A survey of executive compensation contracts in China’s listed companies

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.     

Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms

Recent research in accounting explores how firms use “individual” or “non-financial” measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. We model a firm that conditions bonus payments to executives on information that is not available to those outside the firm. This raises two issues. First, market participants may use the magnitude of such payments to infer the non-public information. Second, because information that is non-public is, by extension, non-verifiable, the firm cannot write explicit contracts based on it. Combining the relational incentive contracts and financial signaling literatures, we examine equilibria of a signaling game in which bonus payments from a firm to a manager convey non-public information regarding the firm’s future cash flows. Our main result is that increases in corporate myopia can, under some conditions, lead to increased profits. This finding is contrary to that typically found in financial signaling models.     

Currents of Liquidity Flows Created by the Different Type of Payments: the Case of SPEI

In the present study we examine through network model and transactional analysis the structure of participants’ funds assigned to cover their own payments and payments initiated by their clients (third party) in the Mexican Real Time Payment system SPEI 2 2 SPEI is an hybrid system, equivalent to a Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS)
. First we build two networks by splitting the number of transactions in two sets of operations, namely payments initiated by third parties and by participants. Our main finding in this regards is that both networks have a core-periphery structure and third party payments help to increase connectivity at the core. From the transactional analysis, we found that third party payments use 47% of the total amount of funds - an indication that participants have strong interest to settle third party payment on real time. Further, in the case of third parties’ payments the ratio of external funds vs. funds formed with incoming payments, is 15%-85%, whereas for transactions initiated by participants this ratio is 19%-81%. This finding is an evidence that with third party payments banks are able to increase the overall level of recycling in the system. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The association between non-financial performance measures in executive compensation contracts and earnings management

Executive compensation, especially cash bonus compensation, has come under fire by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US Federal government, and the media for its role in the current economic crisis. Specifically, the SEC has argued that some compensation packages provide incentives for risk-taking that may undermine shareholder value over the long-term. Short-term incentive payments to executives in the form of cash bonuses are mostly contingent on reaching targets of accounting-related measures or financial performance measures (FPMs). However, the incentives from these payments may lead to accrual manipulation and earnings management (EM). Alternative measures are non-financial performance measures (NFPMs). We expect that firms that employ NFPMs in bonus contracts will have a lower prevalence of EM, since these measures tend to focus executives on the long-term. In this paper, we examine the type of performance measures used by firms in the S&;P 500 index in their cash bonus compensation. We find that firms that use both FPMs and NFPMs have lower discretionary accruals compared to firms that use only FPMs, consistent with lower income-increasing EM. However, we do not find evidence of a reduction in EM behavior using the incidence of meeting or just beating analyst earnings benchmarks, another common EM proxy. In additional tests on a subset of firms with equity offerings, in which incentives for income-increasing manipulation are likely high, we find that firms with NFPMs have lower discretionary accruals. The implication is that NFPMs can be used in compensation contracts to reduce EM behavior and mitigate erroneous executive compensation. This is important to investors as well as regulators, especially in light of the recent debate on compensation reform.     

CEO optimism and incentive compensation

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.     

Betting on the future: the virtues of contingent contracts

It happens all the time. Two parties with common interests fail to reach an agreement--about a sale, a merger, a technology transfer--because they have different expectations about the future. They are both so confident in their prediction, or so suspicious of the other side's motives, that they refuse to compromise. Such impasses are hard to break through. Fortunately, they can often be avoided altogether by using a straightforward but frequently overlooked type of agreement called a contingent contract. The terms of a contingent contract are not finalized until the uncertain event in question--the contingency--takes place. In some areas of business, such as compensation, contingent contracts are common: a CEO's pay is tied to the company's stock price, for instance. But in many business negotiations, contingent contracts are either ignored or rejected out of hand. That's mistake, according to the authors. In an increasingly uncertain world, flexible contingent contracts can actually be more rational and less risky than rigid, traditional ones. In particular, contingent contracts offer six benefits: they enable a difference of opinion to become the basis of an agreement, not an obstacle to it; they cancel out the biases of negotiators; they level the playing field by reducing the impact of asymmetric information; they provide a means of uncovering deceitful dealings; they reduce risk by sharing it among parties; and they motivate parties to fulfill their promises. While contingent contracts are not appropriate in all instances, they are much more broadly applicable than managers may think.     

The Stochastic Seasonal Behaviour of Natural Gas Prices

Previous studies have explored the seasonal behaviour of commodity prices as a deterministic factor. This paper goes further by proposing a general (n+2m)‐factor model for the stochastic behaviour of commodity prices, which nests the deterministic seasonal model by Sorensen (2002) . We consider seasonality as a stochastic factor, with n non‐seasonal and m seasonal factors. The non‐seasonal factors are as defined in Schwartz (1997) , Schwartz and Smith (2000) and Cortazar and Schwartz (2003) . The seasonal factors are trigonometric components generated by stochastic processes. The model has been applied to the Henry Hub natural gas futures contracts listed by NYMEX. We find that models allowing for stochastic seasonality outperform standard models with deterministic seasonality. We obtain similar results with other energy commodities. Moreover, we find that stochastic seasonality implies that the volatility of futures returns follows a seasonal pattern. This result has important implications in terms of option pricing.     

Contracting on litigation

Two risk‐averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third‐party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk‐neutral third parties when the capital market is transaction‐cost free. However, contracting with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.     

Firm value,illiquidity risk and liquidity insurance

Our interest here concerns liquidity supply to firms. We first examine the relation between firm value and access to liquidity supply, and then we investigate the existence conditions and efficiency properties of financial contracts with a liquidity covenant in a continuous-time, infinite-horizon stochastic model of a repeated firm-investors relationship where the key problem is the mutual commitment between the two parties. To model this problem we consider liquidity supply as a stochastic “regulator mechanism” that prevents the firm’s ability to pay from falling below a predefined threshold (here the market fixed coupon), and we then apply recent developments in dynamic programming techniques for “regulated processes” to obtain a close form solution for the firm’s value. Our main finding is that efficient, i.e. actuarially fair and renegotiation-proof contracts emerge in the absence of perfect commitment as the firm and the investor can exert mutual threat of termination.     

Executive compensation and dividend policy

This study examines the use of dividend provisions in executive compensation contracts to influence dividend policy. A sample is constructed with the largest companies in the oil and gas, defense/aerospace and food processing industries, where dividend-related agency costs are expected to be high. The results indicate that the existence of a dividend incentive in the compensation plan is positively associated with higher dividend payouts and yields, and higher annual changes in dividend levels. Evidence is also provided on firm characteristics associated with the use of a compensation contract with a dividend provision. The results are consistent with the theory that firms link compensation incentives to dividend payments to reduce conflicts between shareholders and management over dividend decisions.     

Betriebliche Altersversorgung durch Direktversicherungen: Eine finanzwirtschaftliche Analyse aus Arbeitnehmerund Eigentümersicht

Corporate pension schemes are part of the total remuneration of employees. In this paper we analyze the?Direktversicherung“ — a life insurance on behalf of the employee paid for by the employer — from the viewpoints of shareholders and employees alike. Firstly we examine, what implications this life insurance contract has on the cash flows to shareholders and employees. Social security payments and tax payments on individual and company level are accounted for. Secondly, we deduce possible substitution quotas q: We ask, what insurance premium the employer can afford to pay at most in place of a given amount of salary, without penalizing his shareholders. Next we deduce the minimum insurance premium an employee has to ask for to replace a given part of his salary in order not to worsen his financial position. From the findings, we conclude that a corporate pension scheme via the?Direktversicherung“ has the potential to lead to a win-win situation, with both parties better off than before. Our findings are also interesting for insurance companies offering those contracts to employers.     

The Impact of the Secondary Market on Life Insurers' Surrender Profits

Life insurers often claim that the life settlement industry reduces their surrender profits and leads to an adverse shift in their portfolio of insured risks; that is, high risks remain in the portfolio instead of surrendering. In this article, we aim to quantify the effect of altered surrender behavior––subject to the health status of an insured––in a portfolio of life insurance contracts on the surrender profits of primary insurers. Our model includes mortality heterogeneity by applying a stochastic frailty factor to a mortality table. We additionally analyze the impact of the premium payment method by comparing results for annual and single premium payments.     

Stochastic dividend yields and derivatives pricing in complete markets

When an underlying yields a stochastic dividend yield, derivatives with linear payoff at their maturities that are written on this underlying have the following properties: (i) they have a unique price only if markets are complete; (ii) the dynamic strategies that replicate these contingent claims contain hedging components against the state variables in the economy; (iii) the prices of these derivatives will depend upon the dynamics of the market prices of risk even when markets are complete. Within an affine framework, we explicitly price forward and futures contracts with stochastic dividends. We also show that the quantitative impact of assuming that dividends are deterministic when they are actually stochastic is significant. JEL Classification G12 · G13     

Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets

Although upfront payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers, little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them. In this article, we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers to a common manufacturer. We find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts, and in all equilibria, only one retailer buys from the manufacturer. These findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments.     

Vergleich von ökonomischen und biometrischen Risiken in der Personenversicherung

In life insurance both the time and the amount of future payments between insurer and policyholder may be stochastic; biometrical as well as financial risks are transferred to the insurer. We present an approach that allows to decompose the randomness of the discounted value of future benefits and premiums to a sum whose addends correspond to the uncertainty of the policy development, the interest rates, the probabilities of death, the probabilities of disablement, etc. Upon modeling the actuarial assumptions stochastically, we quantify these risk factors for typical life insurance contracts and compare them with each other. Contrary to a common folklore, the examples show that the systematic biometrical risks are in many cases not marginal compared to the interest rate risk.     

First-Order Mortality Basis for Life Annuities

Mortality improvements pose a challenge for the life annuity business. For the management of such portfolios, it is important to forecast future mortality rates. Standard models for mortality forecasting assume that the force of mortality at age x in calendar year t is of the form exp, where the dynamics of the time index is described by a random walk with drift. Starting from such a best estimate of future mortality (called second-order mortality basis in actuarial science), the paper explains how to determine a conservative life table serving as first-order mortality basis. The idea is to replace the stochastic projected life table with a deterministic conservative one, and to assume mutual independence for the remaining life times. The paper then studies the distribution of the present value of the payments made to a closed group of annuitants. It turns out that De Pril–Panjer algorithm can be used for that purpose under first-order mortality basis. The connection with ruin probabilities is briefly discussed. An inequality between the distribution of the present value of future annuity payments under first-order and second-order mortality basis is provided, which allows to link value-at-risk computed under these two sets of assumptions. A numerical example performed on Belgian mortality statistics illustrates how the approach proposed in this paper can be implemented in practice.     

Pay-performance sensitivity and firm size: Insights from the mutual fund industry

I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate contracts and funds with single-rate contracts.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

The totality of change-in-control payments

Most extant studies consider golden parachutes as the totality of change-in-control payments. However, for the median CEO of firms listed in the S&P SmallCap 600 index in 2009, golden parachute payments are only 46% of total change-in-control compensation. We measure total change-in-control payments using newly available data for this sample. Our results show that the total payments to the departing CEO are estimated at 1.1% of market value (on average). We also show that newly earned compensation (as opposed to accelerated vesting of lagged incentive pay) makes up approximately half of total change-in-control payments for the median CEO, and these two components of severance pay are positively correlated (contrary to existing theory). Furthermore, change-in-control payments do not appear to impede takeover offers or affect takeover premiums. Total change-in-control payments are small on average, and boards seem to take care in negotiating these terms with incumbent CEOs so that change-in-control payments do not adversely affect the firm's prospects in the takeover market.     

Accounting Earnings Processes,Inter-temporal Incentives and Their Implications for Valuation

Accounting measures such as levels and changes in residual earnings are widely used for performance evaluation and executive compensation (Healy, 1985). Quite often, these compensation contracts are of the linear form. In a multiperiod agency setting with hidden actions, where the agent's effort influences the random evolution of a general model of residual earnings, we show that linear compensation contracts based on weighted sum of the levels and changes of residual earnings are indeed optimal. We characterize the contract explicitly and show that the weights are determined by the earnings persistence parameter. Residual earnings are known to be important for valuation too (Ohlson, 1995; Easton and Harris, 1991). In our setting, we demonstrate that residual earnings are also sufficient for valuation. This implies that residual earnings can be used to align incentive goals with valuation objectives. In essence, our paper provides the theoretical underpinnings for linear contracts based on residual earnings and their implications for valuation.