Synthesizing enterprise data through digital dashboards to strategically align performance: Why do operational managers use dashboards?

Based on a cross-sectional field study, Reinking et al. (2019) propose a complex theoretical model for understanding the characteristics of dashboards that promote use and lead to individual and organizational performance gains. This study tests the theoretical model using survey data collected from 323 middle and upper level managers with experience using corporate dashboards. The data were analyzed using components based structural equation modeling, and the results provide strong support for the external validity of the Reinking et al. (2019) theoretical model. The results show that two primary constructs, strategy alignment and interactive management control, are important factors impacting the extent of dashboard use, perceived managerial performance, and perceived organizational performance. Prior research has expressed concerns over the tendency of managers to lose sight of strategic objectives (i.e., strategy surrogation) and focus solely on performance measures. However, our results indicate that operational managers perceive that dashboards focused on specifically tailored KPIs lead to both improved managerial and organizational performance. This study contributes to management control and strategy research in two important ways. While prior research has examined strategy in the executive level context through evaluations, changes, or initiative implementations, this study investigates strategy alignment at the operational levels of the organization. Second, the results suggest that intentional strategy surrogation may have beneficial effects at the lower operational levels in an organization.     

Integrative strategic performance measurement systems,strategic alignment of manufacturing,learning and strategic outcomes: an exploratory study

There is considerable interest in the role of strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS), such as balanced scorecards, in assisting managers develop competitive strategies. A distinctive feature of SPMS is that they are designed to present managers with financial and non-financial measures covering different perspectives which, in combination, provide a way of translating strategy into a coherent set of performance measures. There appears to be wide variation in how these systems are configured. However, as yet, there has been little consideration given to identifying underlying information characteristics that might help explain how the systems have beneficial effects. This study identifies a key dimension of SPMS, integrative information, as being instrumental in assisting managers deliver positive strategic outcomes. Three interrelated dimensions of integrative SPMS were identified in this study. The first, strategic and operational linkages, was a generic factor that captures the overall extent to which the systems provide for integration between strategy and operations, and integration across elements of the value chain. The second attribute, customer orientation, focuses on customer linkages and includes financial and customer measures. The third dimension, supplier orientation, is based on linkages to suppliers and includes business process and innovation measures. A model is developed that predicts that integrative SPMS will enhance the strategic competitiveness of organizations. It is proposed that the influence of integrative SPMS on strategic outcomes is indirect through the mediating roles of alignment of manufacturing with strategy and organizational learning. Data from a survey of 80 strategic business units provide varying support for the proposed relationships.     

Strategy Selection,Surrogation, and Strategic Performance Measurement Systems

Strategic performance measurement systems operationalize firm strategy with a set of performance measures. A consequence of such alignment is the tendency for managers to lose sight of the strategic construct(s) the measures are intended to represent, and subsequently act as though the measures are the constructs of interest, a phenomenon referred to as surrogation. We investigate how involvement in strategy selection affects managers’ propensity to exhibit surrogation. We predict and find that strategy selection reduces surrogation. Surprisingly, we do not find that engaging in strategy deliberation, a key process underlying strategy selection, reduces surrogation. Thus, managers’ involvement in the actual choice of strategy appears to be both a necessary and sufficient condition to mitigate surrogation. Our paper broadens understanding of factors that influence surrogation, such as the effects of different aspects of managers’ strategic involvement and buy‐in. Further, by documenting how managers behave within (as opposed to simply with) strategic performance measurement systems, we highlight the potential for managers to endogenously influence the effectiveness of such systems.     

The Role of Visual Attention in the Managerial Judgment of Balanced‐Scorecard Performance Evaluation: Insights from Using an Eye‐Tracking Device

This paper investigates the role of visual attention in managerial judgments during balanced‐scorecard performance evaluations. Using the Locarna eye tracker to establish the amount of time managers spent focused on visual cues, we found that managers who look more at strategically linked performance measures are more likely to make decisions consistent with the achievement of their subordinates’ strategic objectives. When aware of strategy, managers focused more on strategically linked performance measures than on nonlinked measures. The presentation format of the strategy information did not significantly affect this focus. Our findings indicate that awareness of strategically linked performance measures, but not their presentation, appears to be important in helping managers to make better decisions. This study contributes to the management accounting literature by generating useful insights into the impact of visual attention on judgments and decision‐making processes.     

Aligning Performance Measurement Systems With Strategy: The Case of Environmental Strategy

Alignment of an organization's performance measurement system with its strategy is widely advocated as a guiding principle in management control system design. Despite its importance, it is far from clear what strategic alignment of performance measures entails, whether and how organizations achieve it. In this article we explore the alignment of performance measures focusing on firms' use of environmental performance indicators as the consequence of pursuing an environmental strategy. Based on the economic and contingency literatures on management control system design and performance measurement, we propose that the use of such performance measures is a consequence of changing the design of the performance measurement system to accommodate the strategy, and by increasing the informativeness of performance metrics. We test these propositions in a sample of financial managers in manufacturing firms in The Netherlands. We find that alignment to environmental strategy is mostly achieved through the increased quantification of environmental performance measures and via their increased sensitivity to managerial actions.     

A path model examining the relations among strategic performance measurement system characteristics,organizational justice,and extra- and in-role performance

Economic theory suggests that multiple financial and non-financial measures (i.e., a strategic performance measurement system “SPMS”) be used in compensation contracting to properly direct employees’ attention and motivate behavior aligned with organizational goals. Conversely, linking incentives to the SPMS can result in various dysfunctional behaviors, including game playing by employees, the achievement of unbalanced performance, and the potential of basing compensation on an incomplete performance measurement system. Prior literature has investigated the use of subjectivity in compensation contracting as a means of potentially mitigating these problems; however, subjectivity can introduce other problems including claims of favoritism and bias. Economic theorists have recently begun expanding the traditional agency model to include the notion of fairness or justice. In this study, we obtain data from an organization that uses an SPMS as the basis for the allocation of bonuses and investigate whether characteristics of the SPMS are associated with perceived organizational fairness. Specifically, we hypothesize and show that the extent to which employees perceive that the SPMS reflects a strategic causal model and the degree to which it is technically valid are positively associated with their perceptions of organizational justice. We also provide evidence that heightened levels of organizational justice are the mechanism though which the perceived characteristics of the SPMS are associated with employee performance. The implication is that firms do not necessarily need to introduce subjectivity into the incentive contracting system, but can enhance performance by linking incentive contracts to their SPMS if the system contains characteristics that enhance employees’ perceptions of justice.     

Procedural justice in managerial performance evaluation: Effects of subjectivity,relationship quality,and voice opportunity

This study investigates the effect of subjectivity in performance evaluation on managerial perceptions of procedural justice. Using survey data from a sample of 317 managers, we examine two forms of subjectivity: use and weight of subjective performance measures and ex post flexibility in the weighting of multiple performance measures. We also examine the interaction effects of two contextual factors, superior–manager relationship quality and voice opportunity, on the association between subjectivity and perceived procedural justice. The results suggest that only the superior's use of ex post flexibility in weighting multiple performance measures adversely affects managers' perceptions of procedural justice. Moreover, superior–manager relationship quality reduces the negative effects of ex post flexibility in weighting multiple performance measures on procedural justice, whereas voice opportunity amplifies this negative effect. These findings have practical and theoretical implications, as they shed new light on the trade-off between the informative benefits and perceived unfairness of incorporating subjectivity into performance evaluation.     

Top executive dismissal,ownership and corporate performance

This paper evaluates the empirical relationship between top executive turnover and firm performance. Based on a sample of the 460 largest UK listed companies during the period 1990–1998, we establish an inverse and robust statistical relation between the probability of a management change and a firm's performance: top executives are fired for poor performance. This can result from internal monitoring of management by the board or block share holders. Second, the data indicate that only very poor levels of performance affect significantly the turnover likelihood: corporate performance must fall dramatically to force a senior executive job separation. Third, the likelihood of managerial turnover for poor performance has not changed over time: today's senior managers face the same disciplining effects as those senior managers in earlier years. Finally, there seems to be no evidence that managerial stock ownership, measured as the proportion of ordinary shares owned by top managers, enables them to become entrenched.     

MERGER ACTIVITY AND MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION

A theoretical monopolistic economy is developed to explain relationships between merger activity and managerial compensation packages. In this economy, managers are assigned to and compensated by firms based on models established in “n” person cooperative game theory. Compensation packages offered to managers of potential acquiring firms are studied with respect to their impact on managers' willingness to initiate profitable merger bids. The model explains why overall merger returns decrease as the size of the target firm relative to the bidding firm increases. Model results are consistent with numerous other empirical findings regarding merger profit distributions.     

Corporate Governance,Managers' Independence,Exporting, and Performance of Firms in Transition Economies

Using data on 157 large companies in Poland and Hungary, this paper employs Bayesian structural equation modeling to examine the relations among corporate governance, managers' independence from owners in terms of strategic decision making, exporting, and performance. Managers' independence is positively associated with firms' financial performance and exporting. In turn, the extent of managers' independence is negatively associated with ownership concentration, but positively associated with the percentage of foreign directors on the firm's board. We interpret these results as indicating that concentrated owners tend to constrain managerial autonomy at the cost of the firm's internationalization and performance, but board participation of foreign stakeholders enhances the firm's export orientation and performance by encouraging executives' decision-making autonomy.     

Implicit incentives and reputational herding by hedge fund managers

Several theories of reputation suggest that managers' incentives affect their propensity to engage in herding behavior. This paper investigates these theories by tracking hedge fund managers' herding behavior over their careers. I first examine managerial incentives for herding, and show that more senior managers that deviate from the herd have a significantly higher probability of failure and do not experience higher fund inflows than their less-senior counterparts. These implicit incentives should encourage managers to herd more as their careers progress. I find strong support for this hypothesis: using a number of proxies for herding, I show that more experienced managers herd more than less-experienced managers. Finally, I examine performance differences between more and less-experienced managers, and find that while more experienced managers underperform less-experienced managers, this underperformance does not appear to be caused by differences in herding. Overall, these results are in direct contrast with studies of mutual fund managers, reflecting important difference in implicit incentives between the two industries.     

Organizational culture and performance measurement systems

The aim of this study is to articulate and test the relationships between organizational culture and two attributes of performance measurement systems (PMS), namely the diversity of measurement and the nature of use. The results of a survey reveal that top managers of firms reflecting a flexibility dominant type tend to use more performance measures and to use PMS to focus organizational attention, support strategic decision-making and legitimate actions to a greater extent than top managers of firms reflecting a control dominant type.     

An Empirical Analysis of Financial and Non-financial Managers' Remuneration in Small and Medium-sized UK Enterprises

This paper examines empirically the influences on managerial remuneration in a sample of 97 UK small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The empirical analysis, based on data obtained from interviews with middle (i.e. non-director level) managers and the published financial records of their employing firms lodged at Companies House, examines the relative explanatory power of a number of human capital, job/firm specific and external labour market variables. In addition, the sample was partitioned into two groups, one comprising 29 financial managers and the other comprising 68 non-financial managers. Separate wage equations were estimated for the two groups to determine whether the factors that influence remuneration differ between the two groups of managers. For the overall sample, the results indicate that the managers' ages, qualifications and previous careers and the size, growth, industry and location of their employing firms are able to explain a large proportion of the variance in remuneration. For the sub-sample analyses, firm profitability, (several aspects of) size, and the managers' career histories are of relatively greater importance in respect of financial managers' remuneration, whilst asset growth, industrial sector and location seem to be of more importance for the non-financial managers. These results are viewed as being broadly consistent with the expectations derived from the extant theoretical and empirical literatures on managerial remuneration.     

Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets

Using hand‐collected data on divisional managers at S&P 500 firms, we study their role in internal capital budgeting. Divisional managers with social connections to the CEO receive more capital. Connections to the CEO outweigh measures of managers' formal influence, such as seniority and board membership, and affect both managerial appointments and capital allocations. The effect of connections on investment efficiency depends on the tradeoff between agency and information asymmetry. Under weak governance, connections reduce investment efficiency and firm value via favoritism. Under high information asymmetry, connections increase investment efficiency and firm value via information transfer.     

Dare to play with fire? Managerial ability and the use of short-term debt

This study documents a positive relation between managerial ability and the use of short-term debt. This finding is robust to various specifications, including a difference-in-difference approach based on CEO turnovers. Able managers' preferences for short-term debt are amplified for firms with greater growth opportunities and are attenuated by firms' refinancing risk. Additional analyses shed light on the implications of high-ability managers' strategic use of short-term debt. Overall, the results presented in this study demonstrate that managers' innate ability plays a critical role in shaping corporate debt maturity structure.     

Dynamics of organizational control: The case of Berol Kemi AB

The paper analyzes changes in organizational control related to changes in an organization's economic situation. The thesis of tightening managerial control as a typical managerial reaction to decline is illustrated by developments in a Swedish company chosen as a case example. The interpretation challenges explanations indicating objective, causative relationships between organizational economy and organizational control. Instead, the focus is placed on social mechanisms, such as the social attribution of causes and the increased need for legitimation on the part of managers. Control and production subsystems are also seen to be loosely coupled.     

The role of performance measurement and evaluation in building organizational capabilities and performance

This study examines the processes through which the availability of broad-based strategically relevant performance information impacts on the performance outcomes of organizations. We explore the role of evaluation mechanisms in influencing managers’ use of broad-based performance measurement information for feedback and feed-forward control. We hypothesize that these resultant decision-making patterns impact the exploitation and identification of strategic capabilities within an organization and in turn organizational performance. Using a structural equation model, we find support for a model in which the degree of commonality between measures identified as decision-facilitating and decision-influencing is significantly associated with the use of decision-facilitating measures for both feedback and feed-forward control. In turn, the extent to which decision-facilitating measures are actually used by strategic business unit managers impacts on the strategic capabilities of the organization and subsequently its performance. Overall the results suggest that to encourage managers to use the multiple financial and non-financial performance indicators increasingly incorporated in contemporary performance measurement systems it is imperative that performance evaluation schemes are also designed to reflect these measures. To the extent performance evaluation schemes do not reflect such decision-facilitating measures it is less likely managers will use these indicators to effectively manage performance. The resultant performance implications for the organization arise from the impact of these decision effects on the exploitation of existing capabilities and the search for and identification of new strategic opportunities.     

PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT: A EUROPEAN FIELD STUDY

One of the practical problems faced by managers when appraising strategic investment opportunities, is how to deal with the uncertainty of the outcome(s). They often make subjective judgements about the riskiness of prospective projects, but these are rarely formalized into their strategic decision-making processes. Little attention is paid to this qualitative side of investment appraisal in the corporate finance literature. This paper reports on a field-based study carried out in the logistics industry, which followed an innovative action research approach, operationalized by the use of focus groups and repertory grids. Using a repertory grid technique, constructs were elicited, which managers used to explain the riskiness of a particular project, compared to other projects of a similar type that they had knowledge of from past investment appraisals. The results of the study include a set of 12 project risk attributes, a project typology which defines three types of project, each with a set of weightings reflecting the relative importance of the attributes to the participants. These provide a useful insight into managers' perceptions of the risk attached to strategic investment projects in a large European group. In addition to the context-specific results, conclusions are drawn regarding the use of repertory grids as a framework for a risk assessment technique in other organizational settings.     

The chief strategy officer

They're nominally and ultimately responsible for strategy, but today's CEOs have less and less time to devote to it. As a result, CEOs are appointing "chief strategy officers"--executives specifically tasked with creating, communicating, executing, and sustaining a company's strategic initiatives. In this article, three authors from Accenture share the results of their research on this emerging organizational role. The typical CSO or top strategy executive is not a pure strategist, conducting long-range planning in relative isolation. Most CSOs consider themselves doers first, with the mandate, credentials, and desire to act as well as advise. They are seasoned executives with a strong strategy orientation who have usually worn many operations hats before taking on the role. Strategy executives are charged with three critical jobs that together form the very definition of strategy execution. First, they must clarify the company's strategy for themselves and for every business unit and function, ensuring that all employees understand the details of the strategic plan and how their work connects to corporate goals. Second, CSOs must drive immediate change. The focus of the job almost always quickly evolves from creating shared alignment around a vision to riding herd on the ensuing change effort. Finally, a CSO must drive decision making that sustains organizational change. He or she must be that person who, in the CEO's stead, can walk into any office and test whether the decisions being made are aligned with the strategy and are creating the desired results. When decisions below the executive suite aren't being made in accordance with strategy, much of the CSO's job involves learning why and quickly determining whether to stay the course or change tack.     

Revitalising local democracy: A social capital analysis in the context of a New Zealand local authority

Using an exploratory case study, we assess whether markets and strategic performance management systems (SPMS) enhanced social capital of a local authority in New Zealand and its capacity to foster democracy. We found that SPMS enhanced the interaction among managers and between managers and residents and provided residents with opportunities to participate in local authority decision-making. Market forms of management however, promoted individualism and the pursuit of narrow departmental goals. There was increased control by managers and greater reliance on experts which diminished local people's participation (and the role of councillors) in local affairs. The pairing of contradictory discourses based on efficiency, markets and participatory democracy promoted an overly rational form of democracy inimical to a deliberative democracy. The relations between staff were in a state of continuous tension. The paper contributes to an understanding on how the interaction between the state and local authorities affects local authority social capital and the potential effects on community social capital and local democracy. This paper demonstrates a need for greater attention to the contest between different discourses in the construction and sustenance of social capital and the pursuit of democracy.