The incentive problem and the design of investment banking contracts

This paper summarizes the first-best contract between an issuer and an investment banker when there is no incentive problem and determines the optimal deviation from that contract when an incentive problem is present. Since the offer price is observable, the issuer can dictate the price he prefers. The issuer, however, is unable to observe the distribution effort, and thus an incentive problem arises. Under reasonable conditions the issuer will give the banker a commission function that is an increasing function of the net proceeds from the issue and involves a bonus when the issue is sold out at the offer price.     

The Investment Banking Contract For New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation And The Incentive Problem

In placing a new security issue, an investment banker has an opportunity to obtain private information by conducting preselling activities during the registration period. The task of the issuer is to design a contract that both induces the banker to use this information to the issuer's advantage and provides a disincentive for the banker to price the issue too low in order to reduce the effort required to sell the issue. This paper characterizes the class of price response functions that the issuer can induce the banker to choose under a delegation scheme and demonstrates that delegating the pricing decision to the banker can be optimal.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Information Asymmetry is usually assumed in most explanations of the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). In Baron's (1982) model, the underwriter is better informed than the issuing firm concerning the demand for the IPO. The greater uncertainty associated with the demand will lead to a greater underpricing due to the enhanced value of the underwriter's expertise. In the case that the issuer is also an informed investment banker, Baron's hypothesis predicts no underpricing. Our results based on Canadian investment bankers do not support Baron's hypothesis.     

Working for the enemy? The impact of investment banker job changes on deal flow

This paper examines the impact of job changes by prominent investment bankers on the M&A and equity market shares of investment banks. Using a hand-collected sample of job changes between 1998 and 2006, we find that after controlling for deal and bank-level characteristics, hiring a banker from an investment bank with a more prominent industry presence has a positive impact on both equity and M&A market share for the gaining bank and a negative impact on the losing bank's M&A market share. After the banker switches firms, we find a significant amount of business following the banker from the losing bank to the gaining bank, particularly when the relationship is strong between the client firm and the banker. Abnormal returns around the announcement of a banker changing employers are positive and significant for the gaining bank, suggesting that the market views banker additions as value increasing. Overall, our results suggest human capital is a critical component of investment banking deal flow.     

The role of investment banker directors in M&A

We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms? acquisition behavior. We find that firms with investment bankers on the board have a higher probability of making acquisitions. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors experience higher announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums and advisory fees, and exhibit superior long-run performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience help firms make better acquisitions, both by identifying suitable targets and by reducing the cost of the deals.     

The marketing of seasoned equity offerings

In an accelerated seasoned equity offering (SEO), an issuer foregoes the investment bank's marketing efforts in return for a lower fee. To explain why many issuing firms choose a higher cost fully marketed offer, we posit that the marketing effort flattens the issuer's short-run demand curve. Alternatively stated, with a fully marketed offer, the issuer is paying investment bankers to create demand, making the elasticity of demand at the time of issuance an endogenous choice variable. Empirical analysis shows that both the pre-issue elasticity of the issuing firm's demand curve and the offer size are important determinants of the offer method choice. We find evidence of a large transitory increase in the elasticity of demand for issuers conducting fully marketed SEOs.     

A Theory of the Syndicate: Form Follows Function

We relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production. Although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion, membership stability across deals represents a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi-rents. This improves incentives for individual bankers to cultivate investor relationships that translate into greater expected proceeds. Reputational concerns of lead bankers amplify the effect. We derive conditions under which restricted entry and designation of a lead banker strictly Pareto dominate, in which case it is also strictly Pareto dominant for the syndicate's fee to be greater than members' cost of participation.     

The Case for Intervening in Bankers’ Pay

This paper studies the default risk of banks generated by investment and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in fixed wages as risk sharing on the remuneration bill is valuable. Competition for bankers generates a negative externality, driving up market levels of banker remuneration and hence rival banks’ default risk. Optimal financial regulation involves an appropriately structured limit on the proportion of the balance sheet used for bonuses. However, stringent bonus caps are value destroying, default risk enhancing, and suboptimal for regulators who control only a small number of banks.     

Aspects of international financial services

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issues related to international financial services, particularly foreign direct investment in banking. The paper discusses the challenges of measuring incomes generated from the activities of multinational banks, including their international lending and direct investment in host countries. The paper highlights the complementary role of FDI and trade in financial services and discusses investment in banking services. The patterns of FDI in banking in Eastern European countries, Latin America and East Asia are also analysed with a focus on the costs and benefits of FDI in banking in the emerging countries.     

Optimal financial crises: A note on Allen and Gale

This note provides an example of an optimal banking panic. We construct a model in which a banking panic is triggered by the banker, not the depositors. When the banker receives a pessimistic information on the return on the bank’s assets, he liquidates them prematurely in order to protect his capital. In the face of this liquidation, all depositors withdraw their funds prematurely. The premature liquidation of the bank’s assets strengthens the bank’s balance sheet. As a result, the banking panic does not cause bank failure and the government should not try to prevent the panic. Such a panic occured in 1857 in the United States. JEL Classification G21     

Investment in internet banking as a real option: theory and tests

This paper examines the optimal exercise of strategic real options to invest in Internet banking (IB) technology within a two-stage game, parameterized by the distribution of bank size and uncertainty over the profitability of investment, and empirically tests the results. The value of the strategic investment option to a strategically significant entrant into IB depends on both expected future profits as well as the variance of those profits. Expected profits to an entrant depend, in equilibrium, on its size, as measured by existing market share (concentration) or total assets, relative to its rivals. Conditional on the degree of uncertainty, larger banks should, as a consequence, exercise their options earlier than smaller banks, for purely strategic advantages, and act as market leaders in the provision of IB services. Like ordinary options, however, the value of the strategic investment option to both large and small banks increases in uncertainty, implying that early exercise will be more likely the more information is available about potential demand. We test these hypotheses on investment in IB services with data from a sample of 1618 commercial banks in the tenth Federal Reserve District during 1999. Consistent with our hypotheses, relative bank size, as measured by measures of concentration, and demographic information predictive of future demand both positively influence the probability of entry into IB in our sample.     

International investment in financial services

This paper analyzes and models the significant components of international trade in financial services, namely, foreign direct investment in banking for the US, the UK and Germany. It distinguishes between banks' activities abroad and FDI in banking by banks and non-banks. A model for FDI in banking is proposed which contains certain explanatory variables peculiar to FDI in banking as compared to FDI in manufacturing. The components of the model of FDI in banking is different from those models designed to explain banks activities abroad. The empirical results of this study of FDI in banking indicate that bilateral trade, banks' foreign assets, the cost of capital, relative economic growth, exchange rates and FDI in non-finance industries are the major determinants of foreign investment in banking.     

Banking merchants and banking houses: the hidden key to the workings of the Spanish banking system in the nineteenth century

The historical study of the Spanish nineteenth-century banking system has been almost exclusively carried out through a consideration of the experiences of the joint-stock banks. But the very scarce number of these, and their territorial distribution, makes it necessary for us to look for other financial intermediaries who were able to satisfy the demand for banking services in that time and place. We demonstrate that this role was fulfilled by the banking merchants and banking houses operating through individual firms and partnerships. The object of this work is to make their activities better known and vindicate their importance. The sources used for the study are mainly the accounting documents of several banking houses.     

私人银行：现代商业银行的战略核心业务

私人银行是指以财富管理为核心,面向高净资产客户所提供的顶级专业化的一揽子金融服务,其已成为当今国际知名商业银行的战略核心业务。以家庭办公室为主要组织形式,向富裕人士提供高品质金融服务,是私人银行的重要特征。随着市场经济的快速发展,中国已经形成了一支在社会经济中越来越具有影响力的高收入群体,但由于缺失真正的私人银行服务,该群体日益增长的财富管理需求难以得到有效满足。金融全面开放后,私人银行在国内具有广阔的发展空间。     

Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation

In the bookbuilding procedure, an investment banker solicits bids for shares from institutional investors prior to pricing an equity issue. The banker then prices the issue and allocates shares at his discretion to the investors. We examine the books for 39 international equity issues. We find that the investment banker awards more shares to bidders who provide information in their bids. Regular investors receive favorable allocations, especially when the issue is heavily oversubscribed. The investment banker also favors revised bids and domestic investors.     

我国商业银行投行业务发展初探

随着市场竞争的日趋激烈和管制的放松,我国商业银行出现了投资银行业务与传统业务交叉融合的现象,投资银行业务成为商业银行一项重要的中间业务收入来源。当前,尽管综合经营已成为商业银行重要的利润增长点,但在经营过程中还存在着诸多问题。因此,必须实行投行业务分级准入制,完善风险的内外部控制体系及监控体系,才能使投行业务取得显著进展。     

On investment banker monitoring in the new issues market

This article primarily addresses two largely unanswered questions in the financial economics literature: (i) is there a demand for lead bank monitoring in the initial public offering (IPO) market?, and (ii) does monitoring by the lead investment banker lead to better post-issue performance? We find evidence consistent with the demand for underwriter monitoring in the IPO market. We examine variables which proxy for the incentives of lead underwriters to supply monitoring post-issue. These variables include lead investment bank reputation and whether warrants are issued to the underwriter by the issuing firm. We find that lead bank reputation is positively associated with the post-issue performance of IPO firms. We also examine whether additional value added monitoring is provided by unaffiliated analysts. The number of unaffiliated analysts following is positively correlated with post-issue performance. Our results are consistent with third party monitoring in the new issues market.     

基于客户需求特征的我国私人银行客户服务体系研究

私人银行业务在我国发展的时间不长,对我国私人银行客户的结构及需求特征的研究和分析尚处起步阶段。鉴于此,针对我国快速扩大的高资产净值人群及其日益增长的金融服务需求,应在研究私人银行客户需求的基础上,以私人银行客户服务体系建设为核心,推动我国私人银行业务持续、稳健发展。     

Issuer-oriented underpricing costs in initial public offers: Evidence from Hong Kong

This paper estimates the underpricing cost associated with new shares issued and sold when firms go public in a traditional British-style IPO market in contrast to prior work which focussed on the underpricing cost to pre-IPO investors. Secondly, the estimates account for interest income on application funds received by issuing firms. Using data from the Hong Kong IPO market, the results show that the issuer underpricing cost of new share issues is on average only 14% of headline underpricing. When interest on application funds is taken into account, net issuer underpricing cost reduces to just around 7% of headline underpricing. This finding provides a compelling explanation of why issuing companies may not be concerned about underpricing in traditional British-style IPO markets. Thirdly, we also find that pre-IPO investors take steps to minimise wealth transfer to new investors either by selling a very small proportion or none of their pre-IPO shares. These findings suggest that explanations of IPO underpricing to the various parties involved in the process should, in part, be sought in the institutional structures and investment banking practices of the relevant primary capital market.     

Beliefs affecting additional investment intentions of mutual fund clients

In this article, we aim to examine mutual fund investors’ behaviour in decision-making situations and to analyse future investment decisions via a path model approach. Investors were divided into different groups based on the risk and distribution channel used, and the differences in their investment intentions were examined. The study used empirical survey data collected from the clients of a mutual fund company owned by a Finnish banking group. Loyalty to the common banking group dominated the explanation in the whole model. The safety of the investment was important for branch office investors, whereas obtaining a good return was important for internet investors. Ultimately, explanatory power was highest for the branch office investors and lowest for the internet investors with equity funds. Most investors intended to invest more, and thus there was little variance to be explained. The results indicate that branch office investors with money market funds require more information about the investment business, although it is difficult to see who would be responsible for providing that information. This study has implications for both the theory and management of financial services.