Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

When the risk of default constrains financial contracts, public insurance policies can significantly affect private risk-sharing. This is because by changing income expectations and volatility, redistribution changes the attractiveness of default and thus endogenous borrowing constraints. Extending results by Krueger and Perri (2011) [8], this paper analyses the conditions under which redistribution can improve private insurance by making default less attractive to the income-rich, whose income it reduces. I first explain why public redistribution typically crowds out private insurance in the two-income economy, and identify the role of income persistence and saving after default. Second, I show how, in endowment economies with three income states or more and in economies with capital, redistributive taxes can improve, or “crowd in”, private consumption insurance. Finally, in a quantitative exercise using a realistic income process calibrated to US micro-data, moderate redistribution crowds in private insurance with production but not in an endowment economy.     

Conflicting Interests in Environmental Policy-making?

This paper focuses on possible conflicts of interests between the political aims of reduced emissions from energy consumption, redistribution of welfare and efficient policy-making. We use the results from a LES estimation to calculate the consumption reductions, compensating variations and excess tax burdens of three different tax schemes: one linear and two non-linear. Unless the tax scheme is optimally designed to correct for externalities, there is a conflict of interests between the aims of reduced consumption and efficient policy-making. When ranking different tax schemes, there is a conflict between the aims of redistributing welfare and reduced consumption if we are concerned with the well-being of individual households, but not if we are concerned only with the mean household in different parts of the income distribution.     

Redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds

Discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one-consumer economy, while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution. This paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax, focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high-wage to low-wage workers. In an optimal tax system the MCF will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one. Without optimality the MCF will in general differ between different sources of finance.     

Production subsidies and redistribution

Who gains from stimulating output? We explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension: wealth. There are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population. First, poorer agents gain from a rise in wages, since—to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply—they work harder. Second, because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future, thus lowering real interest rates, poor agents gain in relative terms since their income is based less on interest income. We examine optimal redistribution from the perspective of an arbitrary consumer in the population. We show that, if this consumer has commitment at time zero to set all present and future subsidy rates, and for a class of preferences that admits aggregation in wealth, then output stimulation, and hence redistribution, will only occur at time zero; after that, subsidies are zero. A byproduct of our analysis of this environment is a median-voter theorem: with direct voting over subsidy sequences at time zero, the sequence preferred by the median-wealth consumer is the unique outcome. We also study lack of commitment, since interest-rate manipulation is associated with time inconsistency. We analyze this case formally by looking at the Markov-perfect (time-consistent) equilibrium in a game between successive identical decision makers (e.g., the median agent). Here, subsidies persist—they are constant over time—and are more distortionary than under commitment. Moreover, whereas under commitment asset inequality changes initially—in favor of the consumer who decides on policy—it does not under lack of commitment.     

Trade,environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.     

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis

The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research, but little empirical support. The empirical literature has concentrated on cross-country studies and the size of the public sector, and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality. This analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution (here tax structure). New data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in Norway are exploited. We show how the multi-dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences. In the econometric analysis, instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution. The estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution.     

How should a government finance pension benefits?

Based on an earlier report by Ono (2010), this paper presents consideration of a consumption tax and examines how tax reform to maintain the neutrality of pension benefits affects the income growth rate and the employment rate. A decrease in the rate of worker contribution (labour income tax rate) with an increase in a consumption tax raises employment, but the effect on income growth is ambiguous. A decrease in the rate of firm contribution with an increase in the consumption tax decreases employment and facilitates income growth. Therefore, if the unemployment rate must be decreased, then pension reform with a decrease in the rate of worker contribution should be selected. The results derived through the study described in this paper are consistent with the empirical facts. Moreover, for these analyses, we assume the other production function and confirm the robustness of the obtained results.     

Does Work Always Pay in Germany?

Abstract. Income redistribution in Germany is the result of a combination of several redistribution instruments: there is a complex income tax law, different obligatory social insurances and supplementary benefits. This paper estimates income redistribution by quantile regression, using German EVS data. Two results are obtained: income after redistribution does not always increase in line with income before redistribution, i.e. for people with a low income before redistribution, it does not make sense to increase their efforts, since more work means less earnings. Further, an increasing redistribution rate for higher incomes is not always observable from the data.     

Energy taxation: Reasons for discriminating in favor of the production sector

If a small open economy wishes to restrict it's greenhouse gas emissions, it has to decide whether to impose uniform taxes on all polluters or to resort to a discriminatory policy. In practice, countries tend to impose higher taxes on households and to tax the industrial sector more leniently. This paper identifies conditions under which this is efficient. It is shown that an efficiency maximizing tax planner discriminates in favor of the production sector if (i) there are restrictions on the taxation of lump-sum income or if (ii) labor supply exerts market power.     

Parental nurturing and adverse effects of redistribution

This paper suggests that if parental nurturing is a dominating force in human capital formation then income redistribution may not promote economic growth. In particular, if, consistently with empirical evidence, parental human capital complements investment in a child’s education and yields increasing returns in the intergenerational production of human capital, income redistribution may have an adverse impact on the growth rate of average human capital. Redistribution shifts resources towards the less educationally-productive families and thus in the presence of credit markets imperfections and increasing returns, it reduces the aggregate level of investment in human capital. Moreover, if the degree of increasing returns is sufficiently large to produce sustained growth, this adverse effect on human capital formation may outweigh the conventional beneficial effects of redistribution that arises from the interaction between a production technology exhibiting diminishing returns and credit market imperfections.     

Viewpoint: Innovations in the theory and practice of redistribution policy

Abstract We present a survey of key results from second‐best optimal redistribution theory and their implications for tax‐transfer policy. The core results include the Corlett‐Hague theorem, the Deaton conditions, the production‐efficiency theorem, the Atkinson‐Stiglitz theorem, and the Mirrlees‐Saez characterization of the optimal non‐linear income tax system. These have been augmented in recent years by optimal participation tax rates, the implications of involuntary unemployment, the use of unconventional instruments, such as minimum wages, in‐kind transfer, and workfare, and the optimal taxation of capital income and bequests.     

The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxation approach

A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers - subject to a free-rider problem - produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted.     

Optimal nonlinear income taxation with productive government expenditure

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with a production externality and nonlinear income taxation, and uses it to examine how the fiscal authority devises its nonlinear tax structure from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. It is found that, in the Barro (1990) model, Pareto optimality can be achieved if both policy instruments for the tax scalar and the extent of the tax progressivity/regressivity are set optimally.     

Weintraub's consumption coefficient: some economic implications and evidence for the UK

Weintraub's consumption coefficient, the ratio of total consumerexpenditure to income from employment, helps to elucidate trendsin the sectoral and functional distributions of income. It simplifiesand adds precision to Kaleckian macroeconomics by showing howdistributions of income affect the level of economic activity.Empirical estimates of the coefficient are presented for theUK from 1972 to 1995. From 1975 onwards, the coefficient hasindicated a marked redistribution of income in favour of capitalist(non-employment) income, accompanied by a significant rise inthe average propensity to consume from capitalist (non-employmentincome). Wealth effects induced by the housing boom of the 1980shave enabled capitalists' income and consumption to continueto increase after 1989 despite a fall in investment.     

Income Taxation and the Diversity of Consumer Goods: A Political Economy Approach*

After‐tax income inequality has risen since the mid‐1990s, as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution. We argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution. Within a probabilistic voting framework, we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income, then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate. Focusing on OECD countries, we find empirical support for both the model's micro‐political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes.     

Inequality in democracies: Testing the classic democratic theory of redistribution

The classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in the mean-to-median (MM) income ratio causes a majority coalition in the electorate to collectively demand more redistribution. The functional dependence of redistribution on the MM income ratio is tested in parametric and nonparametric regression frameworks using an OECD panel dataset. While the parametric regression model is found to be misspecified rendering subsequent inference invalid, the robust nonparametric regression model fails to uncover evidence that the MM income ratio is relevant for predicting redistribution.     

Government spending and growth in second-best economies

This paper extends public spending-based growth theory along three directions: we assume a logistic trajectory for the ratio of government expenditure to aggregate income, self-limiting population change, and exogenous technological progress. By focusing on the choices of a benevolent social planner we find that, if the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is sufficiently high, the ratio of consumption to private physical capital converges towards zero when time goes to infinity. Depending on the form of the underlying aggregate production function and on whether, for given production function, technological progress equals zero or a positive constant, our model may or may not yield an asymptotically balanced growth path (ABGP) equilibrium. When there is no exogenous technological progress, an equilibrium where population size, the ratio of government spending to aggregate income and the ratio of consumption to private physical capital are all constant does exist and the equilibrium is a saddle point. In case of positive technological progress numerical simulations show that the model still exhibits an ABGP equilibrium.     

Income distribution,technology and employment in developing countries: An application to Ecuador

In this paper the relationships between the distribution of income, technology and employment are analyzed for the industrial sector of Ecuador. The main conclusion is that the effect of a redistribution of income in favour of the lower income groups on employment is positive but of little significance. However, if such redistribution is complemented by a technological policy which promotes the use of more labour intensive techniques where economically feasible, and by orientation of the increased demand for consumption goods, employment in the industrial sector can be increased by around 18 percent. An integrated model of the input-output type is used to analyzed the effects of different policies on the variables mentioned.     

Does diversity matter? A fresh inquiry into the energy,economy and environment nexus

ABSTRACT

The article extends the literature on the nexus among economy, environment and energy by incorporating an index of electricity generation diversity in production and emission functions. The index is mathematically equivalent to Herfindahl–Hirschman index. The index captures substantial information regarding the ongoing energy transition at the global level. The results obtained through pooled mean group estimation, on a dataset of fairly diversified group of countries, indicate that if diversity index increases by a percentage point, per capita income increases by 2.4% and per capita emissions are reduced by 0.71%. This is against the conventional wisdom in favour of specialization. The study has found some interesting long-run causal pathways. Firstly, the causality runs from diversification to income. Secondly, there is a causality running from electricity consumption to specialization. Thirdly, bi-directional causality runs between emissions and specialization. The results have interesting policy implications. The study supports the growth hypothesis that the electricity consumption drives the economy. As this inevitably increases emissions, a better pathway is through diversification. The fossil fuel intensive pathway may have been the preferred choice in the past for countries with low electricity consumption; the diversified portfolio appears to be prudent in the future.     

Public goods provision and redistributive taxation

This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. The price of charitable giving decreases with the degree of redistribution, and this has a positive effect on the total amount of giving (substitution effect). However, redistribution leads to lower consumption for the contributors and therefore has a negative effect on contributions to the charity (income effect). The theoretical model developed in this paper demonstrates that, under a general class of utility functions, the substitution effect dominates the income effect. Hence, charitable giving increases with the tax rate. In purely egalitarian societies, the public good is provided efficiently and the total welfare is maximized independent of the ex-ante income inequality. However, the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and welfare may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and redistribution does not take into account the cost of effort.