从集体行动的逻辑看当前我国城中村改造

曼瑟尔·奥尔森的《集体行动的逻辑》是公共选择理论的开山之作,书中把经济学思维引入到社会现象和管理学中,系统地阐述了集体行动的理论,开创了研究集体行动理论的先河。因此,依托集体行动理论,尝试对当下城中村改造中面临的难题,予以解释,以期得出破解这一难题的合适路径。     

西方集体行动理论的演化与进展

集体利益的公共产品特性导致成员普遍的搭便车行为,形成"集体行动的困境".如何克服搭便车、走出集体行动的困境,就成为集体行动理论研究的核心内容.西方对集体行动的研究成果非常丰富,但是不同学者之间观点针锋相对、分歧很大.本文把各种观点主要归类为集体行动的理性选择理论、意识形态理论和社会资本理论三种理论流派.各种理论流派各有所长,但都有一定的局限性.     

布坎南与公共物品研究新范式

主流公共物品理论以非竞争性和非排他性作为公共物品判别标准,而以布坎南为首的公共选择学派则分别以集体决策或市场决策来界定公共物品或私人物品。集体决策是公共物品交易与私人物品交易的本质区别。而人们在进行集体决策时将首先选择决策规则,之后在某种决策规则下进行公共物品决策。一致同意规则在集体决策中可以确保帕累托效率解的出现,任何不足一致同意规则都意味着对帕累托效率的偏离。存在互投赞成票行为时,虽然有利于决策的达成,但往往导致对公共物品的过度供给。同时考虑公共物品数量和税费分担安排的公共物品决策同样有望出现威克塞尔解。然而出于决策效率的考虑,人们往往选择僵化的财政制度,这进一步导致公共物品的过度供给。     

浅论提高中国行政效率——基于公共选择理论角度

现代政府主导的行为必须关注集体行动的"效率".公共选择理论的相关阐释对于规范中国政府公共管理行为、实现公共资源的有效配置具有重要借鉴意义.文章通过这一视角、尝试分析中国行政低效的原因,并提出相应的对策,以期对提高行政效率有所裨益.     

社会网络视野下的集体行动——以林镇"群体性事件"为例

本文试图研究当前中国集体行动暴力生成机制,探讨在当前中国基层社会,有哪些因素或机制影响着集体行动中民众对斗争手法的选择,从而使其呈现出暴力型、常规型和破坏型这3种基本类型.本文运用社会运动理论和社会网络理论,以集体行动常见的3种形态为依据,选取林镇近几年发生的群体性事件中的3个典型案例进行比较分析,并以此为基础提出了一个关于社会网络所提供的社会资本总量同集体行动暴力程度之间特定关系的命题.     

集体行动的理论综述

集体行动是人们历来关注的焦点之一。特别是在社会学领域,结构主义、功利主义和构建主义都对集体行动做出了理论上的解释;在经济学界,对于集体行动的研究还刚刚开始,特别是还缺少针对具体经济现象中的集体行动的研究。从社会学和经济学两方面对研究集体行动的理论做一个梳理,以期对研究具体的经济现象有所指导意义。     

碳排放权交易制度的若干问题研究

温室气体减排的实践表明,相比传统的气候变化治理措施,设计合理的碳排放权交易制度能以更快的速度和更低的成本实现减排目标。碳排放权交易制度能在污染物排放总量不变的条件下,赋予排放主体更多的灵活性,用以选择成本最低的减排行动。目前,国际上主要以《京都议定书》的相关规定为碳排放交易制度建立的法律基础,以产权理论和集体行动理论为理论基础。在研究碳排放权制度相关问题时,应立足国际视角将碳排放权作为人类的环境权益加以考量,并认识到碳排放权交易的双重属性。     

集体行动的个体异质效应研究

在古诺-纳什均衡分析框架下,本文研究了个体异质性对集体行动效率的影响.研究结果表明:个体差异度(偏好差异、供给技术差异以及资源禀赋差异)的扩大有利于公共产品供给量的增加,但搭便车问题却随差异扩大而恶化了.相比而言,个体异质性对于搭便车的负面效应要远远大于对供给量的正面效应;同时,个体异质性也使集体行动呈现出负面的集团规模效应.现实中存在许多支持上述假说的经验证据.     

公共选择理论视角看财税政策的优化途径

一、公共选择理论的“偏好显示机制” 公共选择理论认为,最优的税制就是参与公共选择的个体能够至少在理论上获得一致同意的税制。如果偏好显示失真,由于信息不对称,交易成本将提高,则无法建立最优税制。公共选择理论揭示了“偏好显示机制”在公共决策中的重要性,这对我国实现有效的财税决策具有一定的借鉴意义。政府应当代表人民利益,财税决策应当体现人民的意愿和要求,要做到这一点,仅凭决策者的良好愿望和优良素质是不够的,还必须有一套把人民的利益和要求由下而上及时传达的机制。     

集体行动何以可能？——关于集体行动动力机制的文献综述

社会科学界对集体行动动力机制的研究由来已久。结构主义者认为结构才是集体行动的本源,结构决定了意识形态从而也决定了集体行动;功利主义认为有着共同利益的群体成员才有集体行动的可能,但个人理性会令集体行动陷入困境;而建构主义则认为人们是依据意义的社会建构来采取行动的,但集体行动所需的共同意识、资源、成员都需要组织者积极动员,除了群体的意义建构在影响集体行动,行动者的理性也仍然在考察不断变化的周围世界的基础上参与行动抉择。在借鉴国外最新理论的基础上,结合特定社会情境,中国学者建立了一个解释现阶段中国社会正在发生的集体行动的本土化模型。     

Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules

We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single-peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and "solidarity" (population-monotonicity or replacement-domination) must equal a so-called target rule.     

The fundamental difficulty in basing macroeconomic policy on microeconomic theory

Microeconomic theory is the theory of individual choice. For macroeconomic problems to be analyzed and solutions proposed with microeconomic theory, such problems must be capable of being defined in individualistic terms. It is argued that individuals can never perceive truly social problems requiring collective action in a manner consistent with the requirements of microeconomic theory. Even reformulating microeconomic theory to allow for interpersonal comparisons of utility, individuals may not be able to perceive the nature of social concerns in a manner necessary to support individually motivated actions bringing forth a solution.     

GENDER AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE OF SITUATED AGENCY

Amartya Sen defends a rich conception of social choice theory against tendencies to limit social choice theory to the formal investigation of rules of collective decision-making. His understanding of social choice theory makes the field a natural candidate for exploring gender issues in the evaluation of democratic policy. Not surprisingly, Sen has applied the insights he developed from his study of social choice to the evaluation of gender inequality, in particular to women's well-being in the context of the family. I focus on Sen's distinction between well-being and agency, and argue that from the perspective of women's movements and related social movements, the role of agency has so far been unduly neglected in social choice theory.     

集体利益:一种理论解说

集体利益原则在社会价值体系中占有极其重要的地位。那么,集体利益究竟是什么?已有研究对此所做的界定不是很成功。文章的主要任务是就该术语做出理论的诠释。研究表明:集体利益的基础是集团范围内共同的获利机会;集体利益就是与这一共同获利机会相联系的、由个体福利水平来表示的、理想类型意义上的社会状态;具体来说就是在资源配置方面实现了帕累托效率而在利益分配上则做到了平等待人的社会状态类型。概念的诠释有利于纠正概念界定不清导致的种种误用,对于公共政策的制定尤其是对于协调个体利益与集体利益之间的冲突具有重要的规范意义。     

Towards Sustainable Consumption: Economics and Ethical Concerns for the Environment in Consumer Choices

The article examines individual action informed by ethical concerns for the environment as a strategy for moving toward more sustainable consumption. The article first employs a model of rational choice to analyze independent consumer choices among the usually assumed self- and welfare-centered consumers and then expands the model to analyze the implications of other than self- and welfare-centered motivations for consumer choice. The article next analyzes interdependent consumer choices informed by self- and welfare-centered values with the help of a simple game-theoretic model and then moves on to examine the implications of nonutilitarian environmental concerns for interdependent consumer choice in the same game-theoretic framework. The article concludes that although a strategy based on individual action may have limited promise when environmental concerns are widely shared, the case for collective action remains strong because of both efficiency and equity reasons.     

集体行动的逻辑与可持续发展的困境

个体理性的效率追求是经济活动的动力,但个体理性往往导致集体非理性。本文从个体理性与集体理性概念的相对性出发,探讨个体、地方政府、国家在经济活动中本位利益的追求与可持续发展目标的背离。纯粹的市场效率追求会导致“市场失灵,”政府在解决“市场失灵”时如果无法有效约束个体理性的本位利益追求与政绩偏好,在可持续发展问题上就会出现一定程度的“政府失灵”。在“双重失灵”的情况下,集体行动的逻辑必然导致可持续发展陷入困境。要在个体理性的效率追求与集体理性的“共同信念”中实现可持续发展战略,必须明确政府责任并进行追加性制度投资。     

群体规范、集体行动发生与共享资源合作治理

特定群体面临共享资源自发治理的需求时,需要通过群体合作的集体行动来实现,因而集体行动的主要特征是共享资源治理的成本分摊和收益分享问题。本文从近年来逐渐受到重视的群体规范对于集体行动实现的影响机制入手,在清晰界定群体规范的含义基础上分析其在集体行动中的作用机制,并且通过模型说明群体规范的内生性形成问题,从而完整的得出群体规范促进集体行动实现的一般性理论,以期对当今社会和谐治理给出政策含义。     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

Theoretical Issues of Gender in the Transition from Socialist Regimes

Institutional economics is often presented by its critics as a tradition in political economy purporting a mechanistic, robot-like, view of the human agent. In this paper this portrayal of institutional economics is rejected and choice is reclaimed for institutionalism. In fact, institutional economics is not committed to an understanding of behavior as mere stimulus-response. Notwithstanding the fact that institutionalism places great emphasis on habit in human conduct, this does not mean that it excludes autonomy, volition or rationality.

The paper addresses the notion of habit within the pragmatist-institutionalist tradition with the aim of clarifying this concept, disentangling it from current misconceptions. With the intention of contributing to the development of a theory of choice in institutionalism, it then deals with deliberation and choice in the pragmatist literature, namely in John Dewey's Human Action and Conduct. Finally, the implications of deliberation thus conceived, namely in respect to collective action and institutional change, are highlighted.