The impacts of RMB internationalization on onshore and offshore RMB markets

Using the DCC-GARCH model, this study considers distinctive features of China's foreign exchange market to investigate the impacts of RMB internationalization on exchange rates in onshore and offshore markets in different stages during 2010–2017. The results show that policies concerning RMB internationalization, such as interest rate liberalization, exchange rate liberalization, and capital market internationalization, have different impacts on the central parity rate, onshore exchange rate, and offshore exchange rate. In terms of exchange rate liberalization, as the daily trading band was gradually widened in 2012–2015, the onshore exchange rate followed the offshore exchange rate more closely. The central parity rate functioned as a managed floating role. It stabilized onshore and offshore exchange rate fluctuations, while allowing partial marketization. After the exchange rate reform on August 11, 2015, the central parity rate plays a benchmark role based on a more market-oriented price formation mechanism. It makes the central parity rate regain pricing power in onshore and offshore markets. Further, it promotes exchange rate liberalization and RMB internationalization. Nevertheless, with the slowdown of China's economic growth and the narrowing of the interest rate differential between China and the US, the RMB is under pressure to depreciate, and its volatility increases significantly.     

Investigating China's Disaggregated Processed Exports: Evidence that Both the RMB and Exchange Rates in Supply Chain Countries Matter

China's trade surplus is entirely in processing trade. Processed exports are final goods produced using parts and components coming from supply chain countries. Many claim that because much of the value added of China's processed exports comes from other countries, the renminbi should not affect China's processed exports. To investigate these issues, this paper disaggregates processed exports into their two main categories, processing with imported materials (PWIM) exports and processing and assembly (PAA) exports. For PWIM exports, much of the value added comes from China while for PAA exports most of the value added comes from supply chain countries. DOLS results indicate that exchange rates in supply chain countries affect both types of exports and that the renminbi significantly affects PWIM exports, but not PAA exports. These results indicate that both the renminbi and exchange rates in supply chain countries matter for processed exports.     

Risky business: Financial‐sector liberalization and China

China's dramatic growth in exports, its rising conflict with its trade partners over the perceived undervaluation of the renminbi, and the snail's pace of financial liberalization is pushing its bilateral trade and monetary relations to a boil. Discontent in the United States, Japan, Southeast Asia, and, most recently, Brazil, has led popular pundits and even country finance ministers to speak publicly of a “currency war” with many calling for the de‐pegging of the renminbi to the dollar and an immediate appreciation of China's currency. However, China's history of liberalization, beginning with the opening to the West in 1978, is well known as one of gradualism in trade and the financial spheres. Economic history is replete with economic crises brought on by too rapid or premature liberalization of countries' capital flows. This article presents the case both for and against capital account liberalization and highlights the risks that China in particular confronts in responding to external demands for greater openness and an appreciation of the renminbi. It clearly captures the tightrope that China must walk between responding to the demands of its trade partners and maintaining economic growth and political stability at home. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Just How Undervalued is the Chinese Renminbi?

Given that the value of China's currency has been a hot topic recently, this paper explores the equilibrium levels of China's real and nominal exchange rates. Employing a Johansen cointegration framework, we focus on the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) and permanent equilibrium exchange rate (PEER) models. Our results suggest that, while the renminbi is somewhat undervalued against the dollar, the misalignment is not nearly as exaggerated as many popular claims.     

Number One Country,Number One Currency?1

This paper assesses the prospects for renminbi internationalisation, arguing that the process will encounter significant challenges. Some of these are familiar: the Chinese economy, while large, remains poor; China’s financial markets lack depth and liquidity; encouraging international use of the renminbi will require substantial capital account liberalisation, in the course of which things can go wrong. In addition, I highlight a less familiar challenge: China’s political system may be an obstacle to renminbi internationalisation. Since the early nineteenth century, the leading international currency or currencies have been those of countries with democratic political systems where there are constraints on the executive, which have built durable alliances, and where creditors are well represented. This is not a prediction that China must have a Democratic Spring before the renminbi becomes a leading international and reserve currency. But it does suggest that the country will have to contemplate significant political reform.     

Is China's Exchange Rate Policy a Form of Trade Protection?

This paper examines how China's heavily managed exchange rate contributes to its huge trade surplus with its major trading partners, most notably the United States. Based on the distinction between economies’ aggregate output and expenditure and on the premise that exchange rates are shared variables, it develops a straightforward framework that shows how exchange rate management by China's central bank affects China's fast growing output, expenditure, employment, and trade balance, while simultaneously influencing these aggregates in its slower growing industrialized trading partners. This framework reveals that under conditions of limited private capital mobility an inflexible yuan yields higher short-run output gains for China at trading partners’ expense through a form of “exchange rate protection.” At the same time exchange rate misalignment limits China's consumption and hence living standards. A misaligned currency is also shown to bias international saving and investment flows and is central to any explanation of global imbalances.     

On the Link Between Exchange‐rate Regimes,Capital Controls and Monetary Policy Autonomy in Small European Countries, 1979–2000

We investigate international monetary‐policy transmission under different exchange‐rate and capital‐account regimes in eleven small, open economies during the 1980s and 1990s. We find no systematic link between ex‐post monetary‐policy autonomy and exchange‐rate regimes. Capital controls appear to have provided a degree of temporal insulation from foreign monetary policy shocks, though not strict autonomy. The results are consistent both with short‐term autonomy for small countries even under fixed exchange rates and an open capital account, and with long‐term dependence under flexible exchange rates and an independent stability target. Results also indicate that euro‐area market interest rates are significantly more responsive to the development of the corresponding US rate than were the previous national rates.     

Will the Renminbi Emerge as an International Reserve Currency?

The global reserve system can be strengthened by increasing the role of alternative currencies. A gradual evolution to a multicurrency system reduces pressure on a single reserve currency issuer from an ever‐growing balance‐of‐payments deficit. It also allows countries to better diversify their foreign exchange holdings. Given the continuing strong economic growth in the China and its growing influence on the world economy, the renminbi will likely emerge as a new international currency. However, this is contingent on the China accepting a more convertible capital account and developing an efficient financial system. Internationalising the renminbi will likely be a gradual and drawn‐out process. Simulations show that, with greater convertibility, the renminbi could gradually become an international currency within Asia and beyond – sharing from 3 to 12 per cent of international reserves by 2035.     

China's exports,export tax rebates and exchange rate policy

This paper examines the relationship between China's exports, export tax rebates and exchange rate policy. It offers an explanation for why China's exports continued to rise under RMB real appreciations during the Asian financial crisis. Based on a traditional export demand model, we test our hypothesis that the counteracting effects of China's export tax rebate policy have diminished the effectiveness of real exchange rates in facilitating the resolution of trade imbalances under the current pegged exchange rate regime. We find evidence that RMB real appreciations during the crisis negatively affected China's exports, but the negative effects were mitigated by the positive effects of export tax rebates. We also find evidence of a long‐run relationship between China's exports and the other explanatory variables. The empirical evidence suggests that under the pegged exchange rate regime with limited adjustments, real exchange rate movements alone cannot resolve China's external imbalances. The policy implication of this study is that China needs to redirect its decades‐long export‐oriented development strategy to one that emphasises domestic demand‐oriented development and to replace the current pegged exchange rate regime with a market‐oriented more flexible exchange rate regime.     

The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone: Background,Developments and Preliminary Assessment of Initial Impacts

The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (SPFTZ) founded one year ago is a trial for China's new round of reform and opening up, which has promised liberalisation on the capital account and trade facilitation as its main objectives. Here, we discuss why China adopted such a pilot zone after three decades of economic development, and explore what the differences are between the SPFTZ and other free trade areas, and developments of the SPFTZ in the past year. We also make a preliminary assessment of the SPFTZ's initial impacts, especially of its impact on China's capital account opening and financial liberalisation. It is possible that the successful practice of the SPFTZ and more pilot policies replicated in China will give rise to a more balanced Chinese economy in the following decade.     

浮动汇率制度下资本项目开放国际经验与启示

随着国际金融方面改革的深入,我国资本项目开放不断地面临新的环境和形势,汇率政策的变动就是其中之一。以更具弹性的浮动汇率制度为背景,分析其他国家在浮动汇率制度下开放资本项目的经验,总结出开放的条件和步骤的一般规律,并进一步得出对我国现实的政策启示,将有助于我国在今后的改革中有针对性地防范风险,也有助于我国稳步实现资本项目下的完全可兑换。     

资本项目可兑换与汇率制度的互动协调分析

资本项目可兑换与汇率制度相互作用、相互协调.一方面,市场化汇率制度是资本项目可兑换的前提和基础;另一方面,资本项目可兑换决定均衡汇率,并促进汇率制度弹性化和市场化.随着中国经济不断发展和日益融入国际经济体系,中国应进一步开放资本项目,相应地逐步增大汇率制度的弹性空间,最终实现资本项目可兑换和浮动汇率制度.     

The spillover effects of China's monetary policy shock: Evidence from B&R countries

This paper examines the international spillover effects of China's monetary policy shock on macro and financial variables in 26 countries along the Belt and Road (B&R) from 2000 to 2019. We find that a surprise Chinese monetary tightening brings about a widening in the short-term interest rate spread, a drop in the equity price, nominal depreciation against the RMB and real depreciation, and an improvement in the trade balance, on average, across the 26 B&R countries. Moreover, substantial heterogeneous effects emerge in the responses of the foreign real exchange rate and the trade balance in different groups in terms of the 26 countries' trade weights with China, capital openness, and national income levels. Finally, all the empirical evidence reveals that the expenditure switching effect plays an important role in facilitating the international transmission of China's monetary policy shock.     

Determinants shaping the international currency system: Where do currencies stand relative to their equilibria?

Using a sample of 27 currencies, we empirically test the role of a large set of determinants potentially underlying currencies' share in the international currency system, providing, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive study of this kind so far. We propose a new global indicator that quantifies the international use of currencies on the basis of three dimensions—medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. From a range of indicators including openness, financial development and institutional development indicators, we uncover several variables that are significant in explaining the international status of currencies, hence contributing to understanding the role of the determinants shaping the international currency system. We also investigate the long-run equilibrium values for currency shares, allowing us to score currencies on the basis of the potential stemming from the determinants. We contribute to the debate on international currencies' prospects, not only by looking at much discussed currencies such as the US dollar, the euro and the Chinese renminbi, but also by uncovering potential of emerging currencies. This knowledge is of the utmost importance for the debate on the reform of the international monetary system—from the point of view of academics, policymakers and market practitioners.     

中国智库的经费运营模式研究——以中国高端智库为例

资金独立是智库保持竞争力、独立性和影响力的先决条件,但目前对中国智库的经费研究和深入调研仍然较少。国际知名智库的经费来源往往较为多元化,且大部分智库资金都投入到了项目研究中。对中国国家高端智库的经费数据进行分析后发现,目前中国智库普遍存在资金运营情况高度不透明、统计口径与指标衡量混乱、缺乏单独的资金运营情况说明、高度依赖国家财政拨款、经费支出分类较为粗略、行政管理支出过高、部分智库经费结余过甚等现象。本研究认为,中国特色新型智库在借鉴国际经验的同时,更应扎根于中国的政治生态文化,从经费机制上更好地保持智库的独立性,加强内部控制与外部监管。     

Globalisation and Industrial Policy: The Case of China

After a quarter of a century of industrial policy, China's objective of nurturing a group of globally competitive state‐owned enterprises appears to have succeeded beyond most expectations. However, China's SOEs are far from catching up with the world's leading firms. Protection through state ownership in a massive, fast‐growing economy has permitted China's SOEs to earn large profits and achieve high market capitalisations, but this is not the same thing as building globally competitive firms. The fact that China's industrial policy has been unsuccessful after a quarter of a century of intense effort demonstrates how difficult it is to construct an industrial policy in the era of capitalist globalisation, which has produced intense global industrial concentration across large parts of the global value chain. Although the detailed content of the next stage of reform of China's large state‐owned enterprises is unclear, China's determination to build a group of globally competitive large companies remains undimmed.     

Which foreign states support the global use of the Chinese renminbi? The international political economy of currency internationalisation

The internationalisation of the Chinese renminbi has taken a path distinct from most cases involving previous international currencies, in that policy measures adopted by governments have played crucial roles in it. This paper conducts a cross‐country analysis of the factors that have led foreign governments to introduce three primary policy infrastructures to support renminbi use—renminbi swap lines, Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor quotas and renminbi clearing banks. Our analysis shows that a state holding renminbi assets among its reserves or having more developed financial markets is likely to establish a higher level of policy infrastructure supporting renminbi use. We also find that a country's economic and political relations with China may have meaningful impacts on the level of its establishment of those renminbi‐related policy infrastructures. These findings significantly expand our understanding of renminbi internationalisation, by identifying which non‐Chinese factors have affected its progress to date. They also contribute meaningfully to the literature on currency internationalisation and international currencies in general, by calling attention to the roles of foreign states in the process of a currency's internationalisation.     

The Business(es) of the Chinese State

The state industrial sector is the Achilles heel of China's otherwise remarkable economic performance over the past two decades. Most other countries in transition from socialism have transformed SOEs into commercial entities through systematic, market‐driven restructuring and privatisation to become more efficient and competitive. In China, a series of innovative, if often administrative, insitutional reforms since 1978 have begun to achieve the Chinese authorities' goal of ‘separating governemtn from business.’ But the Chinese State still maintains ownership of key enterprises, and government agencies carry out shareholder functions typically performed by private owners in a market economy. Although privatisation and restructuring of SOEs is occurring, it mostly pertains to small and medium sized firms. For the principal businesses, by contrast, the creation of large state enterprise groups and holding companies (and experiments in other forms of ‘state asset management’) have become the main form of restructuring. Today, China's SOEs still account for more than one‐quarter of national production, two‐thirds of total assets, more than half of urban employment and almost three‐quarters of investment. While direct budgetary subsidies have declined, explicit and implicit subsidies are still making their way to prop up loss‐making SOEs through the financial system and other routes. At the same time, SOEs are still producing non‐marketable products, resulting in a sizeable inventory overhang. These inefficiencies and distortions represent a drain on the country's resources and thus present a challenge to the Chinese leadership for reform. This paper sheds light on these challenges by analysing the incentives and constraints on China's SOE reform programme. Four critical aspects of the reforms are highlighted and evaluated against the backdrop of international experience: clarification of property rights; establishment of large group/holding companies and other new organisational structures; improved corporate governance incentives; and implementation of international financial accounting and auditing practices. The paper concludes with policy recommendations.     

Exploration of Chinese SMEs' export development: The role of managerial determinants based on an adapted innovation‐related internationalization model

Over the past two decades, small to medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in China have achieved rapid international development. Due to China's unique cultural and institutional environments, our understanding of the influence of managerial determinants on internationalization is still limited. This exploratory study takes the lens of the innovation model of internationalization to revisit the dynamic development of Chinese SMEs' export operations. Based on the four in‐depth case studies, the findings suggest that exports by Chinese SMEs are influenced by managerial perceptions such as negative country‐of‐origin effect and strict overseas quality standards. In addition, they show that both external and internal drivers act as “change agents” in their internationalization involvement. These findings will assist various stakeholders—government and export promotion agencies—to develop and deliver needs‐based supports and encourage nonexporters to participate in international operations.     

中国崛起背景下的涉外金融安全问题与对策

中国崛起背景下的涉外金融安全问题,主要表现在三个方面,即资本账户开放的安全问题、外汇储备资产或外汇资产的安全问题、国际支付结算体系的安全问题。导致中国涉外金融安全问题的外部原因是本币不具备储备货币的国际地位,需要从外部获得储备货币,必然缺乏安全;人民币汇率的信用依靠美元等储备货币背书,中国经济崛起也曾经依赖美元顺差;美国可以利用美元账户对资金、资产交易、跨境支付结算等,实施行政处罚、限制、冻结等制裁,乃至剔除出账户系统。内部原因是中国经济崛起,美国要打压和制裁;金融开放如果在汇率制度选择、外汇管制和管控上处理不当,允许储备货币资金完全自由进出而无约束,则必然存在金融危机的可能;国际收支失衡导致涉外金融缺乏安全。解决涉外金融安全问题应从四个方面着手:一是通过货币互换和多元化投资等方式保障外汇(储备)资产安全;二是通过提倡主权货币计价、支付、结算、融资,以及开展相关制度设计等方式建设好交易和支付结算系统;三是把握好资本账户开放;四是做好人民币国际化的基础工作。