Simulating the Impacts of Contract Supplies in a Spot Market–Contract Market Equilibrium Setting

This article embeds a principal–agent model within a market equilibrium model of contract and cash markets to analyze the impact of contracting on the spot market for hogs. The equilibrium model incorporates both quality differentiation in the contract market and an endogenously determined cash market price. For three types of contracting scenarios, market equilibrium conditions are derived, and results are presented for a numerical example. Contrary to some empirical results, our model shows that the increased supply of hogs under typical formula-price contracts can increase or decrease the cash market price, depending on the relative size of overall contract supplies.     

Feeder-pig Producers and Finishers: Who Should Contract?

The purpose of this study is to determine the minimum level of contract payments required to produce hogs under a production contract. Required payments needed for contract growing to be preferred to independent production for the average-profit, slightly risk-averse, feeder-pig producer and for the high-profit, moderately to strongly risk-averse, feeder-pig producer are found to be similar to those currently offered by contractors. Feeder-pig finishers with average profit levels would either have to be strongly risk-averse or expect economic profits to fall to zero to prefer contracting over independent production. Low-profit feeder-pig finishers who are moderately to strongly risk-averse would prefer contracting. Feeder-pig finishers who historically have experienced above-average profits would require payments substantially above current contract rates to prefer contracting.     

Testing for Processor Market Power in the Markets for Cattle and Hogs in Canada

Deviations of livestock input prices from processor marginal value product are usually interpreted as an indication of the application of market power by the meat packing industry. However, market power depends on economic conditions that can influence the behavior of meat packers in the market for cattle and hogs. An industry-level translog profit function is applied to data on the Canadian finished cattle and hog markets and industry-wide oligopsony market power functions are estimated. The estimates suggest beef packers exercised a small but sustained amount of market power in the Canadian finished cattle market from 1978 to 1997. This is not the case in the market for hogs, which was competitive from 1960 to 1997. Application of market power in packers'purchases of farm animals decreased with increases in the utilization of domestic supply of slaughter animals and with increased levels of livestock exports. Livestock productivity increases appear to have significantly enhanced oligopsony power in packers'purchases of farm animals. The analysis suggests that beef processors may exert market power when cattle prices are relatively higher.     

The Impact of Organizational Form on Producer Contracting Decisions

A variable that has not yet been considered in the contracting literature is the impact of agribusiness organizational form on the producer's contracting decision. Contracts with cooperatives are more complicated decisions for producers than a standard marketing contract with noncooperatives because of the requisite membership capital investment in the firm. Contracting with cooperatives requires producers to make a dual supply and investment decision. Individual membership equity holdings in all agricultural cooperatives are increasing, but they are generally most substantial in the value-added, new-generation cooperatives. Portfolio theory is used to analyze the producer's decision to contract with three alternatively structured value-added processing organizations in an uncertain environment: a traditional cooperative, a new-generation cooperative and an investor-oriented firm. In the cooperative cases, the contract requires both supply and equity investment.     

Canadian Exports of Livestock and Meat to the United States

Canadian exports of beef and live cattle to the United States have increased significantly since the late 1980s. Hog and pork exports have increased since the mid-1990s. Major factors affecting exports of beef, pork, cattle and hogs from Canada to the United States include the exchange rate, increased Canadian production, Canada-U.S. price differentials and trade liberalization under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989. Increased Canadian exports have resulted in small but significant reductions in U.S. domestic prices of beef, pork and hogs.     

Contract theory and agricultural policy analysis: a discussion and survey of recent developments*

This paper surveys some recent developments in contract theory and illustrates how this theory might be useful for conceptualising policy issues related to vertical coordination and contracting in the agro‐food industry. The article begins by surveying contract theory to identify key economic distortions that can potentially justify government involvement. Next, the general ingredients of agricultural contracts that are most likely to create inefficiencies are discussed. Finally, controversial aspects of real‐world agricultural contracts are highlighted and lessons from the theory are used to determine whether government intervention is justified. Actual legislation that has been proposed in the USA is analysed where appropriate and topics that await further research are also discussed.     

The Role of Risk and Transaction Costs in Contract Design: Evidence from Farmland Lease Contracts in U.S. Agriculture

The objective of this article is to provide new empirical evidence on landlord-tenant choices of share versus cash-rent contracts in U.S. agriculture. The focus is on the contribution of explanatory variables that represent transaction costs, risk-sharing incentives, or both. An empirical model of contract choice is tested against the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS) and finds mixed evidence for low transaction cost and risk-sharing-incentive motives for landlord-tenant choices of a share versus cash-rent contract. However, the behavior of landlords and tenants is consistent with them being risk averse. Although it is standard to control for the riskiness of the principal's task that is contracted, we find that other attributes of the landlord are an important part of a relatively complex story for U.S. land tenancy contacting. The latter results have generally been ignored in other published landlord-tenant contracting studies.     

Risk and (Re-)organization in Agriculture: The Economics of Back grounding Cattle in Saskatchewan

The beef system in western Canada is currently undergoing restructuring. To increase the number of animals a feedlot finishes, their portion of the production process is being narrowed to the final 136 kgof weight gain. This results in a stage of production known as backgrounding, where calves are grown before entering the feedlot. This paper explains the reorganization that is occurring in the context of transaction cost economics, which explains this evolution as a process in which the governance structure involved in contracting has minimized the transaction costs. New methods of marketing these backgrounded cattle are being developed, which may increase the profitability of these operations. This paper measures the impacts of five different marketing options on the backgrounding enterprise's risk and returns. Thirteen enterprises are modeled, using various levels of capital and labor intensities, live stock numbers, sizes of calves fed and average daily gains. These models are simulated from 1978 to 1994 using costs of production and prices of cattle. Profits per head calculations allow the comparison of the enterprise efficiencies. The marketing alternatives are then evaluated using mean-variance rule(E-V) and stochastic dominance methods of risk analysis.     

Evolving Producer–Packer–Customer Linkages in the Beef and Pork Industries

The U.S. pork and beef sectors are rapidly moving from traditional cash markets to formal vertical linkages. In 1999, 27% of hogs and 65% of cattle were traded in the cash market and packers owned 18% of hogs and 5% of cattle; the rest were procured via marketing contracts. Contrary to popular opinion that plant efficiency is the impetus for the change, packers clearly identified quality concerns as the dominant reason for using marketing contracts or self-production. Quality standards and procurement systems to achieve them will increase in importance with the introduction of more branded pork and beef products.     

Subtherapeutic Antibiotics and Productivity in U.S. Hog Production

Antimicrobial drugs are fed to hogs at subtherapeutic levels to prevent disease and promote growth. However, there is concern that the presence of antimicrobial drugs in hog feed is a factor promoting the development of antimicrobial drug-resistant bacteria. This study uses a treatment-effects sample-selection model to examine the impact that feeding antibiotics has on the productivity of U.S. hog operations. No relationship was found between productivity and antibiotics fed during finishing, but productivity was significantly improved when antibiotics were fed to nursery pigs. Restrictions on feeding antimicrobial drugs during the nursery phase would likely impose significant economic costs on U.S. hog producers.     

Vertical Linkages in Agri-Food Supply Chains: Changing Roles for Producers, Commodity Groups, and Government Policy

Market developments arising from closer vertical linkages in agri-food supply chains have given rise to a variety of issues. This paper outlines key issues and discusses possible responses by producers, their associations, and government. A vision of the future organization of agricultural production serves as a basis for discussion. The continued increase in contracting between producers and processors is accompanied by issues of contract transparency, terms, negotiation, and dispute settlement. Other ramifications include producer access to supply chains and the decline of spot markets. Furthermore, the development of agricultural biotechnology products may force a rethinking of the rationale for public investment in agricultural research and development. Evaluation of market power needs to account for efficiency gains from nonstandard forms of organization to achieve a balanced appraisal of the public interest. Agricultural economists are urged to evaluate new forms of firm and industry structure on the basis of how they work in practice rather than in comparison to an ideal form.     

What kind of labour regime is contract farming? Contracting and sharecropping in Java compared

This article compares contract farming with share tenancy, another labour regime in which smallholder farmers are bound by contract to deliver produce to another, usually more powerful party. Based on research in the Javanese village of Kaliloro, we explore contracting and sharecropping as labour regimes, each with their own specific mechanisms of surplus transfer from producers to non-producers. The cases compared are sharecropping of irrigated rice, contract farming of watermelon, and contract farming of poultry. There are important differences in how labour inputs are organized, how decisions are made, how costs are divided between landowner/contractor and farmer, and in the mechanisms of surplus transfer between the contracting parties. Exploring these differences allows us to understand and compare the role of the two labour regimes in the penetration of capital into the rural economy. Neither contract farming nor share tenancy are in themselves “win-win” or “win-lose” relationships, good or bad for small-scale cultivators. The actual balance of burdens and benefits—often contravening the provisions of written contracts or state regulation—is determined by power relations between the contracting parties.     

CONTRACT FARMING AND THE BROILER INDUSTRY

The growth of contract production in certain types of farming is noted, and the main implications of this form of business organization for on-farm decision-making and capital acquisition are identified. The purposes of contracting, from both processor firm and farm viewpoints are discussed, and the broiler industry is used to illustrate the development of contracting.     

Cheating? The Case of Producers’ Under‐Reporting Behavior in Hog Insurance in China

Information asymmetry exists in virtually every insurance setting. The institutional arrangement of hog insurance in China offers a unique opportunity to investigate the farmer's behavior of under‐reporting the actual number of finished hogs on one hand, and the insurer's efficiency in determining the actual numbers on the other. Using data on 444 hog operators synchronized from farm production survey and insurance records, results showed that farmers report on average 11.5% fewer hogs to the insurance company. The level of under‐reporting is positively associated with the size of operation. Farmers with longer farming experience and more conservative risk attitude report more accurately. The under‐report behavior is also partially attributed to a farmer's limited capacity of accurate estimation. Due to information barrier, the insurance company is only able to recover 18.6% of the under‐report at the indemnity payment stage. Results are robust after controlling for potential sample selection problems. It is suggested that technical supports, public programs and premium incentive designs in repeated insurance should be considered to promote more accurate reports.     

Contractual choice and food safety strategy: Empirical findings in the Italian poultry sector

Analysis of contract choice is related here to the contracting nature of hybrid governance structures. First, recent research results on the organization of food safety supply are summarized and some remarks about contracting are proposed, providing the theoretical premises of the study. The approach of empirical analysis is concerned with transactions between farmers and processors in Italian poultry supply chains. The contract arrangement is classified as a hybrid structure, and growers' preferences regarding contract terms are analysed by a choice experiment. Final remarks take into account the role of contract attributes in ensuring the degree of food safety, and give a tentative organizational explanation of the degree of safety supplied. Potential lines of future research are mentioned.     

The Competitive Implications of Top-of-the-Market and Related Contract-Pricing Clauses

This article examines the competitive implications of contract pricing arrangements, which link the contract price to the subsequent cash price. We focus on so-called "top-of-the-market pricing" (TOMP) in cattle procurement. The TOMP clause is shown to have anticompetitive consequences when the same buyers who purchase contract cattle with the TOMP clause also compete to procure cattle in the subsequent spot market. The TOMP clause reduces packers' incentives to compete aggressively in the spot market. Although TOMP pricing is not in producers' collective interest, rational sellers may nonetheless sign these contracts with little or no financial inducement.     

Contracting Institutions,Agro‐food Trade and Product Quality

The agro‐food sector has experienced a profound transformation of contractual arrangements along the value chain, coinciding with important technological innovations and product quality upgrading. Our understanding of the impact that this transformation has had on trade flows in the agricultural sector is very limited. In particular, we have limited knowledge about the extent to which the patterns in agro‐food trade have been driven by the quality of contractual institutions. Using existing measures which capture the sensitivity of agro‐food products to contractual imperfections, we show that countries with better contract enforcement specialise in the production of food which requires higher level of relationship‐specific investments. We also find that countries with better contracting institutions and producing contract‐intensive goods specialise in exporting high quality foods. In addition, we show that the quality of contracting institutions might importantly affect the process of product quality upgrading.     

Production Contracts and Productivity in the U.S. Hog Sector

This article measures the impact of contracting on partial and total factor productivity and the production technology of U.S. hog operations. A sample selection model accounts for the fact that unobservable variables may be correlated with both the operators' decision to contract and farm productivity. Results indicate that the use of production contracts is associated with a substantial increase in factor productivity, and represents a technological improvement over independent production. Results also identify determinants of farmers' decisions to contract and other factors influencing farm productivity.     

The law and economics of Canada's WTO litigation contesting U.S. country-of-origin labeling (COOL)

We explain the interplay of law and economics in the successful WTO challenge by Canada of U.S. mandatory country-of-origin labeling (COOL) measures for beef and pork, which hinged on origin of livestock used in U.S. meat production. Canada mounted a successful legal and economic strategy to convince WTO adjudicating bodies that the United States had violated specific WTO provisions. Canada's economic evidence shows that through costs of segregation the COOL measure harmed the competitive position of Canadian cattle and hogs in the U.S. market. Economic evidence was built into the strategy and cited by the WTO Panels in support of their legal findings that the COOL measure violated U.S. obligations under WTO agreements. Canada was awarded rights to more than one billion Canadian dollars in retaliation and the United States responded by eliminating the offending COOL measure. The COOL case demonstrates how economic and econometric evidence can be used in complex dispute settlement proceedings dealing with technical trade barriers. Economics is especially valuable in the initial stage of framing the effects at issue, in the intermediate stages of documenting empirical causation and in the final stage of litigation, which was to calculate and defend the amount of retaliation.     

Estimated Value of Increased Pricing Accuracy for Fed Cattle

To improve vertical market coordination beef packers have introduced fed cattle grid pricing systems that offer premiums or discounts for varying carcass quality and yield grades. This study calculates the value of cattle quality information for producers considering live, dressed, and grid pricing alternatives. The value of fed cattle quality and yield grade information is at least $15/head. When fed cattle are sold on a live weight basis, high-quality cattle subsidize low-quality cattle by an average of $30/head. Price signals that could improve beef market coordination are ignored when fed cattle are marketed using traditional live or dressed weight methods.