Input substitutability and vertical integration

Input substitutability in final production is a well-known motive for noncompetitive input producers to integrate with their customers. In models that characterize the noncompetitive input industry as a pure monopoly, whether such integration would increase or decrease final production is ambiguous. The analysis here breaks the total output effect into factor substitution and market power components and discovers that the output ambiguity is sensitive to the specific model of noncompetitive equilibrium assumed. For the empirically most important cases of industrial organization, the sole effect of input substitutability on output is likely to be an unambiguous output increase.For their helpful comments, I am indebted to Stephen Karlson, Li Way Lee, W. G. Shepherd, Stephen Spurr, Hal Varian, and the referee. Any errors in the paper persist in spite of them.     

Product variety and vertical integration

R esearch summary: In vertical relationships, the potential for scale economy in manufacturing often calls for specialization and outsourcing. Specialization, however, depends critically on the stability of the task and contractual environment. In a highly uncertain environment, the need for frequent mutual adjustments favors integration instead of outsourcing. To evaluate vertical relationships in value chains where one stage competes on product variety under great uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale, we compare operations data at about 300 distribution centers within a major soft‐drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an upstream concentrate producer. We find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm by aligning incentives and reducing strategic information asymmetry, but it worsened coordination for upstream rivals that shared the same downstream facilities. M anagerial summary: Managers make frequent decisions about outsourcing versus integration. This article helps to crystalize the costs and benefits of integration by pointing to two important factors: the potential for economies of scale and the need for coordination under uncertainty. It studies an industry where one stage of the value chain competes on product variety under great uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale. Based on operations data at about 300 distribution centers within a major soft‐drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an upstream concentrate producer, we find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm (by reducing both stockouts and inventory, and improving sales forecasts), but it worsened coordination for upstream rivals that shared the same downstream facilities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Micro-determinants of vertical integration: Evidence from China

The state-of-the-art literatures, industrial economics, transaction cost theory, and real options theory explain vertical integration (VI) from the perspective of industrial characteristics. However, even within the same industry, VI greatly differs from firm to firm. This indicates that there may be firm-level (micro) determinants in VI. In an effort to probe into firm-level (micro) determinants of VI, we analyze data on the publicly listed firms of the electronics industry in China from 1998 to 2008. We find that between the two micro determinants, firm-oriented determinants consist of three groups of factors of value—profitability, growth, and risk—but insider-oriented determinants do not significantly impact VI.     

Technical change,competition and vertical integration

This paper starts with a survey of the received theories of vertical integration. We then extend these theories by arguing that while uncertainty in general will make integration more effective, a particular type of uncertainty, the possibility of technological obsolescence, works the other way. After making this point at a conceptual level, we build a model to study how the frequency of technological change interacts with the intensity of competition to influence the optimal level of integration. The predictions of the model are then tested and very strongly supported by data from 93 industries.     

Asset specificity and vertical integration in franchising

This study empirically tests transaction cost hypotheses with the use of data on publicly-owned franchised firms. We employ measures of the proportion of company-owned outlets for the degree of integration and brand name capital for the degree of asset specificity. The results suggest that for the sampled firms the degree of asset specificity is positively related to the degree of vertical integration. Additionly, increases in the real interest rate and firm growth rates are found to be positively related with vertical integration, while increases in unanticipated growth and firm experience are negatively related with vertical integration.     

Vertical integration versus vertical separation: An equilibrium model

In this paper, the role of strategic forces in vertical relationships is examined. Using a simple model of differentiated products with symmetric demands and costs, the Perfect equilibrium to a vertical integration-vertical separation game between manufacturers is determined. Given the assumptions of the model, I show that the manufacturer's decision whether to vertically integrate or to remain separate from its retailer depends on the degree of product differentiation. I show that when the products are poor substitutes, the only Perfect equilibrium is vertical integration by both manufacturers. As the products become closer substitutes, an additional Perfect equilibrium appears, both firms vertically separated. For manufacturers, the vertically separated equilibrium always Pareto dominates the vertical integration equilibrium when both equilibria exist.This paper is a revision of Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation. I wish to thank my Senior Supervisor, Professor Thomas W. Ross, for his many helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Economic Association meetings in Kingston, June 1991. Helpful comments and suggestions were also received from Keith Acheson, Leigh Anderson, Jeffrey Church, Chantale Lacasse, Frank Mathewson, and Don McFetridge and two anonymous referees. I am responsible for any errors or omissions.     

The organizational form of vertical relationships: Dimensions of integration

In this paper we argue that the organizational form of a buying firm's vertical relationship with a supplier can be defined as a configuration of four distinct, but related dimensions of integration. These dimensions pertain to ownership integration (the extent that the firm owns the upstream component supplier), coordination integration (the intensity of information exchange to align the two stages of production), task integration (the extent that the buying firm performs upstream tasks), and knowledge integration (the extent that the buying firm possesses knowledge about the upstream component). Ranging from fully integrated to fully disintegrated, these dimensions can be combined to form various organizational configurations that better reflect the true nature of organizational forms than one-dimensional conceptualizations. Drawing on distinct fields of research (e.g. transaction costs economics, information-processing theory, and learning) the goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the four dimensions of integration and their interrelationships. This is an important step for future processes of configurational theory building and normative testing.     

Market orientation and performance: an integration of disparate approaches

A series of five Strategic Management Journal articles has debated several issues concerning the role of market orientation in shaping firm performance. This debate has defined market orientation as a cultural emphasis. Yet, a large body of research in the marketing field views market orientation as an emphasis on certain market information‐processing activities. Using data from 217 firms, we test a model that includes both cultural and information‐processing elements. The findings suggest that both approaches to market orientation help explain performance, but their effects are mediated by organizational responsiveness. Thus, researchers should not only account for both definitions of market orientation, but they should also investigate market orientation in combination with other important performance antecedents. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Non-discrimination rules for ISPs and vertical integration: Lessons from cable television

The experience of cable television indicates that vertically integrated ISPs have plausible incentives to favor their affiliated content and to restrict entry of nascent rival content services, but these incentives are weakened in some respects, and strengthened in others, by differences in the economic architectures of cable and Internet broadband. Non-discrimination regulations designed to control such behavior are potentially more effective than in cable, but rules governing discrimination both in the upstream access and the downstream retail markets (as the FCC's no-unreasonable-discrimination rule appears to do) are likely to be necessary for effectiveness. Beneficial effects of vertical integration on financing and entry of cable programming networks should also apply to Internet video content development, but emergence since the 1970s of a robust programming supply industry with few vertical ties to cable suggests that such benefits will be less significant in the ISP case. Finally, the history of both the cable and ISP industries makes evident that the fundamental policy concern should not be vertical integration but horizontal market shares of ISPs, both at the local and national levels.     

Matching vertical integration strategies to competitive conditions

This paper contrasts the vertical integration strategies of 192 firms in the presence of diverse environmental and strategic forces to suggest how successful uses of vertical integration differ from less successful ones. Briefly, firms which did not use vertical integration as effectively transferred more goods and services internally, and they did so more often under adverse industry conditions. A frequent error was to undertake more integrated activities in-house and engage in longer chains of processing from ultra-raw materials to finished goods. Ironically, many of the vertically integrated firms that suffered adversity possessed the bargaining power needed to contract advantageously for goods or services, but accepted an overly risky ownership position unnecessarily by producing them, instead.     

On the vertical integration of successive monopolies

This essay studies the private incentives for, and welfare consequences of, the vertical integration of successive monopolies. When the merged firm is as efficient as its pre-merger components, private and social interests coincide and the merger raises welfare by eliminating the double mark-up. When the merger leads to higher costs it is possible that some mergers will be privately profitable but not socially desirable and that some will be socially desirable but not privately profitable. These results suggest that a laissez-faire approach to this type of merger by antitrust authorities will not always be appropriate.     

A note on vertical integration as entry

This paper examines the incentive for an intermediate product monopolist to integrate forward into a competitively-structured final product industry when that industry has failed to achieve a position of long-run equilibrium. It is shown that the upstream monopolist's profits are increased more by entering the downstream industry than are the profits of other firms unrelated to this industry. Consequently, the monopolist is more likely to overcome whatever entry barriers might exist at the downstream stage. The welfare effects of this form of integration are shown to be positive, and a theoretical foundation is provided for the policy distinction commonly made between vertical integration by a major acquisition versus integration through internal expansion or a toehold acquisition followed by expansion.     

Diversification,vertical integration,and industry analysis: New perspectives and measurement

Vertical integration, diversification, and industry analysis are fundamental topics in strategic management content research. We develop the conceptualization of these issues by exploring their nature as well as their correct measurement. Toward these ends, we conduct an extensive analysis of the COMPUSTAT II data base and the TRINET data base in all three research contexts. In addition to these two data bases, we also evaluate the Census of Manufacturers, S&P's Financial Dynamics, S&P's Industry Surveys and Dun and Bradstreet's Industry Norms and Key Business Ratios, for purposes of industry analysis. Important contributions include our identification of the potential of COMPUSTAT 11 data to distinguish within-stage forward and backward vertical integration, and between-stage forward and backward vertical integration, as well as our recommendations for the protection of the integrity of studies based on the COMPUSTA T II and TRINET data bases.     

Structural separation versus vertical integration: Lessons for telecommunications from electricity reforms

Structural separation between network and retail functions is increasingly being mandated in the telecommunications sector to countervail the market power of incumbent operators. Experience of separation in the electricity sector offers insights for policy-makers considering telecommunications reforms. Despite apparent competitive benefits, the costs of contracting increase markedly when short-term focused electricity retail operations are separated from longer-term generation infrastructure investments (which require large up-front fixed and sunk cost components). The combination of mismatches in investment horizons, entry barriers, and risk preference and information asymmetries between generators and retailers leads to thin contract markets, increased hold-up risk, perverse wholesale risk management incentives, and bankruptcies. Direct parallels in the telecommunications sector indicate exposure to similar complications, intensifying many of the contractual risks arising from regulated access arrangements. Thus, as in electricity, competition between vertically integrated telecommunications providers would likely induce more efficient and sustainable investment and competition than would separation.     

The impact of vertical integration on losses from collusion

Upstream collusion that increases the price of an input can harm an independent downstream producer (D). We ask whether this harm is more or less pronounced when D’s downstream rival is a vertically integrated producer. We find that such vertical integration increases D’s loss from collusion when D is not a particularly strong competitor. However, when D is a sufficiently strong competitor, vertical integration can reduce D’s loss from collusion when price competition prevails downstream.     

Neglected elements in vertical integration analysis: The case of retail price preticketing

The “conventional wisdom” with respect to the advantages to be gained through vertical integration are highly overrated. That associated with increased efficiency tops the list. Also, those advocating vertical integration have tended to ignore the preticketing phenomenon. In these cases the best that can be said is that there may exist a neutral effect. On the other hand, empirical analysis shows that, at the worost, negative effects may prevail.     

Vertical integration,innovation, and alliance portfolio size: Implications for firm performance

We examine the consequences of alliance portfolio configuration by focusing on contingencies that affect the impact of alliance portfolio size on innovation and financial performance. While increasing alliance portfolio size is expected to positively impact innovation and financial performance, we propose that, at high levels of innovation of the focal firm, increasing alliance portfolio size dampens financial performance. We also propose that firm boundaries moderate the impact of alliance portfolio size on innovation and financial performance differently. Specifically, vertically integrated firms benefit less (more) than their vertically specialized counterparts in leveraging higher innovation (financial) performance with increasing alliance portfolio size. Our analysis suggests that both vertical scope and innovation levels of the firm play an important role in understanding how alliance portfolios impact performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Impact of regulation on vertical integration in the electric industry

The purpose of this paper is to determine the factors which affect electric utilities’ dicisions about whether to vertically integrate into coal. Specifically, we attempt to determine whether variation in the stringency of regulation will affect the probability of vertically integrating. Public Service Commissions allow, to one degree or another, utilities to pass along fuel adjustment charges to customers. Other factors equal, we hypothesize that the larger the fuel adjustment charge allowed per KWH, and the less stringent the PSC’s regulaton of transfer pricing of fuel, the higher will be the probability of vertically integrating into coal to capture rents. A maximum likelihood logit model is specified and estimated; strong support is offered for the theory.     

Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration

Research summary : Two central issues in strategic management are the determination of a firm's internal delegation and its vertical boundaries. Despite the importance of these issues, there is scant analysis concerning their interaction. Using a comprehensive database of the construction industry, we show that vertical integration positively influences the centralization decision and that the main mechanism driving this relationship is an improvement in the hierarchically coordinated adaptation of firm activities when complexity and uncertainty are high. We also observe that centralization is negatively related to the extent of relational contracts between principals and agents, and positively related to an exogenous increase in the cost of employee layoffs. Our results suggest that managers cannot consider firm boundaries and internal organization to be independent decisions. Managerial summary : We ask whether a firm's decision about vertically integrating or outsourcing its activities affects the choice of centralizing or delegating its internal decision‐making process. Our statistical analysis shows that firms with more vertical integration tend to centralize the decision‐making process and that firms that outsource more tend to decentralize more. Why? Vertical integration enables the use of centralized authority to coordinate activities that interact intensively. Accordingly, we found that the positive influence of vertical integration on centralization is especially significant in more complex and uncertain environments, when the need for coordination is higher. Thus, our results suggest that managers should choose vertical integration considering its effect on internal decision‐making processes, particularly when coordination is important. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Market orientation, interdepartmental integration, and product development performance

Various research studies have shown that a market orientation and interdepartmental integration can positively influence product development performance. Addressed in this article is whether market orientation and interdepartmental integration both equally influence product development performance, whether one of these constructs is more influential than the other, and whether such influence is dependent on the type of department being examined? Analyzing survey data from 156 marketing, manufacturing, and R&D managers, the tentative results suggest that a market orientation and interdepartmental integration correlate to improved product development and product management performance in varying degrees across these three manager sets. It appears that a positive relationship between market orientation and product development petformance is likely to be reflected by the marketing department, while marketing and manufacturing departments are likely to reflect a positive relationship between the general construct of market orientation and product management performance. Manufacturing managers also reflect a positive relationship between interdepartmental integration and product development and product management performance. Further analyses involving the elements of a market orientation and interdepartmental integration find that a customer orientation appears important to performance in the case of marketing managers, and that collaboration is important to performance in the case of manufacturing managers. R&D managers did not reflect any statistically significant relationships between market orientation, interdepartmental integration, their constructs, and performance. These results should not be taken as refuting the claim of an important relationship between market orientation and product development performance, however. The present results refine our understanding of market orientation to consider department‐specific effects, as well as temper the claims that implementing a market orientation will readily lead to improved product development performance across all departments in an organization. This may or may not be the case, depending on the focal department.