Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment

We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high‐risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low‐risk consumers. Insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high‐risk agents. Second, we identify a trade‐off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low‐risk market to the less elastic high‐risk market. Third, mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further, at the cost of efficiency.     

Marketable Incentive Contracts and Capital Structure Relevance

This article investigates the claim that debt finance can increase firm value by curtailing managers' access to “free cash flow.” We first show that incentive contracts that tie the managers' pay to stockholder wealth are often a superior solution to the free cash flow problem. We then consider the possibility that the manager can trade on secondary capital markets. Liquid secondary markets are shown to undermine management incentive schemes and, in many cases, to restore the value of debt finance in controlling the free cash flow problem.     

Quote-based competition and trade execution costs in NYSE-listed stocks

This study examines quotations, order routing, and trade execution costs for seven markets that compete for orders in large-capitalization NYSE-listed stocks. The competitiveness of quote updates from each market varies with measures of the profitability of attracting additional order and with volatility and inventory measures. The probability of a trade executing on each market increases when the market posts competitive quotes. Execution costs for non-NYSE trades when the local market posts competitive (non-competitive) quotes are virtually the same (substantially exceed) costs for matched NYSE trades. Collectively, these results imply a significant degree of quote-based competition for order flow and are consistent with off-NYSE liquidity providers using competitive quotations to signal when they are prepared to give better-than-normal trade executions.     

Informational linkage and price discovery between China's futures and spot markets: Evidence from the US–China trade dispute

This study examines the effects of the US–China trade dispute on the informational linkages and price discovery between China's futures and spot markets. Using the daily price data of four assets representing the real and financial sectors in China during 2016–2019, empirical findings suggest that the futures–spot correlations for the stock index, copper, and corn markets have increased significantly during the trade dispute. In contrast, sharp declines in the dynamic correlations between gold futures and spot markets, as gold is a safe haven asset, are observed during the event window. During uncertainty disturbance (i.e., the trade dispute), the futures–spot cointegrated relationships in the gold and corn markets are found to adjust more quickly and efficiently, whereas the correction speeds of the market deviations for the stock index and copper market are moderately slower. With the intensive integration of market expectations with uncertainty shocks, the economic shocks of trade disputes tend to remarkably improve the pricing efficiency of China's futures markets, except for the gold futures market. China's spot markets, however, seem to be more sensitive to the noise trades and information disturbances arising from the trade dispute.     

Competition on the Nasdaq and the growth of electronic communication networks

This paper examines the growth of electronic communication networks (ECNs) and their competitive impact on the Nasdaq. We find that the development of these alternative trading platforms is associated with tighter quoted, effective, and relative bid–ask spreads, greater depths, and less concentrated markets. Further, our results show that an increase in ECN trading may have caused some traditional market makers (wholesaler and national retail dealers) to exit the market for market making. Overall, our results suggest that ECNs provide a source of competition to traditional Nasdaq dealers.     

Durable‐goods oligopoly with secondary markets: the case of automobiles

We study the effects of durability and secondary markets on equilibrium firm behavior in the car market. We construct a dynamic oligopoly model of a differentiated product market to incorporate the equilibrium production dynamics that arise from the durability of the goods and their active trade in secondary markets. We derive an econometric model and estimate its parameters using data from the automobile industry over a 20‐year period. Our estimates are used to provide a measure of the competitive importance of the secondary market.     

Product market competition and the value of corporate cash: Evidence from trade liberalization

This paper uses the 1989 Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement as a source of exogenous variation in product markets to establish the impact of increased competition on the market valuation of corporate cash reserves. I find that the trade liberalization leads to a significant increase in the value of cash for firms experiencing a larger shock to their competitive environment. The impact of the trade liberalization is stronger among firms that face greater risk of losing investment opportunities to rivals. I also show that these inferences about the valuation effect of competition apply more broadly to a large sample of firms.     

Do brokers' recommendation changes generate brokerage? Evidence from a central limit order market

We examine the short‐term response to recommendation changes on the Australian Securities Exchange, a central limit order market. In both central limit order markets and dealer‐driven markets, clients may reward the recommending broker with increased trade volumes. But a central limit order market does not have mandatory market makers and hence provides greater opportunity to free ride. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that recommending brokers are rewarded with higher trade volumes and brokerage commission. Consistent with the tipping hypothesis, these rewards are concentrated in the period shortly before the release. There is no evidence of free riding.     

Determinants of International Insurers' Participation in Foreign Non-Life Markets

Mirroring the trend in the broader marketplace, the global insurance industry is steadily moving toward increased liberalization and deregulation. This study seeks to develop the first empirical model that examines the importance of foreign market characteristics as they relate to the participation of international insurers in the non‐life business of those countries. The analysis reveals that market structure is an important factor in determining whether international insurers participate in a given foreign market. In addition, for markets that are not competitive, removing trade barriers would significantly improve the desirability of those countries as host markets. The results also suggest that countries with higher gross domestic product tend to attract more involvement from international insurers. While this research focuses on the markets of industrialized countries, the findings will provide significant implications for those emerging markets that have not yet collected relevant data on a number of the variables included in this study.     

Transparency in the Mortgage Market

This paper studies the impact of transparency in the mortgage market on the underlying real estate market. We show that geographic transparency in the secondary mortgage market, which implies geographic risk based pricing in the primary market, can limit risk-sharing and make house prices more volatile. Ex ante, regions prefer opaque markets to enable insurance opportunities. We discuss the implications for risk based pricing and house price volatility more generally. In addition, we investigate the specific conditions under which competitive lenders would optimally choose to provide opaque lending, thus reducing volatility in the real estate market. We show that in general the opaque competitive equilibrium is not stable, and lenders have incentive to switch to transparent lending if one of the geographic regions has experienced a negative income shock. We propose market and regulatory mechanisms that make the opaque competitive equilibrium stable and insurance opportunities possible.     

Market competitiveness and Big 5 pricing: Evidence from China's binary market

Big 5 auditors enjoy a worldwide audit fee premium that is believed to be attributable primarily to their reputation for providing high-quality services to clients. This study finds that the fee premium is also attributable to a lack of competition in the market. Taking advantage of the binary structure of the audit market in China, we compare the pricing practices of the Big 5 in the competitive statutory market and the less competitive supplementary market. Although the Big 5 have a reputation for high-quality audits in both markets, the degree of competition in the two markets is very different. Using audit fee data from the period 2000 to 2003, we find that the Big 5 earn a significant fee premium in the less competitive supplementary market, but not in the competitive statutory market. Although our results do not completely rule out reputation as an explanation, they are consistent with the notion that the audit fee premium that is earned by the Big 5 is more likely to be attributable to their dominant market position than to their reputation in the emerging Chinese markets, in which the usual audit-quality benefits for investors and managers are either absent or minimal.     

Financial Economists' Roundtable Statement on THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES MARKETS

Market practitioners, regulators, and economists are now debating the merits of a national market system—a single, fully integrated securities market that would be coordinated by a central computer and mandated by the SEC. This brief statement, signed by 29 distinguished financial economists, argues that such a system is a badidea. The multiplicity of U.S. markets is a sign of innovation and vibrant competition, not a problem that requires regulatory intervention. As a variety of markets with different technologies and trading procedures vie for somewhat different groups of customers with different needs, the result is competing market centers—registered exchanges (such as NYSE and AMEX) with designated specialists; NASDAQ with competing dealers; third market dealers in listed securities; and alternative trading systems (regulated as brokers) serving institutional investors or providing on-line trading to individual investors. Moreover, the fact that the different U.S. markets are linked in various ways and degrees—for example, by information and by private order routing systems of brokers and markets—should caution us against viewing market "fragmentation" as a public policy problem in need of a solution     

Mutual Fund Stock‐Picking Skill: New Evidence from Valuation‐ versus Liquidity‐Motivated Trading

We propose a novel Trade Motivation Matrix that allows differentiating funds’ valuation‐motivated (VM) and liquidity‐motivated (LM) trades on single trade level. It thus enables analyses of stock‐picking skill on three levels: trade, stock, and fund. On trade level, we find significant outperformance of VM buys and significant underperformance of VM sells, indicating manager stock‐picking skills, especially during illiquid market periods. VM trades outperform LM trades, confirming negative performance effects due to flow risk, especially when market liquidity is low. On stock level, collective VM buying explains high future stock returns while collective VM selling is related to future losses, indicating wisdom of the crowd. On fund level, higher trading discretion, measured by a higher degree of VM trading, is observed for smaller, older funds holding higher cash buffers. Finally, higher trading discretion is related to higher future fund alpha, especially during illiquid times.     

On the theory of financial contracting: The personal loan market

Assuming rational expectations, the differing incentives of borrowers and lenders in competitive loan markets determine the typically complex nature of personal loan contracts. Given this framework, contractual provisions such as collateralization, escrow accounts, and other restrictive covenants are efficient mechanisms to control the incentive conflict: credit rationing (market failure) arguments are not necessary to explain the inclusion of these contractual provisions. Within a competitive lending market the benefits from these provisions ultimately accrue to the borrower by lowering the total cost of borrowing.     

Mortgage Delivery to the Secondary Market when Interest Rates are Falling

A borrower whose loan is committed to the securitization process has the ability and incentive to switch lenders if market rates drop during the loan origination period, which creates significant exposure for primary lenders. A simple secondary market contract innovation we call a mortgage rate drop guarantee (MRDG) could shift this risk to the securitizers who represent portfolio investors. Our simulation results indicate this shifting would have improved the risk/return distribution faced by originators without damaging the risk/return position of securitizers during our 1977–2010 sample period. Assuming conservative loan lives and origination periods, and competitive lending markets, the risk reduction features of MRDGs could also have generated significant interest savings for borrowers.     

Whither Capitalism?*

The global financial crisis and policy responses to it have led many to question their fundamental belief in market‐based capitalism. In the U.S., the epicenter of the crisis and poster child of capitalism, signs of creeping nationalization of the financial system have raised fears that the basic model is being turned inside out. In this essay, the author argues that, with more than 90% of the U.S. private sector still operating “largely as a free‐enterprise system,” concerns about nationalization and government involvement in the marketplace are greatly exaggerated. More troubling are the diminishing prospects for a prompt post‐crisis normalization of fiscal and monetary policy, and for a decisive and transparent exit strategy from the present “policies of crisis containment.” In the absence of such decisiveness and transparency, the debate over the efficacy of market‐based capitalism will continue. The longer‐run challenge is to learn from the crisis and take measures designed to limit risk‐taking to acceptable levels in today's global financial environment, with its continuous cross‐border flow of information, trade, and human as well as financial capital. Making Wall Street the villain is the path of least resistance in a politically charged environment, but any fix must be grounded in shared responsibility. As the author says in closing, “Governance, or the lack thereof—both within the private sector as well as by those charged with regulation and oversight—proved to be the weak link in the chain. Fix that, and capitalism will be just fine.”     

股指期货与现货市场的关系研究

本文从市场结构、交易执行效率和市场信息传播三个方面，由浅入深地展开了期现货市场关系的梳理和分析。股指期货市场的出现，一是使得原本现货市场单轨运行的市场结构变为了期现货市场双轨运行的新结构，增加了市场稳定性；二是依托期货交易方式的独特机制，大大提高了交易执行效率；三是期货价格也因此包含了更多内容，促进了市场信息的传播与扩散。同时，股指期货的独特设计使得其非常适合在危机条件下充分发挥功能，是一个重要的风险管理工具，已经成为现代资本市场的重要组成部分和基础性的内在稳定机制。     

Stock–bond dependence and flight to/from quality

This paper investigates the stock–bond dependence structure using a dependence-switching copula model. The model allows stock–bond dependence to switch between positive dependence regimes (contagions or crashes of the two markets during downturns or booms in both markets during upturns) and negative dependence regimes (flight-to-quality from stock markets to bond markets or flight-from-quality from bond markets to stock markets). Using data from four developed markets including the US, Canada, Germany, and France for the period between January 1985 and August 2022, we find that the within-country stock–bond (extreme) dependence could be both positive and negative. In the positive dependence regimes, the stock–bond dependence is asymmetric with stronger left tail dependence than the right tail dependence, giving evidence of a higher likelihood of joint stock–bond market crashes or contagions during market downturns than the collective stock–bond market booms. Under the negative dependence regimes, we find both flight-from-quality and flight-to-quality, with flight-to-quality being more dominant in the North American markets while flight-from-quality is more prominent in the European markets. Further, the dependence switches between positive and negative regimes over time. Moreover, the dependence is mainly in the positive regimes before 2000 while mostly in the negative regimes after that, indicating contagions mostly before 2000 and flights afterwards. Further, the dependence switches between positive and negative regimes around financial crises and the COVID-19 pandemic. These results greatly enrich the findings in the existing literature on the co-movements of stock–bond markets and are important for risk management and asset pricing.     

Who makes markets

A dealer needs access to order flow and information to make a market profitably in a Nasdaq stock. Several variables that proxy for the stocks that an individual market maker's brokerage customers trade, including volume, location, underwriting participation and analyst coverage, are significant determinants of market making activity. Informational advantages may also factor in the market making decision as evidenced by dealers specializing in industries. These findings suggest that individual dealers have competitive advantages in making markets in specific stocks, and that potential market making competition comes from the dealers who share those advantages rather than all Nasdaq market makers.     

Measuring the impact of option market activity on the stock market: Bivariate point process models of stock and option transactions

I apply the bivariate Autoregressive Conditional Duration model of Engle and Lunde [2003. Trade and quotes: a bivariate point process. Journal of Financial Econometrics 1, 159–188] to stock and option market transactions. The first model uses option trades and stock trades. Shocks to option trade/option trade durations have a significant impact on option trade/stock trade durations. Higher implied volatility, larger stock and option market order imbalances, larger stock trades, larger spreads, smaller depths in the stock market and faster trading in the stock and option markets are all associated with faster trading in both markets. In the second model, option trade/option trade timing leads option trade/stock quote timing and several information-related stock and option market covariates impact the expected inter-market event durations.