Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

We analyse the issue of central bank accountability with the aid of a simple monetary policy game with uncertainty about the agent's inflation stabilisation preferences. We find that there may be an important economic role for accountability in addition to its political function of making the central bank answerable to voters through its accountability to the executive. The model suggests that for countries with relatively little central bank independence, or perhaps a poor inflationary track record, significant reductions in inflation can be achieved by lowering monetary policy uncertainty. These reductions are much smaller for inflation-averse central banks, when monetary policy uncertainty is reduced by the same absolute amount. Thus, the effectiveness of accountability – as a means of lowering both inflation and inflation uncertainty – is higher the lower the degree of central bank conservativeness.     

ARE AFRICAN CENTRAL BANKS SUFFICIENTLY INDEPENDENT FOR MONETARY CONVERGENCE?

Central bank independence (CBI) is currently a widely debated and topical issue commanding the centre point of many economical and political debates, filling the pages of many scholarly journals. Both central bank independence and accountability are currently regarded as necessary best practices for achieving price stability. The importance of CBI rests on the premise that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, and that the cost of reducing inflation can be lowered by an independent central bank with credibility. Support for CBI also stems from the argument that the power to create money should generally be separated from the power to spend it. This is even more relevant for countries with weak political institutions. However, various studies (cited below) detected lower inflation in those countries where independence of their central banks is the strongest. Countries all over – including some on the African continent – have increased the independence of their central banks accordingly.     

Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility

This paper offers new insights into the interactions between private agents, the government, and a central bank, and their effect on the outcomes of monetary policy. In a simple game theoretic model we show that, unless there is public monitoring, impatient governments will be tempted to override or outmaneuver the central bank and create surprise inflation to boost output. This both undermines the government’s reputation for sound fiscal policies and reduces the central bank’s credibility. The result is not only higher and more volatile inflation but also sub-optimal output. More importantly, it is also shown that this is likely to occur even if the central banker is fully independent and the government is always patient. In contrast, if the public monitors sufficiently carefully, the central bank is never overridden and monetary policy can be credible even under an impatient government. We derive the general conditions under which each scenario occurs and then relate them to the developments in central banking over the past two decades, most notably to the trends towards greater independence, explicit inflation targeting, clearer communication and transparency. Interestingly, transparency is shown to reduce the variability of both inflation and output (by reducing the monitoring cost and making public monitoring more likely) which is in contrast to the usual transparency literature with a single policymaker which supposes a transparency-volatility trade-off.

Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment

It is argued that credibility problems in macroeconomics hardlyexist, and certainly do not motivate central bank independence.The Rogoff banker, and much work which follows should be interpretedas blueprints for good policy, not institutional reforms. Thereare likely to be significant but at present unquantified costsassociated with central bank independence once the interactionof monetary and other policymakers is recognised. The evidencethat central bank independence reduces inflation or brings otherbenefits is questioned     

Central Bank Autonomy,the Exchange Rate Constraint and Inflation: The Case of Italy, 1970–1992

This paper analyzes the determinants of inflation in Italy over the period 1970–1992. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of central bank independence in influencing monetary growth, and on the role of monetary growth and of the Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM) in affecting inflation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when the Bank of Italy lacked independence and the ERM was still not credible, monetary growth was highly unstable and was the main determinant of Italian inflation, although oil price and tax shocks also played a role. After the March 1983 general exchange rate realignment and the French U-turn, the ERM became more credible and monetary growth stopped being a significant determinant of inflation; instead, the German inflation became the main variable influencing Italian inflation.     

Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?

Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetized Debt? —The paper examines the interrelationship between fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country monetary union. The worst scenario occurs when an independent central bank sets the nominal interest rate and responds to rising government debt/GDP ratios by monetization. The result is high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. Government debt and inflation are contained if the governments bear sole responsibility for solvency, but the public sector remains excessively large. The best scenario occurs if the central bank removes the incentive for the governments to engineer surprise inflation by credible inflation targeting.     

Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?

Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decreaseinflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to pricestability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behaviorin a sample of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variationsin disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. Thepaper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflationare lower in countries with independent central banks. It alsofinds no evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignoragerevenues or electoral manipulation of policy. These resultsraise questions about some explanations of the negative correlationbetween central bank independence and inflation.     

A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence

A Nonnormative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence. — The authors study monetary policy under different central bank constitutions when the labor-market insiders set the minimal wage so that the outsiders are involuntarily unemployed. If the insiders are in the majority, the representative insider will be the median voter. The authors show that an independent central bank, if controlled by the median voter, does not produce a systematic inflation bias, albeit equilibrium employment is too low from a social welfare point of view. A dependent central bank, in contrast, is forced by the government to collect seigniorage and to take the government’s re-election prospects into account. The predictions of their theory are consistent with the evidence that central bank independence decreases average inflation and inflation variability, but does not affect employment variability.     

Central Bank Credibility before and after the Crisis

A new measure of credibility is constructed as a function of the differential between observed inflation and some estimate of the inflation rate that the central bank targets. The target is assumed to be met flexibly. Credibility is calculated for a large group of both advanced and emerging countries from 1980 to 2014. Financial crises reduce central bank credibility and central banks with strong institutional feaures tend to do better when hit by a shock of the magnitude of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The VIX, adopting an inflation target and central bank transparency, are the most reliable determinants of credibility. Similarly, real economic growth has a significant influence on central bank credibility even in inflation targeting economies.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

What to Aim for? The Choice of an Inflation Objective when Openness Matters

Inflation targeting countries generally define the inflation objective in terms of the consumer price index. Studies in the academic literature, however, reach conflicting conclusions concerning which measure of inflation a central bank should target in a small open economy. This paper examines the properties of domestic, CPI, and real-exchange-rate-adjusted (REX) inflation targeting. In one class of open economy New Keynesian models there is an isomorphism between optimal policy in an open versus closed economy. In the type of model we consider, where the real exchange rate appears in the Phillips curve, this isomorphism breaks down; openness matters. REX inflation targeting restores the isomorphism but this may not be desirable. Instead, under domestic and CPI inflation targeting the exchange rate channel can be exploited to enhance the effects of monetary policy. Our results indicate that CPI inflation targeting delivers price stability across the three inflation objectives and will be desirable to a central bank with a high aversion to inflation instability. CPI inflation targeting also does a better job of stabilizing the real exchange rate and interest rate which is an advantage from the standpoint of financial stability. REX inflation targeting does well in achieving output stability and has an advantage if demand shocks are predominant. In general, the choice of the inflation objective affects the trade-offs between policy goals and thus policy choices and outcomes.     

Monetary Aggregates Targeting,Inflation Targeting and Inflation Stabilization in Ghana

The central bank of Ghana (BoG) has operated monetary aggregates targeting and inflation targeting since the 1980s, to ensure enhanced output growth, low unemployment and stable, low inflation. Under inflation targeting, the inflation rate averaged 13.26 per cent per annum between 2007 and 2015, compared with 29.22 per cent per annum under monetary aggregates targeting. The relatively lower inflation rates notwithstanding, an average inflation rate of 13.2 per cent per annum is far above the medium‐term target of 8 per cent. This paper has examined the effectiveness of monetary aggregates targeting and inflation targeting in keeping inflation at moderate levels. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model was applied to the data covering the period 1970–2015. The results show that monetary targeting has steered inflation to moderate levels only in the short run while inflation targeting has maintained low inflation rates in both short run and long run. But neither regime has kept inflation at stable levels and within the target band, due to the sluggish transmission of broad money supply and prime rate changes to inflation. We implore the monetary authorities to strengthen the institutional setup for steering short‐term interest rates in Ghana. They should also enhance the BoG Act 2002 (Act 612), to develop secondary anchors and rules around output, money supply and fiscal deficit. Finally, the monetary policy committee should monetary policy credibility and transparency through strengthening its communication framework.     

The choice of inflation targeting—an empirical investigation

A growing number of countries have anchored their monetary policy to an explicit numerical rate or range of inflation since such an inflation targeting framework was first adopted by New Zealand in 1989. This paper empirically investigates economic structure and institutional factors associated with a country’s choice of inflation targeting using a dataset of 66 countries for the period of 1980–2000. It is found that a sound fiscal position is significantly and positively associated with the choice of inflation targeting framework; the central bank is more likely to adopt inflation targeting with greater financial depth; institutional capacity including central bank autonomy and flexible exchange rate regime is important for the choice of inflation targeting.

Inflation targeting in India: A comparison with the multiple indicator approach

The empirical literature on identification and measurement of the impact of monetary policy shocks on the real side of the economy is fairly comprehensive for developed economies, but very limited for emerging and transition economies. In this study, we propose an identification scheme for a developing economy (taking India as a case study), which is able to capture the monetary transmission mechanism for that economy without giving rise to empirical anomalies. Using a VAR approach with recursive contemporaneous restrictions, we identify monetary policy shocks by modelling the reaction function of the central bank and structure of that economy. The effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate and other macroeconomic variables is consistent with the predictions of a broad set of theoretical models. This set-up is used to build a hypothetical case of inflation targeting where the monetary policy instrument is set after assessing the current values of inflation only. This is in contrast with the ‘multiple indicator approach’ currently followed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The results in this study suggest that the demand effects of interest rate are stronger than the exchange rate effects. There is also evidence of the mitigation of potential conflict between exchange rate and interest rate, one of main monetary policy dilemmas of the RBI in inflation targeting.     

Central bank losses: causes and consequences

This paper seeks to understand the causes and consequences of central banks' losses. Ignorance of this vital issue over a sustained period has led to negative impacts on economies and on central banking and monetary policy effectiveness. Data from developing countries and economies in transition show that central bank losses have reached significant magnitudes. Engaging in quasi‐fiscal activities is responsible for most such losses because it increases central banks' expenditures. The main features of these fiscal activities are their large size and riskiness, and they are difficult to control. Central bank revenues can also be negatively affected because of declines in inflation rates and in the demand for money.     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, WAGE-BARGAINING STRUCTURE, AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN OECD COUNTRIES

The impact of central bank independence and wage-bargainingstructure on inflation and unemployment is explored theoreticallyand tested empirically for a sample of 17 OECD countries overtwo separate periods. The results suggest that inflation islower in economies with greater central bank independence andthat the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the structureof the labour market. Greater central bank independence doesnot appear to be associated with higher unemployment.     

Budget deficits, monetization, and centralbank independence in developing countries

Using various indicators for central bank independence we examinethe relationship between central bank independence and governmentbudget deficits. Using a two-stage procedure we also analyzewhether central bank independence affects the monetization ofdeficits. First, the monetization relation in each country isestimated and then the resulting accommodation coefficientsare related to central bank independence. We conclude that onlyif the turnover rate of central bank governors or the politicalvulnerability mdex is used monetary accommodation of deficitsis negatively related to central bank independence. There isno relationship between independence and the level of budgetdeficits     

Disinflation costs, accelerating inflation gains, and central bank independence

Disinflation Costs, Accelerating Inflation Gains, and Central Bank Independence. - This paper considers the impact of central bank independence on both the costs of disinflation and the gains of accelerating inflation. For this purpose, sacrifice ratios for disinflation episodes and benefice ratios for accelerating inflation episodes are constructed by using a new method. The ratios are calculated for 19 industrial countries over the period 1960–1992. The results indicate that central bank independence only matters during disinflation episodes: Sacrifice ratio and output loss are higher, the more independent the central bank is; whereas during accelerating inflation episodes, central bank independence has no influence on either the benefice ratio or the output gain.     

What does South Korean inflation targeting target?

This paper characterises South Korean monetary policy in the period of explicit inflation targeting that started in 1999. We calculate Bank of Korea's parameters in the policy objective function, conditional on an estimated macro-model. We show that this central bank appears to have pursued optimal policy geared towards achieving price stability, while displaying a considerable degree of interest rate smoothing. In addition, the central bank loss function is estimated to include negligible weights on output and exchange-rate variability.     

通胀预期管理下中央银行沟通的有效性研究——基于中国2003～2010年数据的实证分析

有效管理通货膨胀预期已成为中央银行货币政策调控的重要任务之一。近几年,世界上很多国家通过实施中央银行沟通引导市场预期,实现有效的货币政策调控。本文通过考察通货膨胀预期和中央银行沟通及其他经济变量之间的相关关系,分析中央银行沟通能否有效引导市场通胀预期。结果显示,由于缺乏系统性,中央银行沟通对市场预期的引导作用仍不如其他经济变量,但国内中央银行沟通对市场通胀预期的影响是显著的。其中,相对书面沟通,口头沟通对通胀预期的影响更为显著。在目前较强的通胀预期背景下,系统实施中央银行沟通将对未来通胀预期的管理起到积极作用。