Some Fiscal Implications of Monetary Policy

We study the implications of alternative monetary targeting procedures for real interest rates and economic activity. We find that countercyclical monetary policy rules lead to higher real interest rates, higher average tax rates, lower output but lower variability of tax rates and consumption relative to procyclical rules. For a country with a high level of public debt (e.g. Italy), the adoption of a countercyclical procedure such as interest rate pegging may conceivably raise public debt servicing costs by more than half a percentage point of GNP. Our analysis suggests that the current debate on the targeting procedures of the European Central Bank ought to be broadened to include a discussion of the fiscal implications of monetary policy.     

Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default

This paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt. Two distortions prevail in the model economy: income taxes and liquidity constraints. Possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues, and a political intolerance of raising tax rates. At the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency: fiscal inflation, which reduces the real value of nominal debt, and open market operations, which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector. Three regimes achieve this goal. In all regimes monetary policy is passive. In all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium. The propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response (in the form of tax rate changes) to the level of government debt, while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation. Impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs. In this regime, most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases.     

Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Challenges Under Fiscal Dominance

Countries have significantly increased their public-sector borrowing since the Global Financial Crisis. As a consequence, monetary authorities may face pressure to deviate from their policy targets in ways designed to ease the debt burden. In view of this consideration, we test for greater fiscal dominance over 2000-2017 under Inflation Targeting (IT) and non-IT regimes. We find that evidence of fiscal dominance varies across countries and debt configurations. Higher ratios of public debt-to-GDP may appear associated with lower policy interest rates in advanced economies. However, a declining natural rate of interest largely explains the pattern of lower rates and higher debt in these countries. The most robust evidence of fiscal dominance lies among emerging markets under non-IT regimes, composed mostly of exchange rate targeters. For these countries, policy interest rates are non-linearly associated with public debt levels, depending on both the level of hard-currency public debt-to-GDP and the currency composition of public debt. We also show that emerging market economies with greater exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility, and underlying commodity exposure exhibit stronger associations between public debt and policy interest rates.     

“CONVENTIONAL” MONETARY POLICY IN OLG MODELS: REVISITING THE ASSET-SUBSTITUTION CHANNEL

Conventional monetary policy involves actions by the monetary and fiscal authorities: the former sets a nominal interest rate and the latter sets lump-sum taxes to finance the implied flow of interest payments on government debt. We model such policy within an overlapping generations framework and show that absent any other frictions the magnitude of the nominal interest rate gives rise to asset substitution between government debt and either private debt or capital—substitution that has both real and nominal effects. Such substitution is not in standard New Keynesian models because their dynastic specification implies that government debt is not net wealth.     

Fiscal Rules,Interest Payments on Debt,and the Irrelevance of the Taylor Principle

We show that in New Keynesian models with non‐neutral government debt, the Taylor principle ceases to be relevant for equilibrium determinacy if the government follows a fiscal rule of levying taxes in proportion to its interest payments on existing debt. This is in contrast with previous studies, which typically have assumed that taxes respond to the level of debt, and have found either a confirmation or reversal of the Taylor principle depending on the feedback from debt to taxes. We find, instead, that the equilibrium effect of the interest rate on debt is crucial for determinacy. If, as in our model, taxes are raised in response to debt interest payments, the range of indeterminacy monotonically decreases with the fiscal feedback parameter. When interest payments are completely tax‐financed, indeterminacy is ruled out without any restrictions on monetary policy.     

New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity

Despite the EU Stability & Growth Pact and existing constitutional limits on public deficit/debt at the (sub)national level in many EU member countries, in the wake of the 2010 Greek bailout, many politicians and policy advisors have proposed new constitutional “debt brakes” to prevent future fiscal crises and bailouts. This paper puts a question mark behind this popular policy recommendation. Public choice scholars and other critical observers have repeatedly emphasised that constitutional deficit/debt limits are not per se credible commitments to run a sound fiscal policy in the future. To demonstrate this, design defects of such fiscal constraints are usually pointed out (no politically independent control, no sanctions, etc.). Going beyond this standard approach of credibility assessment, this paper argues for taking the issue of institutional complementarity seriously. To assess its credibility, one has to not only examine the design of a deficit/debt limit but also the institutional environment (tax/expenditure policy, capital market, etc.) in which such a constitutional commitment is embedded.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

A TALE OF TAX POLICIES IN OPEN ECONOMIES

To evaluate fiscal policy reforms for Euro‐area countries, this article develops and calibrates a small open economy model. Debt reduction reforms require higher tax rates in the short term in exchange for lower rates in the long term as the debt‐servicing burden falls. Using the capital income tax to implement such a policy leads to welfare gains; the consumption tax, a very small welfare gain; and the labor income tax, a welfare loss. Holding fixed the long‐run debt–output ratio, offsetting a lower capital income tax with either a higher labor income or consumption tax generally yields welfare gains.     

Budgetary policies in a DSGE model with finite horizons

This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, capital accumulation and finite horizons. Our New Keynesian framework exhibits intergenerational wealth effects and is intended to investigate the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy, which is specified by either a debt-based tax rule or a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deficits. The model predicts that fiscal expansions generate a trade-off in output dynamics between short-term gains and medium-term losses. It is shown that the effects of fiscal shocks crucially depend upon the conduct of monetary policy. Simulation analysis suggests that balanced-budget requirements enhance the determinacy properties of feedback interest rate rules by guaranteeing inflation stabilization.     

Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules

The Fiscal Stability Pact for EMU implies that constraints on fiscal policy facilitate inflation control. In this paper we identify two stable policy regimes. When monetary policy seeks to raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation, a self-stabilising fiscal policy is required to ensure model stability. A fiscal policy which does not, by itself, ensure fiscal solvency constrains monetary policy to be relatively 'passive'. However, in simulations we conclude that the central bank does not need to seek, on this account, the degree of debt stabilisation that appears to be implied by the fiscal stability pact.     

国际直接投资发展趋向、障碍与对策:2008—2012

国际金融危机的冲击使欧美对外投资能力明显下降,中国等新兴市场国家的对外投资能力有所增强。2011年以来世界范围内发展国际直接投资面临以下现实因素制约:(1)发达国家的量化宽松政策,引起了金融资产价格上涨,并传导到实体部门的资产价格,提高了并购FDI的国际投资成本;(2)欧元区等国家货币有贬值要求,汇率风险加大,以及世界主要国家货币政策和财政政策空间有限,会恶化企业对外FDI的风险态度,减少FDI流出;(3)全球经济衰退,跨国公司产品缺少市场需求;(4)东道国为了弥补财政赤字和偿还债务,税收负担相对较重。     

FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICITS, MONEY, AND EXCHANGE RATES

The dollar's strength during the 1980s appears to many—particularly as reported in the financial press—to have been directly linked to the decade's large budget deficits and the subsequent increase in the stock of federal debt outstanding. The popular argument is that the budget deficit and the growth of federal government credit market demand caused U.S. interest rates to rise over that period, inducing large capital inflows from abroad to finance the deficit. According to the argument, the capital inflows caused the dollar to appreciate. Despite the argument's popularity, the empirical literature does not strongly support it. Evidence on the relationship between the federal deficit and the dollar is at best mixed.
This article reconsiders the effects of federal budget deficits on the exchange rate. The analysis involves estimating a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of exchange rates that includes monetary, fiscal, and price level variables. Within the VAR framework, impulse analysis traces the dynamic response of exchange rates to various budget deficit measures.
The analysis finds that deficits do not directly Granger cause exchange rates, but it also finds evidence of an indirect effect working through the money supply and price level. Moreover, the analysis reveals some evidence that foreign exchange markets are forward looking and react to expected budget deficits. The innovations accounting and impulse analysis also suggest a forward-looking dynamic relationship between deficits and exchange rates, but the relationship is sensitive to the ordering of the variables.     

Countercyclical taxes in a monopolistically competitive environment

In the context of a neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition, this paper studies the stabilizing effects of countercyclical tax policy when the income tax rate has an additional role of financing government budget deficits. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, countercyclical taxes generally reduce aggregate volatility, unless the fiscal response to debt accumulation is weak. The presence of monopoly power enhances these effects. Even when automatic stabilizers successfully stabilize business cycle fluctuations, countercyclical taxes are welfare inferior, due to reduced precautionary saving motives. While, if the fiscal response to debt is weak and countercyclical tax policy destabilizing, the increased precautionary saving motive is not welfare enhancing as the asset accumulated is government debt rather than capital. These results are generally robust. Nominal inertia may, however, dominate the precautionary saving mechanism.     

Financing government investment and its implications for public capital: A small open economy perspective

Expenditure reductions played a key role in many small open economies during fiscal consolidation, with large declines in public investment. This led to a reduction in public capital stock and affected the competitiveness of these economies. After the sovereign debt crisis, the governments that consider increasing investment to replenish the public capital stock have limited fiscal space and have to avoid external imbalances. We show that using budget-neutral investment spending can generate long-term benefits of higher public capital stock while at the same time limiting negative consequences for the public finances and the trade balance. The best way of financing government investment, which preserves fiscal and trade balances, and increases welfare, is by reducing other government spending. The second-best is financing investment with value-added tax. Financing with debt worsens fiscal and trade balances, while using distortionary labour taxes reduces labour supply, increases wage costs and worsens the trade deficit in the short run.     

The impact of government debt on the long-run natural real interest rate – a quantitative evaluation

Persistently low natural real interest rates are a problem for monetary policy and financial stability. I analyse to what extent a permanent increase in government debt that is financed by higher taxes could raise the long-run natural real interest rate. As a measurement tool, I use an incomplete markets model with capital and government bonds. Increasing the public debt/GDP ratio by one percentage point raises the real interest rate by between 0.4 and 1.5 basis points, depending on the degree of inequality generated by the model and the tax instrument used to balance the government’s budget constraint. I also show that the interest rate effect of a change in public debt/GDP predicted by the model is significantly smaller than its empirical counterpart for the US, due to the fact that the model understates the empirical fraction of households that are constrained in their consumption decision.     

Financial markets’ behavior around episodes of large changes in the fiscal stance

Using a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2002, this paper shows that interest rates, particularly those of long-term government bonds, decrease when countries’ fiscal position improves and increase around periods of budget deteriorations. Stock market prices surge around times of substantial fiscal tightening and plunge in periods of very loose fiscal policy. In addition, the paper shows that results depend on countries’ initial fiscal conditions and on the type of fiscal consolidations: Fiscal adjustments that occur in country-years with high levels of government deficit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a permanent and substantial decrease in government debt are associated with larger reductions in interest rates and increases in stock market prices.     

Fiscal expansion, monetary policy, interest rate risk premia, and wage reactions

We examine the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy in a small open economy, with emphasis on the interactions between fiscal, monetary and labour market policies. The paper uses the NBNZ-DEMONZ macroeconometric model. Novel features of the model are that it includes an endogenous interest rate risk premium (IRRP), and forward-looking monetary and fiscal policy reaction functions which capture the essence of New Zealand's Reserve Bank and Fiscal Responsibility Acts. The most important empirical result is that the postulated IRRP, proxying financial market mechanisms, can contribute at least as much as the monetary policy reaction function to maintaining price stability. Also of significance are that an income tax cuts package shows more damped real GDP and underlying inflation paths than does an expenditure increases equivalent; and that the inflationary and real sector impacts of a personal income tax cut package depend heavily on how the cut is `shared' between firms and workers. The nature and interdependence of monetary and fiscal policies and labour market conditions are therefore crucial to the macroeconomic outcomes.     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.     

The Role of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Sustaining Growth With Stability in India*

The performance of the Indian economy in recent years has attracted increasing international interest. This paper focuses on the role of fiscal and monetary policies in the evolution of the Indian economy over the years, with particular attention being given to the reforms undertaken in these policies since the early 1990s. The coordination of fiscal and monetary policies has been crucial in the sequencing of the economic reform process carried out since the early 1990s. Monetary policy aims to maintain a judicious balance between price stability and economic growth. With the opening up of the Indian economy and the spread of financial sector reforms aimed at functional autonomy, prudential strengthening, operational efficiency, and competitiveness of banks, considerations of financial stability have assumed greater importance in recent years alongside the increasing openness of the Indian economy. The biggest challenge facing the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in India is to continue the accelerated growth process while maintaining price and financial stability. Therefore, the self‐imposed rule‐based fiscal correction at both the national and subnational levels has to be consolidated and carried forward. The existence of a high level of fiscal deficit also contributes to the persistence of an interest rate differential with the rest of the world, which then also constrains progress toward full capital account convertibility. The success achieved in revenue buoyancy through tax rationalization and compliance has to be strengthened further.