跟单信用证项下提单收货人抬头条款的解读与缮制规范

国际贸易中,海洋运输是常用的运输方式,跟单信用证支付是常用的支付方式,顺利结汇的前提是"单证相符"。在国际贸易实务中,由于出口商对海运提单收货人抬头的缮制有误,从而导致出口商出口收汇的利益受损的例子比比皆是。在概括提单收货人抬头分类的基础上,通过对信用证中提单条款的解读,尝试以案例分析法对跟单信用证项下提单收货人抬头的缮制规范进行剖析,以期为外贸从业人员在实务操作规范方面提供参考,保障出口商顺利结汇。     

海运提单抬头的填写及背书方法

海运提单中收货人(Consignee)一栏即指提单的抬头.根据提单的收货人(抬头)的不同,提单可分为:记名抬头提单(Straight B/L)、不记名抬头提单(Bearer B/L)和指示抬头提单(Order B/L)三种.     

FOB术语下无单放货的风险转移:以职业主义为视角的分析

在海运合同中,在托运人通常不是收货人的情况下,承运人应向第三者收货人交付货物。而在FOB术语下进行的国际贸易,是由买方负责派船接运货物,买方成为托运人。根据《海商法》第七十二条第一款规定,货物由承运人接收或者装船后,应托运人的要求,承运人应当签发提单。在这种情况下,如果FOB下的托运人(即买方)要求承运人签发提单,则买方获得提单后不需要向议付行议付即可取得货款。这就产生了无单放货的风险。如何实现风险转移?职业论的逻辑或许可以成为一种全新的思路。     

指示提单的抬头与背书

提单(BILLS OF LADING)的抬头(CONSIGNEE)与背书(ENDORSEMENT)直接关系到提单的性质、能否转让,物权归属等问题,必须严格按照信用证、合同和有关规定办理.提单的抬头也就是提单的收货人.提单按抬头方式可分为记名提单(STRAIGHT B/L)不记名提单(OPEN B/L)和指示提单(ORDER B/L)三类.记名提单和不记名提单由于风险较大在国际贸易中很少使用.指示提单可以通过背书转让,风险较小,在国际贸易中使用较为普遍.     

电放提单在原产地证书领域的作用不容忽视

海运提单,是船方或其代理人在收到承运货物后签发给托运人的货物收据,是托运人与承运人之间运输契约的证明,法律上有物权证书的效用。     

海运提单的风险与防范

海运提单是海洋运输中和国际结算中的核心单据,是为货权凭证。海运提单是船公司签发的货物收据,是托运人与船方签署的运输契约,是单据持有者在目的港要求船方提交货物的凭证。海运提单起到重要作用时,所具有的风险也是不容忽视的,本文简述海运提单在国际贸易中风险和防范措施。     

浅析无单放货之危害及其对策

在现代的海运实务中,无单放货虽然有其存在的合理性。产生无单放货的原因是运输速度的加快,提单的流转速度相对滞后;境外进口商与国际货运代理或无船承运人串谋,恶意无单放货;提单丢失或买主无力付款赎单等。无单放货但对有关当事人会产生潜在的风险和危害,对收货人、提单持有人、托运人、银行存在潜在风险,破坏了提单信用制度。造成无单放货的原因当中,提单晚于货物到达目的港占了很大的比例,加快单证流转速度无疑有助于解决此问题,简化提单内容多采用简式提单、付货托运人迅速交单、缩短银行的审单时间等。实务操作上,还可以采用新的运输单证和采取必要的防范措施来减少无提单放货的发生及降低由此带来的损害。     

简论国际海运单据认证

国际海运单据通常是出口商办理结汇所必需的件，是证明出口货物已经交付运输、并且是收货人接受货物的依据，它反映了与货物运输有关的发货人、承运人、收货人等各种关系人的责任与权益。国际海运单据在贸促会进行商事认证的单据中占有较大比例，主要有提单、船证(提单附属声明)、运费发票、船龄证明等，现就相关业务简述如下。     

海运提单中收货人抬头与国际结算方式的关系探究

在多年<国际贸易实务>课程的教学中,在我十多年从事国际贸易的具体实践中,许多专业人士对海运提单中收货人抬头与国际结算方式关系的问题难以解答,并且鲜有提及.最近我就相关问题查阅了大量的文献,但是都没有找到令人满意的答案. 关于海运提单收货人(CONSINGNEE)抬头,绝大部分教科书将其分为三类:记名提单(STRAIGHT B/L)、提示提单(ORDER B/L)和不记名提单(BEARER B/L).     

从一则案例看记名提单的风险与防范

记名提单无法转让,而且货物所有权归提单上载明的收货人所有,在美国、南美、非洲等一些国家,提单上载明的收货人可以凭收货通知书或者提单复印件或者保函从承运人处获得货物,即使卖方或者其他善意获得提单的第三方持有记名提单,也无法获得货物所有权并处理货物。因此记名提单的使用,要事先了解进口商的信用,关注出口货物市场行情,避免承运人无单放货行为等,以防范记名提单带来的风险。     

采用FOB贸易术语出口的风险及其防范

近年由于运费不断上涨,我国超过70%的出口都是采用FOB贸易术语.但用FOB若由买方指定货代公司或者船公司,或买方规定以自己为提单的收、发货人,卖方经常会出现钱货两空的局面;同时该术语规定卖方还要承担货物越过船舷之前的风险.故卖方在选用该术语时一定要争取自己来指定货代、投保陆运险和力争用信用证结算方式等有针对性的措施来防范其中的风险.     

国际航空运输倒付运费的风险责任分析

以一起国际航空运费纠纷案例为例,根据航空运输的实践和有关法律的规定,讨论了航空运输倒付运费条件下,托运人承担运费支付责任的条件,重点分析了承运人应负有向收货人收取运费的责任,最后探讨了倒付运费的风险防范措施:让收货人自行安排运输是最好的防范措施;托运人安排运费前要调查了解收货人资信;托运人运输安排要合理;承运人要加强业务管理。     

国际贸易中“货物收据”(FCR)的认定及出口商的因应策略

近年来,FCR作为一种新型的国际贸易单据,在中国对外贸易中逐渐开始使用。与提单相比较,FCR具有其独特的性质及功能,它只是接收货物的一种收据,不具备物权凭证的效力,不具有可转让性,货物只能交给FCR载明的记名收货人。但只要其符合一定条件,FCR可构成"海上货物运输合同的证明",承运人须依FCR履行其运输合同义务。FCR签发人与出口商的关系可能表现为货运代理合同关系,也可能为货物运输合同关系,甚至无任何合同关系,他们之间的关系不同,FCR签发人的责任就不同。信用证付款方式下使用FCR时,出口商接受FCR可能存在无法控制货款和货物运输权等风险,对此出口商须采取相应的因应策略来维护自身权益。     

无单放货下我国出口商的对策

在国际海上货物运输中,无单放货频频出现,并有不断增加的趋势.尽管无单放货有合理之处,但并不合法,它可能给出口商造成钱货两空的损失.文章探讨了可能引起船货纠纷的无单放货形式和我国出口商的对策,以及我国出口商在维护自身合法权益时须注意的一些问题,并提出了防范无单放货纠纷的措施.     

金融危机背景下“中国制造”发展的“蓝色机遇”

在全球金融危机影响下,我国出口贸易遭受贸易保护主义的可能性正在增强,中国以劳动密集型为主的出口企业不仅面临订单减少的问题,更要面对蓝色壁垒的阻碍。反思长期以来中国劳工权益与＂中国制造＂权益的失衡,当前应抓住机遇转变出口增长模式,转＂危＂为＂机＂,促进中国制造业持续、健康发展。     

Does Exporter Turnover Contribute to Aggregate Productivity Growth? Evidence from Malaysian Manufacturing

Malaysia’s economic success is to a significant extent underpinned by its export‐oriented manufacturing sector. The sector has a large foreign presence, with MNCs attracted by the open trade and investment regime, and FDI‐friendly policies. Using unpublished manufacturing census data for 2000 and 2005, we apply the methodology by Foster et al. (1998) to decompose productivity growth. The analysis shows that exporters were more productive than domestic‐oriented establishments, and were distinctly more competitive. The empirical evidence also shows that establishment turnover is important in boosting productivity growth. In particular, we find that turnover of exporters made a larger contribution to aggregate productivity growth compared with domestic‐oriented establishments during the period from 2000 to 2005. Surviving establishments (those that operated in both years), on the other hand, made a negative contribution. It is noteworthy that entrants to export markets were more productive than surviving non‐exporters and even surviving exporters. Exiters from export markets or ‘export failures’, on the other hand, were less productive than continuing exporters. Given the importance of turnover to productivity growth, the government should ensure unrestricted entry to the export sectors for both foreign and domestic investors. Continuing with pro‐FDI policies is also important, given the keener global competition.     

Economies of Product Diversity in Collaborative Logistics

Collaborative logistics, also known as shipper collaboration, is a method of reducing the freight logistics cost of firms that produce and/or distribute tangible goods (shippers), which seeks to improve capacity utilizations of trucks. This study looks at this shipper collaboration problem in the U.S. truckload (TL) industry and proposes a new approach. Unlike other studies, which focused on reducing TL costs by utilizing economies of density, we present an approach that utilizes specific TL economies gained by mixing multiple products with different weight‐to‐volume ratios, which we call economies of product diversity. Using theoretical and empirical evidence, we show that the performance of shipper collaboration can be enhanced notably using this concept, economies of product diversity, which is currently overlooked in the literature.     

The China Market and Lessons from Successful Exporters

Today's China is a market with considerable potential for Western exporters. However, understanding the China market is difficult and penetrating it requires a full commitment from top management. The China market is described and the findings from a survey of succesful exporters is given. The survey results to provide knowledge of the determinants of export success. Lessons to be learned from them are detailed. These should be useful to other exporters and governments.     

Exporting barriers: Insights from Portuguese small- and medium-sized exporters and non-exporters

This study aimed to identify some of the major barriers that may hinder potential exporters and non-exporters from exporting their operations. Both parametric and semi-parametric binary choice models were used to analyze the data with the aim of assessing which of the major barriers detected can better explain the surveyed SMEs' decision to export or not. Six out of the 23 distinct barriers defined initially in the survey were found as statistically significant determiners of the probability that a surveyed SME firm would be a non-exporter. If public agents are interested in promoting and implementing the most effective mechanisms to stimulate exporting of domestic firms, several policy measures are advisable in order to minimize or alleviate the perceived inhibiting impact of barriers on SME firms' exporting decisions. In summary, results from the study revealed that non-exporters consider the lack of knowledge of potential markets, lack of qualified export personnel, lack of technical suitability, degree of competition in the sector, lack of financial assistance (governmental and financial institutions), and lack of qualified human resources as the main export barriers. By comparison, exporters perceived warehousing and control of the physical product flow in the target market to be the biggest barrier.     

AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Market Access?

The United States grants preferential (tariff‐ and quota‐free) market access to a list of products from eligible countries in sub‐Saharan Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). We analyse the increase in prices received by apparel exporters who benefited from AGOA preferences. In the presence of competitive markets, export prices should increase as much as the tariff which was previously collected by the US government. We refer to this price increase as the ‘tariff preference rent’ since exporters receive this income as the rent for their preferential status. The results show that exporters receive only one‐third of this rent and smaller exporters receive less than larger and established ones. We then provide evidence that suggests this may be due to the degree of market power enjoyed by US importers when facing African exporters.