More on Properness: The Case of Mean-Variance Preferences

This paper focuses on the situations where individuals with mean-variance preferences add independent risks to an already risky situation. Pratt and Zeckhauser (Econometrica, 55, 143–154, 1987) define a concept called proper risk aversion in the expected utility framework to describe the situation where an undesirable risk can never be made desirable by the presence of an independent undesirable risk. The assumption of mean-variance preferences allows us to study proper risk aversion in an intuitive manner. The paper presents an economic interpretation for the quasi-concavity of a utility function derived over mean and variance. The main result of the paper says that quasi-concavity plus decreasing risk aversion is equivalent to proper risk aversion.     

强制保险能否提高保险市场效率分析

本文以社会福利为衡量保险市场效率的标准,分析了实施强制保险是否有助于保险市场效率的提高。文章首先证明了在信息不对称的保险市场中存在着市场失灵现象;然后通过比较实施强制保险前后社会福利的差异,得出结论:实施强制保险有助于社会福利的改善,从而可以提高保险市场效率。     

论交强险经营模式与道路救助基金职能

随着交强险社会风险管理功能的不断提高,其面临的挑战愈加清晰。本文分析了我国交强险经营的特殊模式及实现不盈不亏的现实障碍,认为以剔除利润因子、微调费率的方式追求不盈不亏,容易使费率调整频繁,加大交强险经营波动性。并通过分析借鉴台湾公办民营模式及盈亏调节机制,建议我国交强险应该采取公办民营模式下允许微盈的经营模式,同时采取业务费用上限和特别准备金作为微观主体的盈亏调剂机制,并创造性地提出以灵活调整道路救助基金提取比例作为交强险行业层面调剂机制,在此基础上,建议实施地区差异费率、补充道路救助基金来源、健全经营主体退出机制。     

Insurance demand in the presence of loss-dependent background risk

We analyze insurance demand when insurable losses come with an uninsurable zero-mean background risk that increases in the loss size. If the individual is risk vulnerable, loss-dependent background risk triggers a precautionary insurance motive and increases optimal insurance demand. Prudence alone is sufficient for insurance demand to increase in two cases: the case of fair insurance and the case where the smallest possible loss exceeds a certain threshold value (referred to as the large loss case). We derive conditions under which insurance demand increases or decreases in initial wealth. In the large loss case, prudence determines whether changes in the background risk lead to more insurance demand. We generalize this result to arbitrary loss distributions and find conditions based on decreasing third-degree Ross risk aversion, Arrow–Pratt risk aversion, and Arrow–Pratt temperance.     

论机动车交通事故责任强制保险第三者的直接求偿权

在我国,机动车交通事故责任强制保险第三者是否享有直接求偿权的争议并未因《保险法》的修订而停止,本文从合同相对性理论的突破和责任保险理论基础的变化入手,分析了赋予第三者直接求偿权的现实意义,并从法理角度论证了该项权利的性质。最后,结合各国的立法现状,对我国现行相关立法和司法实践进行评析,同时提出相应对策和应注意的问题。     

The effect of information disclosure on demand for high‐load insurance

Economists, regulators, and consumer protection agencies have highlighted the welfare losses for consumers who purchase high‐load insurance against modest stakes risks. Mandatory information disclosure is a potentially attractive public policy tool that might improve consumers' choices, but has not been widely tested in insurance settings. We conduct an incentive‐compatible insurance demand experiment, in which we manipulate the information disclosed to subjects. We test whether any of the three most commonly suggested disclosures affect insurance demand, disclosing either (1) the true probability of loss, (2) the contract's expected loss, or (3) the insurer's profit on the transaction. Similar to consumers in naturally occurring insurance markets, subjects in the laboratory demonstrate significant demand for high‐load insurance against modest stakes. However, we find no effect of any of the three disclosure treatments on subjects' insurance choices. We discuss the implications of our results for possible public policy initiatives in insurance markets.     

Optimal insurance contract and coverage levels under loss aversion utility preference

This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously and determines the optimal coverage levels with respect to deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance, and, by assuming that the insured has an S-shaped loss aversion utility, the insured would retain the enormous losses entirely. The representative optimal insurance form is the truncated deductible insurance, where the insured retains all losses once losses exceed a critical level and adopts a particular deductible otherwise. Additionally, the effects of the optimal coverage levels are also examined with respect to benchmark wealth and loss aversion coefficient. Moreover, the efficiencies among various insurances are compared via numerical analysis by assuming that the loss obeys a uniform or log-normal distribution. In addition to optimal insurance, deductible insurance is the most efficient if the benchmark wealth is small and upper-limit insurance if large. In the case of a uniform distribution that has an upper bound, deductible insurance and optimal insurance coincide if benchmark wealth is small. Conversely, deductible insurance is never optimal for an unbounded loss such as a log-normal distribution.     

Guaranteed renewable life insurance under demand uncertainty

Guaranteed renewability (GR) is a prominent feature in many health and life insurance markets. We develop a model that includes unpredictable (and unobservable) fluctuations in demand for life insurance as well as changes in risk type (observable) over individuals' lifetimes. The presence of demand type heterogeneity leads to the possibility that optimal GR contracts may have a renewal price that is either above or below the actuarially fair price of the lowest risk type in the population. Individuals whose type turns out to be high risk but low demand renew more of their GR insurance than is efficient due to the attractive renewal price. This results in imperfect insurance against reclassification risk. Although a first‐best efficient contract is not possible in the presence of demand type heterogeneity, the presence of GR contracts nonetheless improves welfare relative to an environment with only spot markets.     

CVP under Uncertainty and the Manager's Utility Function Revisited

This paper re-examines the model of Kim, Abdolmohammada, and Klein (KAK, 1996) in which owners of a firm delegate the production decision to a risk-averse manager. Conflict of interest between the owners and the manager emerges as the latter maximizes the expected utility of his/her own wealth rather than that of the firm's profits. This paper shows that the results of KAK on the expected contribution margin and the excess return on the risky asset are flawed. Furthermore, while KAK study the effects of delegating the production decision to the manager on the firm's optimal output based on the mean-variance analysis, this paper derives parallel results within utility functions exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion and any arbitrary probability distribution functions.     

新《保险法》对保险公司的影响

我国《保险法》的最新修订具有里程碑式的意义,对保险公司的组织架构、制度建设、运营行为都将产生深远的影响。从保险公司的角度来看,新《保险法》的实施可谓机遇与挑战并存,如果能够妥善地根据新《保险法》及时对自身作出适当的调整,那么保险公司的核心竞争力无疑会提升,这对整个保险行业的健康持续发展也是十分有利的。     

从保险消费观视角分析我国保险业的发展

对正确保险消费观的研究,不仅对我国保险消费者的消费行为具有重要的指导意义,而且对于完善我国保险市场,实现我国保险业的科学发展亦有十分重要的作用。正确保险消费观,是以风险转移为先,以购买经济保障为本,以互助共济为己任,以最大诚信为最高准则,以保险作为生存必须品,以可持续消费为目标的保险消费理念体系。保险保障形式是整个保障体系中最普遍、最经常、最基础和最重要的防灾救灾形式,它和社会保障共同处于整个防灾救灾体系的基础地位。     

论产品召回保险的性质

产品召回的前提是产品存在系统性缺陷而不管该缺陷是否已经造成损害.产品召回风险是一种或有的法定义务风险,即在一定条件下才存在的法定义务.召回费用是厂商履行召回义务的费用,而非民事损害赔款.因此,产品召回不是厂商对私法责任的承担而是对公法义务的履行.产品召回保险是一种义务保险而非责任保险,其标的应为整批产品虽存在系统性缺陷...     

保险公司偿付能力风险信息对称性与市场供求

保险公司偿付能力充足性是保险监管的内容之一,但是这一信息却往往不被投保人所获知,造成保险供给(保险公司)和保险需求(投保人)两方信息的不对称.本文以保险公司存在偿付能力风险为基本假定,以累积性预期理论和风险调整资本收益率构建保险需求和供给模型,分析在信息对称条件下和信息不对称条件下保险需求的变化及其对保险供给和保险公司...     

中国农业居民医疗保险需求及其影响因素分析

本文基于2006年的微观横截面数据,运用似不相关二维probit模型与工具变量,分析了我国农业居民医疗保险需求及其影响因素,并着重考察了新型农村合作医疗保险与商业医疗保险之间的关系。研究的主要结论:一是参加新型农村合作医疗对乡村农业居民购买商业医疗保险有较显著的刺激作用;二是教育水平、年龄、居住省份、职业对乡村农业居民是否参加新型农村合作医疗有显著影响;职业、家庭规模和地区经济发展水平对乡村农业居民是否购买商业医疗保险有显著影响;三是在乡村农业居民是否参加新型农村合作医疗的决策中观测到逆向选择的行为。     

欧美网络保险的最新发展及对我国的启示

随着互联网的兴起和快速发展,保险业正经历着一次重大变革。欧美国家的保险公司利用互联网等信息技术解决实际业务问题,为代理人、客户、潜在客户、合作伙伴提供各种服务,大幅降低了成本,并提高了业务效益、内部运营效率和合作有效性。本文主要分析了欧美网络保险的发展状况,并找出我国发展网络保险的差距。我国应该借鉴国外经验,结合国内有利环境,重点解决网络安全、风险控制和网上支付等技术瓶颈,全方位发展网络保险,以促进我国民族保险业的高效、快速发展,使之以全新的姿态积极参与国际保险市场的竞争。     

The interplay between risk adjustment and risk rating in voluntary health insurance

Many regulated health insurance markets include risk adjustment (aka risk equalization) to mitigate selection incentives for insurers. Empirical studies on the design and evaluation of risk-adjustment algorithms typically focus on mandatory health insurance schemes. This paper considers risk adjustment in the context of voluntary health insurance, as found in Chile, Ireland, and Australia. In addition to the challenge of mitigating selection by insurers, regulators of these voluntary schemes have to deal with selection by consumers in and out of the market. A strategy for mitigating selection by consumers is to apply some form of risk rating. Our paper shows how risk adjustment and risk rating interact: (1) risk rating reduces the need for risk adjustment and (2) risk adjustment reduces premium variation across rating factors, thereby increasing incentives for consumers to select in and out of the market.     

基于KMV模型对我国上市保险公司的信用风险度量

目前,我国对保险公司的监管主要是静态监管,不能完全满足未来经济发展对保险业监管提出的挑战。为此,本文在介绍了KMV模型后,利用KMV模型对我国已上市的保险公司的风险进行了度量,旨在探讨在未来时机成熟时保险监管中引入KMV模型,利用KMV模型良好的风险预测能力,加强和改善保险监管的可能性。     

我国货币供应量变动对保险需求传导效应的实证分析

本文通过建立STR模型,实证分析了1999年第一季度至2010年第一季度我国货币供应量变动对保险需求的传导效应。结果表明：货币供应量变动对保险需求的影响具有显著的非对称性和非线性特征,即扩张性货币政策对当期保险需求的影响显著,而紧缩性货币政策对当期保险需求的影响有限。具体来讲,宽中趋紧与紧中趋紧的货币政策都将导致当期保...     

中国保险需求地区差距的实证研究

本文分别构建了我国地区人身险和财产险影响因素的实证模型,使用1996年～2008年的省际面板数据,重点采用动态系统GMM估计方法,检验人身险和财产险需求地区差异的动态形成机制。研究发现：与人身保险需求相比,财产保险需求近年来的“习惯形成”特征更为显著,收入水平的增长更有利于加快当前财产保险市场的发展;东部省份的经济发展...