Control,collaboration, and productivity in international joint ventures: theory and evidence

This study analyzes the following unresolved questions: In international joint ventures (IJVs) in a developing country, how could different IJV structures address control and collaboration considerations, and what is the likely effect of such different structures on IJV productivity? Theoretically, we suggest that the ambiguity surrounding these questions reflects the tendency of researchers to view control and collaboration as opposing objectives, studying one or the other; in contrast, we provide a more integrative perspective that blends the two objectives, focusing on common underlying issues relating to enhancing partner commitment, ensuring partner knowledge contributions, and reducing partner risks. We address the most salient design consideration for IJV partners, that is, IJV ownership structure, to posit that joint consideration of the control benefit of a higher foreign ownership level in IJVs and the collaboration benefit of a more balanced IJV ownership structure results in an expected inverted U‐curve relationship between foreign ownership and IJV productivity. Additionally, we posit and test how three environmental contingencies, by affecting the need for control and collaboration in IJVs, would further influence the specific shape of the inverted U‐curve relationship. We find strong support for our theory using an extensive longitudinal dataset of over 5,000 IJVs in China from 1999–2003. We discuss the value of our approach and findings both for researchers and for IJV partners seeking the dual benefits of control and collaboration. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The assignment of call option rights between partners in international joint ventures

We examine call option rights as a contractual clause in international joint ventures (IJVs) and propose that the assignment of the call option right in an IJV is determined by certain ex ante asymmetries between the partners. Results show that between the two partners in an IJV, the firm with greater complementarity with the venture and greater prior IJV experience is more likely to hold the call option right; in addition, the firm's contractual choice on the call option right and its ownership choice on a greater initial equity stake are substitutive. Our focus on explicit call options advances the real options theory of collaborative agreements, and our results also highlight that option rights be considered an important part of alliance design. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board representation in international joint ventures

Research summary : Relatively little attention has been paid to boards in international joint ventures (IJVs), and the composition of these boards in particular. We examine the determinants of foreign partners' representation on IJV boards in order to advance our knowledge of this facet of IJV governance. We argue that a foreign partner's representation on the IJV board is related to its equity contribution. However, we hypothesize that this relationship is moderated by IJV and host country characteristics that affect the importance of the internal and external roles IJV boards serve. These results provide insights into the conditions under which a partner might wish to secure greater board representation for its level of equity, or utilize less board representation than might be suggested by its equity level alone. Managerial summary : The functioning and composition of corporate boards have long been seen as critical to managers and shareholders alike. In contrast, the boards of IJVs have been relatively neglected. We advance our knowledge of this important facet of IJV governance. Specifically, we highlight the importance of two roles (i.e., an internal and external role) that IJV boards and directors fulfill. We find that the importance of these internal and external roles of boards determines whether a foreign partner might wish to secure greater board representation for its level of equity, or utilize less board representation than might be suggested by its equity level alone. Our results provide novel insights that can help managers structure their IJV boards. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of alliance partner choice: Network distance,managerial incentives,and board monitoring

Research Summary: We ask if managerial opportunism is a significant problem in alliance partner choice and examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms in explaining this choice. Using a sample of 313 alliances of U.S. firms from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries from 1992 to 2010, we find that managerial incentives lead to managerial preference for relationally risky distant partners over existing and new close partners. Further, board monitoring encourages managers to pursue existing and distant partners over new close ones, choices aligned with shareholder interests. In addition, we find that board monitoring substitutes for managerial incentives in alliance partner choice. We contribute to the literature on alliance partner choice to identify an important, and hitherto, unexplored perspective. Managerial Summary: This article examines whether managers and shareholders view alliance‐related risks differently, and how the divergent interests between managers and shareholders affect alliance partner choice. We argue that managers’ concern about their loss of employment and compensation from alliance failure impedes the choice of relationally risky alliance partners that may increase shareholder value. We also argue that managerial stock ownership and board monitoring mitigate this managerial propensity. Our findings suggest that stock ownership owned by managers and strong board monitoring are effective governance mechanisms to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Our study offers a novel perspective to understand alliance partner choice by viewing the firm as an entity comprised of fragmented interests.     

Executive preferences for governance modes and exchange partners: An information economics perspective

This study investigates how executives address information asymmetry and adverse selection surrounding international joint ventures (IJVs) and acquisitions. We argue that executives can address such exchange hazards not only through their governance decisions, as prior research indicates, but also through their selection of exchange partners. Our experimental design complements prior research on firms' governance choices in three ways: (1) by incorporating multiple potential exchange partners rather than taking a single partner as given for a realized transaction; (2) by accommodating multiple potential entry modes to address interdependencies across governance structures; and (3) by providing direct evidence on executives' assessments of IJVs and acquisitions. We join together organizational governance research and decision‐making research on IJV partner selection, two literatures that have largely developed separately. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining IJV survival in a transitional economy through social exchange and knowledge‐based perspectives

In this study, we combine social exchange and knowledge‐based perspectives to develop a general path model of IJV survival. We further refine our expectations by considering the transitional economic context of our study and the somewhat unique managerial values resulting from the legacy of Marxist ideology. Results from structural equation modeling suggest that an imbalance in the management control structure between the parents leads to parental conflict and an increased likelihood of IJV failure. An imbalance in the ownership control structure, however, had no influence on conflict or survival. In general, support from the foreign parent is positively related to IJV learning and IJV survival. However, higher levels of technical support provided by the foreign parent to the IJV reduced the level of parental conflict, whereas management support had no effect on conflict. Our results suggest some dilemmas for firms pursuing IJVs in transitional economies. Although the foreign parent often contributes critical resources to the IJV, providing it with bargaining power and a high level of influence, an imbalance in management control between the partners may ultimately be detrimental to IJV survival. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge sharing and safeguarding in R&D collaborations: The role of steering committees in biotechnology alliances

Research Summary: This research contributes to alliance governance research by demonstrating how partners' administrative controls in nonequity collaborations regulate knowledge transfers across partners. These administrative controls can take the form of board‐like joint committees having explicitly delineated authority over certain alliance activities. We illuminate governing committees as an important, albeit neglected, instrument for administrative control in the governance of non‐equity alliances, and we demonstrate that these organizational mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that governing committees safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a partner possesses the incentive and ability to engage in such behavior. This study extends alliance governance research beyond the implications of the equity‐nonequity dichotomy to consider a wider and richer gamut of governance instruments available to address the challenges associated with knowledge transfers in alliances. Managerial Summary: Non‐equity alliances are important vehicles to collaborate with external partners, particularly in the biopharmaceutical industry and other high‐tech sectors. To guide these collaborations effectively, partners can use the contract to custom‐build jointly‐staffed managerial units with clearly demarcated decision‐making responsibilities. We demonstrate that these organizational mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that governing committees also safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a partner values a firm's knowledge highly, or it possesses the required ability to absorb and assimilate a firm's knowledge. Our results imply that contractually‐defined managerial interfaces provide a channel to regulate knowledge‐sharing in collaborative alliances.     

Anxiety of dependency in international joint ventures? An empirical study of drivers and consequences of relationship insecurity

This research introduces and delineates the concept of insecurity in IJV relationships. We define relationship insecurity as a parent firm's concerns about the continuance of the alliance arrangement and its partner's future provision of need satisfaction. According to interdependence theory, exchange partners that experience high dependence inevitably experience this ‘anxiety of dependency’, and the emergence of insecurity can destabilize the working relationship from within. We develop a conceptual model of the drivers and consequences of relationship insecurity in IJVs. Our survey results from 125 IJVs indicate that focal firm dependence and partner firm dependence both negatively affect insecurity, though the former is the dominant predictor. This surprising finding implies IJV partners experience ‘anxiety of low dependency’. The results suggest insecurity not only reduces directly IJV performance, but also lowers the quality of interpartner communication, which in turn dampens performance. Implications of these results are discussed.     

How does local partners network embeddedness affect international joint venture survival in different subnational contexts?

Do local partners' network attributes affect the survival of high-tech international joint ventures (IJV)? How does the effect of network attributes vary in different subnational institutional environments? While the classic economic explanation for IJV formation and subsequent performance draws from the resource-based view (RBV), we add the relational dimension to explain that IJV survival may be affected by local partners’ relation-specific assets within the local network. We test the effect of the local partners’ network attributes as calculated by UCINET (centrality, network status, and structural hole position) on IJV survival. We additionally assert that this relationship is moderated by subnational institutional heterogeneity. Using our sample of 125 IJV dyadic pairs of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in high-tech industries and their local partners in China, we find partial support for our claims.     

AGENCY COSTS AND THE PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE INTERNALIZATION

Recent studies have examined the determinants of international joint venture (IJV) formations and stock market reactions to such investments. Less is known, however, about the evolution of IJVs and the attendant performance implications for parent firms. This paper examines one specific type of IJV evolution, IJV internalization, whereby one firm acquires the IJV by buying out its partner(s). Standard agency theory variables are hypothesized to influence parent firm valuation effects. The results indicate that parent firm valuation effects are positively related to the parent firm equity owned by insiders and the interaction of debt financing and free cash flow. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Co-innovation in networks of resources — A case study in the Chinese exhibition industry

This work explores how network partners collaborate to innovate and innovate to collaborate and thereby achieve value. The innovation processes analyzed are within an IJV in the Chinese exhibition industry. The findings highlight that the IJV's development of a successful trade show resulted from effective co-innovation by partners which enabled the exploitation of opportunities in an industry characterized by rapid growth and continuing structural change. Partner co-innovation enabled evolving strategic and operational capabilities which has led to continued and growing market success. This co-innovation involved the targeted co-mingling of partner resources which creates value that motivated continued cooperation. The effectiveness of the partners' activities is evidenced by the growing size and prestige of their large-scale trade show as well as the expansion of the IJV into other endeavors. The paper concludes by considering the way these innovative processes can be applied in other contexts.     

Government corruption and foreign stakes in international joint ventures in emerging economies

This paper analyzes the relationship between government corruption and the changes in the equity stake of foreign partners in international joint ventures (IJVs) formed with local firms in emerging Asian economies. This relationship is defined according to transaction cost theory. This relationship is complemented by the introduction of a moderating variable derived from organizational learning theory: the country experience of foreign partners. This article is based on a sample of 171 European firms, which formed IJVs in emerging Asian economies during the year 1996. Using an event history analysis, the evolution of each European equity stake was followed-up from year 1996 to the end of the period at risk on January 2007. From the empirical results presented in this article, some findings have been drawn on the attitudes of foreign firms toward government corruption in emerging Asian economies. First, we showed that the government corruption is significantly related to the likelihood of foreign partners to terminate the IJV. However, the nature of this relationship is differentiated according to the score used to measure government corruption. The relationship is positive when using the Transparency International score and negative with the Political Risk Services score. Second, we put into evidence that the country experience of foreign partners moderates the relationship between government corruption and the changes in the equity stake of foreign partners in IJVs in emerging Asian economies.

The antecedents and outcome of control in IJVs: A control gap framework

Plenty of researchers have explored the relationship between parent firm control and international joint venture (IJV) performance. However, the conclusions of these researchers are inconsistent. Some studies suggest that total control from foreign parent firms produces better outcomes, while other studies consider that shared control or split control structures result in higher IJV performance. All of these studies argue that a parent firm’s control over an IJV would influence the performance of the IJV. This paper contributes to these debates by exploring the control gap, that is, the difference between desired control and exercised control of a parent firm. Evidence from 80 IJVs in Taiwan indicates that control gaps in the areas of manufacturing, financial, and human resource management have negative impacts on IJV performance. Empirical results also show that the level of a parent firm’s resource contribution to an IJV positively influences the parent firm’s desired control. The extent of a parent firm’s learning intent in marketing and R&D management is also positively linked with the degree of control desired by the parent firm. These findings provide important implications for the study of control structure in IJV management.     

Imitative innovation and international joint ventures: a dynamic analysis

In this paper we deal with some dynamic issues of international joint venture in the context of a developing country. We provide a rationale for international joint venture formation, as well as its subsequent instability, where instability is interpreted as payoff readjustments between the partners in the venture. Although the joint venture is formed in response to government restrictions on foreign equity holdings in the first period, its subsequent instability is caused by both the change in government policy, as well as the outcome of imitative technological innovation undertaken by the host partner. It is also shown that uncertainty about the government policy in the second period plays an important role in the formation of joint venture in the first period.     

Stepping in and stepping out: Strategic alliance partner reconfiguration and the unplanned termination of complex projects

Research summary : I add to work that emphasizes the stability of strategic alliances by considering the consequences of alliance partner reconfiguration. I offer two contrasting perspectives: (1) alliance partner reconfiguration leads to disruption, hence increases the risk of subsequent project termination; (2) partner reconfiguration leads to adaptation, hence decreases this risk. Data on 1,025 interfirm Australian mining alliances (2002–2011) shows that on average alliance partner reconfiguration increases the risk of project termination. For firm exit from an alliance, the effect is contingent on a firm's resource base, but not for firm entry. Surprisingly, I do not find that alliance partner reconfiguration is beneficial in a dynamic environment. I discuss the implications of these findings for the literature on strategic alliance dynamics and that on strategic alliance outcomes. Managerial summary : This paper studies what happens when over time strategic alliances change their original membership. The research shows that both entry in and exit from an alliance increase the risk of project termination. Hence, weathering difficult times and managing conflict by keeping teams stable should be a prime directive if project survival is the alliance partners' overriding concern. In addition, I find that the exit of a firm with a comparatively large resource base increases the hazard of termination more than if the departing firm has a relatively small resource base. Therefore, one cannot underestimate the importance of trying to keep on board those alliance partners who bring a critical resource to the table. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

伙伴间依赖与国际合资企业的不稳定性研究

基于动态演化的视角,开发了一个有关国际合资企业（IJVs）伙伴间依赖的影响因素和结果的综合概念模型。认为,在IJV发展演化的不同阶段,影响伙伴间依赖的因素不同。在IJV形成阶段,母公司投入的资源、基于情境的IJV伙伴间的讨价还价力是影响伙伴间依赖的主要因素;在IJV形成后到终结这一阶段,伙伴间的相互学习是影响IJV伙伴间依赖的主要因素。伙伴间依赖与IJV不稳定性之间的关系随着依赖程度的变化而定。除此之外,伙伴间的依赖与伙伴间的信任交互作用,共同影响着IJV的稳定性。而伙伴间冲突则对IJV的稳定性产生着直接的、负向的影响。在阐述这些关系的基础上还提出了一些反映这些关系的命题,以期为未来的实证检验做好铺垫。     

Absorptive capacity,learning, and performance in international joint ventures

This paper proposes and tests a model of IJV learning and performance that segments absorptive capacity into the three components originally proposed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). First, trust between an IJV's parents and the IJV's relative absorptive capacity with its foreign parent are suggested to influence its ability to understand new knowledge held by foreign parents. Second, an IJV's learning structures and processes are proposed to influence its ability to assimilate new knowledge from those parents. Third, the IJV's strategy and training competence are suggested to shape its ability to apply the assimilated knowledge. Revisiting the Hungarian IJVs studied by Lyles and Salk (1996) 3 years later, we find support for the knowledge understanding and application predictions, and partial support for the knowledge assimilation prediction. Unexpectedly, our results suggest that trust and management support from foreign parents are associated with IJV performance but not learning. Our model and results offer a new perspective on IJV learning and performance as well as initial insights into how those relationships change over time. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resource ambidexterity through alliance portfolios and firm performance

Research summary : Partner resources can be an important alternative to internal firm resources for attaining dual and seemingly incompatible strategic objectives. We extend arguments about managing conflicting objectives typically made at the firm level to the level of a firm's alliance portfolio. Specifically, will a balance between revenue enhancement and cost reduction attained collectively through partner resources accessed via a firm's various alliances be similarly beneficial for firm performance? Additionally, how do strategic attributes of alliance portfolio configuration, specifically alliance portfolio size and partner resource scope, condition the balance‐performance relationship? Based on data from the global airline industry, we find support for the balance‐performance relationship, though such balance is less beneficial for firms in the case of access to a broader resource scope per partner . Managerial summary : Increasing revenue and reducing costs simultaneously can potentially enhance firm competitiveness. We highlight that an alliance strategy can be an important alternative to internal resources for attaining such dual strategic objectives, particularly when partner resources accessed through alliances are treated collectively as portfolios. We examine the importance of balancing product‐market extending and efficiency‐improving partner resources in the global airline industry as well as the impact of two alternate strategies for accessing resources through alliances: fewer partners with more resources per partner or more partners with fewer resources per partner. We find that resource balance at the portfolio level helps airlines improve performance. Our results also suggest that managers should be cautious of accessing too many resources through just a few partners . Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

Interpersonal guanxi and partner extra-role behavior: Mediating role of relational and transactional governance strategy

This paper identifies interpersonal guanxi between boundary spanners as an individual-level antecedent of partner firms' extra-role behavior (ERB) in interfirm relationships. Drawing on interfirm governance and the guanxi literature, we propose that guanxi between boundary spanners at the operational level may promote partner firms' ERB through two governance strategies: interfirm trust and relationship-specific investment. We analyze 268 pairs of sales managers and salespeople in a variety of industries in China, and we find that guanxi between boundary spanners positively affects partner firms' ERB and that this positive relationship is strengthened by interfirm ownership homogeneity. Moreover, the relationship is mediated by interfirm trust and relationship-specific investment, and the mediation effect of interfirm trust is stronger than that of relationship-specific investment. These findings provide new insights into the relationship marketing and guanxi literature by highlighting the effects of guanxi between operational-level boundary spanners on partner firms' ERB.