Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism

We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social security system. The latter solves the excess of capital accumulation due to the inoperativeness of the bequest motive and the former solves the suboptimal allocation of consumption due to consumption externalities. When the bequest motive is operative consumption externalities only cause an intratemporal misallocation of consumption but do not affect the optimality of the capital stock level. This suboptimal allocation of consumption implies in turn that the path of bequest deviates also from optimality. The optimal tax policy in this case consists of an estate tax and a capital income tax.     

Long‐term care policy with lazy rotten kids

This paper studies the determination of informal long‐term care (LTC) provided by children in a scenario which is somewhere in between perfect altruism and selfish exchanges. Parents are altruistic but children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments. The model is based on Becker's “rotten kid” specification except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Becker's world, with a single good efficiency is achieved. We show that when family aid is introduced the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of LTC is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the inefficiencies by comparing the laissez‐faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the first‐best allocation. We first assume that families are identical ex ante and then consider the case where dynasties differ in wealth. We study how the provision of LTC can be improved by public policies. Interestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance may even enhance the provision of informal aid.     

Can growth-enhanced monetary policy improve welfare when people seek social status?

This paper examines the growth and welfare effects from an increase in the rate of money supply in an Ak type growth model with a relative wealth-enhanced social status motive, production externalities, and liquidity constraints. When only consumption is constrained by liquidity, fast money supply can hasten output growth unless seigniorage revenue is wasted and production externalities do not exist. We find that even though money growth normally promotes economic growth, it does not improve welfare when capital stock is over-accumulated. In general, an optimal monetary policy minimizes seigniorage. Our results also conclude that the optimal monetary policy rarely follows the Friedman rule.     

CONSUMPTION RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS: BEHAVIORAL MOTIVES REVEALED BY SAVERS AND SPENDERS

This article surveyed recipients of one‐off government transfers in Singapore to investigate to what extent different behavioral motives might have affected their consumption response. It also investigates how the recipients' personal characteristics might have affected their consumption response and the appeal of different motives. In the sample surveyed, savers were mostly motivated by precautionary saving, followed by Ricardian equivalence, whereas spenders were mainly driven by rule of thumb and present bias. The bequest motive turned out to be unimportant. Older, better educated, and economically better‐off individuals facing no liquidity constraint were more likely to be savers. (JEL D91, E21, E62, H31)     

Capitalists,workers, and the burden of debt

Abstract

This paper analyzes the burden of debt in a growth model that combines overlapping generations of workers who save for life-cycle reasons and dynastic agents who save for bequest reasons (‘capitalists’). Ricardian Equivalence prevails, but capitalists regard the debt serviced out of taxes on workers as net wealth. In the long run, the Cambridge Theorem holds: the relationship between the rate of profit and rate of growth is determined by the capitalist saving function, independently of worker or government saving. Two alternative closures are considered. Under exogenous growth constrained by a fully employed labor force, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the distribution of income but permanent effects on the distribution of wealth. Under endogenous growth constrained by a fully utilized capital stock, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the growth rates of the components of wealth and permanent effects on the level and distribution of capital.     

Ricardian equivalence and the public and private saving nexus in India

This study tests the Ricardian equivalence theorem (RET) and examines the responsiveness of private saving to public saving in India. Most estimators do not provide support for the empirical validity of RET and long-run cointegration between public and private saving. The increases in household saving (HHS) seem to have been engendered by the provision of saving incentives, institution of saving schemes, self-driven motivation to save, and the precautionary accumulations induced by uncovered uncertainties in incomes, rather than by Ricardian behaviour of households. The self-imposed aversion to debt and debt bequest, borrowing and liquidity constraints, and the intertemporal smoothing of consumption have been the added catalysts that contributed to the increases in HHS. The households with binding borrowing constraints, inadequate or no insurance and uncovered uncertainties in incomes seem to have been saving more to pay for higher inflation-tax. The fiscal consolidation and generation of public saving are essential to reduce the tax burden (both explicit through fiscal taxes and implicit through inflation-tax), minimize the likelihoods of economic and financial crises, and maintain the internal and external value of domestic currency.     

Capital taxation, long-run growth, and bequests

It has been shown that higher capital taxes can have a growth-enhancing effect when combined with a revenue-compensating cut in wage taxes or with an expansion in productivity-increasing public services. The present paper demonstrates that these results critically hinge on the existence of a bequest motive. It is shown that a wage-tax cut is no longer growth-enhancing when bequests are operative. By way of contrast, increasing productive public services may well boost growth. The theoretical findings are illustrated by numerical simulations based on US data.     

Another reconciliation between economists and forestry experts: OLG-arguments

Foresters often claim that the goal of good forest policy is to have a sustained forest yield, or even a maximum sustainable yield. They also claim that people wish to save a few extra trees for their children. This bequest motive is not modelled in the standard approach to the optimal rotation problem. In this paper, we present a standard version of an overlapping generation model augmented with a simple tree technology. We show in particular that the market equilibrium can be dynamically inefficient, and that a bequest motive in terms of trees can correct for the overaccumulation of capital that causes the inefficiency. The bequest motive also enables us to account for a harvesting intensity varying with age (young people typically cut more than elderly people) in spite of a perfect capital market.The crux of the argument is that a bequest motive is likely to increase the equilibrium interest rate and move the economy away from a maximum sustainable yield policy. It, however, improves efficiency and is able to explain empirical regularities that are not easily explained by a traditional perfect capital market approach to forestry.The author acknowledges comments from Karl-Göran Mäler, Stockholm School of Economics, participants in the economics-forestry economics seminar at the University of Umeå, and two anonymous referees.     

UNCERTAIN INCOME,UNCERTAIN TAXES AND RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE*

L. K. C. Chan (1983) and R. B. Barsky et al. (1986) have demonstrated that a tax cut financed by bonds to be repaid from proportional income taxes on uncertain future income, by reducing the latter's riskiness, stimulates current consumption - Ricardian equivalence does not hold. However, their two-period models exclude the possibility that future taxes are uncertain. In this paper a three-period model is developed that, by allowing the government two periods in which to collect taxes, introduces ex ante tax rate uncertainty. This renders the result concerning Ricardian equivalence ambiguous. By comparison, taxes levied as lump sums and via a ‘lottery’ respectively produce the ‘usual’ effects (zero and negative) on consumption.     

Ricardian Equivalence and the Efficacy of Fiscal Policy in Australia

Events surrounding the global financial and economic crises of 2008 and 2009 have sparked a renewed interest in discretionary fiscal policy. This article considers whether private saving in Australia behaves in a manner that is consistent with Ricardian equivalence, thus mitigating the effects of fiscal policy, or conversely, if fiscal policy has some ability to influence the real economy. Results indicate that, while there is not a full Ricardian response to changes in the fiscal stance, there is some partial offsetting behaviour—implying that fiscal policy does elicit some (limited) impact on economic activity.     

Sustainable Forestry: Timber Bequests, Future Generations and Optimal Tax Policy

This paper analyzes harvesting and timber bequest behavior in a two-period overlapping generations model where the government uses site productivity, yield and inheritance taxation. The ceteris paribus effects of forest and inheritance taxes are derived first, then the paper discusses the optimal design of forest and inheritance taxes by assuming that intergenerational externalities are either absent or operative. In the absence of intergenerational externalities, it is optimal to use only the site productivity tax, and not to introduce yield and inheritance taxes at all. In the presence of intergenerational externalities the situation changes. The paper demonstrates that the externality can be internalized by introducing either a yield tax or an inheritance subsidy, or both. If the government is able to use both at the same time, it is desirable to use the yield tax to 'punish' excessive harvesting and an inheritance subsidy to 'bribe' to give bequests.     

Bequests as signals: Implications for fiscal policy

This paper explores how bequests affect redistributive fiscal policies. The main premise underlying our approach is that bequests act as a signal of parental affection. It is shown that private transfers in the form of bequests may not offset public transfers to a significant extent, even though such private transfers are altruistically motivated and are strictly positive for all but a negligible set of households. This is notable since these conditions are normally believed to yield a fully offsetting response (Ricardian equivalence). We explicitly identify circumstances under which the departure from Ricardian equivalence is large. Notably, the departure may be quite large even when our model is observationally very close to one in which Ricardian equivalence is known to hold (in the sense that children care very little about parental affection).     

Social security in a Classical growth model

This paper develops a growth model with overlapping generationsof workers who save for life-cycle reasons and Ricardian capitalistswho save from a bequest motive. The population of workers accommodatesgrowth, so that the rate of capital accumulation is endogenousand determines the growth of employment. Two regimes are possible,one in which workers' saving dominates the long run and a secondin which the long-run equilibrium growth rate is determinedcompletely by the capitalist saving function, sometimes calledthe Cambridge equation. The second regime exhibits a versionof the Pasinetti paradox: changes in workers' saving affectthe level, but not the growth rate, of capital in the long run.Applied to social security, this result implies that an unfundedsystem relying on payroll taxes reduces workers' lifetime wealthand saving, creating level effects on the capital stock withoutaffecting its long-run growth rate. These effects are mitigatedby the presence of a reserve fund, various levels of which areexamined. Calibrating the model to realistic parameter valuesfor the US facilitates an interpretation of the controversiesover the percentage of the national wealth originating in life-cyclesaving and the effects of social security on saving. The modelis offered as an analytical framework for the review of currenttopics in fiscal policy, in particular identifying the socialsecurity reserve fund as a potential vehicle for generatingcapital accumulation and effecting a progressive redistributionof wealth.     

Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Dynasties and Uncertain Lifetimes

This paper studies how the lack of an annuities market affects savings behavior and intergenerational transfers in a dynastic overlapping generations economy. I find that the answer to this question depends crucially on altruism. On the one hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is operative, then the lack of annuity markets enhances capital accumulation. On the other hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is not operative, the absence of annuity markets can either increase or decrease aggregate savings. I characterize under which conditions capital accumulation is enhanced. I also prove that an overlapping generations economy with altruism and uninsurable lifetime risk faces capital overaccumulation relative to the modified Golden Rule. The efficient allocation corresponding to the modified Golden Rule can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium by a pay-as-you-go social security system, and this can only be done if individuals are altruistic.     

Do Germans Save to Leave an Estate? An Examination of the Bequest Motive

I investigate whether a bequest motive for savings influences the post-retirement wealth trajectories of German households. Two measures of the bequest motive are studied: the existence of children as the main group of potential heirs and the respondents' declared intention to bequeath. While having children has no significant impact on households' wealth trajectories, stated bequest intentions are associated with considerable heterogeneity in wealth holdings. The main conclusion from this study is that both the pure life-cycle model and the life-cycle model with bequest motives provide a valid basis for a theory of household wealth accumulation once the heterogeneity of preferences is acknowledged.
JEL classification : D 91; J 14     

To Leave or Not to Leave: The Distribution of Bequest Motives

We examine the effect of observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the desire to die with positive net worth. Using a structural life-cycle model nested in a switching regression with unknown sample separation, we find that roughly three-fourths of the elderly single population has a bequest motive. Both the presence and the magnitude of the bequest motive are statistically and economically significant. On average, households with a bequest motive spend about 25% less on consumption expenditures. We conclude that, among the elderly single households in our sample, about four-fifths of their net wealth will be bequeathed and approximately half of this is due to a bequest motive.     

Renewable resource and capital with a joy-of-giving resource bequest motive

In this article we ask whether a privately owned natural renewable resource can be conserved and managed efficiently when households have a joy-of-giving resource bequest motive. We model an overlapping generations economy in which firms have access to a CES production technology combining the natural resource, physical capital and labor. Our results shed light on the interplay between the resource bequest motive and the substitutability/complementarity relationship between capital and the natural resource in the determination of the equilibrium propensity to use the resource. The mere existence of the bequest motive does not guarantee that the resource will be conserved in the long run. When the resource is highly substitutable with capital, the equilibrium actually never exhausts the resource stock whatever the intensity of the bequest motive. When the resource is a poor substitute for capital, the equilibrium preserves the resource only if the taste for bequeathing is strong enough. Be the economy in over-accumulation or in under-accumulation of the natural resource, it always increases aggregate consumption to run the stock of capital at a level lower than the efficiency level.     

Like Father,Like Son: Inheriting and Bequeathing

This paper incorporates indirect reciprocal behavior in the context of bequeathing decisions into an otherwise standard OLG model. We provide conditions for the existence of a unique steady state with operative bequests. Contrary to standard OLG models, we show that taking into account such behavioral interactions allows one to rationalize both an increasing and U‐shaped pattern of the inheritance to GDP ratio over time, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Moreover, the model predicts a nonlinear (U‐shaped) relationship between the size of an unfunded social security program and the long‐run stock of per capita capital, which in turn provides a novel explanation of the inconclusive empirical findings on the relationship between social security, savings and long‐run growth. Ricardian equivalence is shown to hold in a special case of the model     

Social status pursuit,distribution of bequests and inequality

The quest for social status modifies lifetime decisions and as a consequence, the trajectory of the overall economy. Focusing on the relative wealth dimension of social status, we build a two-period overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents to investigate the effects of status quest on the evolution of bequest distribution and household inequality. We show that the bequest motive and the concern for social status not only increase the stationary level of capital but also enhance the household equality.     

Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the perceived target of threat—groups or individuals—and the symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one׳s own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive—reciprocity—is ruled out by the data.