Life Expectancy Heterogeneity and the Political Support for Collective Annuities

Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non‐contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.     

Asymmetric Information and Annuities

The standard Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) analysis of adverse selection economies is extended to a particular model of annuity market which features both elements of moral hazard and adverse selection. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to time preferences and they make investments in health care that affect their survival probabilities. The main case considered is that where both preferences and investments (and hence the endogenous survival probabilities) are unobserved. Thus, the model captures a further source of inefficiency that is particular to annuity market: an endogenous correlation between the desire for annuities and the survival probabilities. The basic insights of Wilson (1977) —as worked out by Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985) —are worth also in this new setting. When the equilibrium is separating, the government intervention may yield Pareto improvements. If the equilibrium is pooling, the government intervention may improve the well‐being of individuals affected by the inefficiencies and the negative externalities caused by the asymmetric information.     

Flexible Life Annuities

Annuity contracts typically deliver a stream of income at a predetermined level in order to insure against the risk of longevity. This paper explores whether flexible annuities, which give subscribers the possibility to choose between different levels of annuity, are welfare enhancing. In the case where agents gradually discover their actual probability of survival, a predetermined and one-size-fits-all annuity plan is optimal. If an expenditure risk is added along with the longevity risk, a flexible annuity plan is better even though the consumption path cannot be isolated from uninsured expenses anymore.     

Optimum and Risk-Class Pricing of Annuities

When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have an interest in insuring themselves against moving into different 'risk-classes' as their life expectancy is revealed. The First-Best allocation involves transfers across states of nature. With symmetric information, competitive equilibrium separates different risk classes and cannot provide such transfers because insurance firms are unable to precommit . When utility is invariant to risk-class realisation, the optimum entails uniform consumption and optimum retirement age independent of risk-class and an optimum social security scheme is superior to competitive equilibrium. When preferences depend on risk-class, welfare ranking of systems becomes indeterminate.     

Annuities, Bequests, and Portfolio Diversification

In this article, the diversification motives of the demand for annuities is analyzed. Using a model allowing for the uncertainty of both the human life length and the interest rate, the Decision Maker is supposed to choose an optimal portfolio to maximize a bequest. Conditions under which an increase in the risk of bond returns increase the demand for annuities are proposed and discussed. Moreover, it is shown that, contrary to previous claims, more risk adversion is associated with a lower demand for annuities.     

Refundable Annuities (Annuity Options)

Individuals can insure themselves perfectly against uncertainty about the length of life by purchasing deferred annuities early in life. In the absence of other uninsurable uncertainties (e.g., income), there will be no residual purchases or sales of annuities later in life, thereby avoiding any  adverse-selection . In contrast, the presence of such uncertainties creates an active residual annuity market based on the arrival of new information. We characterize the equilibrium in the residual annuity market and propose a new financial instrument,  refundable annuities  with a guaranteed refund price, which enables individuals who hold a portfolio of such annuities to better adjust their optimum consumption plan to different realizations. Refundable annuities are shown to be equivalent to  annuity options , that is, options that, if exercised, enable the purchase of annuities later in life at a predetermined price. Holding a variety of refundable annuities is ( ex ante ) welfare enhancing.     

Taxes,Retirement Transfers,and Annuities*

In most countries, retirement benefits from pension saving must be taken as an annuity. By contrast, Australia allows benefits to be taken as a lump sum, and instead has recently introduced various tax incentives to encourage annuity purchase. This paper investigates the effectiveness of these tax concessions, and concludes that they do little to achieve this objective This is because they are nullified by the provisions of the broader tax and social security framework within which Australian private pension policy is set     

Income Distribution and Redistribution

Abstract:

It seems that some observable structural trends in recent decades such as globalization, skills-biased technological advances and level of unionization all over the world have been affected by income distribution, in addition to other economic variables. The latest trends in the 2000s exhibited a widening gap between the rich and the poor not only in some of the already high inequality countries, but also in traditionally low inequality countries. In order to mitigate inequality, many countries have followed redistribution policies (taxes and transfers). In this article, we will mainly focus on the effects of redistribution policies consisting of income taxes and social transfers on income inequality using the micro data in Turkey. Additionally, since financial crises have been becoming more important with increasing frequency of crises all over the world, we also search for the effects of crises on inequality and the degree of mitigation of redistributive policies, especially during the Global Recession.     

分而治之及其再分配效应

本文建立了一个分而治之的理论模型,阐释拥有资源再分配权力的社会组织管理者如何通过实施这个策略实现自身利益最大化,以及这种策略会对社会经济资源再分配产生什么影响。本文不仅展示了这种策略如何针对两个被领导群体的社会组织发挥作用,而且揭示了在多个被领导群体的社会组织中管理者如何实施这个策略。研究结果发现,在社会经济资源的再分配过程中,差异化的再分配政策并不一定是由群体之间不平等的资源禀赋造成的。由于管理者所实行的分而治之策略,拥有同等禀赋的群体有可能面对完全不同的再分配政策。管理者为了实现自身利益最大化,可以通过利益输送与一部分群体形成最小化获胜结盟,让他们成为受益群体,同时完全剥夺边缘群体的资源,获取中间群体的一部分资源。由于这种分而治之的差异化再分配政策,小部分群体可以从中获益,其它大部分群体则会受到损害,从而造成不同群体间的社会经济地位不平等。     

Strategic Political Participation and Redistribution

The purpose of this paper is to study formation of support and opposition to redistribution. We analyze a society with two groups of citizens and a government. The government distributes income from one group to the other in response to political pressure. The interaction between the groups is modeled as a two-stage game. In stage 1, the groups decide if they want to be politically active. In stage 2, the active group or groups seek influence on the direction and size of the transfer. We demonstrate that supporters of redistribution are always politically active but that opposition is often absent. Moreover, when opposition is absent there is a strong tendency for underdissipation of the transfer, while political competition typically leads to overdissipation.     

Redistribution and constitutional political economy

Economists since Pareto have sought to demonstrate that governmental redistribution to assist the poor increases overall welfare in society. This paper addresses the general issue of redistribution but focuses on two recent efforts to justify redistribution in the context of constitutional political economy. It is argued below that income insurance and other proposed rationale for redistribution overlook or minimize information and incentive problems endemic in all governmental programs to assist the poor. Two reasons for opposing legislated redistribution are discussed—the first rooted in pragmatic considerations, the other based on principle. The conclusions are twofold: (1) purported justifications for redistributive policies are inconsistent with methodological individualism, and (2) it is problematic as to whether imposing such an obligation on the public-at-large even at the constitutional level will improve the welfare of the poor and the non-poor.     

Intergenerational Redistribution and Fiscal Policy

This article argues that although the intergenerational stance of fiscal policy is hard to measure accurately, a goal of approximate generational balance is reasonable.     

Redistribution and fairness: a note

The introduction of (inequity adverse) fair agents in a simple redistributive voting game reduces the political relevance of the middle class and increases the equilibrium level of redistribution. Interestingly, some of the predictions in Meltzer and Richard [J. Polit. Econ. 89 (1981) 914–927] are affected: a rise in the income inequality between poor and middle class may not decrease redistribution, because of the additional support for redistribution provided by the fair agents.     

Immigration,Conflict, and Redistribution

In this paper, we analyze how the possibility of conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in developed democracies. This possibility can generate income redistribution towards immigrants even if they have no voting rights. We show that the threat of conflict between natives and immigrants lowers vertical income redistribution (from the rich to the poor) as the level of immigration increases. The opposite holds for horizontal income redistribution (from natives to immigrants), which increases with the level of immigration. Income inequality weakens the negative effect of immigration on vertical redistribution, but it also reduces horizontal redistribution. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the results of our empirical analysis on data from 29 European countries: larger immigrant populations are associated with more redistribution towards immigrants and lower vertical redistribution.     

Redistribution and Small Coalitions of Friends

When side marketing trade is perfect, linear taxation of retradeable commodities is the only scheme that survives attempts to arbitrage. In this paper, I discuss tax schemes when side trading is imperfect in the sense that commodities can only be re-exchanged within coalitions no larger than two people. In the framework of a two-class economy, I identify coalitions which might have an incentive to form and provide a characterisation for the Pareto-efficient tax scheme. The tax formula has a very simple form and strongly resembles the formula for the no-side-trade case. In a numerical exercise, the constraints imposed on policy by an imperfect side trading process are found to be almost as tough as those imposed by perfect side trading.     

Redistribution and growth: Pareto improvements

This paper analyzes the relationship between income distribution and economic growth. It introduces heterogeneous households who have preferences for leisure into Grossman and Helpman's model of endogenous growth (in which income distribution has no effect on economic growth). Wealth distribution affects the endogenous rate of growth as the labor supply of each individual responds inversely to his permanent income. When the labor Engel curve is concave (convex), unequal wealth distribution decreases (increases) the rate of growth. Pareto-improving-growth-enhancing wealth redistributions are characterized.     

Redistribution and Subsidies for Higher Education

The financing of higher education through public spending imposes a transfer of resources from taxpayers to university students and their parents. We provide an explanation for this phenomenon. Those who attend institutions of higher education will earn more income in the future and will pay more taxes. People whose children do not receive higher education, however, should agree to help pay the cost of such education, providing that taxes are sufficiently high to ensure an adequate redistribution in favor of their own children at some time in the future.
JEL classification : D 71; H 21; H 52     

Redistribution and entrepreneurship with Schumpeterian growth

We examine the effects of redistributive taxation on growth and inequality in a Schumpeterian model with risk-averse agents. There are skilled and unskilled workers, and the growth rate is determined by the occupational choice of skilled agents between entrepreneurship and employment. We show that redistribution provides insurance to entrepreneurs and increases the growth rate. The effects on inequality are such that low tax rates increase inequality relative to laissez-faire due to changes in wages, but higher tax rates can simultaneously raise growth and reduce inequality. We contrast the optimal linear income tax with alternative policies for promoting R&D and find that it is preferable on both equity and efficiency grounds.