Asian Financial Crisis and the Evolution of Korean Banks Efficiency: A DEA Approach

Abstract

In the mid-1990s, the East Asian countries experienced severe financial crisis that were followed by deep economic downturns. A variety of methodologies have been used to understand the nature of the Asian financial crisis. However, the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the efficiency of the financial industry has yet to be critically examined. By employing the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach the present study attempts to examine for the first time the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the efficiency of the Korean banking sector. The study focuses on three major approaches, namely, intermediation, value added, and operating approaches. The results clearly bring forth the high degree of inefficiency in the Korean banking sector, particularly a year after the Asian financial crisis. We find that the Korean banking sector has consistently exhibit higher technical efficiency levels under value added approach, while technical efficiency seems to be lowest under intermediation approach.     

An empirical analysis of the factors determining the financial crisis in Asia

This article tests a hypothesis that the causes of the Asian financial crisis are weaknesses in the balance sheet of financial institutions, high international interest rates, high short-term external debts, excessive loans, and continuing large current account deficits. It also tests a hypothesis regarding the determination of nonperforming bank loans. Empirical tests are carried out with panel data on seven countries in Asia—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand—for the 1995 through 1997 period. The 3-month LIBOR interest rate and nonperforming loan rates of banks are found to be the major determinants of the Asian financial crisis. The nonperforming bank loan ratios are explained by the corporate leverage ratio. In addition, both the corporate high leverage ratio and LIBOR interest rates are found to significantly affect the outcome of the Asian crisis. Lowering world interest rates and taking the measures of individual Asian countries to reduce nonperforming assets and debt-to-equity ratios would be very effective in preventing reoccurrence of the crisis.     

Crisis Vulnerability

Earlier attempts to explain the East Asian crisis of 1997 have overemphasised the importance of contagion, missing the central role of vulnerability. According to conventional accounts, Thailand experienced a financial panic due to such factors as corrupt government and corporate practices, inadequately supervised banks and venal currency speculators. Confidence in the Thai currency and banking system collapsed, provoking capital flight, a float of the Thai currency and a drastic decline in its value. This undermined confidence in the prospects of other East Asian countries, also provoking crises there. This article clarifies the concept of vulnerability and demonstrates its relevance by showing the long-term development of vulnerability in each of the three 'IMF bail-out' countries: Thailand, Indonesia and Korea. By 1996 all three were vulnerable to a currency crisis. Contagion provided the short-term trigger for the crisis but was not its underlying cause. The policy lesson is to avoid vulnerability, not to attempt to avoid contagion.     

Bank market power, economic growth and financial stability: Evidence from Asian banks

This paper examines whether Asian banks are still prone to moral hazard in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis. Using a sample of commercial banks from 12 Asian countries during the 2001–2007 period, our empirical findings highlight that greater market power in the banking market results in higher instability. Although banks are better capitalized in less competitive markets their default risk remains higher. A deeper investigation however shows that such behaviour is dependent on the economic environment. Higher economic growth contributes to neutralize greater risk taking and higher instability in less competitive markets.     

Risk Sensitivity of Bank Stocks in Malaysia: Empirical Evidence Across the Asian Financial Crisis

The present study examines the sensitivity of commercial banks' stock excess returns to their volatility and financial risk factors, measured by interest rates and exchange rates, across the recent Asian financial crisis. In general, we found that there were no significant differences among Malaysian commercial banks in their risk exposure prior to and during the Asian financial crisis. The introduction of selective capital controls, a fixed exchange rate regime and a forced banking consolidation program, however, had increased the risk exposure of both large and small domestic banks. The effects of these risk factors were significantly detected in both large and small banks.     

Determinants of bond market development in Asia

One of the major reasons behind the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was the excessive dependence of the Asian economies on commercial banks for domestic financing. The region failed to diversify its sources of corporate financing as it relied mainly on banks since its other types of financing, namely bond markets, were still underdeveloped and their sizes were quite small. On the other hand, the 2008 global financial crisis and the ongoing European debt crisis have led to constraints in acquiring local currency and foreign currency liquidity in the corporate sector in Asia as foreign banks withdrew investments from Asia. Furthermore, Asia needs large long term capital (US$ 750 billion per year for 2010–2020) for developing infrastructure connectivity within and across its economies. Local and regional capital can be channeled for long-term infrastructure projects and other productive investment through bond markets. Having a well-developed local currency bond markets can enhance the resilience of domestic financial sector to external shocks and it can facilitate better intermediation of savings into productive investments in Asia. To enhance corporate bond financing, it is important to examine factors that affect the effective development of bond markets in Asia. The study attempts to identify the determinants of bond market development in Asian economies through examining the relationship of bond issuance with selected key financial and economic factors. It also intends to provide policy recommendations for the further development of the Asian bond market. Major determinants for bond market development in Asia include the size of an economy, the stage of economic development, the openness of an economy, the exchange rate variability, the size of the banking system, and interest rate variability.     

THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA

After the 1997 East Asian crisis, central banks throughout the region tried to reduce the risk of future bank failures by promulgating regulatory reforms. The results in Indonesia have been to concentrate rather than mitigate banking risks, and to decrease the access of low-income households and enterprises to formal financial services, especially in rural areas. The most severe casualties of the ‘reforms’ have been local government-owned micro finance institutions. In the provinces where these institutions have functioned best, they have addressed a market failure by extending coverage to areas not served by conventional financial institutions. Understanding the past performance and potential for replication of these success stories continues to be important because of the substantial gaps that remain in the access of rural Indonesian households and micro enterprises to fi nancial services.     

Why didn't Canada have a banking crisis in 2008 (or in 1930, or 1907, or …)?

The financial crisis of 2008 engulfed the banking system of the US and many large European countries. Canada was a notable exception. In this article we argue that the structure of financial systems is path‐dependent. The relative stability of the Canadian banks in the recent crisis compared to the US in our view reflected the original institutional foundations laid in place in the early nineteenth century in the two countries. The Canadian concentrated banking system that had evolved by the end of the twentieth century had absorbed the key sources of systemic risk—the mortgage market and investment banking—and was tightly regulated by one overarching regulator. In contrast, the relatively weak, fragmented, and crisis‐prone US banking system that had evolved since the early nineteenth century led to the rise of securities markets, investment banks, and money market mutual funds (the shadow banking system) combined with multiple competing regulatory authorities. The consequence was that the systemic risk that led to the crisis of 2007–8 was not contained.     

What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis?

The paper explores the view that the Asian currency and financial crises in 1997 and 1998 reflected structural and policy distortions in the countries of the region, even if market overreaction and herding caused the plunge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic activity to be more severe than warranted by the initial weak economic conditions. The first part of the paper provides an overview of economic fundamentals in Asia on the eve of the crisis, with emphasis on current account imbalances, quantity and quality of financial ‘overlending’, banking problems, and composition, maturity and size of capital inflows. The second part of the paper presents a reconstruction of the Asian crisis from the antecedents in 1995–1996 to the recent developments in early 1999 in parallel with a survey of the debate on the strategies to recover from the crisis, the role of international intervention, and the costs and benefits of capital controls.     

现代商业银行的风险管理研究

随着全球经济形势的变化、金融创新以及技术革命出现，现代银行业面临着越来越多的风险。由于金融业本身特性加上银行的规模较大，一旦银行出现经营危机将会给整个国家带来巨大的负面效果。于是对现代银行的风险管理研究有极其重要的意义。本文分为四个部分，首先是对商业银行风险管理的概述，第二部分是国外商业银行风险管理研究，第三部分是我国商业银行风险管理的现状，最后是我国商业银行风险管理的对策与建议。     

An introduction to problems of economic development in the CMEA countries

Through the Asian financial crisis, many key international economic issues have come to the forefront the stability of the international financial system under the IMF, “Asian values”, the universal validity of the Asian Economic Development Model, China's leadership in the regional world economy, Japan's role in the region, and the immunity of Greater China from the current financial crisis. Currently, most Asian countries seem eager to redress structural problems involving the government sector, banking, and corporate governance. In the process of this full scale restructuring, Korea must reevaluate its economic relationship with Central Asia. This paper argues that Korean financial crisis stems basically from the system failure. Furthermore, since a small open economy carries with it intrinsic vulnerabilities, the government should be more careful in securing optimal foreign exchange, opening capital markets based on the economy's absorption capacity. In this respect, the banking industry should be run based on the profitability of capital. Once banking industries are distorted by the practice of government‐led policy loans, it is more difficult to correct those customized distortions. The banking industry should play a larger role as the “brain of the economy”, sensing abnormalities of the economy. Moreover, in today's increasingly interdependent global economic system, no single country can solve its problems without close coordination of its policy with the outside world. An early warning system to signal financial instability would help developing economies in modernizing and strengthening their domestic financial institutions and would also work as a supplement to the IMF standby fund. Also, human resource management has proven too important to be neglected. Central Asia could derive lessons from the above Asian “failure”, not the Asian “miracle”, to avoid inappropriate policies and to deepen its economic development.     

关于东亚区域货币合作问题的分析

1997年的亚洲金融危机给东亚各国的经济带来了沉重打击。此后,东亚各国纷纷认识到开展区域内货币金融合作的必要性,并以此来增强抵御风险、化解危机的能力。这次亚洲金融危机改变了东亚国家的政策取向,区域经济一体化步入制度性安排的快车道,这也为东亚区域货币合作创造了条件。另外,美元区与欧元区的相继建立和运行不仅证实了最优货币区理论在实践上的可行性,也增强了东亚各国在货币合作问题上取得成功的信心。本文将要对东亚区域货币合作问题做以探讨分析,从而说明东亚区域货币合作的必要性和可行性。     

Will Bank Bailouts Bust Budgets? Fiscalisation of the East Asian financial crisis

East Asia has returned to a position of relative financial stability and modest economic growth seven years since the onset of the East Asian financial crisis, but the long-range impact of the crisis is still unclear, especially regarding fiscal ramifications. Thailand and Indonesia were two of the hardest hit economies and each had exemplary fiscal policies before the crisis. Since the crisis, both countries have maintained prudent fiscal policies, keeping budget deficits relatively small, managing debt burdens effectively and limiting exposure to contingent liabilities. Both countries have addressed the short-term triggers of the financial crisis admirably and continue to monitor vigilantly their external vulnerabilities. Thus, if either country experiences a fiscal crisis, it will be the result of other factors—bank bail-outs will bust budgets only if banks have to be bailed out once again due to incomplete or insufficient financial sector reform.     

日本银行的信贷扩张及其危机效应

通常人们将日本银行的坏账和不良资产问题归咎于日本的泡沫经济以及东南亚的经济危机．而在具体、现实的解释上，日本银行自身经营的失败和机制的缺陷才是最重要、最直接的危机成因，对日本银行信贷扩张历程的分析展现了日本银行不良资产困境及其危机效应的形成过程。     

Capital requirement and financial crisis: The case of Japan and the 1997 Asian crisis

This study investigates the direct link between the implementation of the 1988 Basel capital requirement in Japan and the shrinkage of banks’ foreign assets, particularly in Thailand in the 1990s. The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage investigates the hypothesis that the capital crunch in Japan induced Japanese banks to alter their portfolios and reduce their foreign assets. The second step tests the hypothesis that the change in behaviour of the Japanese banks induced the increase of the probability of financial crisis in Asia. Our results support the responsibility of the Japanese capital requirement, among other factors, in triggering the 1997 Asian financial crisis as an external common shock and give a new angle on the financial crisis literature.     

Why are currency crises contagious? A comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998

Why Are Currency Crises Contagious? A Comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998.—This paper analyzes three channels through which currency crises are transmitted between countries: contagion based on unsustainable economic fundamentals; contagion resulting from herding behaviour in financial markets; contagion induced by close trade integration. The presented model that links currency crises with these three types of contagion is employed to analyze the transmission of the Mexican crisis in 1994–1995 and the Thai crisis in 1997 to other emerging economies. The empirical results show that, first, the most important contagion channels were based on close financial and trade integration rather than on the weakness of macroeconomic fundamentals. Second, the vulnerability to capital flow reversals and weak financial sectors made countries particularly prone to a currency crisis, while external imbalances and currency misalignments were much less important. JEL no. F30, E60, E65, E44     

LIQUIDITY CREATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN BANKS UNDER STRESSED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The financial crisis placed severe pressure on global bank liquidity. Many banks were unable to create sufficient liquidity and had to receive government support or face default. This paper attempts to determine the impact of the financial crisis on liquidity creation within South African banks using a model previously applied to US banks. Four measures of liquidity creation are discussed and applied to data spanning 2004‐2009. Although created, liquidity decreases steeply from 2007, liquidity levels in 2009 remain about 45% higher than those of 2004. The four large South African banks created about 80% of the total market liquidity. The authors are aware that the liquidity measures discussed in this paper may not accurately reflect the manner in which South African banks created liquidity before and during the financial crisis as the period under review was characterised by various other factors. These factors include the concurrent rise in securitisation, considerable changes in the South African Reserve Bank's (SARB) stance on monetary policy, historic low‐interest rates during the period and severe curtailing of local inter‐bank dealing. It remains possible that these factors may have had an impact on the way in which South African banks created and disseminated liquidity. This possibility will be the subject of future research.     

Toward regional financial and monetary cooperation in East Asia1

The financial and economic crisis in 1997–98 came as a dramatic shock to East Asian economies, and has prompted to institutionalize a regional financial and monetary cooperation. This paper demonstrates the strong will of East Asian countries to develop the regional financial and monetary cooperation, outlines recent developments, and provides possible prospects for the future. It points out that the option to keep consistent with the IMF system actually weakens regional solidarity, and recommends an immediate establishment of a strong regional surveillance and peer pressure mechanism for the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) to evolve into a common pool of foreign exchange reserves, a sort of East Asian IMF. It also argues that East Asian countries should closely coordinate their exchange rate regime to maintain intra‐regional and extra‐regional exchange rate stability.     

Bank financial structure in pre-crisis East and Southeast Asia

Seeking evidence on the role of bank governance in the 1997 crisis, we study financial structure and bank performance from 1987 to 1997. Financial performance ratios (capital adequacy, liquidity, profitability, and loan preference) are regressed on structural variables (bank assets, net income, administrative expenses, and time), focusing on banks’ management efficiency and financial performance. During financial liberalization, loan-preference ratios were higher, perhaps signaling more risk; so were capital-adequacy ratios. Capital adequacy falls, then rises as management size increases; profitability behaves oppositely, indicating diminishing returns. Thailand’s, Korea’s and Indonesia’s banks show stronger lending preference but weaker profitability; possible harbingers of crisis.     

Cost efficiency,economies of scale,technological progress and productivity in Indonesian banks

This study estimates cost efficiency, economies of scale, technological progress, and productivity growth among Indonesian banks from 1993 to 2000. Average cost efficiency for the banking sector over this period was 70%. However, there is a marked difference in cost efficiency before and after the Asian economic crisis. The banking sector cost efficiency was 80% prior to the crisis and 53% after the crisis. Moreover, results indicate that private-owned banks and joint venture/foreign banks were more efficient than public-owned banks. Furthermore, the relationship between cost efficiency and total assets suggests an optimum bank asset size. Cost reductions attributed to technological progress and economies of scale were greater prior to the Asian economic crisis. Larger decreases in total factor productivity are evident in the post-crisis period.