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1.
Several non-experimental studies claim that heterogeneity among individuals reduces trust. A few experimental studies have
examined the effects of naturally-occurring differences among subjects on trusting behavior, and in contrast, most have not
supported these claims. We adopt a novel approach by inducing heterogeneity among subjects in a canonical trust experiment.
We accomplish this by varying the show-up payments given to subjects for participating in the experiment. We find that this
induced inequality does not consistently affect first- or second-mover behavior in the classic trust game in the manner predicted
by either previous theoretical work or empirical studies of survey-based measures of trust. Further, the effect of inequality
on trust, in terms of both sign and significance, depends on whether show-up payments are awarded publicly or privately.
JEL Classification C9, Z13 相似文献
2.
We present the results of an experiment measuring the impact of low group status and relative group size on trust, trustworthiness and discrimination. Subjects interact with insiders and outsiders in trust games and periodically enter markets where they can trade group membership. Low status and minority subjects have low morale: that is, they comparatively dislike being low status and being minority subjects. Group discrimination against low status and minority subjects is unchanged. However, low status subjects are deferential to high status subjects in terms of comparatively higher trust, and minority subjects are deferential to majority subjects in terms of comparatively higher trustworthiness. 相似文献
3.
《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2012,81(3):553-573
When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and active monitoring. This paper reports the results from a stylized laboratory experiment designed to test whether subjects in the role of firm owner rely on the social preferences of other (‘employee’) subjects with whom they are matched when choosing which payoff version of a simple trust game these employee subjects should play (‘the organizational mode’). Our main finding is that they do so, albeit in a different way than theory predicts. The importance of the first mover's social preferences for trusting behavior is recognized by the owner subjects, but the significant (first order) impact second movers’ social preferences have on trusting behavior of first movers seems to be overlooked. 相似文献
4.
Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information. 相似文献
5.
Elicitation using multiple price list formats 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Steffen Andersen Glenn W. Harrison Morten Igel Lau E. Elisabet Rutström 《Experimental Economics》2006,9(4):383-405
We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price
list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives
for truthful revelation. The main disadvantages are that it only elicits interval responses, and could be susceptible to framing
effects. We consider extensions to address and evaluate these concerns. We conclude that although there are framing effects,
they can be controlled for with a design that allows for them. We also find that the elicitation of risk attitudes is sensitive
to procedures, subject pools, and the format of the multiple price list table, but that the qualitative findings that participants
are generally risk averse is robust. The elicitation of discount rates appear less sensitive to details of the experimental
design.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C9, D81, D91
An erratum to this article is available at . 相似文献
6.
The empirical findings on bank runs and market discipline are at odds with the theoretical predictions from the literature, at least in emerging markets. Using unique survey data from the Netherlands, we explore two possible explanations: deposit holders may have limited knowledge of deposit insurance (DI)-schemes or they may not fully trust these schemes to be executed faithfully. We find that knowledge on the eligibility for DI is limited, particularly when it concerns minor banks. Nevertheless, households with more deposits have better knowledge of the DI-scheme and show higher levels of trust. In addition, deposit holders generally expect an associated payback time that well exceeds the time it has taken to pay back depositors in the past. Moreover, consumers believe repayment is more likely and faster for large, systemic banks. These results confirm that both households’ awareness of the coverage and trust in the operations of the DI-scheme are suboptimal. 相似文献
7.
David Schmidt Robert Shupp James M. Walker Elinor Ostrom 《Games and Economic Behavior》2003,42(2):281-299
This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game and when they remain matched with the same individual for a sequence of games. 相似文献
8.
Fabian Bornhorst Andrea Ichino Oliver Kirchkamp Karl H. Schlag Eyal Winter 《Experimental Economics》2010,13(3):260-283
We run an experiment in which students of different European nationalities are matched in groups of five and repeatedly choose
with whom within their group they want to play a trust game. Participants observe of each other age, gender, nationality and
number of siblings. The region of origin, “North” or “South” is a major determinant of success in the experiment. Participants
tend to trust those they trusted before and who trusted them. We do not find evidence of regional discrimination per se. It
is only the underlying and significant differences in behavior that translate through repeated interactions into differences
in payoffs between the two regions. 相似文献
9.
Cooperation is a pervasive social phenomenon, but more often than not economic theories have little to say about its causes and consequences. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that cooperative behaviour might be motivated by pure self-interest when the “social” payoff in a game is increasing. We report the results of a series of experiments on the Centipede game. The experiments are organised in two subsequent steps. Subjects first participate in a 2-period trust game, randomly matched with unknown partners. We apply the strategy method in order to elicit their social preferences. On the basis of their pre-game behaviour, individuals are divided into three main social groups: selfish individuals, pure altruists and reciprocators. At the second step of the experiment, subjects play a repeated 6-move Centipede game with an increasing final payoff. Each subject plays twice, in a low and in a high-stake Centipede game, and he/she is informed about his/her co-player social preferences. We provide statistical evidence to identify the origin of cooperation within homogeneous and heterogeneous social groups. We construct a Poisson regression model to assess the determinants of the duration of conditional cooperation in the Centipede. 相似文献
10.
Non-governmental organizations and other non-profit organizations attract workers who strongly identify themselves with their missions. We study whether these “good guys” are more trustworthy, and how such pronounced group identities affect trust and trustworthiness within the groups and towards out-groups. We find that subjects who strongly identify themselves with a non-profit mission are more trustworthy in a minimal group setting but also harshly discriminate against out-groups when subjects are grouped by the missions they identify themselves with. 相似文献
11.
Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust decisions involve multiple agents. Of particular interest is the case when a breach of trust is not profitable if carried out in isolation, but requires an agreement among agents. In such situations the pattern of behaviors is richer than in dyadic games, because even opportunistic trustees who would breach trust when alone may act trustworthily based on what they believe to be the predominant course of action. Anticipating this, trusters may be more inclined to trust. We dub these motivations derived trustworthiness and derived trust. To capture them, we design a “Collective Trust Game” and study it by means of a laboratory experiment. We report that overall levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when derived motivations are present, and this generates also higher levels of trust. In our set-up, the effects of derived trustworthiness are comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality. 相似文献
12.
In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects’ moral self-image supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral cleansing when immoral actions harm either another person or representatives of organizations. 相似文献
13.
Trust and trustworthiness in games: An experimental study of intergenerational advice 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates the development of conventions of trust in what we call intergenerational games, i.e., games played by a sequence of non-overplapping agents, who pass on advice on how to play the game across adjacent
generations of players. Using the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) as our experimental decision problem, advice seems to decrease
the amount of trustthat evolves when this game in played in an inter-generational manner in that it decreases the amount of money sent from Senders
to Returners. Ironically, advice increases trustworthinessin that Returners tend to send more back. Further, subjects appear to follows conventions of reciprocity in that they tend
to Send more if they think the Returners acted in a “kind” manner, where kind means the Sender sent more money than the receiver
expected. Finally, while we find a causal relationship running from trustworthiness to trust, the opposite can not be established.
We note that many of our results can only be achieved using the tools offered by inter-generational games. The inter-generational
advice offered provides information not available when games are played in their static form. Combining that information with
elicited beliefs of the Senders and Returners adds even more information that can be used to investigate the motives that
subjects have for doing what they do.
Electronic supplementary material Electronic supplementary material is available for this article at and accessible for authorised users.
JEL Classification C91 · C72
Resources for this research were provided by National Science Foundation grants SBR-9709962 and SBR-9709079 and by both the
Center for Experimental Social Science and the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University. We would like
to thank Shachar Kariv for both his comments and research assistance. We also thank Mikhael Shor and Judy Goldberg for research
assistance, and Yevgeniy Tovshteyn for computer programming. 相似文献
14.
Zeeshan Samad Myrna Wooders Bradley Malin Yevgeniy Vorobeychik 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2023,25(6):1251-1269
How does concern about genetic data privacy compare with other concerns? We conduct behavioral experiments to compare risk attitudes towards sharing genetic data with a healthcare provider with risk attitudes towards sharing financial data with a money manager. Both scenarios involve identical decisions and monetary stakes, permitting us to focus on how the framing of data sharing influences attitudes. To delve deeper into individual motivations to share data, we provide treatments that study how data sharers' altruism and trust affect their decisions. Our findings (with 162 subjects) indicate that individuals are more willing to risk a loss to privacy of genetic data (for an anticipated return framed as health benefits) than they are to risk loss of financial data (for an anticipated return in financial benefits). We also find that 50%–60% of data recipients choose to protect another person's data, with no significant differences between frames. 相似文献
15.
We run an experiment where 97 subjects could retrieve records of completed past auctions before placing their bids in current
one-bid, two-bid, and auction-selection games. Each subject was asked to participate in 3 current auctions; but could retrieve
up to 60 records of completed (past) auctions. The results reveal a positive relation between the payoffs earned by the subjects
and their history-inspection effort. Subjects act as if responding to the average bidding-ratios of the winners in the samples
that they have retrieved. They apply intuitive signal-dependent stopping rules like “sample until observing a winner-value close to my won” or “find a close winner-value and try one more history” when sampling the databases. History-inspection directs bidders with relatively high private-valuations to moderate bidding
which increases their realized payoffs. (JEL C9 D4 D8)
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C93, D44, D83 相似文献
16.
Günter Wolkersdorfer 《Geopolitics》2013,18(3):145-160
This essay attempts to reassess the writings of Karl Haushofer, a German professor of geopolitics during the period of the Third Reich. However, this examination is not to be another historical reflection. Instead it approaches the question what different kinds of historical reflections on Karl Haushofer as a person and his geopolitics were made in Germany and how they influenced the further geopolitical research. The different interpretations of Haushofer are examined in the form of a discourse analytic study. It shows that the different judgments concerning his work are open to diverse political interpretations. 相似文献
17.
The Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) model explains human subjects’ behavior in a wide range of repeated games which have unique Nash equilibria. Using a variation of ‘better response’ strategies, IEL agents quickly learn to play Nash equilibrium strategies and their dynamic behavior is like that of humans subjects. In this paper we study whether IEL can also explain behavior in games with gains from coordination. We focus on the simplest such game: the 2 person repeated Battle of Sexes game. In laboratory experiments, two patterns of behavior often emerge: players either converge rapidly to one of the stage game Nash equilibria and stay there or learn to coordinate their actions and alternate between the two Nash equilibria every other round. We show that IEL explains this behavior if the human subjects are truly in the dark and do not know or believe they know their opponent’s payoffs. To explain the behavior when agents are not in the dark, we need to modify the basic IEL model and allow some agents to begin with a good idea about how to play. We show that if the proportion of inspired agents with good ideas is chosen judiciously, the behavior of IEL agents looks remarkably similar to that of human subjects in laboratory experiments. 相似文献
18.
Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for
bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also
between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are
rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment
1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness,
but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition
is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions.
Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a “blinding effect” on considerations such as betrayal and inequality
aversion. 相似文献
19.
This paper explores whether generosity in experiments is truly evidence of concern for desirable social outcomes. We conduct
an experiment using a binary version of the dictator game. We introduce several treatments in which subjects are able to leave
the relationship between their actions and resulting outcomes uncertain, either to themselves or to another subject influenced
by those actions, thus giving subjects the moral “wiggle room” to behave self-interestedly. We find significantly less generous
behavior in these manipulations, relative to a baseline in which the relationship between actions and outcomes is transparent.
We conclude that many subjects behave fairly in the baseline case mainly because they intrinsically dislike appearing unfair,
either to themselves or others.
We thank Cristina Bicchieri; Iris Bohnet; Colin Camerer; Robyn Dawes; Ernst Fehr; George Loewenstein; John Patty; Charlie
Plott; Matthew Rabin; seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, Berkeley, Cornell, Emory, and Princeton; participants at the
2003 Public Choice, 2003 ESA, 2003 SJDM, and 2004 BDRM meetings; and anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
We greatly appreciate the access to resources at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) at the University
of Pittsburgh. This research was funded by a Carnegie Mellon Berkman Faculty Development Grant to Weber and a Russell Sage
Behavioral Economics Small Grant to Dana. 相似文献
20.
Daniel Friedman Kai Pommerenke Rajan Lukose Garrett Milam Bernardo A. Huberman 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(1):79-104
We seek to isolate in the laboratory factors that encourage and discourage the sunk cost fallacy. Subjects play a computer
game in which they decide whether to keep digging for treasure on an island or to sink a cost (which will turn out to be either
high or low) to move to another island. The research hypothesis is that subjects will stay longer on islands that were more
costly to find. Eleven treatment variables are considered, e.g. alternative visual displays, whether the treasure value of
an island is shown on arrival or discovered by trial and error, and alternative parameters for sunk costs. The data reveal
a surprisingly small sunk cost effect that is generally insensitive to the proposed psychological drivers.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .
Jel Classification C91, D11 相似文献