of the breakeven tax rate indicate that home purchase has a relative cost advantage over renting for most potential occupants. Renting is only financially attractive to low tax bracket individuals. This finding is consistent with Australian tenure patterns. However, there are more puzzling results. A majority of landlords belong to tax brackets below the top bracket, landlords in the lowest tax brackets typically make below normal profits, and reservation rental rates at the bottom of the rental housing market are relatively high. Down payment requirements, lock-in effects, and rent clientele groups are put forward as possible explanations for these findings.     

Regional Efficiency Wages: Are They a Source of Real Earnings Differentials?

This paper investigates the role of spatial efficiency wage premiums as a partial explanation for both inter-industry and geographic wage differentials. The empirical approach is based on an analysis of panel data for six select manufacturing industries operating within specific (U.S.) states. Besides testing for the existence of a regional wage curve, this research adds to the evidence on traditional determinants of spatial wage differentials. An explicit treatment of regional cost-of-living conditions is unique to the analysis; also, industry wage structures are accounted for in explaining regional wage differences. The findings here contribute to an initial body of evidence on regional efficiency wages. The empirical evidence indicates that the relationship between regional wages (nominal or real) and the local unemployment rate is much more complex than implied by the wage curve.     

Real Asset Valuation under Imperfect Competition: Can We Forget About Market Fundamentals?

Real assets are usually valued by computing the stream of profits they can bring to a price‐taking firm in a liquid market. This method ignores market fundamentals by assuming that all the relevant information is included in the spot price. Our article analyses the bias resulting from such an approach when the market is imperfectly competitive. We propose a stylised two‐period model of the natural gas market with no uncertainty, focusing on strategic interactions between two types of oligopolistic players—pure traders and suppliers with downstream customers—who have access to storage. We show that the true value of storage capacity is not the same for traders and for suppliers. Comparing the latter value with the traditional price‐taking valuation reveals a systematic bias that tends to induce underinvestment.     

Are All Private Benefits of Control Ineffective? Principal–Principal Benefits,External Governance Quality,and Firm Performance

Private benefits of control (PBC) are benefits that controlling shareholders consume, but that are not shared with minority shareholders. Research focusing on the value protection role of corporate governance typically frames PBC as principal–principal (PP) agency costs, and interprets them as a form of minority shareholder expropriation that decreases firm performance. Taking a value creation perspective of corporate governance, however, we propose a more nuanced role for PBC. Specifically, we see them also as PP agency benefits that compensate controlling shareholders for their monitoring and advisory services, which can increase firm performance. Since both PP costs and benefits affect firm performance, we theorize that PBC enhance firm performance at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, we show that the effect of PBC on firm performance is more positive when country‐level external governance mechanisms are strong.     

Corporate environmental reporting: Are French firms compliant with the Task Force on Climate Financial Disclosures' recommendations?

This article deals with the practices of French corporate environmental disclosure with a focus on climate-related risks. In particular, it aims to analyse the compliance of CAC 40 firms with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (2017), an international initiative made up by Financial Stability Board to enhance financial transparency. On the basis of a content analysis of firms' reference documents spanning 2015–2018, we constructed the Climate Compliance Index (CCI) to evaluate whether firms disclose information on climate risks and opportunities about governance, strategy, risk management and metrics. Our results highlight a gradual increase of the CCI despite disparities across sectors and management areas. The content analysis allows us to develop a set of indicators frequently reported by domain and to identify and define climate risks and opportunities and their financial impacts per sector, which is a first step to improve the disclosure of non-financial information.     

Are We Measuring Up …? Questions on the Performance of National Statistical Systems

This article proposes a systematic approach to evaluating the performance of national statistical systems. Its starting point are the so-called Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics, which were adopted by the United Nations some time ago. The aim is to translate the principles into operational terms and concrete questions about 'how we are measuring up'.     

Benefits and Strategic Outcomes: Are Supplemental Retirement Plans and Safer Driving Related in the U.S. Trucking Industry?

We suggest that a firm's benefits can relate to important organizational outcomes that have strategic implications. We propose a number of mechanisms that could relate benefits to strategic outcomes, including the notion that benefits can help attract and retain the type of employees who are most likely to perform in ways consistent with the firms’ strategies. We illustrate this with the case of supplemental retirement benefits in an actual setting, the long‐haul trucking industry. We report positive organization‐level relationships associated with the management choice of offering these benefits. Our results show that firms offering supplemental retirement plans engage in significantly safer driving practices, as measured by the proxy of driver insurance costs, as hypothesized. These findings show that benefits can be related to outcomes that have strategic implications for the firm. By showing that retirement plans may be of value to organizations, we help to bridge the academic‐practitioner divide and provide motivation and guidance for additional work on this important but underresearched topic. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.