水利工程项目投标决策研究

自国家正式颁布《招标投标法》以来,涉及国家公共安全和公众利益的大型基础设施建设项目实行招标投标制已成必然。如何适应水利水电建设项目实行招标投标这种竞争性的变化,己经成为参与水利水电工程项目建设的所有潜在投标人的共同课题。一个灵活的富于技巧并具有弹性的投标策略,将有助于投标人降低投标边际成本,提高企业中标率。对于一个水利工程的施工单位来说,为了在竞争中获胜,必须研究投标策略,因为投标的获胜不仅决定于竞争者实力,而且也决定于正确的竞争策略。     

浅析水利工程项目投标决策方法

水利工程是关系到国计民生的基础设施,随着水利工程建设市场的竞争日益激烈,施工企业在实力均衡的情况下,投标决策的合理与否就成为了企业能否中标的关键。本文通过引用某水利建设工程项目投标过程的投标决策实例,总结了投标决策的几种方法来供于参考。     

建设项目投标报价风险决策方法研究

本文在对投标报价决策时应考虑的风险因素进行了分析的基础上，运用了模糊数学知识给了相应的计算方法，从而为最终的报价决策提供了可靠的依据。     

拍卖投标中的卖方干扰策略分析

本文讨论了拍卖投标博弈中卖方通过代理人来干扰投标拍卖过程的两种策略,区分了买方不能辨别和能辨别卖方代理人类型的两种信息假定,由此讨论了卖方代理人对拍卖投标结果产生的影响,其结果是此时收益等价定理不再成立。这一模型可以用来解释现实中常常发生的一种卖方策略性行为。     

建设工程投标决策与技巧

在建设工程招标过程中，投标决策应首先判定是否投标，其次是如果参加投标，还应考虑投什么性质的标；并且在投标过程中要运用适当的技巧以提高中标率及中标后的经济效益。     

论工程投标报价决策

一、工程投标报价决策应具备的要求正确的决策依赖于诸多要素的分析。工程投票报价的决策过程是采集与报价有关信息的过程 ,是整理有关信息的过程 ,是分析有关决策的过程。工程投标报价决策所具备的要素有 :工程投标报价决策要素之一 :业主的基本情况。业主是代表国家对投标项目进行实施的机构 ,如大秦铁路修建办公室、京九铁路修建办公室、铁路工程建设管理公司 ,这些业主代表国家对国家投入铁路的资金进行管理 ,这样的机构只负责项目的前期建设 ,不负责项目的后期管理。业主是代表地方政府对投标项目进行实施的机构 ,如某某高速公路管理处…     

关于公路工程投标决策方法的几点认识

在公路工程的投标中,投标单位怎样将中标率提高,怎样取得预期利润等,一直都是其进行投资的决策之时所要面对的至为关键的课题。本文将以公路工程的投标决策作为基础,对其方法进行相关探索;并结合了笔者自身的相应经验,发表了几点认识。希望本文的研究能对投标单位在公路工程的投标有所帮助。     

工程量清单计价时投标决策及投标策略

实行工程量清单计价之后 ,投标报价方式改变了过去传统的定额计价方法 ,企业自主报价、合理低报价中标成为投标报价的特点。投标报价对于投标人来说更具挑战性。投标决策和报价策略变得尤为重要。文章认为 ,投标决策是投标的前提 ,投标策略是投标的保证 ,并就此进行深入探讨。     

IPO定价机制选择：固定价格、拍卖与累计投标

本文进一步拓展了Biais和Faugerson-Crouzet（2002）的模型。研究发现，固定价格定价机制由于不能收集投资者关于股票的真实信息，其抑价水平往往高于拍卖（统一价格拍卖）以及累计投标定价这三种定价机制，只有在投资者拥有的私人信号全部是坏信号的情况下，三者之间的抑价水平才会一致。拍卖与累计投标的抑价水平差异取决于投资者的理性约束行为。     

浅谈工程投标决策

承包商通过投标取得项目，是市场经济条件下的必然。在建设工程招标过程中，投标决策应首先判定是否投标，其次是如果参加投标，还应考虑投什么性质的标；并且在投标过程中要运用适当的技巧以提高中标率及中标后的经济效益。     

Auctions with shill bidding

Summary. Shill bidding has increased substantially in recent years since the technology employed to conduct on-line auctions enables many sellers to disguise their identities and bid. Although their intent is to gain by misleading the bidders on the value of the object, we show that in a common value auction sellers are worse off shill bidding. In fact, any out-of-auction mechanism that makes it difficult for them to shill bid increases their revenues. In addition, shill bidding reduces the surplus of the bidders and the surplus from trade. It is only the auctioneer who could gain from this activity and in that sense he may not have an incentive from within the auction to discourage shill bidding.Received: 1 February 2002, Revised: 12 August 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D44.Correspondence to: Georgia KosmopoulouWe thank Timothy Dunne, Kevin Grier and the anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments.     

Auctions with cross-shareholdings

Summary. We study the effect of cross-shareholding among two competing firms on their bidding behavior and the expected sales revenue for the seller in an auction environment. The bidders private signals are independent, and the model encompasses the private values model and a particular common value model as special cases. When cross-shareholding is symmetric, the bids decrease towards the collusive level as the degree of cross-shareholding increases. The Revenue Equivalence result no longer holds: the first-price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller than the second-price auction.With asymmetric cross-shareholding, revenue comparisons are only possible in the common value setting. Expected revenue for the seller is again higher in the first-price than in the second price auction. Bidding behavior in the second-price auction is more sensitive to changes in cross-shareholding and the value environment than in the first-price auction.Received: 18 September 2000, Revised: 27 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44.Correspondence to: Sudipto DasguptaWe thank Sugato Bhattacharyya, Paul Klemperer, Kunal Sengupta and Guofu Tan for helpful discussions, and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved the paper. The usual disclaimer, of course, applies.     

How to subcontract?

Firms compete for a contract and subcontract part of the work. If subcontracting takes place before the award of the contract, the revenue equivalence result breaks down, as subcontractors anticipate that their bids influence the probability of the firm winning the contract. Properties of the optimal subcontracting mechanism are discussed.     

Bidding between incumbent and entrant

Facing an informed incumbent who has cost advantages in two different states, the uninformed entrant bids cautiously due to the incumbent’s cost advantage in the low cost state. The incumbent bids aggressively, earning additional profits because of his cost advantages.     

Auctions with a buy price

eBay and Yahoo allow sellers to list their auctions with a buy price at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately. On eBay, the buy-now option disappears once a bid is placed, while on Yahoo the buy-now option remains in effect throughout the auction. We show that when bidders are risk averse, both types of auctions raise seller revenue for a wide range of buy prices. The Yahoo format raises more revenue than the eBay format when bidders have either CARA or DARA. Bidders with DARA prefer the eBay auction, while bidders with CARA are indifferent between the two. Part of this work was completed while Reynolds was a visitor at Instituto de Analisys Economico in Barcelona and while Wooders was a visitor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. We are grateful to these institutions for their hospitality.     

Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences

In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. This paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model both explains why a revenue-maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price and buy price than when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price only. The comparative statics properties of bidding behavior are in sharp contrast to equilibrium behavior in other models where the existence and size of the auction's buy price have no effect on bidding behavior.     

Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values

Auctions are often used to sell idiosyncratic goods difficult for potential bidders to value ex ante. Laboratory auctions with uncertainty over final values in this experiment resulted in 18% and 27% of bids above the expected value of the item in private-value first-price and English auctions, respectively. Risk-seeking preferences as measured on an individual decision task cannot explain overbidding and the first-price auction results suggest that risk aversion may not be a good explanation for bidding behavior observed with certain values. Several candidate explanations fail to explain overbidding, rather it appears to stem from some bidders who are prone to overbidding. Relative to first-price auctions, the size and frequency of overbids are significantly larger in English auctions, while more English auctions are won by overbidders. Differences between the formats appear to be driven by the dynamic nature of English auctions which is consistent with popular notions of “auction fever.”     

Bidding and Information: Evidence from Gilt-edged Auctions

Many studies have shown that government debt auctions underprice debt compared with the secondary market. This paper corroborates this for certain forms of gilt auction by comparing the price received at auction with an almost identical parent stock in the secondary market. Although the sample is small, the parent/auction stock price comparison gives a cleaner measure than used in other studies. The paper also compares non-fungible auctions (where the auction stock differs slightly from the parent at auction and merges subsequently) with fully-fungible ones (where they are identical throughout). Significant underpricing only occurs in non-fungible auctions.     

我国网上拍卖中竞买者出价行为的实证分析

本文从竞买者出价频率与出价水平特征、出价时间过程的自相似性、出价水平的动态变化,以及出价水平的影响因素效应等四个方面,对我国网上拍卖中竞买者的出价行为进行了实证分析,结果发现:与eBay网上竞买者的出价行为相比,我国网上竞买者具有很高的倾向在后期出价,潜在影响因素易于在拍卖后期对竞买者的出价水平产生较大的影响;竞买者具有较强的投机心理,其出价行为存在较大的个体差异,缺乏规范、典型的模式。     

A Simple Model of Expert and Non-Expert Bidding in First-Price Auctions

This paper studies the equilibrium bidding behavior in a first-price sealed-bid auction when the number of informed bidders is not common knowledge. Both the independent private values and the common value cases are analyzed, under the assumption that a “neutral” signal exists. In equilibrium, experts and non-experts draw their bids from distinct supports: experts bid in the upper and lower tail of the bidding distribution and non-experts randomize their bids in between. For common values, it is shown that the seller's expected revenue always decreases with the probability of a bidder being informed when this probability is small. The opposite result is shown for the case of independent private values.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82.